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ABSTRACT 
Current theories of Situation Awareness (SA) are based on three broad cognitive 
processes, that of perception, comprehension and projection. While there are 
considerable variations on how SA is defined and subsequently modeled (see Endsley 
1995, Hancock & Smith 1995 or Edgar & Edgar 2007), most current theories fail to 
account for the role and influence of emotions on SA. A further shared characteristic 
of the current models is the lack of integration of SA theories with the ever-increasing 
knowledge of the functional specializations of different brain areas. This thesis' main 
aim was to bridge these gaps by integrating current developments from neuroscience 
and cognitive psychology with perception, learning and decision-making aspects of 
SA, all within the context of different affective conditions. 
The experiments described in this thesis, therefore, share a focus on the emotional 
effects on the aforementioned cognitive processes as well as detection of possible 
neural signatures as reflected by Electroencephalography (EEG) recording. The first 
experiment showed that negative, neutral and positive affective conditions had 
markedly different effects on the processes of SA. Subsequently, the next three 
experiments focused on the effects of emotions in a particular aspect of SA, that of 
decision making, and attempted to isolate the EEG correlates of advantageous and 
disadvantageous decision-making processes. It was found that about 400 to 300 
milliseconds (denoted as SM400) prior to enacting a decision, the EEG recording was 
able to distinguish between the advantageous and disadvantageous choices. Finally, 
the last three experiments investigated the mechanisms by which emotions exert their 
influence on how information is perceived and learned. It was found that negative and 
positive affective stimuli dilated and contracted the perception of time respectively 
and that, furthermore, the processing of negative stimuli is based more on long-term 
memory as opposed to working memory. The research in this thesis suggests that 
what kind of SA one person may have is very much affected by emotional processes. 
This thesis hopes to have contributed to an initial understanding of these processes 
and stimulate further research on these areas. 
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Chapter 1 - Current Theory and Application of Situation
Awareness 
INTRODUCTION 1.1 
"SA is a simple, easy-to-understand wrong answer" (Flach 1995). Many organisations, 
private and public, have invested in the research and development of SA with the aim 
of improving performance and reducing error. Particular domains, such as the military, 
aviation (Uhlarik, & Comerford, 2002), accident and emergency services (Gaba, 
Howard, & Small, 1995) or the management of nuclear plants (Crichton & Flin, 2004) 
are, understandably, especially sensitive to the subject. Human error in these domains 
can lead to the loss of human life, potentially in a great scale - see below (Woodhouse 
& Woodhouse, 1995). A relatively new direction of research in Human Factors and 
Ergonomics (HFE) has developed out of the attempts to understand and reduce the 
scope for human error in these high-risk fields. A sub-branch of HFE, which is 
especially dedicated to understanding safety from the perspective of human-made 
errors, has been focused on what is called Situation Awareness (SA). The idea of SA 
research in its basic form simply means understanding how a person becomes aware 
of their [mainly working] environment so as to avoid costly or dangerous errors. As 
will be discussed below, several models have been developed in an attempt to 
operationalize the Situation Awareness (SA) concept in applied settings with some 
degree of success. In this quest, researchers have tested a variety of paradigms and 
methods such as questionnaire-based methods; for example Mica Endsley's Three 
Level Model of SA or Quantitative Analyses of Situation Awareness, which is based 
on Signal Detection Theory. Mainly based on cognitive psychology, SA incorporates 
1 
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research from a large number of well known cognitive constructs such as, perception, 
attention, memory or schemas; the latter plays a central role in many of the SA 
models. 
Though some attempts have been made, psychophysiological measures have 
not been utilised to any great extent (Wilson 2000). In fact only a handful of studies 
can be found which directly target the potentiality of psychophysiological methods for 
contributing to measures of SA (French, Clark, Pomeroy, Seymour, & Clarke 2007). 
In addition and rather surprisingly, the role of emotions has largely been ignored in 
SA research. 
This thesis represents an attempt to address some of these shortcomings in SA 
research with a specific focus on the development of theoretical and practical 
characteristics of SA so that it is integrated with the rapid developments in the 
understanding of emotional and neurophysiological aspects of human functioning. 
This chapter presents a critical review of the currently dominant theories of 
SA and their application to human performance in high-risk environments; the review 
is thematic rather than exhaustive. Three different approaches will be evaluated, the 
three-level model (Endsley, 1995), the perceptual cycle model (Smith & Hancock, 
1995), both of which differ among themselves on the degree of importance assigned 
to either the process or product as indicative of Situation Awareness (Stanton, 
Chambers & Piggott 2001). Finally, Quantitative Analysis of Situation Awareness 
(QASA), which is based on Signal Detection theory (Edgar & Edgar 2007), will be 
evaluated against the previous two theories. QASA is currently leading the field in 
developing neural activation measures based on electroencephalography (EEG) as 
indicators of SA both of which are key elements to this thesis. It will be argued that 
the addition of psychophysiological measurements to the current measures of SA may 
2 
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help drive new lines of inquiry through which we can further develop understanding 
of SA. Developed by Dr. Graham Edgar on behalf of BAE systems, QASA is a 
relatively new and promising arrival in the field. Further inquiry into this approach is 
the starting platform of this PhD thesis hence QASA will be particularly closely 
inspected. 
1.2 BACKGROUND INTO THE CONCEPT OF SA 
Put simply, SA is the capability to keep, record, and represent the changes in the 
environment as an accurate mental model. Typically SA is important when a human 
operator has to manage several processes, often simultaneously, to ensure good 
performance (Endsley, 1995). A familiar example would be drivers who must at the 
same time that they scan the road, jmaintain and adjust the correct pressure on clutch 
and gas pedals, be ready to stop or communicate their movement intentions to other 
drivers via signals and so on. Assuming they possess the right skills to perform each 
of the required actions, they have got good SA if when a specific performa,nce or 
behaviour is required, a specific skill, (i.e. emergency breaking) is triggered as a result 
of an accurate mental image of the current situation. 
The concept of SA is particularly relevant to industries that involve high 
degrees of risk, such as the military aviation industry (Jensen 1997), battlefield (Kass, 
Herschler, & Companion, 1991) or medical procedures (Gaba, Howard, & Small, 
1995). In the literature, the loss of SA is linked to many accidents with a large 
proportion involving the loss of human life. In a review of Controlled Flight into 
Terrain (CFiT) aviation accidents, Woodhouse & Woodhouse (1995) reported that 
74% of aviation accidents, or about 5000 deaths from 1978 to 1992, could be 
attributed to loss of SA as opposed to impaired proficiency of skill (Gronlund, Ohrt, 
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Dougherty, Perry, & Manning, 1998). Likewise, Hartel, Smith & Prince (1991) report 
that poor SA was a causal factor in 200 aircraft accidents. 
More recently, a renewed interest on SA has followed the rapid expansion of 
information technology and increased automation in typically human controlled 
processes. There are increasing concerns regarding the new demands imposed on the 
attentional and monitoring resources of operators; having several options for 
completing the same task is not necessarily always helpful. Sarter & Woods (1995) 
point out that the increase in the number of functions, options and automation means 
that the human operator has to monitor the systems to a much greater degree than 
before. The ever increasing and differing sets of options associated with each systems' 
mode of operation, Sarter and Woods argue, creates new attentional demands. An 
operator must know which mode the system is on, how to track the operations of the 
current mode, how to shift if needed to another mode of operation, and how it will 
behave next. The increase in flexibility, though appearing advantageous at first 
glance, may exceed human monitoring capabilities (Stanton, et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, it may result in adding to the cognitive workload especially at those 
critical times when an effective support system is most needed (Sarter & Woods, 
1995). A pilot's statement describes this new problem very clearly: "With old cockpits 
the workload was high but you were always aware of what's going on." (Adams, 
Tenney & Pew, 1995; Stanton et al., 2001). 
1.3 DEFINITIONS OF SITUATION AWARENESS 
Although a fuzzy concept which is hard to define, the understanding of SA is often 
assumed as though it is self-evident (Adams et al., 1995). In reality no agreement 
exists on a single definition and a large and varied number of definitions and 
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measurements are still in circulation (Rousseau, Trembley & Bretton, 2004). In a 
special issue on SA in Human Factors (Volume 37, No. 1) all articles, nine in total, 
define SA in different terms (Baxter & Bass, 1998). Nevertheless, Stanton et al., 
(2001) distinguish three that have dominated the literature over the years: 
1. "Situational awareness is the perception of the elements in the environment
within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and a 
projection of their status in the near future" (Endsley, 1988). 
2. "Situational awareness is the conscious dynamic reflection on the situation by
an individual. It provides dynamic orientation to the situation, the opportunity 
to reflect the past, present and future, but the potential features of the situation. 
The dynamic reflection contains logical-conceptual, imaginative, conscious 
and unconscious components, which enables individuals to develop mental 
models of external events" (Bedney & Meister, 1999). 
3. "Situational awareness is the invariant in the agent-environment system that
generates the momentary knowledge and behaviour required to attain the 
goals specified by an arbiter of performance in the environment" (Smith & 
Hancock, 1995). 
Stanton et al, (2001) and Salmon, Stanton, Walker & Green (2006) argue that 
the main difference between these three definitions is whether they consider SA to be 
synonymous with the cognitive processes engaged in creating it, or as a separate 
product, the creation and the update of which those processes contribute towards. 
Endsley's model of SA (first definition above) is a product-based approach whereby 
SA is seen as separate from the processes that contribute to it; the latter can be 
different in different people or circumstances, Endsley argues (Endsley 1995a). The 
processes used to achieve SA are regarded as not exclusively related to a specific skill 
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or technical expertise (O'Brien & Hare 2007) but nevertheless are regarded as 
important to ensure good performance (Wiener, Kanki, & Helmreich 1993; Helmreich, 
Merritt & Wilhelm, 1999). 
On the other hand, the Smith & Hancock's (1995) model of SA, which is an 
extension of Neisser's (1976) perceptual cycle model (Figure 1.1), places the 
emphasis on the interaction between the individual and environment. 
In accordance with N eisser' s earlier model, Smith and Hancock suggest that 
interaction is driven by continuous feedback loops between ( external) environmental 
stimuli and (internal) schemata whereby environmental stimuli help activate or trigger 
schemas which, in tum, drive further exploration that, again, activate and modify 
schemas and so on in a continues cycle (Stanton, Salmon, Walker, Baber & Jenkins 
2005); SA, it is argued, results from that interaction. 
Similar to Smith and Hancock's model, the Quantitative Analyses of Situation 
Awareness (QASA) method emphasizes the processes that are used in achieving SA. 
There is, however, a clear focus on the individual's early cognitive processing 
tendencies. The QASA model suggests that early information bias (IB) in information 
processing stages restricts the information that is 'passed on' and thus the kind of SA 
an operator can have (see sections 1.6, 1.6.1 and 1.6.2 below). 
An operator with a bias toward stringent filtering of information will have SA 
based on a restricted range of information whereas, conversely, an operator with lax 
bias will have SA based on a wider range of available information (Edgar & Edgar, 
2007). Each type of SA has its own characteristics, which may be advantageous in 
some situations while being disadvantageous at others. The important departure from 
earlier models is that, conceptually, QASA moves away from good and bad SA 
emphasizing instead a relationship between different types of situations with different 
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types of SA. This approach invites researchers to explore the characteristics that 
emerge from the relationship between specific facets of a situation (i.e. the urgency, 
time available, personality traits) and different types of SA (based on a larger 
information base or a more restricted one). 
Neisser's perceptual cycle (1976) Smith & Hancock perceptual cycle (1995) 
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Figure 1.1: Neisser v Smith and Hancock Models. Both Neisser and Smith and 
Hancock models share the cyclical nature and the base operations: samples, modifies, 
directs. Smith and Hancock's model provides more fine-grained definitions of 
Percepts, Schemata and Exploration stages. 
In the next section all three models of SA will be critically evaluated starting 
with the Endsley's model of SA. 
1.4 THE THREE LEVEL MODEL OF SA 
Endsley (1995) proposes a three level model of SA which she defines as: the 
perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future 
(Endsley, 1995). This definition is further deconstructed into three linear levels, that 
of Perception, Comprehension and Projection. 
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Perception: This is seen as the most fundamental level of SA and the one most 
dependent on the domain of operation. This level requires a mental representation of 
the environmental elements along with their status, attributes and dynamics. A 
descriptive example is that of a tactical commander who would need to know 
"location, type, number, capabilities, and dynamics of all enemy and friendly forces 
in a given area and their relationship to other points of reference" (Endsley, 1995). 
As mentioned previously, the elements likely to be important for achieving perceptual 
level SA depend on the operational domain within which SA is required. The next 
two levels that follow are more generic in that they are regarded as not intrinsically 
linked to a specific domain, in other words not dependent on a specific environment. 
Comprehension: Using reading as an analogy, Endsley states that the 
difference between perceptual and comprehension level is "analogous to having a 
high level of reading comprehension as compared to just reading words" (Endsley, 
2000). In other words, the meaning of a situation is what the second level of SA refers 
to. Further on, Endsley argues that this meaning should be considered in term of 
subjective interpretation (awareness) and as objective significance (situation) and the 
meaning must be in line with operator goals. For example, when a soldier observes 
the movements of enemy forces in some particular formation and within a certain 
proximity to his post, that should give him/her some indication of their intent and 
objectives as well as what that means in relation to their goals. So, besides being 
aware of the relevant elements, some interpretation or narrative that binds those 
elements together is the condition for level 2 SA. 
Projection: The term projection is not used here in the sense of planning an 
outcome but rather anticipating one. This is seen as the top level SA and often a mark 
of the expert (Endsley, 2000). Projection, being the most advanced level of SA within 
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this model, requires good knowledge of both levels of SA, perception (the elements 
involved) and comprehension (the understanding of their meaning and the 
relationship between them). For example, the accurate knowledge of enemy and 
friendly forces, landscape details, the equipment available and so on and the 
comprehensive understanding of their relations would allow a military commander to 
project with some degree of confidence the most likely future states and enabling 
guided decision making and contingency planning. Accurate anticipation means that a 
decision maker is efficient in his planning and will increase the effectiveness of the 
allocation of resources, cognitive and otherwise, and more importantly reduce costly 
errors (Endsley, 2004). 
Endsley argues that as well as separate from the processes that support it, SA 
should also be considered as a separate construct from other processes that may 
influence it, such as attention, working memory, workload and stress. The processes 
that support SA are organised collectively under the term "Situation Assessment" and, 
Endsley argues, they can be different in different people though how they may differ 
is not specified in great detail. 
More importantly, Endsley argues, SA should be seen as separate from either 
performance or decision making (Figure 1.2), suggesting that a person may have great 
SA but performance may be poor due to lack of training or poor tactics; whereas 
decision makers may arrive at the right decisions even if the SA is lacking. 
Consistent with Endsley's model, McGuinness & F.oy (2000) have proposed to 
add a fourth level to Endsley's model, Resolution, which provides awareness of the 
best path to follow towards a desired outcome. Resolution is the capability to draw a 
single course of action from a subset of available actions, establishing a link between 
knowing what is going on and decision-making. 
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Figure 1.2: Endsley's Three Level SA Model. As can be seen, Endsley's model is a 
typical box and arrow diagram. The mechanisms of SA are perceived as separate from 
decision-making, goals and objectives and information processing stores. 
It is important to highlight at this point that SA appears to be treated as 
another information processing box. Even though McGuinness and Foy rightly draw 
attention to the idea that SA may benefit from a clear integration with decision-
making, their approach only amounts to simply adding another information 
processing box. Flach (1995) is critical of Endsley view of SA as a separate construct 
stating that, as regarded by Endsley, SA amounts to just adding yet another box in the 
information processing diagrams somewhere after attention and before decision 
making (Figure 1.2). Evidence will be considered below which suggests that the box 
and arrow approach may be incompatible with the emerging picture of the functioning 
of the brain; evidence emerging from brain imaging indicates that the neuronal 
structures operate in a much more fuzzy way than the box and arrow approach 
suggests. There are further issues with Endsley's approach, which will be discussed 
below (sections 1.4.2 to 1.4.2.5) but its application will be considered first. Based on 
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her three level definition, Endsley (1995, 2000) has developed a measure of SA 
known as the Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT). As will 
be discussed, the success of SAGAT is largely dependent on the degree of accuracy 
and the depth of the description of a situation. 
J.4.1 The Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique
The Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT) is the principal 
measuring tool that has emerged from Endsley's model of SA and is based on the 
freeze-probe technique (Stanton et al., 2005). Individuals assessed are presented with 
a number of questions which are designed to target knowledge at the three levels of 
SA (Endsley 1995b), level 1 SA (perception of the elements), level 2 SA 
(comprehension of their meaning) and level 3 SA (projection of their future status). 
The SAGAT method was originally designed to assess the SA of pilots in the military 
aviation domain, and variations of it were adopted for other uses such as SAGAT­
Tracon, which is a specific air traffic control version or SACRI (situation awareness 
control room inventory), designed to assess the SA of a control room operator 
(Stanton et al., 2005). 
The SAGAT assessment method is usually administered online and is based 
on some form of simulation of the situation under analysis. At various random points, 
the performance on the task is 'frozen' and a number of questions are presented to the 
participants, querying for information at each of the three levels of SA at that point in 
the task (figure 1.3). An example given by Endsley (1995b) describes an 
administration of SA in the context of military aviation. Examples of level 1 SA 
question include queries about aircraft location, destination, altitude, weapons or fuel 
level quantity and so on; level 2 SA queries assess information about impact of 
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system degrades, tactical status of threatening aircraft, availability of fuel in terms of 
time and distance whereas level 3 SA queries are themed around predictions of 
immediate future such as intended tactics and actions of the threatening aircraft or 
firing positions. At the end of the task, a SAGAT score is calculated which also 
factors in a measure of the time elapsed during the 'freeze' time when participants are 
answering the SAGAT questions. 
+ 
Start System/Scenario Simulation 
+ 
Randomly Administer Simulation Freeze 
No + 
+ ---- o you have sufficient data. -----
+ 
Evaluate participant SA query against simulation data 
+ 
Calculate SAGAT score 
+ 
Figure 1.3: The SAGAT Flowchart. The flowchart depicts the main steps and the 
sequence of a typical SAGAT administration procedure (Stanton et al., 2005, pg. 232). 
A major if not the most important aspect of the SAGAT technique is the 
generation of questions addressing all three levels of SA. Endsley (2000) has 
suggested goal directed task analysis method whereby the task under question is 
deconstructed into major goals and sub-goals (Figure 1.4). A wide range of cognitive 
engineering procedures are used to extract the questions. Input from experts, 
observations, verbal protocols, analysis of written material and questionnaires are also 
factored in. Endsley admits that it is a complex process, which can take up to a year to 
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accomplish (Endsley 2000). Endsley notes, however, that once a full analysis is 
carried out, SAGA T can be used repeatedly as long as there are no major changes of 
operator procedures or objectives. 
l. l 
Sub-goal 
Decision 
SA requirements: 
Level 3, Projection 
Level 2: Comprehension 
Level l , Perception 
1.0 
Major goal 
1.2 
Sub-goal 
Decision 
1.3 
Sub-goal 
Decision 
SA requirements: 
3: Projection 
2: Comprehension 
1: Perception 
Figure 1.4: SAGAT Method of Deconstructing Goals. Major goals are deconstructed 
into minor/sub goals. Each sub-goal is broken down into a series of decisions 
necessary for achieving each sub-goal. The SA information at each level of analysis, 
Perception, Comprehension and Projection, are then identified with regard to the 
decisions; the SAGAT questions are derived from this information (Source: Wright, 
Taekman & Endsley 2004). 
1.4.2 Application Limitations and Validity ofEndsley's Model of SA 
A major limitation of the SAGAT technique is that the assessed information 
important to a situation is locked to a specific domain (Rousseau et al., 2004; Endsley, 
1995). For example, the SA of a soldier in a battlefield is necessarily different when 
compared to that of a general working on the strategic aspects of a battle and further 
different still when compared to someone working on a nuclear plant's safety 
procedures. In each case the maintenance of SA requires different skills, it reflects 
different aspects of the environment and serves different goals. This limits the 
application of each SAGAT analysis to a very specific domain, which apart from the 
inefficiency and the added cost to its application, more importantly also restricts the 
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attempts at validating its results to that specific domain. The domain specificity of 
each SAGAT application makes its claims difficult or impossible to verify 
independently. Furthermore, SAGAT is built by the amalgamated contributions of a 
wide range of processes, which lack a specific psychological profile and appear 
somewhat put together in an ad-hoc style. Endsley explains (Endsley, 2000) that 
SAGAT is built over many months and sometimes years drawing contributions of 
domain-specific experts, psychology experts, observations by both categories, 
analysis of documents and other. 
There are further ambiguities that add to the difficulty and cost of repeating 
the procedures that create a SAGAT-type analysis. For example, how was the 
expertise and competency of the contributing experts assessed? Obviously not all 
experts are of the same mental and professional capacity. Also, how exactly were the 
analysis of the materials and protocols carried out? How can a researcher and 
assisting experts creating a domain specific SAGAT make sure that their observations 
are consistent with the ones made by Endsley? In other words, much more detail is 
needed about SAGA T procedures if its claims are to be independently verified. If not, 
any findings not in accordance with the ones reported by Endsley can be easily 
dismissed as a difference on one or many of the processes involved in creating that 
specific SAGAT questionnaire. While its application may be useful to a business or 
organization, from a research perspective more procedural details are needed to assess 
its validity. The fact that it is widely used offers little scientific comfort: "The work of 
science has nothing whatever to do with consensus. Consensus is the business of 
politics. Science, on the contrary, requires only one investigator who happens to be 
right. In science, consensus is irrelevant. What is relevant is reproducible results. The 
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greatest scientists in history are great precisely because they broke with the 
consensus." (Crichton 2003). 
Dekker (2001) expresses a similar concern with the whole field of SA 
research: "Falsifiability means the investigator has to leave a trace that others can 
follow. In human factors it is not uncommon to make the shift from context-specific to 
concept-dependent in one big leap (e.g. "this underestimate of the closing rate 
signifies a loss of situation awareness''); which produces conclusions that no one else 
can verify. " 
Research and theory on SA has been dismissed as abracadabra (Dekker & 
Woods 2002) and denigrated to folk psychology (Dekker & Hollnagel 2004), 
therefore bringing greater scientific clarity to its measuring procedures will be of 
benefit to everyone and lend scientific credibility to the field. 
1.4.2.1 Problems of Causality, Inference and the Resurrection of the 
Homunculus. 
Flach (1995) was the first to raise the concern about the circular reasoning often 
found in SA literature. In a stem critical analysis of SA models, especially Endsley's, 
he acknowledges that SA denotes a useful research construct but Flach alerts to the 
danger of falling into circular logic. If SA is assigned causality, in other words 
considered the cause of some effect, an error or decrease or increase in performance 
can be considered both to arise from poor SA and to contribute to it (see for example 
Hartel et al., 1991 above). Statements of the type "a loss of SA caused some human 
error", widely prevalent in SA literature, lead to circular reasoning of the type: "We 
know SA was lost because the human made an error - why the human made an error, 
because SA was lost" (Flach, 1995). Flach expressed concern about the easily 
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misunderstood nature of SA: 'As a causal explanation, SA is a simple, easy-to­
understand wrong answer that, in the end, will be an obstacle to research.' Endsley 
(1995a) also makes the same mistake while arguing for the limited capacity of SA. 
She says that improved SA on some elements via involvement of attention may mean 
loss of SA on some other elements (Endsley, 1995, pg. 41 ). If we denote the two sets 
of hypothetical elements in question with A and B, how then do we know the SA for 
A was lost, because SA for B increased? Why did SA for B increase, because SA for 
A was lost! Furthermore, assigning a causal role to SA necessitates the resurrection of 
the all-knowing Homunculus in the brain. In the vast complexity of the environment, 
who decides which parts of it make the situation? The causal role assigned to SA in 
this case implicitly assumes a homunculus that evaluates information and makes 
predictions. Logically, this is an indefensible position. 
1.4.2.2 Preserving the Dynamic Link Between the Situation and Awareness 
SA has often been labeled as an ill-defined concept made up from a multitude of other 
ill-defined concepts (Sarter & Woods 1991). Additionally, the idea of having a static 
and bounded SA that, furthermore, is strategically ignored seems highly unlikely. If
one makes a bad action or decision then surely it must be factored in as part of the 
poor overall SA arsenal: e.g., if SA says that when the enemy is in position X then 
you must do Y (when in fact you should do Z), then surely this is part of a poor 
overall SA schema? Moreover, people in the same settings can have equally valid but 
radically different explanations and models to capture it; it is known that all the 
elements of perception and other cognitive processes are strongly context bound 
(Dekker & Lutzhoft 2004). 
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The fluidity and inconstancy of the world has been noted as long ago as pre­
Socratic times. Heraclitus said ''you cannot step into the same river twice", an insight 
expressed more accurately later on by Cratylus 'you cannot step into the same river 
once' both describing a world which is always fluidly moving between the past and 
the future. In psychology, this fluidity of the world is often denoted by the term 
'dynamic environment' (Osman & Speekenbrink, 2011). Dynamic environment 
denotes a state of affairs in which the environmental states are in a continuous change. 
While a snapshot within this series of successive environmental states may be 
correctly interpreted by an operator, by the time that an action is taken, it may well be 
that the situation has changed so that that action has become obsolete, less effective or 
even dead wrong. Therefore SA cannot be referred to as a state or a product and yet 
maintain the link between SA and a dynamically changing environment. If the 
environment is in continuous change, so should SA. 
Likewise, Patric & James (2004) emphasize the importance of preserving the 
dynamic link between situation and its awareness: "As a phenomenon (SA) it is 
necessary to examine the relationship between the dynamically changing situation 
and a person's understanding or awareness of it. The two sides of this equation are 
inseparable [. . .] Useful generalizations concerning SA will only emerge when 
analyses preserve the link between characteristics of a particular situation and a 
person's awareness of it. " (pg. 67). Similarly, Smith & Hancock (1995) have argued 
that any measure of SA is rendered impossible if it is not tied in closely to 
performance. 
Finally, evidence emerging from neuroscience is supporting a brain/mind that 
functions in a much more fuzzy and integrated way, which is at odds with SA as a 
box approach. For example, Bar (2003) and Bar, Kassam, Ghuman, Boshyan, et al., 
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(2006) report that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) facilitates the top-down processing of 
perceptual information and integrates it with the bottom-up processing, suggesting 
therefore that memory, and perhaps schemas, are influenced by and influence 
perceptual processing in a cyclical fashion. The perceptual information, according to 
Bar, is coarsely and quickly passed through to the PFC via occipital cortex, which 
then projects back to the temporal cortex the most likely initial guess which further on, 
re-enters or feeds back to the bottom-up processes of recognition. This has the effect 
of limiting the number of interpretations for the stimulus and therefore speeding up 
recognition; a mechanism, which might be crucial under conditions of time pressure. 
Bar et al., (2006) conducted a study using both Magnetoencephalography (MEG) and 
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) while participants completed a 
behavioural task that facilitated object recognition with repeated trials. They found 
that activity in the left orbitofrontal cortex preceded activity on the areas that are 
known to facilitate object recognition, the temporal cortex. 
Luu, Geyer, Fidopiastis, Campbell, Wheeler, Cohn & Tucker et.al., (2010) 
also found support for this view. Luu et al., (2010) argued that perceptual processing 
must be further organised into meaningful concepts, which reflect the perceptions 
from which they arise. Using a modified version of the Waterloo Gestalt Closure Task 
while recording the participants' brain activity with Dense Array EEG ( dEEG), Luu 
and colleagues found that the activity in medial orbital frontal electrical responses 
(about 250 ms post stimulus) was associated with intuitive judgments. At 150 ms post 
stimulus presentation, activity in the temporal-parietal-occipital (TPO) predicted 
activity in the mOFC, whereas at -300 ms, 150 ms later, TPO was influenced by 
mOFC. According to these findings, Endsley's model describes a psychological 
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function, which appears to be ungrounded smce m this model, perception,
comprehension and anticipation are somewhat linearly organised.
1.4.4.3 The Problem of Disengagement (Freeze Technique) 
The two sides of the equation crucial to SA are the environment and the person 
embedded in it. SAGA T breaks this link in two counts: 1) its measures require that 
participants disengage with the task while the questions about their SA are answered 
{figure 1.2, above), and 2) this means that SAGAT data are calculated based on the 
reconstructive memory which may or may not reflect the SA at the time and is likely 
to invoke instead what a participant reasons in retrospect about what should have been 
known. In which case, the SAGAT indication of good SA may actually indicate 
another measure on another capacity. Participants with longer experience and training 
may be in a better position to infer the correct answers even if the SA at the time may 
have been no different from others. 
Endsley {1995; 2000) draws attention to the differences between experts and 
novices as a demonstration of SAGAT's power to show the difference between good 
SA {experts) and poor SA {novices). Differences in SAGAT measures between 
experts and novices could also be interpreted as SAGAT's power to show the 
differences in training and experience rather than differences in SA. Also, the 
involvement of experts in the process of deriving the questions for SAGAT may also 
go some way into explaining why experts generally score better in SAGAT type 
scenarios and questionnaires. 
Another issue has been with regard to the degree of the interference and 
deterioration on performance that "freezing" an ongoing task may cause. Aware of the 
problem, Endsley has carried out a series of experiments to test the effects of 
'freezing' on performance. She reports several studies, including many that she 
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orchestrated herself, which did not find a significant effect of the 'freeze' aspect of 
SAGAT on participants' performance (Endsley 2000). However, McGowan & 
Banbury (2004) report that 'freezing' or interrupting does indeed affect participant 
performance. In a driving hazard perception test, McGowan & Banbury (2004) found 
participants' hazard perception scores decreased when participants were interrupted. 
They suggested that the previous studies did not find interruption effects on 
performance because they did not take into account reorientation effects ( questions 
about a situation highlight to the participant which aspects of the task are relevant to 
the questions), which compensate for the 'freeze' or interruption effects on the 
SAGAT. This would confound the performance measure, which in real terms may 
actually deteriorate. McGowan & Banbury (2004) urge caution when interpreting 
interruption based measures, such as SAGA T, because the results of such measures 
may be dependent on the construct used to generate the queries leading, again, to a 
circular reasoning approach. 
1.4.2.4 Normative versus First Person Perspectives 
Dekker & Lutzhoft (2004) have criticized Endsley's approach from the standpoint of 
the normative against first person perspectives and have highlighted some issues 
which arise when comparing an arbitrary idea about what should have been known 
with what was actually known as a way of measuring SA. To have a valid measure of 
SA there should be a way to understand why it made sense for people to think and act 
in the way they did at that specific time and place. In retrospect, what can appear as 
an appalling loss of SA can be just a normal working experience to the individual who 
is immersed in the actual situation as it is happening. The most important question is, 
how is it possible that what can look like as an unbelievable loss of SA from a 
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retrospective observer's point of view, appeared completely reasonable from the
insider's perspective? There is no indication that this issue is sufficiently recognised 
in Endsley's model of SA. 
The 'picture' or model formed with the view to measure what should have 
been known or should be known are usually derived in conditions where 1) the 
performance of detailed analyses are possible and 2) analyses are performed at leisure, 
quite contrary to the often time-pressured decision making conditions that are 
encountered in real life. This is comparable to studying the cognitive processes of 
people driving a golf cart in order to understand the cognitive processes involved 
when driving a formula one car. Even if both behaviours involve a similar set of skills 
the environments in which they operate are radically different. A derivative of this 
perspective is a seductive but misleading frame of reference by which a normative 
rendering of reality is artificially imposed on the immediate reality within which an 
individual actually operates. In the immediate reality, the individual is invariably 
embedded in the immediate context, which dictates what elements of the environment 
are processed (Dekker & Lutzhoft 2004). Therefore, by definition, their SA 
assessment is incomplete. 
1.4.2.5 Summary of Critique on Endsley's Model 
As already acknowledged, Endsley's model has been, and continues to be, the most 
widely used SA model in human factors research. There are a large number of studies 
that have confirmed its findings and a further large number of studies that have 
attempted to validate various aspects of Endsley's model. However, there are also
many criticisms (some of which fundamental) to this model and the assumptions that 
it makes. The SA as a box approach, separate from decision making and attention,
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circular reasoning and the difficulty of testing its claims are some of the issues that 
have been identified by researchers. Especially the difficulty of verifying the model's 
claims by being able to replicate exactly its supporting studies is a major obstacle 
which hinders rigorous scientific examination of the work validating this model. 
Next, the perceptual cycle model is considered. 
1.5 SMITH & HANCOCK'S PERCEPTUAL CYCLE MODEL 
In this section the main aspects of the perceptual cycle model will be described and 
then contrasted against an earlier model, Supervisory Attentional System (SAS) 
proposed by Norman & Shallice (1982). It will be argued that though both models 
share common elements, the perceptual cycle model represents a step back not 
forward when compared to SAS even though the latter was proposed years earlier. 
In the perceptual cycle model, Smith & Hancock (1995) suggest that SA 
should be seen as residing in the interaction between the individual and their 
environment and not in either of them. Furthermore, Smith & Hancock suggested that 
SA should not be regarded as either a product or a process but rather as a combination 
of both; in other words SA should be seen as a product, which is continually shifting 
and updating. In this framework of SA, the emphasis is placed on the dynamic 
interaction between environment and individual and a further emphasis is also placed 
on the role of the internal models, which, similar to the role of schemas in Neisser's 
model, drive and are driven by the external element of situations. In a similar but 
more general way, the role of the internally held mental models in the Smith & 
Hancock perceptual cycle model of SA are to anticipate and feedback into the 
development of the situation which in tum drives the exploration process which may 
validate the expectations or, if not, modify them accordingly. Both Neisser (1976) and 
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Smith & Hancock (1995) describe perception as an active adaptive process. In
contrast to Endsley's linear model, a central aspect to this approach is its cyclical
nature. The schemas are the active knowledge structures, which direct the exploration
of perceptual processes and feedback their interpretation to the perceptual processes
to further guide their exploration; the content and structure of schemas are the driving 
force in this model. Their function is to provide a link between prior experience and 
current situation, the combination of the two creating the frame of reference for 
anticipations. 
Suggesting that SA is a subset of the overall content in working memory, 
nevertheless, Smith and Hancock suggest that it is an "externally directed 
consciousness" which indicates that "the goal of the behaviour that SA directs must 
reside in the task environment rather than in the agent's head' (Smith & Hancock, 
1995) therefore the SA is linked to the dynamics of the environment rather than to an 
internal model as the Endsley's model suggests. The measurements of SA are made 
possible via the specification of the goals within the task environment which are 
restricted both by environmental and task constrains, and operator's active knowledge 
and experience or as Adams et al., put it (1995, p.90) "the perceiver's active schema". 
1.5.J A Brief Description of the Concept of "Schemas" 
Since schemas feature quite heavily in both Endsley's model and this one, a brief 
description of the main features of this concept is useful at this point. One definition 
of schema is: "Schemata can represent knowledge at all levels-from ideologies and 
cultural truths to knowledge about the meaning of a particular word, to knowledge 
about what patterns of excitations are associated with what letters of the alphabet. 
We have schemata to represent all levels of our experience, at all levels of abstraction. 
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Finally, our schemata are our knowledge. All of our generic knowledge is embedded 
in schemata." (Rumelhart, 1980). Schema can integrate their own inherent schema 
expectancies with stored perceptual details that actually occurred (Miller & 
Gazzaniga, 1998); often, the expectancies of the schemas will lead to vivid 
recollections of details or events that did not happen which may match in intensity 
those that actually did happen. An elegant example of schema and their influence on 
perception and memory is cited by Miller & Gazzaniga (1998) who reported on a 
classical experiment by Brewer & Treyens (1981). Graduate students who had waited 
in a "graduate student's office" were unexpectedly asked to recall what was in the 
office. Students (falsely) recalled to have seen items like books and so on which one 
would expect in a student's office. Furthermore, at a perceptual level the effect of 
schemas may be illustrated by various illusions; a simple demonstration is given in 
figure 1.5 below; although there is no triangle anywhere in that figure, triangles are 
clearly perceived. 
7 
v 
Figure 1.5: Kanizsa' triangle (1995). Kanizsa' triangle demonstrates the effect of 
schemas on perception; The information contained in the photo (bottom up 
processing) triggers the 'triangle' schema which then effects perception (top down 
processing) resulting in triangles being 'seen' even though there is no triangle. 
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Schemas, therefore, represent the ability of the mind to create an abstraction of 
related patterns out of the streams of information, store them and recognize them later 
on. They can be considered as the brain's solution for handling vast amounts of 
information. The relevance of schema theory to the SA theories is self-evident. 
Evidence from studies with schemas suggests, however, that they operate largely in 
an automatic fashion below the level of conscious awareness and are involuntary 
(Norman & Shallice, 2000). All of those properties of schemas are incompatible with 
the view of SA as an essentially conscious structure (Endsley 1995a), and yet 
schemas are placed at the center of the SA models of both, Endsley (1995) and Smith 
& Hancock (1995). 
1.5.1.1 Comparison Between the SAS and Perceptual Cycle Models 
Even though there is no disagreement among researchers that schemas or mental 
models are a useful construct in SA, a clear explanation on how exactly they are 
involved is lacking. Perhaps some light can be thrown on their operation from the 
Norman & Shallice's Supervisory Attentional System (SAS) model (2000). SAS is 
described as having "access to a representation of the environment and of the 
organism's intentions and cognitive capacities. It is held to operate not by directly 
controlling behaviour, but by modulating the lower level [resources] by activating or 
inhibiting particular schemata. It would be involved in the genesis of willed actions 
and required in situations where the routine selection of actions was unsatisfactory 
for instance, in dealing with novelty, in decision making, in overcoming temptation, 
or in dealing with danger." (Shallice, 1988, p335.)
The SAS is highly related to the central executive component in the working memory 
model (Baddeley & Hitch 1974), to the concept of intention as used in Bratman 
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(1987), and to awareness on 'global workspace theory' (Baars, 1988). The SAS model 
is principally based on studies with people with brain damage. Within the SAS model, 
Norman & Shallice ( 1986) suggest that people with damage in the pre frontal cortex 
and the cingulate structures may have a compromised SAS functioning but intact 
horizontal thread functioning ( contention scheduling) which is why they are able to 
carry out simple tasks but are impaired in complex tasks. Shallice (1982) reported a 
trend that people with damage in the frontal lobes were significantly impaired when 
performing complex tasks while at the same time they were able to perform simple 
tasks normally. 
supervisory 
attentional 
system 
Figure 1.6: Norman and Shallice Supervisor Attentional System Model (1980). This is 
a simplified SAS model representing the flow of information. 
Evidence suggests that many different brain regions distributed over the cortex 
may be involved in SAS-type control operations (Garavan, Ross, Li & Stein, 2000). 
Furthermore, the work from Damasio and colleagues in the late 1980s, early 1990s 
highlighted the importance of emotions (Damasio, 1994) in these processes, an idea 
that is not considered in either Endsley's or Smith and Hancock's models. 
There are two main assumptions that underpin the SAS model which bear 
particular relevance to SA, the automatic (schema) and the controlled or willed 
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processing (SAS) of stimuli (as shown in figure 1.6). Automatic processes require 
little or no mental effort, no awareness or intention, do not interfere with other mental 
processes, are fast and sometimes unavoidable (Eysenck & Keane, 1995; Wood, 1983, 
Pg. 38). Automatic processes can be acquired by training (riding a bicycle for 
example) and have clear benefits (increasing performance speed, preserving mental 
effort for other tasks), but they also introduce a cost. Since automatic processes are 
generally not available to consciousness, they are less flexible and, more importantly, 
they do not impinge upon monitoring resources except at points when the processes 
fail due to some change on the prevailing circumstances. If such failures are not 
detected then 'action slips' may occur (Norman, 1981; Botvinick & Bylsma, 2005). 
When problems are detected, attention is engaged along with other cognitive 
resources in order to make sense of the new information (Hawkins & Blakeslee, 
2004); deliberate control at this point is necessary. 
Norman and Shallice (1980) suggest that deliberate or controlled actions are 
particularly necessary for: 
o Tasks that involve Planning or Decision Making
o Troubleshooting
o Ill learned or novel sequences of action
o Tasks that are dangerous or technically difficult
o If a task requires overcoming of strong habitual response or resisting
temptation 
In all five situations outlined above, the use of uncontrolled automatic 
processing may lead to error; therefore conscious and effortful processing is also 
required (Norman & Shallice, 1980). Arguably, the five outlined situations also 
represent the totality of the situations about which SA is sought. Two complementary 
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processes are outlined, the first for handling simple and well learned acts and the 
second for the conscious attentional control which modulates performance. These 
processes exert their influence via a third mechanism named contention scheduling. 
Contention scheduling, which operates at the automatic level, acts by activating or 
inhibiting supporting or conflicting schemas while 'triggers' control the initiation of 
activated schemas when precise timing is required (Figure 1.6). At the horizontal 
thread level, the first three units, perceptual system, trigger database and contention 
scheduling respectively account for Smith and Hancock's perceptual cycle model. 
Though proposed years after the SAS model, Smith and Hancock's perceptual 
cycle model of SA is really a step back, not forward. Importantly, the SAS model 
accounts for willed and involuntary behaviours, a distinction which is assumed but 
rarely mentioned in the Smith and Hancock and Endsley's models. It explains the 
mechanism by which the operators with more experience generally do better. It can be 
argued that their experience is encoded in a wider and more developed set of schema 
that frees their attentional resources to monitor the evolving aspects of situations. For 
example, Tenney, Adams, Pew, Huggins, & Rogers (1992, pg. 3) state that SA may 
vary according to pilot experience and the ability to automate: "For each [] alerting 
signal or event, the crew must determine its relevance, its procedural and goal­
related implications, and its urgency. Especially for the experienced crew, such 
events may often call forth highly practised patterns and result in 'automatic' 
responses that do not add to the workload'. 
However, and typically, when automatic processes take over an individual 
might display behaviour consistent with attentional wandering or task disengagement 
where the allocation of attention to task-relevant stimuli is reduced. Cheyne, Solman, 
Carriere & Smilek (2009) lists the following number of reasons that contribute to this 
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phenomenon: protracted, unvarying, familiar, repetitive and undemanding tasks and 
environments. From the SAS model, we can describe this as a mode of operation 
relying mostly on automatic schemas. It is not clear how the perceptual cycle model 
can account for this. 
Furthermore, the perceptual cycle model does not offer an explanation for 
novel situations about which we do not have available schemas, at which point, willed 
action, or conscious control is required. Norman and Shallice (1986) propose that 
willed action is necessary to account for non-routine, novel situations. Moreover, 
novel or cognitively demanding tasks may require the concatenation of several 
schemas. Schema are considered as automatic but organising them in a specific way 
to meet novel or cognitively complex problems is not; some involvement of conscious 
and willed cognitive control is therefore necessary to account for this too. Again, it is 
not clear how this can fit in with the perceptual cycle model of SA. 
Smith & Hancock's, as well as Endsley's, models are presently lacking in 
detail of how exactly the schema influence perception and perception schemas. The 
importance of schema for both models cannot be understated. Endsley goes as far as 
to state that her definition of SA is equivalent to another, previously suggested 
definition for the term Situation Model, which in tum was defined as "a schema 
depicting the current state of the system modeI" (Endsley, 1995a). Despite the critical 
role that both, Endsley and Smith & Hancock and others too (Sarter & Woods, 1991; 
Mogford, 1997) place on schema or mental models with regard to them having a 
fundamental function in the operation of SA, neither model offers a clear explanation 
of the exact processes involved and as previously noted, both models fail to venture 
beyond the general and rather vague indications of the central role that is assigned to 
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them. A detailed and verifiable description as to how precisely schemas are involved 
in the formation and maintenance of SA is simply missing. 
1.6 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SITUATION AWARENESS 
First presented by Edgar, Smith, Stone, Beetham & Pritchard (2000) and later 
published by Edgar, Edgar & Curry (2003), the Quantitative Analysis of Situation 
Awareness method (QASA) is a new and promising direction of research in SA, 
which addresses many of the concerns raised above on other models. The QASA 
method assumes that processes and tendencies that happen relatively early during the 
situation assessment can result in different kinds of SA. In contrast to other models, 
which see SA as varying between good and bad, QASA suggests that many kinds of 
SA exist along a spectrum. At one extreme SA is based on a relatively small subset 
of available information (more focused) whereas at the other, SA incorporates a wider 
range of available information (more distributed). These can be roughly grouped into 
two broad categories of SA which for convenience will be abbreviated here as 
Focused SA (FSA) and Distributed SA (DSA). Each category is characterized by 
different properties (Figure 1. 7), which are advantageous in some situations while 
being disadvantageous in others. When immediate action is required, a focused SA, 
FSA, which ignores a large part of available information in favour of only the most 
immediately relevant may be more advantageous than a distributed type SA even 
though the latter may be more accurate; a time/accuracy trade-off may often favour 
FSA to DSA in emergency situations. For example, if you wake up one morning and 
you find that your paint is peeling, wooden furniture gone and there is smoke coming 
in through the bedroom door, which problem do you deal with first? None of them of 
course, the house is on fire! On the other hand, situations that allow for some luxury 
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of time and reqmre strategic thinking may benefit from a more careful and
comprehensive assessment of all available information and therefore may benefit 
from a more distributed type of SA, DSA. Depending on the situation, sometimes 
FSA other times DSA may be more effective in reducing error and optimizing 
performance. It should be noted that this model is in its infancy and as such it has not 
been extensively tested. For example the sensitivity of this method to detect 
differences between different personality types or even genders or age has not been 
tested. 
The theory behind the QASA model of SA is based on the idea that an 
individual uses a portion of the available information at any one time and an inherent, 
unconscious cognitive information bias (IB) determines the characteristics of that. IB 
reflects expectations about how a situation might develop and biases the attentional 
resources to address its expectations in such a way that the rest of the available 
information is gated out (Edgar & Edgar, 2007). What is filtered out may be in some 
ways more important than what is filtered in. 
Characteristics associated with FSA and DSA 
Time Critical • Time non-Critical
Intuitive Analytic
• Fast • Slower
• Automatic • Deliberate
• Involuntary • Voluntary
Based on little information • Based on detailed information
DSA 
Figure 1.7: Focused and Distributed SA. FSA on the left to DSA on the right 
represent the opposite ends of the spectrum, which describes different types of SA 
with different properties. 
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The IB is defined as an information processing tendency that at one end 
denotes a relaxed information processing style whereas the other end denotes a 
stringent information processing style; termed as negative and positive bias 
respectively. How the filtering of information by a variable information bias is 
described in more detail below, but is assumed to rely on a criterion 'representation 
strength'. Information that has a representation strength above criterion is 'passed', 
that which has a representation strength below criterion is 'rejected'. IB as defined 
and measured by QASA has a particularly interesting implication; it suggests that the 
SA may be based only on items of a particular representation strength, which might 
include not only true information but also false information (Edgar & Edgar, 2007). 
False information, just like the true information, is based on a range of 
representational strengths, which can affect the confidence in the information. 
Confidence is not always connected to the accuracy of the representations but often to 
the degree with which the representation confirms prior and existing expectations. 
(Hertwig & Ortmann, 2004; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). 
1. 6.1 Signal Detection Theory
Since QASA is based on Signal Detection Theory (SDT), some basic explanation of 
the method is necessary (a comprehensive description of signal detection theory can 
be found in the work of Green & Swets (1966)). SDT is a theoretical and practical 
method, which can be used to model the separation of signal from noise in situations 
when a set of data contains both a known signal and random noise. A common 
example is that of detecting a target in the midst of noise on a radar screen. SDT 
posits two internal factors, the observer's sensitivity (ability to distinguish between 
signal and noise) often measured by d' - or d-prime, and their response criterion 
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(specific criteria or a threshold which is used to distinguish signal from noise),
measured by fJ (beta).
In a typical signal detection task, stimulus data can be plotted as two 
distributions (Figure 1.8 - below). The distribution on the left represents performance 
probability if the stimulus data only contained signal, that on the right if the data 
contained only noise. If the distributions are fully overlapped it represents a situation 
where the data contains both, signal and noise in equal measure. As can be seen from 
the graph, the distributions can partly overlap in which case, as is common in real life, 
sometime noise can be internally represented as signal and vice versa. This would be 
more common with ambiguous stimuli for example (McGuinness, 2007). 
Depending on the response criterion, a participant or an observer may set the 
bar of proof ( or the threshold or the bias) high before accepting a stimulus as signal, 
in which case s/he is being cautious, or otherwise, may decide to lower the threshold 
and accept most information as true. In both these cases, the first approach of caution 
we can term as a stringent IB whereas the latter as a lax IB. 
1.6.2 Application Signal Detection Theory in Quantitative Analysis of Situation 
Awareness 
In the QASA method, a series of statements are presented to an individual about a 
situation, for example, "'Enemy unit is at position X"; half of the statements are true, 
half are false. Participants respond with either true or false. The responses then are 
used to determine the performance of the participant in terms of their ability to tell 
signal (true information) from noise (false information). 
To avoid some limitations on the most common measure associated with the 
standard parametric SDT measures d' and/J, (d-prime assumes, for example, that the 
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representation strengths of signal and noise are normally distributed), the QASA 
method uses the non-parametric equivalents, A' and B" (that do not make any 
assumptions with regard to the distributions of noise and signal (Edgar & Edgar 
2007)). A' is calculated and used to give an estimation of the sensitivity and B" gives 
a measure of the IB. Confidence ratings on each statement are also collected. That is, 
participants are asked to indicate on a Likert 1 to 4 scale how confident they are that 
the answer they have given is correct. 
The quality of SA is in part reflected by the true ratio of false and true 
information that has gone into building the SA of an individual. Both, the capability 
of an individual and the degree of task difficulty are contributing factors on the ratio 
of false and true information that has gone into an SA (Edgar & Edgar 2007, pg. 375). 
Since usually there is a degree of overlap between the true and false information 
(Figure 1.8), IB functions as a threshold of representation strength for all available 
information. Below that threshold, information is considered as false and above that 
it is considered to be true. 
Stron• Poaiiive Ne1ative Weak 
Figure 1.8: Distributions of False and True information in QASA Theory. False and 
True information are represented by the distributions, right and left respectively. A 
strong negative IB incorporates most of true information but also more false 
information. The situation is reversed for strong positive IB. 
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Highlighting the differences between 'knowing' and 'remembering', Edgar & 
Edgar (2007) have argued that the distinction is reflected in different levels of
confidence about the recalled information which has predictable effects on IB. Low
confidence may push the IB more positive as the individual seeks to increase certainty
on the information accepted as true, high confidence on the other hand may have the
opposite effect. If the threshold is set high, in which case the IB moves to the left 
(Figure 1.8), then the criterion against which information is accepted as true becomes 
more stringent resulting in the SA being based in less information - in other words 
only information which has higher internal representational strength is accepted as 
true. Figure 1.8 shows how a strongly positive IB may include little false information 
at the cost of excluding a lot of true information. In other words, an SA that is 
characterized by a highly positive IB is based on potentially less information which is 
filtered through more stringent criteria in which case, the information on which SA is 
built upon is likely to be less false and more true with the trade-off that more of the 
true information may be rejected as false. Conversely if we have a negative bias, the 
information on which SA is based is most likely to include most of the true 
information, the trade-off being that a larger proportion of false information may also 
go into building the SA. 
In addition to bias, the FSA and DSA types of SA are also influenced by the 
conditions of a situation in which the true and false distributions may be more or less 
discrete. If there is no time pressure there is the possibility that the individual may be 
able to increase the representation strength of certain items of information by 
gathering extra information from the environment or by corroborating the information 
with other sources or previous knowledge. Individual differences, such as greater 
expertise or experience in a situation may also change representation strengths, 
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although this may, as can be predicted from the discussion of schema above, also 
apply to false information. It can be argued that, often, perceived timing could be 
absolutely crucial. True and false information may become easier to separate if we 
think we have time to look at a situation carefully, conversely, harder if we think we 
are under time pressure. 
1.6.3 Applications of QASA Tool 
The QASA method of measuring SA is still under investigation but there are some 
clear advantages over the other methods, if a clear link between SA and Bias is 
established. While we cannot infer the quality of SA from IB, knowledge of the 
fluctuations of IB over time may enable us to infer what kind of SA an individual is 
likely to have, FSA or DSA. For example, if we can infer that an individual has a 
highly positive IB, we may also be able to infer that that person will have an SA that 
is based in a restricted range of information from the totality of potentially available 
information and vice versa. 
Note that we cannot infer directly whether a positive or negative IB indicates 
an advantageous or disadvantageous SA that depends on the situation. If a situation 
involves a large number of irrelevant distractions (more noise) for example, the 
filtering out of all information except what is strictly needed may help focus the 
cognitive and physical energies more efficiently to the task at hand. Conversely, 
highly positive IB may be disadvantageous when a careful assessment of all the 
information is needed. 
A positive IB would be definitely advantageous if a soldier is performing a 
rescue operation under enemy fire but shortsighted if military strategists are planning 
a campaign within an army command centre environment. A situation, which involves 
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no or little ambiguity, would be represented by a clear separation of curves
representing true and false information (see Figure 1.9). Conversely, a greater degree
of ambiguity in a situation would be represented by a greater degree of overlap; 
degrees of uncertainty inherent in a situation determine the extent of 
overlap/separation. If IB is more negative, more of the true information will filter 
through but more false information will filter through also. If IB is positive, less false 
information is allowed through, but more true information is also filtered out. A 
strong positive IB, therefore, represents a narrowing down of the attention and a 
stringent criterion to accept information as true. The opposite, a strong negative IB 
represents a widening of attention to include more information and a relatively lax 
information mode. FSA and DSA are represented in this scheme mainly within the 
framework of time. For a given situation, if time is abundant, then the better 
separation between the false and true information may be possible which will favour a 
negative IB more and represent a DSA type of SA. Whereas if the opposite was true 
as in an emergency then the separation between true and false information is harder 
favouring a stronger positive IB representing an FSA type of SA. 
Initial studies have shown a strong negative correlation between IB and SA 
(Edgar & Edgar, 2007). In a landmark QASA study reported by Edgar, Edgar, & 
Curry (2003), the QASA method was tested in a command and control, war game 
scenario simulation which was enacted in a terrain model facility (Figure 1.1 O); the 
blue forces were fighting against the red forces. Four commanders controlled four 
commands in the blue forces, A, B, C and D. Communications between commanders 
were carried out only via written messages, which meant all communications could be 
monitored. All red units were 'hidden' unless it was judged that blue units on the 
ground could 'see' red units. 
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Figure 1.9: Distributed and Focused SA in QASA. Theoretical distributions of the 
internal representation of strengths for true (solid curve) and false (broken curve) 
items of information (adapted from: Edgar & Edgar 2007, pg. 375). 
A probabilistic element was introduced with regard to the ' spotting' of the red 
units so that some uncertainty was factored into the scenario. Answering the probe 
statements was framed as 'situation reports' to the headquarters. The scenario was run 
a total of seven times. 
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Figure 1.10: Photograph of the Terrain Model used in the QASA Study. The terrain 
was a real model of an area in Germany. 
Commanders, A, B, C and D controlled the blue forces in the war game 
scenario. The probe statements were designed to address the three levels of SA in 
accordance with the SAGAT model, for example: 
• Perception: A has crossed the river at point x .
• Integration (as opposed to Endsley 's comprehension): The strongest
enemy force is present in area A.
• Projection: At time x you will reach point y (scored post-hoc)
Other classifications were also used, such as use of relevant versus non-
relevant information. Generating the measures of SA and IB based on Signal 
Detection Theory, Edgar et al., (2003) found that IB was indeed negatively correlated 
with SA. They also observed a particularly interesting behaviour of commander D, he 
appeared to have no perceptual level SA at all whereas at the same time showing a 
comparatively normal integration and projection levels. It suggested that SA was not 
only achieved in a hierarchical manner whereby information is linearly integrated 
from perception up to projection, but instead, SA may be built from a top-down 
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direction too; in other words, prior knowledge, expectations and other unconscious 
processes may all contribute to the final Situation Awareness. 
A follow up study (Edgar et al., in press) tested the influence of IB in 
information processing in conditions where participants previous knowledge and 
expectations were tightly controlled. Participants were required to detect a pattern or 
category based on the feedback they received from their choices. Halfuray through 
104 trials, unbeknown to the participants, the category was changed and the effect of 
that could be traced on the second half of the test. Based on the Wisconsin card 
sorting task (WCST) (Berg, 1948; Grant & Berg, 1948), the task involved two crucial 
features; I) it was possible to track participants SA and IB as progressing completely 
independent from prior knowledge and experience (the task was deliberately bare), 2) 
the forced loss of SA halfuray through could mimic situations when the SA of a 
participant is misleading due to an undetected change in the situation. Again, a clear 
negative correlation was found between SA and IB. However, for participants who 
showed an IB tendency towards the positive, cautious end, the correlation was 
somewhat modulated by the forced loss of SA; a move towards positive correlation 
between IB and SA was found after the category change for this group. A tentative 
explanation about this is that the forced loss of SA may have produced a negative 
emotional arousal, which has made participants more careful about accepting 
information as true (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994). 
A further study using the same paradigm but in a more realistic settings was 
conducted including a crucial additional feature, an affective element in the form of 
feedback on the body count of lives lost/saved linking incorrect and correct decisions 
to lost or saved lives. SA and the subsequent decisions in this scenario had 
consequences. Edgar et al., (in press) found that the negative affective component 
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may have had an influence on the direction of the IB towards the positive end of the
scale suggesting a more cautious approach to accepting information as true.
The SA literature and research has so far not investigated how brain activity 
may be related to the different aspects of SA, nor is it clear how SA, as is presently
conceived, may reflect the way that the brain functions. Ensdley (1995) took the 
explicit position that the concept of SA, as she defined it, was beyond the reach of 
psychophysiological measures arguing that it is not possible to infer from such 
measures the sort of memories and awareness of a participant. While this is of course 
self evident, the content of the thoughts cannot be inferred by EEG or fMRI readings, 
nonetheless, knowledge about the brain activity, especially EEG recording which can 
be carried out in real-time and millisecond precision, may enable us to infer what sort 
of SA a person is likely to have. In particular, SA itself involves a comparison with 
the external situation, which is therefore intractable to measures of brain activity. 
Bias, on the other hand, is proposed to be a criterion that is set internally by the 
individual and so the brain activity underpinning this criterion-setting (bias) process 
may be amenable to study using EEG. Neuroscience can inform us about which brain 
systems are active at key intervals in a situation and we may be able to infer from that 
which processes may be operational at which junctures. 
It is also worth to keep in mind that 'the perils of inferring the mind from 
measuring the brain are not all that different from those encountered when attempting 
to infer the mind.from measuring behaviour' (Barrett, 2009). While Endsley's current 
definition of SA does not allow for contributions from brain research, the IB may 
provide an elegant way to take advantage of the research in brain activity and 
psychophysiological measures, especially with regard to EEG. The position taken 
here is not against developing subjective measures of SA. Many studies show them to 
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be useful, however, a full theoretical and detailed description of SA would greatly 
benefit from an account of how it is manifested in the brain. 
1.7 SUMMARY 
SA is a widely used psychological concept with the potential to mcrease safety, 
improve performance, and reduce error in a vast range of high-risk human professions. 
However, some of the main models of SA, such as Endsley's, have not yet fostered 
wide support in the psychological domain and have been the subject of, sometimes 
stem, criticism. Circular reasoning is often cited as a major issue with regard to the 
current SA theories; the conceptual separation of SA from decision making has also 
been highlighted as, at best, not well justified. The freeze-probe technique has also 
been criticised and, furthermore, caution has been urged on the grounds that 
interpreting interruption based measures may be dependent on the construct used to 
generate the queries. Also an argument is made that hindsight reasoning may affect 
responses and the way in which questions that are generated may lack ecological 
validity. A further important failing is in the lack of detail that is often characteristic 
of the current SA models and finally, and somewhat surprising, is the complete lack 
of theoretical and ground work on how the emotions and the neural systems are 
involved. 
This thesis aims to investigate further the concept of IB and its underlying 
neural correlates and furthermore, to investigate how emotions may be involved in 
achieving, maintaining and updating SA within a dynamic environment. An attempt 
will be made to develop ways to circumvent the freeze-probe techniques via the use 
of psychophysiological tools, such as EEG. 
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Chapter 2 - Emotional Aspects of SA Functioning: 
Theoretical Background 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having its main applications in areas that involve high risk, including the possibility 
of the loss of life, the study of SA is especially important and relevant within the 
context of emotive situations. Since the effects of emotion in the processes of SA are 
vastly understudied, the exploration of this relationship is the focus of this thesis in 
general, and this chapter in particular. 
Emotions, that are defined here in terms of three major dimensions of valence, 
arousal and dominance (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1997), are related to many 
cognitive processes, such as attention, memory, learning and decision-making; all of 
which are important psychological constructs in the understanding of SA (Endsley, 
1995). The first two, affective valence (ranging along the axis of pleasant to 
unpleasant) and arousal (ranging from calm to excited) are considered as the primary 
dimensions of emotions (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1998). All emotions can be 
represented along the varying degrees of the affective axis of valence and arousal 
(Figure 2.1 ). 
The evidence for emotional involvement in cognitive processing suggests that 
different degrees of involvement of the affective systems are underpinned by the 
dominance of either approach or avoidance motivational systems (Ito, Cacioppo, & 
Lang, 1998; Norris, Gollan, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 2010). At a relatively low
emotional involvement, when there are no present threats in the environment, there is
a tendency for the approach behaviours to dominate over avoidance behaviours
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(Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). Conversely, when the situations present some degree of 
threat there is an increased sensitivity to potentially negative stimuli and the 
avoidance behaviours tend to dominate. As the attentional resources are directed to 
either potential-threat or potential-reward related information by the processes of 
attention, it can, logically, lead to radically different internal representations of 
situations. In this chapter and the next, the research into the effects of different 
emotions on attention, memory, (this chapter) and decision-making (the following 
chapters) will be examined and their relevance to the SA research, as a whole, will be 
discussed. 
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of pictures from the IAPS Set. "A sample is shown of men 
and women, plotted in a two-dimensional affective space, defined by the mean ratings 
of pleasure (y-axis) and arousal (x-axis) for each stimulus. The separate limbs of the 
overall boomerang-shaped distributions are consistent with the hypothesis that 
emotional reactivity is organized by two underlying neural systems-appetitive and 
defensive-that each vary in arousal." (Taken from Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert 1998). 
The first section of this chapter is concerned with emotional involvement in 
the cognitive processes of attention and memory. There is accumulating evidence 
which suggests that different degrees and types of emotional involvement affect the 
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processes of memory ( e.g. Cahill, Prins, Weber, & McGaugh, 1994; Guy & Cahill,
1999) and attention (e.g. Friedman & Forster 2010; Fredrickson & Branigan 2005)
differently and that their effect on these processes, arguably, bears direct relevance to 
the current measures of SA. Following the literature review on these topics, the 
second section of this chapter will examine how different emotional states are 
reflected in the QASA measure of SA. It will be argued that the assumptions 
underlining the QASA model are particularly well suited to evaluate the workings and 
effects of emotions on SA. 
2.1.1 General Mechanisms of Attention 
It has been known for a long time that attention selection mechanisms are modulated 
by the limited processing capacity of the sensory systems; therefore some stimuli are 
preferentially processed over other stimuli (Broadbent 1957; Neisser, 1967). Which 
stimuli are selected for further processing is determined by the operations of, what 
have been called, attentional filters (Driver 2001) which are driven both by "bottom­
up" and "top-down" cognitive processes (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). In a review of 
the neural circuits underlying attentional function, Corbetta and Shulman distinguish 
different but partly overlapping neural circuits underlying these two systems. 
According to Corbetta and Shulman, the top-down, goal-directed processes of 
attention are underpinned by activity in the intraparietal cortex and superior frontal 
cortex. The bottom-up attentional processes, which are primarily underlined by the 
activity in the right hemisphere and also involve the temporoparietal cortex and
inferior frontal cortex, specialize in the detection of behaviourally relevant, salient, or
unexpected stimuli that are important in the preparation of goal-directed behaviours
(Corbetta & Shulman, 2002).
45 
-------------- Chapter 2 --------------
The operations of either system are determined by different factors. Kastner & 
Ungerleider (2000) cite stimulus salience (such as high contrast) as one such factor 
important in the bottom-up processes of selective attention. Also, top-down influences, 
as in goal-directed behaviour, can override the bottom-up influences and force 
attention to stimuli which may be less salient but more relevant to the goal at hand. 
Kastner & Ungerleider (2000) suggest that the biased processing of 
information may be reflected in a range of neural circuit modifications such as, (a) the 
enhancement of neural responses to attended stimuli, (b) filtering of unwanted 
information by counteracting the suppression induced by nearby distracters, ( c) the 
biasing of signals in favor of an attended location by increases of baseline activity in 
the absence of visual stimulation or ( d) the increase of stimulus salience by enhancing 
the neuron's sensitivity to stimulus contrast. 
In addition to bottom-up and top-down processes, there is a large body of 
cognitive and imaging research, which suggests that attentional filters are also 
influenced by emotional processes - the foundation of which is underlined by the 
activation of general avoidance/approach motivational systems (Bradley, 2009). 
Which of these two systems is dominant determines, according to Bradley (2009), a 
cascade of perceptual and motor processes that aim to end up with the selection of an 
appropriate behaviour suggesting that, therefore, the selective attention filters are also 
modulated by the motivational systems. 
2.1.1.1 The Relationship Between Attention and Emotion 
How are the emotive stimuli capable of triggering avoidance or approach behaviours 
moderated by the processes of selective attention? Compton (2003) suggests a two­
stage process. In the first stage, emotionally-potent stimuli are initially processed by 
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sub-cortical and limbic areas including the amygdala. In the second stage, the stimuli
are filtered by the sub-cortical emotional regions, and are then prioritized for further
processing via selective attention. Inputs from the amygdala and the frontal lobe
regions then converge to drive the selection of appropriate behaviours, as well as 
maintaining representations in working memory (Compton, 2003). The idea is that 
attentional processes preferentially select emotionally - potent stimuli; there is 
evidence that supports this conclusion (see below). 
For example, Ohman, Flykt & Esteves (2001) reported that participants were 
quicker to find fear-relevant images (snakes or spiders) as opposed to fear-irrelevant 
images (flowers or mushrooms). Furthermore, they reported that participants, who 
were specifically fearful of one of the fear-relevant stimuli but not the other, 
facilitated their search for their respective fear-relevant object but showed no 
differences in the processing of fear-irrelevant stimuli. In other words, general 
threatening stimuli had the effect of capturing the processes of selective attention 
quicker compared to non threatening stimuli and, further confirming the findings, the 
effect deepened if the stimuli was personally threatening to participants. Furthermore, 
Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver & Dolan (2001) who scanned the participant's brain in 
ffMRI while performing a matching task for pairs of stimuli in pre-specified locations 
and in the presence of other irrelevant stimuli, found that when faces or houses 
appeared in the unspecified locations, the right fusiform gyms, which is an essential 
area for processing faces (Bokde, Lopez-Bayo, et.al., 2006), was more strongly 
activated by the faces that had a fearful expression. The amygdala on the other hand, 
which is related to the processing of threat-related stimuli and acquisition of fear­
conditioned responses (Vuilleumier et al., 2001), was un-differentially activated in 
response to the fearful faces regardless whether the fearful stimuli appeared in the
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pre-specified location or not; a finding also confirmed by Phelps, Ling & Carrasco 
(2006). This supports the idea that the processes of selective attention preferentially 
process the emotional stimuli and that the amygdala plays an important role in this 
process. 
The next section will consider how stimuli that have passed through the 
attentional filters are integrated with items in memory. 
2.1.2 General Mechanisms of Memory 
There are three core processes that describe memory; encoding, storing or 
consolidating and recalling information. Encoding refers to those memory processes 
that convert, or transduce, information from various sensory modalities into a 
psychological/neural construct that can be stored or recollected at a later time. 
According to the "encoding specificity principle" (Donald, & Tulving, 1973) such 
encoding processes - which are closely related to learning processes that include 
association learning as well as processes of classical and operant conditioning - leave 
a "memory trace" that includes the contextual cues within which the memory was 
originally formed. After a memory trace has been acquired, a consolidation process 
occurs. This consolidation process is further sub-divided into 1) synaptic potentiation, 
which takes place over minutes and hours, and 2) system consolidation, which takes 
place over weeks, months or years (see Dudai, 2004 for an extensive review); the 
former is dependent on the activation of the local nodes in the neuronal circuits that 
encode the experience-dependent internal representation, whereas the latter may 
involve large scale reorganisation of the brain circuits through which the original 
memory trace retains its dependence in the neural circuits involved in the acquisition 
but may also spread to new locations in the brain (Dudai, 2004). Memory retrieval, on 
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the other hand, encompasses the processes through which a stored memory is re­
activated as and when required. There are three main types of memory retrieval
paradigms; free recall, cued recall and serial recall all of which have been used by
researchers to study the memory processes in both humans (e.g. Page & Norris 1998)
and animals (e.g. Botvinick, Wang et al., 2009). 
As has been discussed above ( section 2 .1.1.1) the processes of emotional 
processing and attentional processing appear highly related. Evidence also suggests 
that attentional processes are more important to some memory processes and less in 
others. For example, it has been shown that encoding processes, but not storage and 
recall processes of memory, are selectively disrupted by tasks that involve divided 
attention (Craik, Naveh-Benjamin, Ishaik & Anderson (2000). In conditions where a 
parallel task (which divides attention) is performed concurrently during the encoding 
stage the retrieval process is impaired Craik et al., (2000). This indicates that 
attentional processes are particularly important during the encoding stages. 
The effects of emotional processes on memory appear to be broader and, as 
will be argued, the effects of different emotions during the encoding and the 
subsequent effects observed during the recall stage are particularly important with 
regard to SA. 
2.1.2.1 Emotion, Memory and Attention 
Perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of the interrelation between an emotional 
event and the subsequent memory traces and their effects can be seen in the case of
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). A mental disorder that often has a known
negative emotional trigger (major threat to self, intense fear, hopelessness or horror),
PTSD has profound and persistent effects on both the processes of memory formation
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and consolidation, and those of attention (Steinmetz, Scott, Smith & Kensinger, 2012). 
Characterised by an amygdala-based increased fear response associated with a 
specific traumatic event, PTSD involves re-experiencing of the symptoms, intrusive 
memories and nightmares, flashbacks, emotional numbing, amnesia and cognitive 
avoidance (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - DSM IV). It is 
suggested that two important brain circuits, the amygdala and the hippocampus; the 
first associated with emotions (Amunts, Kedo, Kindler, Pieperhoff, Mohlberg, Shah, 
Habel, Schneider & Zilles, 2005), the other with memory formation (Eichenbaum, 
Otto, Wible & Piper, 1991; Squire & Schacter, 2002), are involved in the generation 
and maintenance of the PTSD symptoms (Shin & Liberzon, 2010). 
Less dramatically but yet important, varying degrees of emotional arousal are 
shown to have a differential effect in memory feature binding, which is the way in 
which we select features of perceptual objects and organize them into a 
comprehensive whole (Triesman, 1998). A study carried out by Mather, Gorlick &
Nichole (2006) looked at the emotional arousal effects in memory feature binding. On 
a series of successive trials, participants were presented with four pictures of high, 
medium and low emotional arousal and were asked to monitor and remember the 
locations of the pictures on the screen. They found that memory for picture location 
worsened as emotional arousal increased and that, furthermore, participants with 
higher depression scores had the worst memory for the location of the negative 
pictures. This was correlated with differential activation in several brain structures. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) showed that, relative to people with 
low arousal, people with high arousal showed increased activity in the fusiform gyms, 
middle temporal gyms/middle occipital gyms, lingual gyms) and less activity in 
superior precentral gyms and the precentral superior temporal intersect. Mather at al., 
so 
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(2006) concluded that high arousal and negative valence stimuli, attract attention in
such a way that the normal functioning of working memory is disrupted, leading to
the impaired binding of memory elements. Likewise Cahill, Prins, Weber, &
McGaugh, (1994) and Guy & Cahill (1999) have shown an enhanced memory 
encoding for information presented within a negative emotional context. The effect 
was diminished when participants were injected with an adrenergic antagonist 
(propranolol hydrochloride) (Cahill et al., 1994). This supports the idea that through 
its effects on attentional systems emotional arousal is involved in biasing the 
processes of memory encoding and consolidation. 
Other evidence suggests that memory is also often distorted or condensed 
under conditions of emotional stress (Anderson, Lisa, Shimamura & Arthur, 2005). In 
an influential study, Christianson & Loftus (1991) presented to a large number of 
participants (397 in total) a series of themed slides in which only one slide of the set 
was presented twice with varied emotional content, from negative (women injured 
near a bicycle) to neutral (women riding a bicycle). Participants who watched the 
emotional slide (prime) were better able to recall central details about the slide, 
whereas the recall of peripheral information was impaired in comparison to 
participants that watched the neutral slide. When they exchanged the emotional slide 
for one containing novel stimuli - a women carrying the bicycle in her shoulder - they 
found that the recall for that particular slide was worse equally for peripheral and 
central information. This study suggests that emotionality (but not novelty) is 
responsible for a mode of attentional processing that has increased central and 
decreased peripheral acuity. Christianson & Loftus also reported from participants' 
reflection on the experiment that they elaborated differently the elements of a 
situation if the slide contained emotional, neutral or novel stimuli. Similarly, Hulse &
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Memon (2006, 2007) found that in emotional situations people form enriched 
memories but these memories, however, are usually centered around the location of 
the emotional stimuli, a behaviour which could be explained by involvement of the 
amygdala (Phelps & LeDoux, 2005; Compton, 2003) leading to the attentional 
tunneling effect ( attention narrows down to the elements that are perceived as most 
threatening). While the function of the increased capability to filter out superfluous 
information in threatening situations may be evolutionary adaptive, in situations 
where a careful assessment of information is needed, the attentional tunneling effect 
may hinder rather than help. This precise conclusion was reached many years earlier 
by Kohn (1954) who wrote: "Under conditions of stress ... the perceptual field is 
constricted or narrowed, and the scope or span of behaviour tends to be restricted to 
those elements which contribute most to the direction of behaviour, or to those 
elements which appear to be the most threatening." (p. 290). 
Contrary to the effects of negative emotional arousal on the processes of 
attention and memory, positive emotional arousal may contribute to a broadening of 
attentional scope. Fredrickson & Branigan (2005) tested 104 participants on emotions 
such us amusement, contentment, neutrality, anger and anxiety; participants watched 
a movie appropriate to each emotion. They found that, in comparison to the neutral 
state, the positive emotional states were associated with a broader attention span as 
opposed to negative emotions, which were associated with a narrowed attention span. 
This effect extends to both explicit and implicit emotional states. Furthermore, 
Friedman and Forster (2010) reported that an extensive body of the research literature 
on this topic supported the proposition that the scope of attention widens or narrows 
with positive or negative implicit emotional states respectively. They suggested that 
this was an indication that emotional involvement changes the shape of cognitive 
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processing as well as the content. In other words, it changes not only what
infonnation is processed but also how it is processed.
The cost of the attentional tunneling is poor overall memory formation for 
some possibly relevant situational elements (Wessel & Merckelbach, 1998) whereas 
the benefit is that if peripheral information is not needed, than filtering it out may help 
to improve performance. Such tunneling of information, however, may impact on the 
underlying mental model of a situation and thus may also impact SA (Endsley, 1995). 
Given that QASA already assumes that sometimes SA is based on a restricted scope 
of information (focused situation awareness - FSA) and sometimes in a wide scope 
( distributed situation awareness - DSA), there is some credibility to the hypothesis 
that the effects of emotion on the processes of attention, at least in part, determine the 
scope of SA and that QASA should be sensitive to those changes. An important 
practical question, therefore, is whether the QASA measure can be used to detect the 
effects that different levels of emotional arousal have on SA. 
In the following experiment the focus is on exploring the relationship between 
different emotional states and SA. According to the evidence discussed so far, 
negative emotional arousal should have an effect on IB such that the IB becomes 
more positive under negative emotional arousal and more negative under positive 
emotional arousal underlying the FSA and DSA types of SA respectively. In other 
words, with negative arousal, there may be a more conservative filtering of 
information, while with positive arousal there may be a more liberal approach. To test
this in the following experiment, participants' emotional states were manipulated 
using three sets of standardised emotional pictures, negative, positive and neutral,
selected from the International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert,
2005) and their SA and bias were measured using QASA technique.
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2.2 EXPERJMENT 1: EMOTIONAL INFLUENCES ON SA AND BIAS AS 
MEASURED BY QASA 
The following experiment consisted of a scripted war-fighting scenano with the 
participant viewing the scene from the vantage point of one of the combatants. The 
task was inherently changeable and dynamic and the participants were asked at 
different points to answer a series of questions that were presented as coming from 
the 'headquarters'. The participants' anxiety levels pre and post experiment were 
measured using the State Anxiety Inventory (SAI). 
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Three main hypotheses were tested: 
1) Negative and Positive emotional arousals will have a different effect
on IB with the Positive emotional arousal causing IB to become more 
negative (on the QASA scale) and Negative emotional arousal causing 
IB to become more positive (on the QASA scale). 
2) Different types of emotional arousal will have a different effect on SA
in the situation assessed, with Positive emotional arousal improving 
SA as measured by QASA, and the Negative emotional arousal 
impairing SA. 
3) Negative and Positive emotional arousals will have a different and
opposing effect on the correlation between IB and SA. That is, negative 
emotional arousal will reverse the negative correlation between SA 
and IB. In other words, in the negative arousal affective condition the 
relationship between the IB and SA will be such that when the IB 
decreases, the SA also decreases whereas for the positive emotional 
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arousal affective condition the relationship is such that when IB 
decreases the SA increases. 
2.2.1 Method 
2.2.1.1 Participants 
Forty-five participants were randomly selected (opportunity sampling) mainly from 
students of the first year of the Psychology degree at the University of Gloucestershire. 
Participants were equally divided into three groups of 15 participants, each group to 
one emotional condition: positive (mean age = 24.60 SD = 3.48, 4 female), negative 
(mean age = 23.33, SD = 3.62, 3 female) and neutral (mean age = 23.13, SD = 2.95, 2 
female). 
All participants had self-reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All 
participants signed a consent form accepted by the Ministry of Defence Research 
Ethics Committee (see Appendix B) prior to taking part in the study. Participants 
were not offered any monetary reward for taking part in the study and had the right to 
withdraw at any time without giving an explanation. 
2.2.1.2 Materials 
Spielberg State Anxiety Inventory 
The Spielberg State Anxiety Inventory subset from Trait/State Anxiety Inventory 
(ST AI) is a validated emotional anxiety assessment questionnaire used to generate 
separate measures of State and Trait Anxiety. The subset of STAI, State Anxiety
Inventory (SAI) was used to confirm that the negative IAPS images induce negative
affect and positive IAPS images induced positive affect relative to the neutral IAPS
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images. SAI is comprised of 20 self-report type questions. Initially proposed and 
developed by Spielberger (1989) SAI is widely used in psychological experiments 
and has been adapted for cross-cultural research in more than 30 languages. 
STAI has gone through extensive reliability and validity testing that make it a 
valid instrument for use in both research and clinical settings (Sesti, 2000). Several 
items on the STAI are reverse coded (items 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 19, 20). Internal 
consistency coefficients for the scale have ranged from .86 to .95; test-retest 
reliability coefficients have ranged from .65 to .75 over a 2-month interval 
(Spielberger et al., 1983 ). Considerable evidence attests to the construct and 
concurrent validity of the scale (Spielberger, 1989). 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS) 
Sixty colored pictures were selected from the IAPS (Center for the Study of Emotion 
and Attention, 1999) consisting of 20 positive, 20 neutral, and 20 negative pictures, 
based on valence (a bipolar continuum with negative and positive poles measured as 
hedonic distance from neutral) and arousal ( a continuous axis of intensity increasing 
from low to highly arousing.) ratings. Positive pictures included erotic couples and 
happy families; neutral pictures included neutral faces and household objects; 
negative pictures included mutilated bodies and scenes of attack and threat. Positive 
and negative pictures were selected to be the most arousing exemplars in the 
respective subcategory. Normative ratings of valence and arousal for pictures in these 
categories differed (Table 2.1 below): 
1. Emotional calibration set (n = 6): 5760, 5780, 5750, 7492, 5825, 5725.
2. PositiveSet(n =20): 2050, 2070, 2080, 2160, 2165, 2170, 2311, 2340, 2341,
2360,4650,4651,4652,4658,4659,4660,4664,4670,4680,4690. 
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3. Neutral Set (n = 20): 2190, 2200, 2210, 2230, 2381, 2440, 2480, 2570, 2850,
7002, 7009, 7010, 7020, 7030, 7040, 7080, 7175, 7233, 7235,9070. 
4. Negative Set (n = 20): 1050, 1120, 1201, 1300, 1930, 3000, 3010, 3051, 3060,
3071,3080,3102,3110,3130,3530,6260,6350,6510,6540,9405. 
Normative rating of Arousal and valence for the four sets of chosen photos 
Calibration (n 6) Positive (n 20) 11/eutral (n 20) ]Vegative (n 20) 
Arousal (mean) 4.01 5.7 2.6 6.4 
Valence (mean) 7.45 7.4 4.9 2.6 
Table 2.1: Normative Ratings for Valence and Arousal. Normative ratings are given 
for all the IAPS photo sets selected, Calibration set plus Positive, Neutral and 
Negative sets. 
Quantifying and Analysing Situation Awareness (QASA) tool 
QASA is an SA measurement tool/technique based on signal detection theory and 
developed by Edgar & Edgar (2007) which measures an individual's ability to tell 
false from true information (A') and detects and measures the inherent information 
bias (B") in the answers (see Chapter 1, section 1.6 to 1.6.2 and Appendix A "QASA 
tool"). Below are the actual algorithms (Equation 2.1) used to calculate the 
Information Bias (B") and the Situation Awareness (A') score (Equation, 1). 
QASA ALGORITHMS 
A'= 0.5 + (sign (H-F) (
H-F) + IH-FI 
)4max(H,F) - 4HF 
H = 'H it' rate 
F = 'F alse alarm' rate 
max (H,F) = either H or F, whichever is greater. 
B" = sign (H-F) H(l-H) - F(l-F) 
H(l-H) + F(l-F) 
Equation 2.1: QASA Equations. Here are the actual algorithms used to calculate the A' 
(which is the SA score) and the B" (which is the Information Bias score). 
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The algorithms were implemented in an excel spreadsheet by Dr. Graham 
Edgar, (please see Appendix for a copy of the calculating sheet) which was used to 
calculate the SA and IB scores for each participant. Included in the Appendix is also a 
'QASA tool - instructions' (Edgar, personal communication) which outlines step-by­
step instructions on how to use the Excel sheet to calculate the IB and SA scores. The 
IB and SA scores were calculated for each participant separately. As well as the 
measures of SA provided by the analysis as described above, participants were also 
asked to rate, on a four-point scale (guess, fairly uncertain, fairly certain, certain) how 
confident they were that each answer they to the T/F probes was correct. All scores 
(A', B'' and confidence) were then rescaled to give a score in the range -100 to + 100. 
Score A' - Situation 
Positive 
(max +100) 
Zero 
Negative 
Awareness 
(SA) 
Good SA. Can 
tell true 
information 
from false: 
higher score is 
better. 
No SA 
guessing? 
Misguided. 
Believes false 
information is 
(max -100) true and vice 
versa. More 
negative is 
worse. 
B" - Bias 
'Strict' bias. Tendency 
to reject information as 
false even if true. The 
higher the score the 
greater the tendency to 
reject information as 
false. 
No bias towards 
accepting or rejecting 
information. A 'neutral' 
attitude. 
'Lax' bias. Tendency to 
accept information as 
true even if false. The 
more negative the score 
the greater the tendency 
to accept information. 
Confidence 
Indicates a belief that 
the responses given 
are correct, suggesting 
a belief that SA is 
good. A higher score 
represents 
confidence. 
greater 
Does not believe 
answers are 
predominantly either 
correct or incorrect. 
Indicates a belief that 
the responses given 
are wrong, suggesting 
a belief that SA is 
poor. 
Table 2.2: Interpretations of the SA, Bias, and Confidence Scores: Interpretations of 
the SA, bias, and confidence scores provided by the QASA tool. 
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Stimulus Presentation Computer 
Stimulus presentation was controlled by e-prime version 2.0 (PST, Inc.), running on a
Dell PC, using Microsoft Windows XP with Service Pack 2. 
Each image was presented on a 0.48m diagonal, 4:3 aspect ratios computer 
screen with a frame refresh rate of 60 Hz. The screen was placed 1.5 m in front of the 
viewer, resulting in a picture presentation with a visual angle of 14.7 degrees of visual 
angle horizontally and 11 degrees vertically. 
2.2.1.3 Design 
This was a between-participants design with type of emotional arousal induced as the 
between-participants independent variable with three levels (positive, negative or 
neutral emotional arousal). The experiment simulated a war-fighting scenario, which 
was operationalized as a rapid series of individual slides ( 408 in all) presenting a 
military mission. At six semi-random intervals within the presentation participants 
were presented with blocks of eight QASA probes concerning the situation presented 
on the previous slides. Confidence measures on four-point Likert scale were also 
collected. 
Participants first completed the SAI inventory and then affect was 
manipulated using the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Lang, Bradley, 
& Cuthbert, 1997, 2008); a series of pictures validated and rated as generating 
different affects (emotions). Pictures were chosen to generate positive, neutral or 
negative affect. A series of twenty IAPS pictures of the appropriate affect category
Were shown to the participant prior to the scenario. IAPS slides were then interleaved 
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with the scenario slides at pseudo-random intervals of 8-13 slides. On completion of 
the task, participants again completed the SAI inventory. 
2.2.1.4 The Main Experimental Hypotheses 
1) Experimental Hypothesis 1: Negative and Positive emotional arousals will have a
different effect on IB with the Positive emotional arousal causing IB to become more 
negative (on the QASA scale) and Negative emotional arousal causing IB to become 
more positive (on the QASA scale). 
Null hypothesis: There is no effect of emotional arousal on IB. 
2) Experimental Hypothesis 2: Different types of emotional arousal will have a
different effect on SA in the situation assessed, with Positive emotional arousal 
improving SA as measured by QASA, and the Negative emotional arousal impairing 
SA. 
Null hypothesis: There is no effect of emotional arousal on SA. 
3) Experimental Hypothesis 3: Negative and Positive emotional arousals will have a
different and opposing effect on the correlation between IB and SA. That is, negative 
emotional arousal will reverse the negative correlation between SA and IB. In other 
words, in the negative arousal affective condition the relationship between the IB and 
SA will be such that when the IB decreases, the SA also decreases whereas for the 
positive emotional arousal affective condition the relationship is such that when IB 
decreases the SA increases. 
Null hypothesis: There is no effect of emotional arousal on the correlation between IB 
and SA. 
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2.2.1.5 Procedure 
Participants were given full written descriptions of the task (see Appendix B).
Participants were then asked whether they had any questions and required to sign a
consent form before proceeding any further (See Appendix B). All but one volunteer 
elected to participate in the experiment. 
Participants were then seated in front of the computer and were instructed to 
start the task. After starting the e-prime experiment, the experimenter left the testing 
room but remained within earshot of the participant. 
The experiment is outlined below in a step-by-step fashion; the procedure was 
identical for all participants: 
1. The e-prime experiment started, participant asked to provide the following
details in the given order 
2. Subject Number
3. Session Number
4. Subject Identifier participants were encouraged not to use the real name)
5. Subject Age
6. Subject Sex
7. Subject Handedness
8. Researcher ID
9. Summary of Start up Information
10. Welcome Message presented on screen: Welcome to the experiment. Please
read the instructions before each of the following tasks carefully. Please ask 
any questions you might have before proceeding with the tasks. We hope you 
will enjoy it. Press Spacebar when you are ready to continue.) 
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11. Instructions presented on screen: "Next, you are required to complete a
(SAI) questionnaire. Please be aware of the following: 1) Once a question has 
been answered, you CANNOT go back to change your answer. 2) Please do 
not click outside of the Big Green boxes because that will terminate the 
programme. [Participants were verbally informed to notify the experimenter if 
that happened - there were no such cases.} Press space bar to continue ... " 
12. Questionnaire instructions presented on screen: A number of statements
which people have used to describe themselves are given. Read each statement 
and then click on the answer, which corresponds most closely to how you feel 
right now, that is, at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do 
not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which 
seems to describe your feelings best. Please press spacebar when you are 
ready. 
13. Participants were presented with the question at the top left of the screen.
Response options were: 
1. Not at all
2. Somewhat
3. Moderately so
4. Very much so
and were presented on screen beneath the question (Figure 6). 
Four 4X5 cm green coloured boxes were arranged horizontally on the bottom 
of the screen each box labelled by numbers from 1 to 4, from left to right. 
14. After each selection, participants were presented with the question and their
selected response (Figure 2.2). 
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15. The experiment was programmed to add the scores automatically after each
response in accordance with the instructions in the ST AI manual. 
Figure 2.2: SAi Questionnaire. Figures above show how the SAI questionnaire was 
presented to participants on the computer screen. The top picture shows the 
presentation of questions along with the answering options, the lower one shows the 
feedback after participants' answer each question. 
16. After the questionnaire, a message appeared on the screen alerting the
participant to the start of the next step. The message read as follows: "Please 
just sit still and keep your eyes on the images for the duration of the next 
slides. Press spacebar when you are ready ... " 
17. Six images selected from Emotional calibration set (see materials section)
were presented for 10 seconds each in the same order as given in the set. A 
fixation cross in the middle of the screen was presented for 500 ms between 
each image (see Figure 2.3). 
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soo _ms. 
6 images times 10 s 
Figure 2.3: Calibrating Emotions. Participants are presented with 6 images, which 
stay on screen for 1 Os each, presented at 500ms intervals. This presentation was the 
same across all groups and it was used as way of calibrating the participant's 
emotional arousal to the same level across all groups. 
18. E-Prime was programmed to randomly assign the participant to one of the
conditions, Neutral, Positive or Negative. If one category reached the target 
number of participants (15) then the experiment was programmed to assign 
participants into one of the two remaining categories. 
19. Instructions for the next step appear on screen reading: "Please look
attentively at the following series of photos. You might be asked questions 
about them later. " 
20. Participants saw either the Neutral, Negative or Positive set of IAPS photos
appropriate to the randomly assigned emotional condition in the same order 
given in the set (see Materials section for information on photo sets; see 
Figure 2.4 for duration information). 
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soo .ms.
20 images times 2 s 
Figure 2.4: Manipulating Affect According to Groups. Participants are presented with 
20 images, which stay on screen for 2s each, presented at 500ms intervals. This 
presentation was used as way of manipulating emotional arousal. 
21. Instructions for the main task came on screen reading: "You are a soldier and
you are working in a remote control room. You are asked to monitor the 
images that are being streamed from a camera. The camera is mounted on a 
soldier who is currently engaged in fierce fighting. The images coming from 
the battlefield are jumpy and blurry because of a bad connection. The enemy 
is trying to interfere or break the connection which is why, sometimes, you 
might see images that are not from the original camera. Your task is to 
monitor the images and gather as much information about the situation as 
you can. Military Headquarters will at times ask you for information. Press 
space bar when you are ready to continue ... " 
22. Upon pressing the spacebar, the main part of the experiment simulating a
war-fighting scenario started. A rapid series of individual slides ( 408 in all) of 
a military mission were shown to simulate the scenes during a military 
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m1ss1on. At 6 intervals participants were presented with blocks of eight 
QASA probes (see attached CD, Chapter 2 for an example of the probes) 
concerning the situation presented on the previous slides (see Figure 2.5). 
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Figure 2.5: Main Experiment Structure. 6 blocks of photos were presented, the 
numbers of photos contained are presented on the right side of each block. Between 
each block of photos 8 QUASA type probes were presented to participants where they 
had to answer with either True or False. The question was first presented on the 
screen for 3s. Then, a content relevant photo selected from the just presented block of 
photos followed by the question again with the option to answer True or False 
followed it. Following that, a confidence rating from 1 to 4 on participant's answer 
was taken. The numbers inside the each box indicate the precise position of each of 
the emotional images presented within each block. Their positions were pseudo 
randomly assigned to ensure a distribution of emotional images across the whole task 
but in a non-predictive manner. 
23. Upon completing the mam task, participants agam completed the SAi
questionnaire (steps 11 to 15). 
24. A final question appeared asking the participants to indicate in a 1 to 4 Likert
scale how much they played computer games (Figure 2.6). 
25. Debriefing.
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V' 
V' 
Figure 2. 6: Computer Question. Computer Question assess mg participants' 
familiarity with computer games as participants see it. 
2.2.2. Results 
2.2.2.1 Changes in Induced Affect 
To assess the effects of the negative, positive and neutral IAPS images on participants, 
changes in affect were assessed using the State Anxiety Inventory (SAi) subset of the 
Spielberger State/Trait Anxiety Inventory, one of the most widely used measures of 
anxiety (Spielberger, 1989). The test was administered before the start of the 
experiment, and again at the end. The mean differences for the three-affect conditions 
are shown in Graph 2.1. A one-way between-participants analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted on the data with affect condition as the independent 
variable, and the difference between the post- and pre-test scores as the dependent
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variable; thus a positive score indicates an decrease in anxiety levels, a negative score 
a increase and a zero score indicates no change. 
Using Boxplots, two outliers were detected, one in the negative and one in the 
neutral group. The outliers were replaced with the value closest to the outlier, which 
is a method known as "Windsorizing" (Barnet & Lewis, 1978 1). The bias score was 
normally distributed for the positive, negative and neutral groups, as assessed by 
Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > 0.05). Homogeneity of variances was violated, as assessed by 
Levene's Test of Homogeneity of Variance (p < 0.05). Anxiety score was statistically 
significantly different between different affect condition groups, Welch's F(2, 26.11) 
= 21.81, p < 0.01. Anxiety score increased from the negative group (M= -8.87, SD= 
4.03) to the neutral (M= 0.80, SD= 5.37) and positive (M= 3.40, SD= 8.61) in that 
order. As Levene's test of equality of error variances was approaching significance 
(p = 0.057), Games-Howell post-hoc pairwise comparisons were conducted. Games-
Howell post-hoc analysis revealed that the mean increase from neutral to negative (-
9.67, 95% CI [-13.98, -5.36]) was statistically significant (p < 0.01), as well as the 
increase from negative to positive (-12.27, 95% CI [-18.48, -6.05], p < 0.01). No 
significant differences were found between the positive and neutral affect groups in 
anxiety levels thus confirming that, relative to each other, positive and negative affect 
conditions resulted in driving the anxiety levels in the expected direction - decreasing 
for the positive group and increasing for the negative group relative to each other. 
Only the negative affect condition resulted in a significant increase in anxiety as 
I Windsorizing" (Barnet & Lewis, 1978) will be conducted on all data 
screening henceforth to account for the influence of outliers. In this process, outlier 
effect size values are altered to match the next highest, non-outlier, effect size and 
then the overall mean effect size is recalculated. 
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compared to the neutral condition; the positive affect, though heading in the expected
direction, did not reach significance. 
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Graph 2.1 - Mean Change in SA! Scores. 
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Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval for the mean. Mean change in SAI 
score over the course of the experiment for each affect condition. 
2.2.2.2 Testing Differences in Computer Games Familiarity Between the 
Three Affective Groups 
Due to the presence of many outliers (three outliers were detected in the positive 
affect condition, one in the neutral affect condition and five in the negative affect 
condition - all five in the negative affect condition were extreme outliers) and the 
Shapiro-Wilk test showing that the data were not normally distributed for any of the 
Groups (p < 0.05), a non-parametric counterpart of ANOVA, K.ruskal-Wallis test, was
run to determine if there were differences in the Computer Games score between
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different Emotional Arousal groups. Pairwise comparisons were performed usmg 
Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. 
Statistical significance was accepted at the p < 0.05 levels for the omnibus test and p 
<0.01 levels for the multiple comparisons. Computer Games score was not 
statistically significantly different between the different levels of Emotional Arousal. 
Thus it is concluded that familiarity to computer games, which the task does 
approximate to an extent and which could have been a potential confounding factor, is 
not significantly different across the different affective conditions hence unlikely to 
have acted as a confound. 
2.2.2.3 Testing Experimental Hypothesis 1 
Negative and Positive emotional conditions affect IB differently with the negative 
affect condition making IB more positive and the positive affect condition making IB 
more Negative on the QASA scale. 
The bias scores were subjected to a one-way ANOVA taking the affect 
condition (positive, negative and neutral) as the between-participants IV and the 
calculated bias scores as the DV. 
Using Boxplots, two outliers were detected, one in the positive and one in the 
neutral group. The outliers were replaced with the value closest to the outlier. The 
bias score was normally distributed for the positive, negative and neutral groups, as 
assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > 0.05). There was homogeneity of variances, as 
assessed by Levene's Test of Homogeneity of Variance (p > 0.05). The bias score was 
statistically significantly different between different affect conditions, F(2,44) = 51.64, 
p < 0.01, o/ = 0.69. The bias score increased (see Graph 2.2) from the positive group 
(M = -20.27, SD= 11.82) to the neutral (M = 2.05, SD = 5.91) and negative (M = 
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10.33, SD = 6.61) in that order. Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that the mean 
increase of bias from positive to neutral (22.32, 95% CI [14.75, 29.88]) was
statistically significant (p < 0.01), as well as the increase from neutral to negative 
(8.29, 95% CI [0.72, 15.85], p < 0.03) and the increase from positive to negative 
affect condition (30.60, 95% CI [23.03, 38.17], p < 0.01), thus rejecting the null 
hypothesis. 
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Graph 2.2: Affective Conditions and IB. Error bars set at 95% confidence interval. 
Mean differences on the measures of bias are significantly different between positive 
and neutral, neutral and negative and positive and negatives affect conditions. 
2.2.2.4 Testing Experimental Hypothesis 2 
Negative and Positive emotional conditions affect SA differently with Negative 
condition impairing SA and Positive condition aiding SA score. Null hypothesis:
Emotional arousal does not affect SA score. 
71 
------------- Chapter 2 -------------
... 
I I 
l 
---- - - ------- Chapter 2 - ------------
The SA scores were subjected to a one-way ANOV A taking the affect 
condition (positive, negative and neutral) as the between-participants IV and the 
calculated SA scores as the DV. 
Using Boxplots one outlier was detected in the positive one group. The outlier 
was replaced with the value closest to the outlier. The bias score was normally 
distributed for the positive, negative and neutral groups, as assessed by Shapiro-
Wilk's test (p > 0.05). There was homogeneity of variances as assessed by Levene's 
Test of Homogeneity of Variance (p > 0.05). The SA score was statistically 
significantly different between different affect conditions, F(2,44) = 16.31, p < 0.01, 
o/ = 0.39. The SA score increased (see Graph 2.3) from the neutral group (M= -4.79, 
SD= 28.62) to the negative (M = 11.59, SD= 28.40) and positive (M = 48.75, SD= 
21.23) in that order. 
60.00 
SO.OD T 
40.00 
30.00 
20.00 
10.00 
0.00 
I 
-10.00 �-----------------------, 
Posmv� N-eutr.al eganue 
Affect cond,non 
Mean SA scores 48.75 -4.79 11.59 
Graph 2.3: Affective Conditions and SA. Error bars set at 95% confidence interval. 
Mean differences on the measures of SA are significantly different between positive 
and neutral, neutral and negative and positive and negatives affect conditions. 
Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that the mean increase of SA from neutral to 
positive (53.54, 95% CI [30.20, 76.88]) was statistically significant (p < .001), as well 
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as the increase from negative to positive (37.16, 95% CI [13.82, 60.50], p < 0.01).
There were no significant differences on SA scores between negative and neutral 
affect conditions (p > 0.05), thus the null hypothesis will be rejected. 
2.2.2.5 Testing Experimental Hypothesis 3 
Negative and Positive emotional conditions will affect the relationship between IB 
and SA. Null hypothesis: Emotional arousal does not affect the relationship between 
IB and SA. 
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Graph 2.4: Affective Conditions and Correlation of SA and IE. SA scores plotted 
against bias scores for the positive, neutral and negative affect conditions. Linear 
(solid line) and quadratic (broken line) least-squares line fits are shown. Mean 95% 
confidence intervals are shown for the quadratic fits. 
73 
u 
..., 
<( 
Ill 
Chapter 2 
.. ·· 
.· ... ·· 
.·· ... ···:·.a·· 
,··~.' .. ····::~-
.· .... · 
.· ... : 
0 : 
',o 
', 
', 
··· .... o'· ... 
,, 
0 
D 
0 
0 
0 
D 
- ---------- - Chapter 2 --------------
The SA scores were plotted against the bias scores for each affect condition 
(Graph 2.4). A least-squares procedure was used to fit curves to the data, with a 
quadratic function providing the best fit. The model was a significant fit of the data in 
the negative (R2 = 0.85; F(l,12) = 35.46, p < 0.01) and positive (R2 = 0.74; F(l ,12) =
17.03, p < 0.01) conditions, but not in the neutral condition (R2 = 0.27; F(l,12) = 2.24, 
p > 0.5). There was no relationship apparent between confidence and either bias or 
SA in any of the affect conditions. The maximum R 2 for any plot of confidence 
against bias or SA was 0.18, and so no further analyses were conducted on these 
relationships. The curve fits suggest that the relationship between SA and bias is 
different in different affect conditions and so the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
2.2.2. 6 Testing Differences in Confidence in Answers Between the Three 
Groups 
The confidence scores were subjected to a one-way ANOV A taking the affect 
condition (positive, negative and neutral) as the between-participants IV and the 
calculated confidence scores as the DV. Confidence scores were added than averaged 
for each participant hence a score approaching four indicates high confidence whereas 
a score approaching one indicates low confidence. 
Using Boxplots, two outliers were detected, one in the positive and one in the 
neutral group. The outliers were replaced with the value closest to the outlier. The 
bias score was normally distributed for the positive, negative and neutral groups, as 
assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > 0.05). There was homogeneity of variances, as 
assessed by Levene's Test of Homogeneity of Variance (p > 0.05). The confidence 
score was statistically significantly different between different affect conditions, 
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F(2,44) = 11.82, p < 0.01, o/ = 0.31. The SA score increased (see Graph 2.5) from the 
positive group (M = 1.60, SD = 0.10) to the neutral (M = 1.70, SD = 0.09) and
negative (M = 1.81, SD = 0.16) in that order. Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that 
the mean increase of confidence from negative to neutral (0.12, 95% CI [0.01, 0.20]) 
was statistically significant (p < 0.03), as well as the increase from positive to 
negative (0.21, 95% CI [0.11, 0.32], p < 0.01). There were no significant differences 
on confidence scores between positive and neutral affect conditions (p > 0.05). 
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Graph 2.5: Affective Conditions and Confidence. Error bars set at 95% CI interval. 
Participants in the Negative condition showed the highest increase in the confidence 
scores, which reached statistical significance. Significant increase in confidence 
scores for the negative group may reflect this group's attempt to counteract the 
negative emotions. 
2.2.3 Discussion 
Before discussing the main results, the two control measures indicating familiarity to 
computer games and the effect of the IAPS images on participants' anxiety levels, as 
indicated by SAI, will be discussed. The analysis of the two measures that controlled 
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for the participants' familiarity to computer games and the effect that IAPS images on 
participants confirmed that there were no significant differences on the former and the 
expected differences on the latter, both of which were the desired outcomes. The SAi 
scores, which provide an introspective index of state anxiety at a particular point in 
time, showed an increase on the anxiety levels for the participants that were shown 
the negative images. The images, which were selected from the lower end (negative) 
of the normative valence ratings given by IAPS did have the effect of increasing 
anxiety levels relative to both the neutral and positive IAPS images. Conversely, the 
positive images, which were selected from the higher end (positive) of IAPS valence 
scale led to a decrease in anxiety levels, significantly different from the negative 
images but not from the neutral images. The analysis of the SAi and the game 
familiarity scores indicate, therefore, that computer game familiarity was not 
significantly different across different affect conditions and unlikely to have had an 
effect on participants' performance, and also that IAPS images did achieved the 
desired emotional manipulation in the three groups. 
Under these conditions, both the bias and the SA scores, as well as their 
relationship appear to confirm the experimental hypotheses. The bias score was 
positive for the negative affect condition and negative for the positive affect condition 
and the analysis showed that the IB for the negative and the positive affects 
conditions were significantly different from the IB in the neutral affect condition. This 
is in line with most of the research on attention and emotions presented in the 
introduction (Friedman & Forster 2010; Fredrickson & Branigan 2005; Kohn 1954). 
As these studies suggest, under the negative and positive affect conditions, the 
attentional spans narrows or widens respectively and this seems to have been reflected 
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by the IB measure of QASA, which became more positive (conservative) in negative
emotional conditions, and more negative (liberal) under positive emotional conditions.
The analysis of SA scores also confirmed the experimental hypothesis and is also in 
line with the studies cited in the introduction (Hulse & Memon 2006, 2007; 
Fredrickson & Branigan 2005). The SA score was improved for the positive affective 
condition relative to the neutral and the negative affective conditions. The positive 
affective condition seems to have had a stronger effect on the SA score and 
significantly improved the SA of the participants. 
Importantly, the different affect conditions seem to have had the effect of changing 
the relationship between the IB and SA scores. Negative affect seems to lead to a 
general positive shift in bias, which suggests an increase in the rejection of 
information. As participants' behaviour becomes more conservative and their 
attention span narrows, this is reflected in a decrease on their overall awareness. 
However, if they reject the right information (not relevant to SA) they get high SA, if 
they reject the wrong information they get low, or negative, SA - hence the 
'sideways-U' function. These data thus indicate that high positive bias can give either 
high or low SA. This relationship would suggest that bias is driving SA. This would 
seem likely, as the absence of feedback in the task (as to whether the answers to the 
probes are correct or incorrect) would make it difficult for participants to modify their 
bias in the light of their performance. 
If affective state affects bias and bias affects SA, then it would seem likely 
that in the neutral affect condition there should be a weaker relationship between bias 
and SA, as was found to be the case. Without the manipulation of affect, bias may 
show a tendency to freewheel and to drift towards zero (note the bias scores are
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generally lower in this condition), leading to no significant relationship between bias 
and SA. 
Positive affect, on the other hand, leads to a negative shift in bias and an 
increase in the amount of information taken in. That seems to lead to an increase in 
SA up to a point and then SA appears to level off. An explanation is that SA may 
plateau when the participant simply cannot handle any more information reaching, in 
effect, information-processing capacity. 
Thus, as hypothesized, the data showed that different affective states did affect 
SA and IB as well as the relationship between the SA and IB. 
It has been shown in this chapter that task-independent emotional arousal does affect 
SA, IB and the relationship between the two. The next chapter considers what would 
happen if the emotional stimuli were task relevant. What if the emotional arousal is 
directly related to task performance? The next chapter provides an overview of 
emotional theories; beginning with a general overview of psychological and 
biological models of emotion and narrowing down to focus on the theories and 
models that have been developed within the context of decision-making and 
perception. 
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Chapter 3 - Emotion and Cognition 
"The Emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their 
judgments, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure" (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1378a, 
20 - 22) 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As demonstrated in the second chapter, emotions do play a critical role in the 
processes of memory and attention, which are important to Situation Awareness. This 
finding warrants a closer look at the nature and workings of emotions, which so far 
have not been considered in the SA context even though the evidence suggest that 
they are an important aspect of understanding SA. 
What are emotions? For most people emotions are a mix of feelings and 
behaviours, love, hate, disgust, joy, shame, envy, guilt, anxiety, fear and so on are all 
types of emotions which everyone is familiar with or has experienced at one time or 
another; they are part of everyday existence. However, questions such as what 
precisely defines emotions, do they emerge from diffuse or localised patterns of 
cerebral activity or are they sensory signals arising from the body or even are they 
something else completely, have proven difficult to answer despite the prolonged 
interest in their understanding. Aristotle is quoted to have stated in his work, Rhetoric 
(1378a, 20 - 22), "The Emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect 
their judgments, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure". Building on 
Aristotle's work, Galen, a prominent Roman physician, argued for a clear separation 
between the thoughts and emotions. According to Galen the brain was the seat of 
reason whereas the heart that of emotion (Galeni,1528, book VI). This view 
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dominated western thought for over 1000 years until the early 20th century when
studying the brain's neural circuits opened a new direction in the study of emotions 
(LeDoux, 2003). 
In his 2003 paper on the 'emotional brain, fear and amygdala' LeDoux also 
charts developments in the neuroscience of emotions in the early part of the 20th 
century. As the discovered link between the hypothalamus and the autonomic nervous 
system became clearer (Karplus & Kreidl, 1927), it was proposed that the 
hypothalamus also played a central role in emotional processing (Cannon & Britton, 
1925). Papez (1937) and MacLean (1949, 1952) retained the link between the 
hypothalamus and the autonomic nervous system and extended it to include the 
forebrain in the emotional circuits; later on christened as the limbic system. The term 
limbic system is still in use (Nakano, 2007) but, as LeDoux (2003) points out, there is 
no clear definition guiding the selection of structures of the brain that should be 
included ( or excluded) from that system, and the current definition has not fostered 
wide acceptance among researchers. Nonetheless and as it will be discussed further in 
this chapter, the early research on the brain circuits underlying emotions, especially 
the limbic system has been and continues to be the basis for many of the theories of 
emotions today. The trend in the research on emotions, however, has been somewhat 
sporadic and not consistent. 
Despite the long historical interest on the topic and the potential benefits that 
knowledge about emotions would certainly afford, there has never been a systematic, 
rigorous and sustained approach on the study of emotions. The reasons why may be 
glimpsed from a statement taken from Gardner (1985, p.6) who, while fully 
acknowledging the importance of emotions for cognitive functioning, states that their 
inclusion would "unnecessarily complicate the cognitive-scientific enterprise". 
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Evidently not many researchers have agreed with Gardner's proposition. For 
example, LeDoux (2000) states: "A pure cognitive approach, one that omits
consideration of emotions, motivations, and the like, paints an artificial, highly 
unrealistic view of real minds. Minds are not either cognitive or emotional, they are 
both and more. Inclusion of work on emotion within the cognitive framework can 
help rescue this field from its sterile approach to the mind as an information­
processing device that lacks goals, strivings, desires, fears, and hopes". Furthermore, 
as evidence for the growing interest in this field, Murray, O'Doherty & Schoenbaum 
(2007) cite an interesting statistic, in 1987, two years after Gardner's statement, only 
nine papers were published with the term Orbitofrontal Cortex, an area implicated in 
emotional processing, by 2007 this had increased to an average of 32 papers per 
month. 
The complexity notwithstanding, an ever-increasing body of research on 
emotions has accumulated over the years, a small portion of which was discussed in 
Chapter 2. This chapter will investigate further the theory and research on emotions 
with particular focus on the biological perspective. This chapter is divided into two 
main sections. 
The first section can be further divided into three general sub-sections the first 
of which will chart the most prominent developments in the investigation of emotions, 
past and present. It will be argued that emotions and feelings are not external to the 
functioning of cognition but are rather part and parcel of it. It is unlikely that the 
capability to reason has evolved independently of the mechanisms of biological
regulation and the latter are inextricably linked to emotional and motivational forces
Which are fundamental processes of survival and adaptation (Damasio, 1994; Ekman
& Davidson, 1994; Pinker, 1997). It will be shown that evidence from neuroscience
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and other related disciplines suggests an important role in the regulation of positive 
and negative affect for the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and Amygdala both of which are 
highly interconnected into larger circuits including the anterior cingulate, 
hippocampus, and insula (Davidson, Putnam & Larson, 2000b ). 
The second sub-section will evaluate the neurological basis of this view and 
suggest that the representations of the body proper in the somatosensory maps and 
other related neural circuits might fundamentally underpin the ontology of emotions. 
It will be argued that increasing evidence supports the proposition that emotional 
states are, if not entirely, at least in part representations of various states of the body 
in the Central Nervous System (Damasio, 1994). 
The third subsection will present the case for clear functional links between 
the autonomic nervous system, operations of emotions and their modulating effects in 
cognitive functions of attention, memory and learning. A more specific aim of the 
third sub-section is to argue that emotional processes are not simply adjunct to other 
cognitive processes to be studied as an afterthought, much like Gardner above seems 
to suggest, but are rather inseparable and that a complete account of any cognitive 
process must necessarily account for emotions. 
The second main section will examine the experimental evidence from the 
stance of psychological and biological perspectives with particular focus on the 
Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SM). First outlined by the neuroscientist Antonio 
Damasio and colleagues in 1991 (Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1991) and later on 
described on much greater detail in his book, Descartes Error (Damasio, 1994), the 
Somatic Marker Hypothesis argues for an important role of emotions in decision­
making processes. According to Damasio (1994), the Somatic Markers, so called 
because of their origin in the body proper and the Autonomic Nervous System (ANS), 
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are responsible for brining to bear in decision making processes, prior experiences
whose affective component can bias decisions towards those that, in the past, have
been associated with positive outcomes and away from those that have been
associated with negative outcomes. The examination of Damasio's and other 
researcher's work in this area will lead to a number of hypotheses, which will be 
tested in a series of experiments that follows. 
3.1.2) Phineas Gage's Accident Marks a Change in our Understanding and 
Investigation of Emotions 
Figure 3.1 Photo of Phineas Gage. This is a photo of Phineas Gage holding the iron 
that destroyed his frontal lobes. 
Phineas Gage (Figure 3.1) is perhaps one of the most familiar names to any researcher 
of neuroscience, novice or experienced. The interested reader is directed to the first 
Chapter in Damasio's book "Descartes Error". It offers a detailed account including a 
cursory analysis of the reactions of the neuroscientist of the time (Damasio 1994, p. 3).
83 
------------ Chapter 3 
�������������� Chapter3 �������������-
Although the precise details of Gage's story and the subsequent explanations 
are not entirely agreed upon (see for example Macmillan 2008), it is generally 
undisputed that the lesions on specific areas of the frontal lobes caused the peculiar 
changes to Gage's cognitive functioning. Unfortunately there was no post-mortem 
done on Gage's brain hence the exact location of the damage is not known. However, 
a reconstruction of Gage's skull and iron rod in three dimensions has allowed 
researchers at Harvard Medical School to conclude that the damage that Gage 
sustained was most likely confined to the left pre-frontal cortices including Ventro­
Medial Prefrontal Cortex (vmPFC) region of the brain (Damasio, 1994, p. 31-32) 
(Figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2: The reconstruction of Gage's skull and iron in three dimensions. 
A particularly intriguing observation following Gage's injury was the apparent 
intactness of his logic and rational thinking standing in stark contrast with the glaring 
deficiencies in his global functioning (Damasio, 1994), which brings into question 
purely rational models of decision making. Experimental investigations of decision-
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rnaking have shown that, much like Gage's functioning after his damage to vmPFC
demonstrates, real life decision making under varied degrees of uncertainty do not
describe an exclusively rational mind (Haidt, 2001; Green, 2009; Damasio, 1994,
2004). The distinction between the rational and the, so to speak, emotional
functioning is a fundamental tenet of the dual process theories of cognition who argue 
for the co-existence of two systems, System II (analytic) and I (heuristic) respectively 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Kahneman 2011, p. 19). The case of Gage's post 
accident selective deterioration of emotionally based cognitive functions while 
rnaintaining the capability to reason rationally seems to support the view of two, 
relatively separate cognitive systems. 
3.1.3 EVR- The Modern Gage 
In 1991, Damasio and colleagues reported a case study involving a patient, 
codenamed EVR, with brain damage in the frontal lobes in the same general area as 
Gage's. EVR was around 35 years of age when he had to undergo brain surgery 
removing a meningioma. The operation left him with bilateral lesions on 
ventromedial frontal cortices. Prior to the operation EVR is described as ''from all 
perspectives a normal individual. He was intelligent, hard working, successful at 
securing a steady skilled job, and at being promoted for his good performance. He 
was active in social affairs and was perceived as a leader and example by his siblings, 
and by others in his community" (Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1991 p. 217). 
Following the surgery, just like Gage, EVR could not maintain a job and his ability to 
plan his immediate and future activities was severely impaired. A typical feature of
EVR's post operation functioning was to engage in endless deliberation of multiple 
choices ending up, if at all, selecting a random choice. 
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It is important to highlight that despite the severe impairments that were plain 
for everyone to see and have been documented (Damasio et al., 1991, p. 217-218), 
just like Gage, EVR's other cognitive processes remained undisturbed. A battery of 
neuropsychological tests indicated that EVR's intelligence functioning remained 
intact or ranking on the higher end of the scales. EVR's IQ scores on the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Test-Revised were within the top 1st-2nd percentile. A range of 
other neuropsychological tests also indicated a high functioning individual: Shipley­
Hartford Vocabulary score = 37/40; Abstraction score = 40/40; Visual-Verbal Test 
score = 73/84. In addition, EVR also showed a normal to superior ability in tests of 
learning and memory, scoring 145 in Wechsler Memory Scale, 14 out of 15 in Rey 
Auditory-Verbal Leaming Test Trial 5, 9/10 in Benton Visual retention Test and 
32/36 in Ray-Osterrieth Complex Figure recall score (Damasio et al., 1991, p. 218). 
And finally, according to Damasio, EVR's performance in Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test, the Category Test, the Word Fluency test and paradigms requiring cognitive 
estimation and judgments of regency and frequency were perfect. It would be hard to 
argue that anyone looking at the range of tests and the scores produced by EVR would 
get any hint at all that they indicated a damaged mind. Classical tests of memory, 
learning and attention, such as the comprehensive range cited above, seem to be 
completely insensitive to EVR's condition. It is worth pointing out that the failure of 
these tests to detect anything raises some important concerns for the validity of 
SAGAT, which is essentially based in similar measures of memory, attention and 
learning. 
A critical point in understanding EVR's condition, Damasio suggests, is to 
consider the basis of the mind as relying on the synchronized activity of multiple 
brain regions in which vmPFC has an important role. In his earlier paper (Damasio, 
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1989) argues against the integration of memory and motor processes in single, defined
anatomical locations and advocates instead for the time-locked, synchronous
activations of multiple sites as a better fit; in this scenario, timing is critical.
According to Damasio, meanmg emerges by the time-locked multiregional 
retroactivation of widespread fragment records, the concerted activity of which can 
become manifest consciousness. He suggests that the recall of entities and events 
occurs when the neuron ensembles in multiple sensory and first-order association and 
motor cortices are synchronously activated in time-locked fashion from firings on 
convergence zone neurons (see Damasio, 1989 for a full review); the latter operate 
both at prior and later levels of processing. The activity of convergence zones, of 
which, as we will see vmPFC is an important site, is crucial in that it enables a two­
way communication between representations arising directly from the body proper 
and those residing in the central nervous system. 
According to Damasio, the brain representations of an excitatory stimulus are 
first represented in the early sensory cortices and the somatosensory representations 
of the body-states, both of which have feedback and feed-forward connections with 
convergence zones. The latter maintains the order of the onset of the brain activity 
and also brings to bear the attentional focus via the feedback connections to the early 
somatosensory and other sensory cortices. The systems are locked into a brief, 
synchronous activity, which spans across cortical and sub-cortical structures 
(Damasio, 1994, p. 162). In cognitive terms, this means holding on-line multiple bits 
of heterogeneous cognitions while they are evaluated for their negative or positive 
consequences. In this scenario, and largely in line with Panksepp's description of a 
State versus Channel model (Panksepp, 2004, 2007) as well as Kahneman's System I 
versus System II functioning (see sections 3.1.4.2 and 3.1.5 below, respectively), the 
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Somatic Marker (SM) may involve non-specific neurotransmitter systems, like 
dopamine or serotonin, which can bias the activity in the cerebral cortex towards 
aversive or appetitive behaviours. Damasio argues that the SM system is an 
expression of the large available pool of experiences acquired via the 
punishment/reward feedback mechanisms. The function of this mechanism, Damasio 
argues, is to restrict the decision space towards a smaller and selective set of choices 
which are more likely to be relevant in a given a situation and hence increase the 
speed and efficiency of the decisions made. 
A neuroscientist by profession, it is worth pointing out that Damasio's view of 
the organisation of the brain is largely in accordance with the most recent 
developments in neuroscience in the way the brain is studied. The Graph Theory and 
Connectivity studies have shifted the focus of investigation from specific brain 
regions to identifying areas of high and low neuronal connectivity at the systems and 
networks level (Bullmore & Spoms, 2009). This approach seeks to categorise the 
organisation of the brain in terms of network hubs of differing connection densities. 
Multimodal neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies have found many important 
and highly densely connected network hubs in the medial frontal and parietal regions 
(Xie & He, 2011). A consistent finding has been that damage in highly connected 
network hubs results in more widespread effects and greater damage to the overall 
cognitive functioning as compared to damage in comparatively less densely 
connected hubs (He & Evans, 2010; Bullmore & Spoms, 2009). The concept of 
convergence zones that Damasio proposes can be seen as a pre-cursor to the concept 
of the brain's network hubs of connectivity. A particularly important and densely 
connected hub resides in the frontal lobes. In particular, the functioning of the medial 
prefrontal cortex, part of which is vmPFC, has drawn wide attention especially for its 
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association with emotional processes and their effect in higher-level cognitive
processes of abstract thinking and reasoning (LeDoux, 2003; Bechara, Tranel,
Damasio & Damasio, 1996). 
3.1. 4 Structural and Functional Organization of Pre.frontal Cortex 
Since the time of Gage and until now, the functioning of the Frontal Lobes have been 
a focus of continuing fascination in neuroscience and a great and increasing number 
of studies are leading to a much more nuanced understanding of their functions. The 
methods of study have included studying behaviour in patients with brain lesions 
(Damasio et al.,, 1991), experimentally producing brain lesions in animals (Kolb & 
Nonneman 1978; Kolb 1984), stereotaxic surgery (Goldensohn 1992), histological 
methods (Cooper, Siddons Mann, 1995) and more recently imaging the living brain 
with various non-invasive modem scanning techniques such as functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI), Electroencephalography (EEG), Positron Emotion 
Tomography (PET) and others. 
The emerging mosaic of evidence points to a close and complex interaction 
between, especially, the medial prefrontal cortex and the limbic system, such as the 
amygdala-hippocampal circuits (LeDoux, 2003, pg. 151), associating, roughly, the 
higher level cognitive functions with the former and emotional functioning with the 
latter. The medial prefrontal cortex is regarded by an increasing number of 
neuroscientist (LeDoux, 2003; Damasio, 1994) as an essential anatomical part of the 
brain, which allows cognitive processes to regulate and be regulated by the neural 
circuits of the limbic system, especially amygdala. 
As we will see, the medial prefrontal cortex may be the best candidate site 
Where the neuronal systems responsible for the integration of the limbic and cognitive 
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information. Furthermore, the evidence presented below shows a clear functional link 
between the pre-frontal cortex and the autonomic nervous system of the body. This is 
important since one of the main theories considered in this and next three chapters, 
the Somatic Marker Hypothesis, considers the functioning of the body proper as a 
central component in the ontology of emotions and assigns to it an influential role 
within the human decision making processes. 
3.1.4.1 Evidence of the Functional Anatomy of the Pre-Frontal Cortex and its 
Interconnectivity with Subcortical and Autonomic Nervous System Networks 
Compared with other animals, the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is more developed 
in humans accounting for about 30% of the cerebrum (Fuster, 1996). PFC can be 
divided into three substructures, lateral, orbital and medial all of which are very 
densely connected areas. Orbital and medial structures (OFC and MFC respectively) 
are particularly heavily connected with higher sensory, cortical as well as the limbic 
and other subcortical areas of the brain associated with emotions (Kahnt, Grueschow 
& Speck, 2011). Specifically, the lateral OFC is densely connected to the sensory 
areas of olfactory, gustatory, somatosensory, auditory, visual and also the pre-motor 
regions (Cavada, Company, Tejedor, Cruz-Rizzolo. & Reinoso-Suarez, 2000). MFC 
is selectively connected with the hippocampus, posterior parahippocampal cortex, 
posterior cingulate and retrosplenial areas, and area prostriata whereas OFC receives 
greater inputs from Amygdala. Both, OFC and MFC structures are connected with 
amygdala, hippocampus, thalamic limbic nuclei, cingulate cortex (Rempel-Clower & 
Barbas, 1998) and biochemically specific cell groups in the basal forebrain and 
brainstem (Cavada et al., 2000). Furthermore, both OFC and Amygdala project to the 
inhibitory thalamic reticular nuclei (Zikopoulos & Barbas, 2006, 2012) which is an 
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essential brain system implicated in the operation of selective attention (McAlonan,
Cavanaugh & Wurtz, 2006; Zikopoulos & Barbas, 2012). The projections of
Amygdala and OFC to the inhibitory thalamic reticular nuclei (TRN) can explain the
neuronal mechanisms through which emotionally salient stimuli is able to attract 
attention. Important aspects of this interconnectivity are considered below. 
The Amygdala, which has long been known for its involvement m fear, 
anxiety and other processing of negatively valenced stimuli (Larkin 1997; LeDoux, 
1996, 2000), has recently been suggested that it is also involved in the processing of 
positively valenced stimuli; there is evidence that the latter modulates the activity of 
the Amygdala to a greater degree than negatively valenced stimuli (Cunningham, Van 
Bavel & Johnsen, 2008). 
On the prefrontal cortex, Kringelbach & Rolls (2004) propose that rewards 
and punishment related information is processed separately, with the MFC monitoring 
reward related information whereas lateral OFC monitors punishment related 
information. A recent fMRl study found evidence for this proposition and, in addition, 
found evidence that MFC codes both reward related information and their behavioral 
consequences whereas OFC made use of the negative reinforcement to cue 
behavioural change (Elliott, Agnew & Deakin, 2010). Kringelbach and Rolls also 
found that anterior parts of OFC were more related to the processing of abstract 
stimuli as compared to more posterior OFC areas. 
Recently, Kennerley and colleagues have reported a double dissociation 
between the functioning of OFC and Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) with the latter 
using a common valuation currency integrating multiple decision parameters and the 
former dynamically evaluating current choices relative to recent choice values 
(Kennerley, Behrens & Wallis, 2011). 
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Left Prefrontal Cortex (LPFC) on the other hand is causally associated with a 
suboptimal decision strategy, especially in situations requiring greater degrees of 
cognitive control (Xue, Juan, Chang & Lu, 2012). Controlling for different degrees of 
uncertainty, Stem, Gonzalez, Welsh & Taylor (2010) found that increased uncertainty 
during the accumulation of evidence was associated with increased activity in the 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, whereas greater uncertainty associated with the 
execution of a decision increased activity in the lateral frontal and parietal activity. 
Also the ventromedial pre frontal cortex (vmPFC - Figure 3.3) did show an increased 
activation with increased uncertainty. vrnPFC receives input from both sensory 
regions and somatosensory cortices (Rolls, 2004) both of which are interconnected 
among themselves and have extensive inputs from the body proper (Damasio, 1994, 
p.180; Bush, Luu & Posner, 2000).
Of particular relevance to the issue of the link between cognition and bodily 
aspects of emotion, it has been long demonstrated that electrical stimulations of PFC 
result in significant increases in blood pressure and can provoke an autonomic 
response strong enough to cause cardiac ischemia and myocardial infarction (Rempel­
Clower & Barbas 1998). This suggests a causal neural pathway from PFC to the 
autonomic structures of the nervous system, possibly via its projections to the 
hypothalamus. To trace the ascending and descending neuronal projections between 
prefrontal cortex and hypothalamus, Rempel-Clower and Barbas injected horseradish 
peroxidase conjugated to wheat germ agglutinin (in 17 animals), fluorescent dyes (in 
3 animals) and 3H-labeled amino acids (4 animals) with eight injections in the OFC, 8 
in MFC and 8 in LFC in a total of 24 Rhesus monkeys. The brains of the Rhesus 
monkeys were then dissected and studied under microscope. Rempel-Clower and 
Barbas found strong evidence for robust descending neural projection specifically 
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from the limbic prefrontal areas to the hypothalamic autonomic areas supporting the
idea for a structural and functional connection between the prefrontal cortex and
autonomic nervous system via the hypothalamus.
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Figure 3.3: Approximate locations of Lateral, Orbital and Medial Pre Frontal 
cortices on a model of the brain. 
3.1.4.2 The Integration of the Pre-Frontal Cortex Within Large Scale Theories 
of Brain Organisation 
Many neuroscientists have attempted to orgamze this highly complex mosaic of 
interconnected brain regions into larger psychobiological explanatory constructs with 
varying degrees of success. The SAS model, which was discussed in the first chapter, 
is one example. More recently, Panksepp (2004) has suggested that the functioning of 
the brain is best organised around two major axes, namely State versus Channel 
functioning. The State functioning denotes the propensity of some brain systems to 
have a global effect and rely less on sensory channels than is the case for the Channel
functioning. These systems involve biogenic amino transmitters, norepinephrine,
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dopamine and serotonin systems whose widespread effects are the global regulation 
of neuronal arousability. 
According to Panksepp, these functions may be necessary to generate the 
psycho-neural context that drives more finely grained cognitive functions. The latter, 
that constitute the Channel functioning, are more in tune with the stream of 
information from sensory and perceptual channels, hence are designated as Channel 
functioning, and respond to pressure created by the State function. Panksepp argues 
that State or Global functioning differs from channel functioning in that they are not 
computational in the same way. The State functioning role is not to convey discrete 
packets of information but create holistic urges and in their evolutionary role - which, 
according to Panksepp (2004), precedes Channel control systems - have left their 
imprint in the instinctual behaviours who display intentionality as part of the action 
apparatus. The comparatively newly developed cortical centres, which underlie 
channel functions, are more akin to generation of subtler choices. 
There is a clear parallel to this neuroscience perspective of the organisation of 
the brain and the cognitive theory of brain organisation known as the dual process 
theory (see next section), which also organises cognitive functions along two systems, 
System I and System II. As will be explained below, the functional description of the 
State functioning of the brain as described by Panksepp also describes the 
characteristics of System I functioning, and Channel functioning that of System II. 
Taken together, both theories amalgamate into a clearer picture of the biological and 
cognitive aspects of psychological functioning, both of which are needed for a full 
explanation of the interaction between emotion and cognition. The next sections will 
focus on the cognitive aspects of emotional organisation. 
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J.J.5 Dual Process Theory of Cognition 
As the circumstances surrounding Gage's accident demonstrates, people are often
prone to errors. While fortunately for most of the time the consequences of our errors
are negligible, at other times they can be very costly or dangerous indeed (see Chapter
1, e.g. Woodhouse & Woodhouse 1995; Gronlund, Ohrt, Dougherty, Perry &
Manning, 1998). Consequently, a large number of public and private entities are 
interested and invest in finding ways to reduce error occurrence, an apt example is the 
funding of this research by the MoD. Typically, attempts at reducing the scope for 
error have resulted on ever more elaborate checklists and procedures (Kahneman 
2011). They are certainly effective and serve an essential role in reducing the scope 
for error in a wide variety of tasks. Well designed checklists and procedures can be 
effective for tasks such as setting up complicated equipment, handling malfunctions 
or running regular checks on multiple systems. 
However, an important question is how do these checklists and procedures 
interact with experience and skill? Is the way that people function based on laws of 
logic and clean powers of deduction which underlie mathematical and cost-benefit 
type analysis, or are they more likely to base their cognitions in intuition and gut 
feeling. The answer, as we will see, is both. Which mode of cognition takes priority 
depends on the situation but both modes of cognition are at play all the time. This is, 
in a nutshell, what the Dual Process Theory argues for. 
The Dual-Process theory argues for the existence of two separate cognitive 
systems, System I and System II, each encompassing quite distinct evolutionary 
histories (Evans, 2003). Evans describes System I as evolutionarily old, universal and 
one that humans share with other animals. System II on the other hand is, 
comparatively, evolutionarily young; its most obvious manifestation is the distinct 
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human ability for analytical and abstract reasoning. This distinction, of course, is not 
new and has resurfaced in various guises in the psychological discourse of at least the 
past 100 years. In a literature review, Sloman ( 1996) observed that System I is 
analogous to the described operations of vast and diffuse associative networks whose 
modus operandi consists of learned associative pathways working in parallel, whereas 
System II is analogous to descriptions of serial, analytic systems, manipulating 
symbols in a rule-governed way. 
Prominent advocates of the view of cognition as a rule based, analytic system, 
Fodor & Pylyshyn ( 1988) have argued that via combinations of simple rules, the mind 
is capable of generating large numbers of propositions to create ever more elaborate 
and larger sets of propositions. They highlight that rule-based systems of the mind, 
branded as the "language of thought", are systematic in nature. An example they give 
is that the capability of understanding that "Mary loves John" implies a capability of 
understanding "John loves Mary". There is no doubt that we can reason in this way 
but, Sloman (1996) argues, that is one method of reasoning which functions aside 
another whose mode of operation is rather different. An example is heuristic 
reasoning, which is a mode of thinking and decision-making based on intuition and 
expertise. This mode of thinking is largely automatic, comprised of many subsystems, 
which run in parallel below the level of consciousness awareness (Ferguson & Zayas 
2009). We are aware of only their product which emerges into conscious awareness 
while the processes themselves remain hidden (Evans, 2003). 
Not unlike the SA debate of product versus process, there has been a long 
debate within p_sychological circles whether cognition processes information in a
serial or parallel way dividing researchers along these lines of explanation. See for 
example the debate between the Associationists and Gestalt psychologists, the former 
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arguing that the perception as a whole is built by elementary associations whereas the
latter arguing that the whole precedes its parts or Treisman and Gelade's earlier work
on the feature integration theory of attention which suggests that features of the visual
scene, for example, are registered early, automatically and in parallel while objects
are recognised later requiring focused attention (Treisman & Gelade 1980) . 
Treisman and Ge lade asserted that "float free", unattended features of a visual scene 
can be conjoined by utilizing past experience and contextual information prior to 
conscious perception. 
The dual process theory takes the view that both modes of thinking are present 
and attempts to integrate them into one overarching explanation. Evidence does seem 
to support the presence of both systems and suggests important differences in their 
functional and anatomical characteristics as well as phylogenetic history, which may 
clarify as well as extend the implications for the effects of emotion on cognition. 
For example, look at the picture of the face at Figure 3.4 on the left. 
Immediately and in parallel, simultaneous fashion one knows that it is of a female, 
with blonde hair, smiling, happy, and for someone who has seen her movies there will 
be an associated feeling of familiarity (the picture is of the actress Scarlett Johansson). 
Both perceptual (blonde, female) and intuitive (happy, familiar face) information 
emerges seamlessly without any conscious effort. This mode of thinking is clearly not 
a product of detailed analysis of an analytic system. Conversely, and as any A level 
student will testify, making sense of a complex mathematical equation does not "jump 
out" in the same way; a systematic, procedural led, knowledge based analysis is 
required (Kahneman 2011, p. 19). 
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Figure 3.4: System I and System II Functioning. System I - Looking at the picture 
above (Actress Scarlet Johansson) one can without much thinking or analysing derive 
a number of conclusions almost immediately. 
A demonstration of differences on the basic cognitive processes along the 
System I and II functioning can be found in a study by Ohman, Flykt, & Esteves 
(2001) who reported that participants' search and find behaviour towards fear-
relevant pictures (snakes or spiders) but not fear-irrelevant pictures (flowers or 
mushrooms) was relatively unaffected by stimulus location or the number of 
distractors. It suggests that fear relevant pictures, which represent an emotional 
stimuli, are handled by parallel processing whereas non-emotional stimuli are handled 
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by serial processmg; a distinction made in System I and System II functioning 
respectively. 
The processes of System I can greatly affect and usually dominate System IL 
Using the Sequential Evaluative Priming Paradigm, Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & 
Kardes (1986) have shown that the classification of the valence of the Target stimuli 
is faster and more accurate when it shares the same valence with the Prime even 
though the latter is not consciously perceived. This shows that Primes are 
unconsciously and automatically processed and that they affect the conscious 
evaluation of the Targets implicitly. This capability of System I to exert covert 
influence to observable behaviour has been demonstrated for human faces, images of 
objects and it can affect mood states behaviours and judgments (Ferguson & Zayas 
2009). 
A particularly elegant, highly ecological demonstration of System I and II 
functioning and their interaction is illustrated from a study carried out at the 
University of Newcastle, UK (Bateson, Nettle & Roberts, 2006). They tested the 
effects of seemingly unrelated stimuli on the participants' behaviour. Capitulating on 
a long established honesty box system which was used for collecting voluntary 
payment to pay for coffee and tea, Bateson et al., (2006), introduced an instructions 
for payment noticeboard which was displayed at eye height on a cupboard door 
located above a counter on which the honesty box was situated along with the coffee 
and tea making equipment. The notice featured a 150 by 3 5 mm banner that alternated 
each week between an image of a pair of eyes and an image of flowers printed above 
the prices for tea, coffee and milk. Keeping participants naive to the purpose of the 
banner, researchers recorded every week the total amount of money collected in the 
honesty box and computed the ratio of money collected to the volume of milk 
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consumed in each week to control for weekly variation in consumption (Figure 3.5). 
The graphed results are self-evident and show rather clearly how an apparently 
unrelated stimulus did influence behaviour. If asked, the participants who were 
completely unaware of the banner would surely not be able to make the link between 
their behavior and the banner. How would current SA models cope with this given 
that the main causal factor of this behaviour is not consciously linked to it? 
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Figure 3.5: Somebody is Watching. When the posters are eyes, the eyes are symbols 
"somebody is watching". The graph shows clearly that when the posters had eyes the 
payments were consistently greater. (Source: Bateson, Nettle & Roberts, 2006). 
Slavic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein's experiment in 1988 showed that System I 
is dominant over" System II. In an effort to change the emotional appraisal of their 
participants with regard to various technologies, they gave participants brief 
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statements some stressing the benefits of a particular technology others stressing the
low risk of another. It was rather surprising to find that the participants who had read
about the benefits of a given technology also changed their beliefs with regard to its
risks although there was no evidence indicating so. As Kahneman (2011, p. 140) 
explains: "the emotional tail wags the rational dog". 
The same effect is seen in the social effects of prosopagnosia, a difficulty in 
recognizing familiar faces. People with this condition often cause unintentional 
offense, for example, by failing to greet friends and family who might happen to pass 
by on the street. Even when the friends and family know about their condition, they 
cannot help but feel offended. The fact that they are informed about the condition, 
nevertheless, does not seem to stop the emotional reaction (Yardley, McDermott, 
Pisarski, Duchaine & Nakayama 2008). 
And finally, the two systems theory can draw ample support from the very 
well studied Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935). A widely used task, the Stroop effect is 
reliably produced each time when participants are presented, for example, with color 
words (i.e. Green, Blue) and asked to name as quickly as possible the color of the ink 
in which the words are printed. In a congruent condition the colour of the ink matches 
the word whereas in the incongruent condition the colour of the ink and the word 
mismatch. In the incongruent condition, participants frequently read the word itself 
even though the task requires them to speak out the ink colour. In the two systems 
theory, according to Kahneman (2011), System I overshoots its mark by doing more 
than the task actually demands which, in tum, involves the effortful processing of the 
System II to suppress the unrequired behaviour that would otherwise follow the
System I activity. Stroop effect is a clear demonstration of the interplay between these
two different modes of processing.
101 
From an evolutionary perspective, System I enables an organism to make 
rapid decisions and is responsible for maintaining a fast and dynamic link with the 
reality of an environment which can change at any moment without notice. However, 
unless it is explicitly shown that the decisions it is making are wrong, System I will 
implicitly assume the opposite and continue without the need for much conscious 
thought (Kahneman, 2011). The neural bases of the interplay between these two 
systems, the evidence presented above seems to indicate, may reside in Frontal Lobes. 
The SAS model of the organization of the brain briefly described in Chapter 1 as well 
as Panksepp's model are largely congruent with the two systems explanation. All of 
these models share the opinion that the brain cognitive systems are largely separated 
between the automatic and voluntary systems and all agree that the automatic system 
is evolutionarily older, concerned with the heuristic, parallel processing, intuitive and 
fast and providing a psychoneural context for the operation of the voluntary system. 
On the other hand, the voluntary system is consistently described across these models 
as evolutionarily younger, concerned with finely grained cognitions and, in 
comparison generating subtler choices and having the capabilities for serial, analytic 
and abstract reasoning. 
An important implication of the two systems theory is that, often, the aspects 
that affect the assessment of a situation and go on to have a profound influence on the 
decision making processes, which is the main reason why SA is studied, are often 
hidden from conscious awareness and, therefore, not directly accessible by 
questionnaire-type methods. 
A particularly influential theory, which, it will be argued, can bring many 
important aspects of these theories together into a testable format has been proposed 
by Damasio (1994) and is known as the Somatic Marker Hypothesis. Initially based 
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on the peculiarities of the EVR case (see section 3.1.3 above), Damasio has attempted
to weave together all the emerging puzzle pieces into a clearer understanding of
frontal lobe functioning, their involvement in emotional processing and their role in
regulating decision-making behaviour. A particularly useful aspect of the Somatic
Marker Hypothesis is the idea that somatic states can learn to adapt to a situation and
covertly influence decision-making. We can think of Somatic Markers functioning as
part of an apparatus, which in a biological level is congruent with the State 
functioning and at a cognitive level with System I. 
An explanation of Damasio's theory cannot be fully complete without 
considering its origin: the seminal work of two well known figures in psychology, 
William James and Carl Lange. We should note from the outset that Somatic Marker 
Hypothesis is at present just that, a hypothesis. Most researchers vary in the degree to 
which they endorse or reject the Somatic Marker Hypothesis, however, there is no 
doubt that it has generated, at times heated, debates. In this and the following two 
chapters, the Somatic Marker hypothesis features predominantly. 
3.1.6 Autonomic Nervous System and Emotions 
As mentioned above, the origins of Somatic Marker theory of emotions builds upon 
the work of William James and Carl Lange who around 1880s first came up with the 
theory later to be known as James-Lange theory of emotions (Friedman 2010; Lowe 
& Ziemke 2011). James (1890, p. 449) stated "common sense says, we lose our 
fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted 
by a rival, are angry and strike . . . this order of sequence is incorrect . . . the more 
rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike,
afraid because we tremble". Similarly and independently from James, Carle Lange
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(1885) emphasized the physiological mechanisms of the body, especially the 
vasomotor function, as important in supporting emotional states. The common aspect 
between James and Lange idea was that the bodily changes that follow perception of 
an exciting stimulus are, in effect, the emotion. 
James pointed out that the emotions, such as fear, would be impossible 
without their correlate body manifestations: "we feel sorry because we cry, angry 
because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, 
because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be. Without the bodily states 
following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, 
colourless, destitute of emotional warmth." (James, 1884). Abstracting from emotion 
all the bodily symptoms, James argued, there is nothing left to account for the 
experience of emotions. Independently of James, Carl Lang also arrived at the same 
conclusion: "If from one terrified the accompanying bodily symptoms are removed, 
the pulse permitted to beat quietly, the glance to become firm, the color natural, the 
movements rapid and secure, the speech strong, the thoughts clear, -- what is there 
left of his terror?" (Lange, 1885). 
Cannon (1929, p. 280-283) opposed the James-Lange theory of emotions 
arguing that the range and quality of emotions could not be adequately mirrored by 
body states. For example, qualitatively different emotions, such as fear and anger, are 
characterized by similar body states such as increased heart rate, inhibited digestion 
and increased sweating (see Bear, Connors & Paradiso, 2001, pg. 582 - 584). Cannon 
reported that transaction at the higher end of the spinal cord, which diminish feedback 
from the Autonomic Nervous System (ANS), did not lead to diminished emotions. 
Furthermore, Cannon (1929, p. 281) states: "If these differences are due to other than 
visceral changes, why is it not always possible by voluntary innervations to produce 
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emotions? We can laugh and cry and tremble. But forced laughter does not bring
happiness, nor forced sobbing sorrow, and the trembling from cold rouses neither
anger nor fear" concluding that emotions must reside exclusively in the brain
(Cannon (1929, p. 280-283). 
Evidence however, has not supported Cannon's conclusions. Ekman and his 
colleagues carried out a series of experiments and demonstrated ANS specificity for 
different emotions (Ekman, Levenson & Friesen, 1983; Levenson, Carstensen, 
Friesen & Ekman, 1991; Ekman, 1992). Ekman instructed participants, muscle by 
muscle, to create on their face a specific expression of an emotion. He found greater 
activity of ANS following facial expressions of emotion. Furthermore, he found that 
the ANS and the heart rate increased when the expression mimicked a negative 
feeling (anger, disgust) relative to mimicked expressions of positive feelings. Other 
measures revealed that the finger temperature increased when the emotion simulated 
was anger as opposed to fear and moreover, when the reported feeling of emotion 
matched the facial expression, the ANS distinctions among the negative emotions 
were greater. Open-ended questionnaires were administered to measure participants' 
subjective feeling of emotion, which established that the observed ANS activity 
following voluntary facial expressions was also followed by the appropriate 
subjective emotion. Ekman's findings support the hypothesis that body states precede 
subjectively felt emotions and furthermore, that different emotions can be represented 
by emotion specific configurations of the body systems. These results were replicated 
cross culturally and across different age groups. 
More recent studies have shown that spinal cord lesions very often do not 
completely disrupt the afferent signal from the peripheral to the central nervous
system, which could explain, in accordance with James-Lange theory, the present
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feeling of emotion on Spinal Cord Lesion (SCI) patients (Nicotra, Critchley, Mathias 
& Dolan 2006). Furthermore, Nicotra et al (2006) provided evidence that experience 
of emotions is hindered by such injuries, whereas Damasio (1999, pg. 60 - 61) points 
out that, even in an event of total disruption of communications between central and 
peripheral nervous systems via spinal cord, feedback is still transmitted via cranial 
nerves, facial muscles and facial viscera. Additional support for the James-Lange 
theory comes from the effects of benzodiazepines. Benzodiazepines (a particularly 
recognised branding of benzodiazepines is Valium) are often prescribed as muscle 
relaxants as well as anxiolytics. The assumption here is that it is hard to feel tense 
when all your muscles are relaxed. 
An additional development that deserves mentioning was proposed by 
Schachter & Singer (1962). They affirmed the causal role that ANS plays in the 
generation of emotions, in accordance with James-Lange, but argued against ANS 
capability for emotion specificity. They argued that an emotion-non-specific 
physiological arousal is labeled at a later stage by the cognitive circumstances, which 
then tum the non-specific arousal into the feeling of a specific emotion. In a highly 
influential but heavily criticized study (Friedman, 2009), Schachter & Singer (1962) 
injected norepinephrine in two groups of people, one was informed about its effects 
the other was not. In the waiting room a confederate who posed as another participant, 
created either a euphoric or angry situations. As expected, they found that the group 
that did not know about the epinephrine and its effects behaved and reported feeling 
emotions consistent with the emotional environment created by the confederate. They 
did not find this. in the group that new about the effects of the epinephrine injection.
However, this theory does not explain the emotion specificity of ANS representations 
reported by other studies (i.e. Lacey, 1950; Ax, 1953), by Ekman (1983; 1992). 
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3.J. 7 The Somatic Marker Hypothesis
Patric & James (2004) reported a case in a nuclear plant where operators evaluated as
true a machine reading of a valve, which indicated that it was shut. The situation
evolved in the following way: the reactor temperature rose tripping the reactor and 
electromagnetic valve. Sometime later a machine reading indicated that the valve was 
shut, when in fact it was open. Despite plenty of information indicating otherwise and 
which should have normally raised the alarm, the operators still believed for more 
than two hours that the valve was shut when in fact it was not. One of the 
psychological elements that contributed to this conclusion, Patrick and James suggest, 
was the fact that operators had prior knowledge about a persistent leak occurring on 
that valve, and it was this particular piece of knowledge that explained way all other 
conflicting information that was indicating otherwise. In terms of dual processes 
theory, an alternative explanation may be that System I processes could have 
concluded, erroneously, that the valve was displaying the same behaviour as before 
and overruled all other cues with which System II would have, according to the theory, 
otherwise been processing. Many people tend to rely on heuristics, such as the one 
that assigns a high level of credibility to machine readings, and rightly so because 
machines rarely fail; hence in both situations, operator's actions, or inactions, can be 
attributed to this type of heuristic reasoning which in this particular case led them to 
form an inaccurate representation of the situation. The question is, did they have any 
feeling at all during the sequence of events that something perhaps was not quite
right? If yes, is it possible to detect such a feeling from changes in the brain or body
physiology?
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It will be proposed in this thesis that the Somatic Makers paradigm offers the 
best hope that such a measure can be developed and potentially used as an indicator of 
situation awareness processes within System I or State functioning. A particular 
advantage of the Somatic Marker theory with respect to the aim of this thesis is that 
Somatic Markers precede decisions. This means that the possibility of detecting the 
SM activity specific and prior to a disadvantageous decision hence an attempt to 
modify it prior to its enaction is conceivable. As will be discussed below, the Somatic 
Marker hypothesis makes predictions specific enough to be reliably tested. Though 
not absolutely precise, the neural architecture supporting the theory has been spelled 
out in some detail which makes it possible to target psychophysiological measures of 
Somatic Markers, especially EEG, with reasonable accuracy. 
The first term of the label Somatic Markers, can be directly related to James-
Lange theory of emotions. Damasio (1994, p. 174) states: "Because the feeling is 
about the body, I gave the phenomenon the technical term somatic state ("soma" is 
Greek for body); and because it "marks" an image2, I called it a marker." The body, 
defined here in a general sense including visceral and non-visceral sensations, 
automatically marks the decision options with a negative or positive emotional signal 
based on the prior experience. This is a fast and automatic process, which quickly 
reduces the decision space with the effect of an increased efficiency of the conscious 
reasoning mechanisms. If we refer back to Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, the operation of 
the Information Bias (IB) also has a similar role of biasing information processing by 
restricting its information space. Furthermore, IB seems to be directly affected by the 
emotional aspects of information processing. There is therefore a clear parallel 
between the operation of Somatic Markers and Information Bias. 
2 Images are defined as the main content of our thoughts not specific to any sensory modality but 
including all (see Damasio 1994, p. 106-108 for a detailed description) 
108 
-------------- Chapter 3 --------------
According to Damasio, the valence of the SM markers is an expression of the 
learned behaviours and past experiences that are brought to bear in the assessment of
any situation hence linking the consequences of each possible scenario that
experience predicts to an emotional signal. A negative emotional signal will
automatically inhibit or reject a large number of possible options whereas a positive 
one will bias the cognitions towards those options which prior experience has 
associated with positive outcome. The impaired functioning of the SM, therefore, 
impairs the speed and efficiency of System II processes by failing to reduce its range 
of choices to a size that System II can deal with; both the Gage and EVR cases 
demonstrate the widespread effects of the failure of this system. If the neural circuit 
that supports the functioning of SM is damaged, both the speed and the efficiency of 
making decisions is impaired to the point of near paralysis. As we have already seen, 
vmPFC functioning seems to have a central role in this. 
Testing the hypothesis, Damasio et al., (1991) compared the performance of 
three groups in an emotional task (see below for details); group 1 consisted of five 
patients with bilateral lesions in lower medial frontal regions; group 2, which was the 
brain-damaged controls, included 6 patients with brain lesions elsewhere other than 
vmPFC and group 3 consisted of 5 normal non-brain damaged controls. All 
participants were exposed to three types of stimuli: 1) Elementary Unconditioned 
Orienting stimuli which has been shown to reliably induce Skin Conductance 
Response (SCR) in normal people (such as hand clapping close to the ear). 2) Target 
Pictures depicting emotionally charged images with "strong meaning" and 3) Non­
Target Pictures with neutral images and no implied strong meaning and which did not 
usually elicit large SCRs. A further condition with two levels was introduced, Passive
and Active; in the Passive condition, participants were not required to make any
109 
Chapter 3 --- -----------
-------------- Chapter 3 --------------
verbal or motor response, whereas in the Active condition, participants were required 
to describe the content of the photos and the impact it made on them. 
The findings showed that vmPFC patients did not generate discriminatory 
SCR in the passive condition but showed normal discriminatory SCR in the Active 
condition for target versus non-target. Normal SCR in vmPFC patients in response to 
Unconditioned Orienting stimuli (hand clapping) ruled out autonomic dysfunction. 
These results were replicated in a repeat of the experiment several months later and 
also two years later; vmPFC patients consistently showed no discriminatory SCR in 
the passive condition. This clearly points to a direct causal link between the damage 
to the vmPFC, the body's Autonomic Nervous System (ANS) and the well­
documented cognitive impairments in decision making that follow damage to vmPFC. 
In addition to studying patients with damaged vmPFC, support for SM 
hypothesis has been largely based on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). IGT will be 
described in greater detail further down but, to give an early overview, it has been 
widely praised for its ecological validity and subtle structure which have made it a 
widely used testing paradigm in many psychological experiments (see second 
paragraph below - section 3 .1. 7 .1 ). 
3.1. 7.1 Investigations of Somatic Marker Hypothesis using Iowa Gambling 
Task 
There are several variants of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) in use but the original 
version consists of five, 20 trial blocks where in each trial a participant makes choices 
from four concui-rently presented decks of cards, A, B, C and D, for monetary gains. 
Typically, the two decks on the left, A and B, are set so that participants make higher 
gains (relative to decks C and D) but over time lead to a cumulative loss. Decks C and 
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D on the other hand offer lower gains but over time lead to a cumulative profit.
Rewards are present in every trial whereas losses are intermittent.
IGT attempts to simulate real life decision-making conditions in laboratory 
settings and has shown differences in the decision making performance on vmPFC
damaged patients as compared with the normal population (Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio & Anderson, 1994). The IGT paradigm has also reliably shown expected 
discriminations in performance on a range of neurological and psychiatric conditions 
such as, addiction (Bechara & Damasio, 2002), schizophrenia (Whitney, Fastenau, 
Evans & Lysaker, 2003), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Cavedini, Riboldi, Keller, 
D'Annucci & Bellodi, 2002), Huntington's and Parkinson's disease (Stout, Rodawalt 
& Siemers, 2001) drug abuse (Bechara, Dolan, Denburg, Hindes, Anderson & Nathan, 
2001) anorexia nervosa (Cavedini, Bassi, Ubbiali, Casolari, Giordani, Zorzi & Bellodi, 
2004) patients with pathological gambling problems (Brand, Kalbe, Labudda, 
Fujiwara, Kessler & Markowitsch, 2005). It has also been used to show how people 
make economic decisions (Bechara & Damasio, 2005) and it has been enabled testing 
a dissociation between SM and Working Memory in neural and functional processes 
(Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & Anderson, 1998). Furthermore, dysfunction of SM in 
IGT has been found to correlate with hypersensitivity to reward and insensitivity to 
punishments as well as insensitivity to future consequences (Bechara, Tranel & 
Damasio, 2000). 
The strengths of IGT, according to Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio 
{1997a), rests on the fact that the reward/punishment schedules of the IGT are 
sufficiently obscure so that the learning that takes place is largely implicit. They also 
point out that the task offers a greater ecological validity when compared to other
similar tasks such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. 
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To assess the progression of implicit learning during the IGT task, Bechara et 
al., (1997) subjected vmPFC patients (n 6) and healthy control group (n = 10), to a 
modified version of IGT which assessed participants' explicit knowledge of the task 
every ten trials beginning with the trial 20. The findings supported a categorisation of 
the development of knowledge from implicit to explicit into the following stages: 
I. pre-punishment before major losses had been encountered (trial 1 - 20)
II. pre-hunch following the pre-punishment stage where participants were
expected to start generating anticipatory SCR (trial 40 - 50). 
III. hunch - where most participants started to have some idea about advantageous
and disadvantageous decks (trial 50 - 80). 
IV. Conceptual stage where most participants were expected to have conscious
knowledge of the rule underlying the game (80 +). 
Most participants, Bechara and colleagues found, started to developed 
anticipatory SCR around the pre-hunch period, however, the most important finding 
in this study was that even though around 50% of vmPFC patients reached conceptual 
stage, in absence of anticipatory SCR (in other words, with an impaired SM system) 
they continued to make disadvantageous choices (Bechara et al 1997; Dunn, 
Dalgleish & Lawrence, 2006), which has led to the deduction that the SM biasing 
effects on the decision making are largely implicit and powerful. The conclusion that 
Bechara and colleagues came to was that vmPFC patients are unable to "access 
complex signals reflecting records of previous experience shaped by reward, 
punishment, and the emotional state that attends them" (Bechara et al., 1997, p.1294) 
which impairs their decision making behaviour. 
A later study with IGT, also implicated the Amygdala in the neural circuit 
required for the generation of Somatic Markers. Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Lee 
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(1999) found that patients with damage in the Amygdala displayed the same absence 
of SCR signal as did vmPFC patients. Additionally, participants with damage to 
Amygdala also did not show SCRs related to the post selection feedback. An 
important finding was that some normal controls whose performance on the task 
indicated that they did not learn the rules (they chose disadvantageously), also did not 
display discriminatory SCR prior to selection lending strong support to the idea that 
the optimal functioning of the SM is important in decision-making. 
Other areas that are thought to play a role in the SM neural circuitry are the 
Insula, which facilitates bi-directional communication between affective inputs from 
limbic structures such as the orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala (McDonald, Shammah­
Lagnado, Shi, & Davis, 1999) and anterior cingulate and the attentional prefrontal­
parietal network in the processing of somatic states associated with risky decision 
making (Bechara, 2001; Paulus, Rogalsky, Simmons, Feinstein & Stein 2003) as well 
as the Somatosensory Cortex where it is which the body maps its internal states in the 
Central Nervous System (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1997b). Furthermore, 
Tranel, Bechara & Denburg (2002) reported that lesions on the right hemisphere were 
associated with the decreased performance in IGT more so than lesions on the left 
hemisphere which lends support the suggestion by Bechara & Damasio (2005) that 
right vmPFC may be associated with the negative SM whereas left with positive SM. 
It should be mentioned that the use ofIGT is not without controversy. For 
example. Steingroever, Wetzels, Horstmann., et al., (2013) highlight that the 
interpretation of the results on IGT is based on 3 key assumptions: (a) healthy 
participants learn to prefer the good options over the bad options; (b) healthy 
participants show homogeneous choice behavior; and ( c) healthy participants first 
explore the different options and then exploit the most profitable ones. Re-analysing 
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eight data sets in which IGT data came from healthy participants, they found that all 
the assumptions may be invalid; that is, (a) healthy participants often prefer decks 
with infrequent losses instead of the good decks; (b) healthy participants show 
idiosyncratic choice behavior; and ( c) healthy participants do not show a systematic 
decrease in the number of switches across trials. 
Also an effect has been found in chronic marijuana users who tend to perform 
poorly on the IGT. Wesleya, Hanlona, & Porrino (2011) contrasted 16 marijuana 
users against an equal number of controls; both performed a modified IGT in an MRI 
scanner. Marijuana user performed badly from beginning to end while there was no 
difference in group performance during the initial strategy development phase 
suggesting a decreased susceptibility of marijuana users to the negative emotional 
stimuli. While cannabis is associated with positive syndrome schizophrenia, it is 
unclear whether cannabinoids are also related to negative symptoms such as affective 
blunting. It is known that marijuana users are associated with schizotypy personality 
disorder (Skosnik, Park, Dobbs & Gardner, 2008) and attentional disinhibition 
(Skosnik, Spatz-Glen & Park, 2001), both of which could have an effect on how the 
participants perform in IGT. 
3.1. 7.2 The role of Automatic Nervous System (ANS) in Somatic Markers: The 
Communication Between ANS and Central Nervous System and its Effects on 
the Performance in Iowa Gambling Task 
Some studies using IGT with patients that have suffered vanous degrees of 
impairments on ANS and CNS communication via the spinal cord have not found that 
it leads to deterioration on the performance in IGT, which is what SM hypothesis 
predicts. In fact, a superior performance compared to controls on IGT has been 
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reported for patients with pure autonomic failure (Heims, Critchley, Dolan, Matthias 
et al., 2004). Furthermore, North & O'Carroll (2001) had also found no meaningful 
differences in the IGT performance between patients with spinal cord damage (full 
lesion at C6) and controls (see Figure 3.6). These arguments we have encountered 
before with the James Lange hypothesis and some of the evidence explaining this has 
been already discussed on section 3.1.6 above. However, there are two further aspects 
of SM hypothesis, which will be considered next, that help explain why and how 
patients with spinal cord lesions can perform well in IGT, in other words, suggest a 
functioning SM system despite the injuries. 
Figure 3. 6: Organisation of the Spinal Cord Lesions at C6 do not lead to differences 
in IGT performance. Note that C6 location is high up the spinal cord. A complete 
lesion there disrupts almost (but not all) communication between ANS and the brain 
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3.1. 7. 3 The "Body Loop" and Aas if Body Loop" 
The body brain loop in the SM hypothesis has been extended to include an "as 
if Body Loop" (Figure 3.7). This system accounts for circumstances when a fast 
situation assessment is required that does not allow for the whole body loop system to 
come into play (Bechara & Damasio 2005). At this point, according to Bechara and 
Damasio, the "as if Body Loop", the neural circuits of which reside entirely in the 
CNS, can simulate the appropriate body states from trained neural circuits in the 
somatosensory cortices without the need for the input from the body proper. 
Bechara and Damasio suggest that both systems address different functional 
needs with the body loop being engaged in situations involving uncertainty whereas 
the "as if Body Loop" being engaged in the selection of risky choices. The evidence 
for this dissociation is limited and it is not clear why this is the case. For example, 
anticipatory SCR found in the Cambridge Gambling Task, which differs with IGT in 
the fact that its contingencies are explicit, hence avoiding ambiguity, are lower than 
onIGT. 
Evolutionarily and Ontogenetically, the Body Loop precedes the "as if Body 
Loop", Bechara and Damasio claim, with the as if Body Loop superseding the base 
mechanism and quite possibly being generally more active than it. The end result of 
either process, which can be either covert or overt to consciousness, is to represent the 
relevant facts related to a situation as somatosensory images (see Damasio 1994, p. 
97-98 for a definition of images) and juxtapose them with stored image
representations that include both the possible outcomes associated with a particular 
situation and the related emotional signals related to them. At covert level, the 
resulting emotional signal biases decisions away from what it marks as bad and 
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towards what it marks as good choices, whereas at overt mode it acts as an alarm or 
incentive signal respectively. 
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Figure 3. 7: The Body Loop. Above are the neural structures that are proposed to 
support each of the systems, the Body Loop (left) and the as if Body Loop (source 
Dun et al., 2006) 
Key: VMPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; AM, amygdala; SMC, somatosensory 
cortex. 
3.1. 7.4 Somatic Markers versus Reinforcement Learning in the Iowa 
Gambling Task 
Many studies have implicated the role of OFC, a large part of which is vmPFC, in the 
stimulus-reinforcer associations (Fellows & Farah, 2003; Berlin, Rolls & Kischka, 
2004; Deco & Rolls, 2005; Simmons & Richmond, 2008). In view of this evidence, 
Rolls (2004; 2005) has outlined an alternative model of the OFC functioning 
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implicating this region in the representation of reinforcers, monitoring changes in 
them and using that information to modulate previous stimulus-reinforcer associations 
to adapt with the current conditions. This would facilitate a rapid change in behaviour. 
This role of the OFC in stimulus-reinforcer association learning, it has been 
argued, explains why some participants perform badly on IGT. For example, at the 
beginning stages of IGT procedure, the disadvantageous decks are initially 
advantageous, as they do not deliver a punishment until several selections later. By 
rearranging the punishment-reward schedule so that punishments occur on the initial 
deck selections, Fellows & Farah (2005) have found that the poor performance of the 
vmPFC patients was comparable to controls suggesting that reversing the previously 
established stimulus-reinforcer association learning (i.e reversal learning), not SM, 
was a more likely explanation why vmPFC patients perform poorly in IGT task. 
However, Bechara, and colleagues have pointed out that the location of the lesions of 
the vmPFC patients in this study was mainly in the right hemisphere, which is 
associated with working memory suggesting that the poor performance that Fellows 
and Farah found was more related to impairments in working memory not SM system 
(Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & Damasio 2005). 
Furthermore, Turnbull, Evans, Bunce, Carzolio & Connor (2005), Turnbull, 
Evans, Kemish, Park & Bowman (2006) and Dymond, Cella,Cooper, &. Turnbull 
(2010) have not found support that reversal learning does take place during the 
original IGT. However, they have developed a variant of the IGT, which they claim it 
does. 
Turnbull, Evans, Kemish, Park & Bowman (2006) first proposed a novel 
variant of IGT which, in essence, extended from the original to include a second 
phase in which the reward/punishment contingencies were switched across so that 
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previously advantageous decks become disadvantageous and vice versa. The 
reward/punishment contingencies were systematically altered after the original IGT 
100 trials in three signaled shift periods. Using this new paradigm, Tunrbull et al., 
(2006) have shown that schizophrenic patients with negative symptoms (but not the 
one with positive symptoms) are impaired on the later trials of each shift period 
compared with controls. Patients with negative symptoms of schizophrenia suffer 
from a blunted affect (Carson 2000, p.638) which could explain, in accordance with 
the SM hypothesis, the impaired performance. 
Dymond et al (2010) have further tested this new paradigm with a large 
number of normal participants (N = 206) in order to assess the role of the reversal­
learning in IGT. Arguably, this modified version of IGT to include reversal learning 
has some advantages in context of the SA and compared with other SA measuring 
techniques. Most importantly, it provides a way whereby we can experimentally 
manipulate and measure learning, induce a change in situational circumstance which 
is in direct contradiction to the previous learning and observe how participants 
perform and how is this reflected in behavioral, and psychophysiological measures. 
They introduced a few further adaptations from the original design; the task 
was computerized the subjective ratings of the goodness or badness of the desk were 
included and finally, the shifts in the contingency changes were not signaled. They 
found that at the onset of the contingency shifts, following the first 100 trials, the 
change did disrupt learning but the performance subsequently improved for each of 
the three contingency shifts. They also reported that low performers did overall select 
a higher proportion of previously-good-now-bad decks when compared to high 
performers. 
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3.1.8 Summary 
Considering the extremely complex systems and the numerous biological and 
psychological aspects involved in the generation of SM, It is not surprising that the 
SM hypothesis as well as its main experimental technique, the Iowa Gambling Task 
(IGT), have generated a considerable amount of controversy and debate over the years, 
(for an extensive critique see Maia & McClelland (2004), Dunn et al., (2006) and 
Colombetti (2008); but also see response, Bechara et al., (2005) with no general 
consensus emerging among researchers in this area yet. However, many agree that 
more studies are needed before a more nuanced understanding can be reached 
regarding SM (Colombetti, 2008; Dunn et al., 2006). The current investigation is 
aimed at furthering that understanding. 
To summarise, theoretical and experimental evidence presented in this chapter, 
which encompasses different fields of research such as neuroscience and cognitive 
psychology, suggests the existence of two separate systems, each of which is 
underlined by different neural correlates, has different cognitive functions and the 
concerted product of which underlies many higher order cognitive functions not least 
decision making. With regard to decision-making, SM hypothesis suggests that 
embodied emotional factors associated with previous experiences are an important 
supporting factor and the malfunction of which greatly impairs the efficiency of its 
operations. In line with Panskepp (2004) description that channel functioning 
responds to pressures from global functioning (see above), and the dual processes 
theory which concludes from a cognitive perspective that System I greatly influences 
System II, the Somatic Marker hypothesis may fill an explanatory gap by spelling out 
in greater detail the mechanisms of interaction between the two in both psychological 
and biological perspectives. The underlying neural circuitry of the SM, more 
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specifically the pre frontal cortex, is a highly likely neural site to be involved in the 
integration of System I or Global functioning with System II or Channel functioning. 
If the operations of the SM system can be detected with methods that offer high 
temporal resolution, such as EEG, then there is, at least conceptually, a possibility of 
developing an on-line psychophysiological measure of the decision making system 
which can be incorporated in the existing measures of SA, especially the QASA 
model. QASA model of SA is particularly well suited since it is the only model that 
has explicitly developed a measure of SA based on the implicit cognitive construct of 
IB. It is not at all unreasonable to entertain the premise that IB and SM may be two 
sides of the same coin, first from the cognitive perspective and largely in line with 
operations of System I, and second from the neuroscience perspective. The 
functioning of the IB and the SM, as stated so far, are of aiding decision making by 
automatically simplifying the decision space. 
In the next three chapters, a series of experiments will be presented whereby 
an attempt is made to develop an ERP measure of somatic markers and test it under 
various modifications of the IGT task, as first proposed by Tunrbull et al., (2006). If 
an EEG measure of SM system is possible, then the behaviour of Somatic Markers 
can be investigated under systematically changing situational conditions, which, in 
theory, could lead to a valid biological marker that can be integrated with QASA 
measures of SA. 
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Chapter 4 - Investigating Electroencephalography 
Correlates of Somatic Markers 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As outlined in the previous chapter the primary evidence supporting the Somatic 
Marker Hypothesis has been based on studies utilizing the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). 
Often described as an ecologically valid, interesting, easy to understand paradigm 
presenting a familiar environment to most participants, the IGT is also well suited to 
investigate aspects of implicit learning and, to a degree, its psychophysiological 
correlates. Regarding the latter, measures of Skin Conductance Response (SCR) have 
been central to the validity of the IGT and Somatic Marker (SM) hypothesis. 
However, the use of SCR has also meant that serious adjustments to the task have had 
to be made. Perhaps the most important adjustment has been the introduction of an 
intertrial interval of typically greater than 15s which is necessary to accommodate 
SCR recording restrictions (Dunn et al., 2006). This introduces a substantive 
confound in the ecological validity which is one of the main strengths of this task. 
Other studies have used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
(Fukui, Murai, Fukuyama, Hayashi & Hanakawa 2005; Li, Lu, Arnaud & Bechara 
2011) or electroencephalography (EEG) (Schutter & Van Honk 2005) all of which 
introduce their own brand of limitations on the ecological validity of the task. In 
comparison though, EEG is one method that can offer the least amount of interference 
on the original design as it is fast and relatively unobtrusive. On the whole, as Dunn 
and colleagues have also concluded, there are relatively few psychophysiological 
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studies, which are done with IGT. Measures of SM markers, other than SCR, that 
confirm the previous findings would certainly offer strong support to the SM 
hypothesis. In this respect, the high temporal resolution of EEG and its potential to be 
integrated with the task with minimal adjustments make it a particularly preferred 
option. 
There are relatively few studies that have used the IGT paradigm in EEG 
studies, none of which we could find has so far attempted to lock the SM signal with 
regard to a response in an Event Related Potential (ERP) type study. At first look, the 
SMs, as investigated by the IGT task, are ideal candidates for an ERP study since the 
SM signals once developed, according to SM hypothesis, are locked and precede each 
choice selection. However, even though it is thought that the SM signal precedes the 
conscious learning of the task, ( see Maia & McClelland 2004 for an opposing 
argument), the duration from learning the task to reaching explicit insight, either side 
of which it would be futile to look for SM, at best is about 40 trials (Bechara et al., 
1997). Within those 40 trials, there is no way to control how many would be related to 
disadvantageous choices and how many to advantageous ones. At best scenario, there 
would be 20 in each group which, even if this happened, it may not be enough for 
detecting SMs in an ERP; ideally, more trials are needed. 
Increasing task difficulty and forcing the knowledge of the task to remain 
implicit for longer periods can overcome this methodological issue. This can be 
achieved in several ways. One way is reducing the margin between the gains and 
losses. However, this method would require many careful and systematic alterations 
of the margins to find the optimal point whereby participants learn the task but do not 
reach explicit knowledge, the so called "conceptual stage" (Bechara et al., 1997). An 
added difficulty is that there is no reason why the optimal point should be the same 
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for different people hence increasing the difficulty of taking this approach. One other 
way would be reducing the profit/loss margins between the decks while increasing the 
number of trials, however, a more elegant way may be increasing the amount of 
redundant feedback after each choice. This would create the conditions whereby there 
is more information than is needed to understand the situation which, in theory, would 
increase the cognitive effort and drive down performance. 
If more than necessary feedback information was presented, redundant 
feedback, in the same modality, such as in the graphical or numerical feedback that is 
usually presented in the computerized versions of IGT, then each feedback source 
would be potentially competing for the same cognitive resources and drive 
performance down. As noted in the first chapter, more information does not mean 
better conditions for understanding; it can lead to the opposite. Most if not all of the 
online IGT tasks arrange the feedback so that there is no redundant information (see 
Figure 4.1 for a typical arrangement). This is just as well because the role of the 
feedback in the current IGT versions is to aid learning not make it harder. The 
following experiment will test the hypothesis that increasing the amount of feedback 
on the original IGT will make the task harder which means that the task may be 
adapted to extend the number of trials in which participants' behaviour is guided by 
implicit learning as opposed to conscious knowledge of the rules of the task. This can 
enable us to increase the number of trials through which we can look for the EEG 
correlates of Somatic Markers. 
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Figure 4.1: A Typical Arrangement of the Decks in Iowa Gambling Task. A typical 
computerised IGT does not have redundant feedback. (source Li, Lu, Zhong, Arnaud 
& Bechara 2010). 
In the original version, participants are expected to reach the conceptual stage 
by around trial 80 (see previous chapter). With increased redundant feedback, it is 
hypothesized that the conceptual stage will be reached at later stages or not at all. 
Analysis of the behavioural data, the responses, can be used to assess whether the 
participants have learned the task at all. If in congruence with other studies the 
behavioural data indicates that there is a significantly increasing pattern of good 
selection choices, than that would support the argument that the task has been learned. 
In the normal version of the IGT, only around 70% of control participants reach 
conceptual stage, the remaining 30% who do not reach conceptual stage nevertheless 
perform normally on the task (Dunn et al., 2006). Increasing task difficulty may help 
reverse this ratio so that more participants do not reach the conceptual stage but 
nevertheless perform normally on the task. 
Also, anticipatory SCR begins as early as the 20 to 40 blocks of trials 
(Bechara et al., 1997). Combining these factors together, a modified version of IGT 
with increased difficulty (redundant feedback) may allow us to look for an ERP of 
somatic markers in 80 trials, which would increase the power of their detection if 
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somatic markers were present and, more crucially, retain the original task structure 
without major alterations. 
Furthermore, if the knowledge acquired during IGT is consciously realised 
toward the end of the task, as suggested by Bechara et al., (1997), then shifting the 
reward-punishment schedules across while maintaining the same learning rules will 
fail to show an interference; participants should be able to realise quickly that the shift 
has happened and modify their responses swiftly and accordingly. If, however, that 
knowledge remains implicit, than the reversal learning effect will increase difficulty 
of learning under the new and symmetrically reversed situational conditions. It is 
hypothesized that an ERP component related to SMs, if found in the original IGT 
version, will fail to emerge again in the reversal learning conditions. 
The aim of this study is twofold, first to investigate whether knowledge which 
is I GT-related does ever become explicit with added redundant feedback and if not, 
whether the previously acquired SM signals may than cause interference to later 
learning, thus simulating conditions whereby the SM system is forced into a 
dysfunctional state that impairs rather than aids learning in healthy participants. 
Importantly, this could facilitate the exploration of the EEG correlates of the SM in its 
functional system states and, quite possibly dysfunctional system states. 
Dysfunctional in this respect means that the SM system essentially plays a disruptive 
function to learning. 
In the following experiment, a modified and computerized version of IGT, 
involving two parts, will be administered. The first part will pertain to the original 
conditions of the IGT, namely, 100 trials and a similar reward/punishment schedule 
distributed across the decks, as reported in Bechara et al., (1996) with the addition of 
the redundant feedback. It is expected that in this procedure, in line with the other 
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studies, participants will start to develop SMs as the task progresses. The second part
will replicate the first but the reward/punishment schedules will be reversed across the 
decks so that the previously 'safe' decks will become 'risky' and the 'risky' decks, 
'safe'. The change in task conditions caused by the shift requires that participants 
adopt reversal learning the SM that participants have developed in the previous task 
conditions will need to shift away from the already made associations and re-establish 
new ones to reflect the change; it is worth noting that vmPFC patients are also found 
to be impaired in reversal learning conditions (Dunn et al., 2006). 
The main hypothesis that will be explored is that once SMs are established and 
linked to the task conditions in the first hundred trials, then that will create an 
interference effect on later learning that directly conflict SMs in the next hundred 
trials and impairs the ability of the participants to reorganise adaptively in the new 
task conditions. In other words, the previously established SM will become a 
hindrance to learning when the reward/punishment schedules are symmetrically 
reversed (i.e. the risky and safe decks swap over); hence, this is expected to 
demonstrate how SM system can sometimes lead to impaired performance in healthy 
people as well as suggest a mechanism by which sometime, prior experience or 
learning can be disruptive rather than helpful. As the task progresses and before 
reward/punishment schedules shift across, it is expected that EEG recording from the 
electrodes located on frontal areas of the scalp will start to show differentiation for 
risky versus safe choices prior to card selection. It is expected that this will not be the 
case in the reversal learning condition, the next 100 trials. The detection of the EEG 
SM signal and its relation to performance may offer an alternative, on-line, non­
invasive measure to studying decision-making. 
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4.1.1 Onset of Late Negative Slope of Bereitschaftspotential as a Possible Onset 
Latency of SM 
With regard to EEG correlates of the Somatic Markers, there is no prior research that 
explicitly has attempted to temporally lock the SM activity prior to each choice. The 
intertrial interval of 1 Os or more that is typical with SCR studies are less than ideal 
when it comes to translating it to an EEG type study since EEG' s main strength is in 
its unparalleled temporal resolution in the order of milliseconds; 10 seconds in EEG is 
a relatively long time. So the question therefore is, where would be expected to find 
SM's biasing activity if, as predicted, it was preceding each choice? 
After carefully considering the points of engagement of participants with I GT, 
it is clear that the actual physical enactment of a decision made in the IGT paradigm 
is a finger movement pressing a number associated with the selected choice on the 
keyboard. Literature on the movement related cortical potentials (MRCP), which are 
well known in EEG literature and are related to EEG potentials that occur around the 
time of movement onset, arguably, could indicate the best possible temporal location 
where we might be able to detect SM related activity; at the point when a decision is 
being acted upon we might expect the inhibiting or encouraging emotional signal to 
be strongest. 
The earliest known MRCP component is the readiness potential also known as 
Bereitschaftspotential (Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006). Bereitschaftspotential, or 
Readiness Potential (henceforth referred to as BP) is a slowly rising negativity 
beginning 1 to 2 seconds before movement onset and is seen most strongly around the 
vertex area (Evidente & Caviness, 2009). BP is characterized by two main 
components, Early BP and Late BP. The Early BP beginning 1 to 2s before the 
movement onset and Late BP also known as Negative Slope (NS) is characterised by 
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a sudden increase in negativity at around 400ms, (Shibasaki & Hallett 2006). The
Late BP is maximal around the contralateral central electrodes for hand movement,
approximately electrodes Cl  or C2 according to the international 10/20 system, and 
central for foot movement, approximately CZ. 
While the early BP is most likely related with brain processes involved in 
movement preparation, such as the supplementary motor area, pre-suplementary 
motor area and lateral premotor cortex bilaterally (Evidente & Caviness, 2009), the 
Late BP is thought to reflect the activity of Primary Motor Cortex (Ml )  as neural 
systems underlying final movement execution are activated (Shibasaki & Hallett 
2006). In studying the different EEG wavebands associated with BP, Pfurtscheller & 
Aranibar (1977), Pfurtscheller & Lopes de Silva (1999) and Pfurtscheller & Neuper 
(2003) have suggested that a power decrease in the alpha and beta bands prior to 
movement onset (Event Related Desynchronization) indicates an increase of the 
cortical activity in the corresponding area (Shibasaki & Hallett 2006). 
Since the outward motor behaviour associated with the Iowa Gambling Task 
decision making option is a simple finger movement, selecting the response, the most 
likely time that the SM signal would activate is quite possibly during the onset of the 
Late BP, in other words, during the time that the M l  area is preparing the execution 
of the behaviour. It is at that point that we may be more confident that a choice has 
been selected and the appropriate biasing signal, SM, should be active at that point, 
inhibiting or encouraging the response. If this is the case, we should expect to find a 
greater activity of the related brain areas for the disadvantageous response selections 
(suppressed alpha) as compared to advantageous choices since, contrary to 
advantageous choices, the SM biasing signal is attempting to inhibit a behaviour that 
is already in process of being executed. If such a signal were discovered, than this 
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would support the Somatic Marker Hypothesis and open this theory to further 
investigations using EEG. 
Therefore, it is expected that differences in the frontal area of the brain, more 
specifically, electrodes F3, FZ and F4, are most likely to show a differentiation 
between the advantageous and disadvantageous choices on the alpha band around the 
400ms prior to response selection. According to the literature, the mid and left frontal 
areas are expected to underlie SM activity hence it is expected that electrodes FZ and 
F3 are more likely to show a differentiation between advantageous and 
disadvantageous response selections. BP is affected by laterality (Shibasaki & Hallett, 
2006) therefore a right handed sample are likely to produce a greater effect on the left 
side of the cortex. 
4.2. EXPERIMENT 2-INVESTIGATING EEG CORRELATES OF SOMATIC 
MARKERS 
4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1 Participants 
Fifteen participants were randomly selected ( opportunity sampling) mainly from 
students on the first and second year of the psychology course at the University of 
Gloucestershire (mean age = 32.44, SD = 14.94, 8 male, 13 right handed). 
A subsample of this group, a total of 11, was asked to participate in a 128-
channel EEG recording while completing the task (mean age = 34.00, SD = 15.59, 7 
male, 2 left handed). All participants signed a consent form accepted by the Ministry 
of Defence Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix 4 for the form) prior to taking 
part in the study. Participants were not offered a monetary reward for participating in 
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the study and were made aware of their right to withdraw at any time without an
explanation
4.2.1.2 Materials 
Stimulus Presentation Computer 
Stimulus presentation was controlled by e-prime version 2.0 (PST, Inc.), running on a 
Dell PC, using Microsoft Windows XP with Service Pack 2. 
Each image was presented on a 0.48m diagonal, 4:3 aspect ratios and a 
computer screen with a frame refresh rate of 60 Hz. The screen was placed 1.5 m in 
front of the viewer, resulting in a picture presentation with a visual angle of 14.7 
degrees of visual angle horizontally and 11 degrees vertically. 
Apparatus 
Each sess10n involved the administration of a computerised version of the Iowa 
Gambling Task, provided by the experimenter, to assess decision-making. Further 
details of the experiment will be described below (section 4.2.1.3). Sessions took 
approximately 30-40 minutes. 
EEG Recording 
EEG data were recorded with Net Station 4.4.2, an EEG recording system (Electrical 
Geodesics, Inc. EGI, Eugene, OR), with a 128-channel Geodesic Sensor Net (Tucker, 
1993). All electrode impedances were kept at 50 kQ or below (Ferree, Luu, Russell, 
& Tucker, 2001). During signal collection, each electrode was referenced to the 
vertex. Data were sampled at a rate of 250 per second, and filtered offline with a 7-12 
Hz bandpass filter. Prior research suggest that suppressions on this band, Alpha, may 
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indicate increased activity in the corresponding area (Pfurtscheller & Neuper 2003). 
EEG was recorded continuously using a Net Amps 300 (Electrical Geodesics Inc., 
Eugene, OR, USA). CZ (Vertex) was used as the reference. ElectroOculoGram 
(EOG) was monitored using electrodes placed above and below each eye. The 
electrode impedance was kept below 50 kQ at the start of the recording. This range is 
acceptable given the high input impedance of the amplifiers of this system. Off-line 
analyses of the data were performed using Net Station 4.5.4 software (Electrical 
Geodesics, Inc., Eugene, OR, USA). The ERP data were sampled at a rate of 250 Hz. 
Trials were marked "bad" if the average amplitude exceeded 100 µV, if they 
contained more than 10 bad channels, or contained eye movement in excess of 55 µV. 
These automated criteria were supplemented by visual inspection. In the remaining 
trials, data for bad channels were replaced by a spherical spline interpolations 
algorithm implemented in Net Station using the data from remaining good channels. 
4.2.1.3 Design 
The study uses a within subjects design with two independent variables (IV): (1) 
Selection choices with two levels; each level representing advantageous and 
disadvantageous deck selections and (2) Electrode Position, which has 3 levels, 
electrodes F3, FZ and F4. The dependent variables (DV) was the EEG recordings 
from each electrode site (further details below). 
The task had 200 trials overall. The first 100 trials were a replication of the 
original Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). On the second 100 trials, unbeknown to the 
participants, the patterns of rewards and losses were switched across the decks (see 
IGT task description below for more details) so that the previously created SM may 
be tested under the new, conflicting conditions. To assess the conscious knowledge of 
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participants, two questions were asked every ten trials, starting after the first 20 trials
(see below for the exact questions asked).
4.2.1.4 Procedure 
After giving informed consent, participants were led into a softly lit room and asked 
to sit in a reclining chair. Prior to starting the test, a verbal description of the 
experiment was given. The test itself was presented entirely on the computer screen 
and the experimenter was absent throughout the duration of the task. Participants were 
asked to follow instructions from the computer screen. While the experiment was 
running, the experimenter was located in an adjacent room. Upon finishing the task, 
participants were instructed to ring a bell to notify the experimenter. 
Iowa Gambling Task (computerized version) 
Following a few (6) pilot tests, the data from which is not included, the following 
modified version of IGT was developed. Pilot tests were mostly focused on the 
amount of feedback that would drive down performance enough to increase the 
number of trials that could be used to detect Somatic Markers. The arrangement 
shown in the figure 4.3 below was deemed to be the most optimal arrangement. 
Similar to the standard administration of the IGT, participants were shown 
four decks of cards (A, B, C, and D) on a computer monitor (Figure 4.2) and started 
with £2,000 credit of fictional play money. Participants used a computer keyboard to 
select cards from the decks in 200 trials overall. The objective of the task was to make 
as much money in the long run as possible. Present on the screen and after each 
choice, there were a total of 13 sources of feedback. The feedbacks can be organised 
in two main groups of feedback mechanisms, the Long-Term feedback which would 
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be the Graphs and the running Total tally of Wins and Losses and the Immediate 
feedback which is feedback from each card selection. 
The Graph section has two levels, green representing accumulated gains, red 
representing accumulated losses; the longer the green bar the more the participant had 
won and the longer the red bar the more the participant had lost. The Total tally group 
has three further levels showing an ongoing tally of losses, a 'Total Won' in green 
colour,' Total Lost' in red colour and 'Total Money' in yellow colour. 
The Immediate feedback has two levels across four decks. At rest the 
participants sees two yellow lines of text labeled Won and Lost underneath each deck. 
When a choice is made, the winnings are shown as green and the losses as red. The 
amounts stay on screen for 500 ms while at the same time the other feedback groups 
are updated accordingly. 
The subject did not know either the reward/punishment contingencies of the 
cards or the total number of trials. The rewards and punishments were immediately 
displayed at the time the participant selects a deck (Figure 4.2 and 4.3). 
Figure 4.2: Arrangement of Card in the Modified !GT Task. The screen participants 
saw at the beginning of the experiment. There were three running sums on the top 
right, continuously updated that gave the participants information about losses, 
winnings and the sum total. The two bars on the top left provided a visual 
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epresentation of wins and losses, with wins represented with colour green on the top 
�ar and losses represented with red on the bottom bar. Underneath each deck there 
we;e two running counts, which provided information about winnings and losses 
associated with each individual card selection.
Figure 4.3: Feedback After Each Response in !GT Task. After each selection (in this 
case Deck A), the sums were immediately updated. There was also visual feedback 
indicating the choice made (the selected deck changed colour). The visual feedback 
stayed on screen for exactly one (1) second. This also defined the minimum of 
intertrial interval. 
Two of the decks (the "safe" decks: C and D) featured relatively low monetary 
gains and occasional low losses with a net gain of £250 over ten trials; the other two 
decks (the "risky" decks: A and B) feature larger monetary gains with occasional 
large losses and a net loss £250 over ten trials. The mean initial reward per trial was 
£107.30 for deck A, £116.90 for deck B, £54.90 for deck C, and £52.50 for deck D; 
and the mean subsequent monetary loss is £149.50 for deck A, £163.30 for deck B, 
£26.30 for deck C, and £21.20 for deck D. The total time taken by the participant to 
complete the task was approximately 45 min. 
Unbeknownst to the participants, after the initial 100 trials the patterns of 
winnings and losses assigned to each of the decks was reversed so that rewards and 
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punishments initially associated with Deck A were assigned to Deck C, those of Deck 
B to Deck D and vice versa so that the frequencies of rewards and punishments were 
kept the same and only the long term gains swapped. 
Initially, after the first 20 trials and afterwards every ten trials up to a hundred 
(100), participants were asked to answer two questions (Figure 4.4): 
1. Please tell me how you feel about this game?
2. Please tell all you know about what is going on in this game?
The same pattern of questioning was replicated after the 1001h trial, on the 
second phase of the task. 
While participating in the task, eleven of the participants' brain waves were 
recorded using a 128 channel, HydroCel Geodesic Sensor net, part of the EGI, EEG 
system as described above ( 4.2.1.2). 
Figure 4.4: The Questions Screen. Two questions will be presented on-screen. 
Participants answered using the keyboard. 
Upon termination, participants were given a full verbal and written debriefing. 
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4.2.2 Results 
This section will be divided into two further subsections: Analysis of Behavioural
Data and Analysis of EEG data. 
4.2.2.1 Behavioural Analysis 
Performance score on the IGT was split into five equal blocks of twenty card 
selections for the first hundred trials (Phase 1) and the same for the second hundred 
trials (Phase 2). For each block, a net score was calculated based on the number of 
card selections from the advantageous decks (C + D in the first part of the 
experiment) minus the number of card selections from the disadvantageous decks (A 
+ B), so that the Calculated Score = (C + D) - (A+ B). Thus, a positive score reflects
a higher ratio of selection from the advantageous decks and a negative score a higher 
ratio of selection from the disadvantageous decks. A zero score means that selections 
were equal on both, advantageous and disadvantageous decks. This is reversed on the 
second part of the experiment, after category change (Phase 2) since the advantageous 
decks become disadvantageous and vice versa. Table 4.1 shows the mean and 
standard deviation for each Block Selection for before and after category change 
(Phase 1 and 2 respectively). The table shows that there was a steady increase in 
learning for all participants over the five blocks for both Phase 1 and Phase 2. There 
are, however, an overall larger number of advantageous responses for Phase 1. The 
biggest increase for both phases seems to be from block 1 to block 2 but overall the 
response lines seem to roughly approximate the same shape although the overall 
scores are more negative for post category change (Graph 4.1). 
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Means and Standard Deviations of the First and Second 100 
Trials (N = 15) 
Before Category Change After Category Change 
Trials Mean SD Mean SD 
1- 20 -2.53 4.98 -2.93 5.18 
21-40 2.67 5.00 --0.93 5.55 
41- 60 1.20 3.91 -1.73 6.41 
61-80 0.80 5.00 1.07 6.63 
81 - 100 2.40 8.25 -0.67 3.83 
Table 4.1: Means and Standard Deviations for the Behavioural Data (Normalised 
Outliers). Means and Standard Deviations for the first and second 100 trials, grouped 
in sets of 20 trials. The distribution of means show an increasing trend toward 
advantageous choices in the first 100 trials, but not so in the second 100 trials. 
After the category change (phase 2), participants' responses shift back towards 
disadvantageous choices and in contrast to the pre-change phase of the experiment, a 
higher proportion of participant choices were made from disadvantageous blocks all 
the way to the end of the task, apart from Selection Block 4 (Graph 4.1). 
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Graph 4.1: Means of Pre and After Category Change with SE Bars. Responses below 
zero mean that the proportions of choices from disadvantageous decks (risky) are 
higher than those from advantageous decks (safe). Before changing the 
reward/punishment schedules, the first 100 trials, participants' responses show a clear 
trend, favouring advantageous decks more in each successive block and overall, apart 
from block 1, showing a higher ratio of selection from advantageous decks. After 
reward/punishment reversal, this trend disappears; participant's responses consistently 
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favour selections from disadvantageous decks, though there still appears a trend to
shift toward more safe choices as the task progresses.
Responses were subjected to a repeated measures two-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with five levels of trials Selection Blocks (each block was the
mean of the 20 trials in a successive fashion starting from the first Selection Block 1 
to 20) and two levels of before and after the category change, Phase 1 and 2. 
Using Boxplots, outliers were detected in Selection Blocks 1, 3 and 4 for 
before Category Change and 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 for after Category Change. The outliers 
were replaced with the value closest to the outlier. Also, the assumption of the normal 
distribution of Selection Block 3 Phase 1 was violated as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk 
test (p < .05) hence Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied to the analysis; all the 
other levels were normally distributed. The assumption of sphericity was not violated, 
as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p > .05). 
There was no statistically significant interaction. There was a main effect of 
Selection Blocks which showed that there was a statistically significant difference in 
the selection of cards from Advantageous to Disadvantageous decks between different 
time points encompassing both categories F(2.89, 40.50) = 2.96, p < .05, ri2 = 0.18 
Repeated contrasts revealed that there was a significant increase in selection of safe 
decks on Selection Block 2 as compared to Selection Block 1, F(l ,  14) = 8.96, p < 
0.02, partial ri2 = 0.393 but no significant differences between comparisons of other 
successive blocks. This suggests that participants learn to respond adaptively from the 
second block of trials onwards. 
3 Partial ETA Squared: ranges from O to 1, I indicating a large effect size (see Richardson, 2010 for a full review) 
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Subjective data 
The answers to the two questions were examined to detect whether participants 
explicitly discriminated between Disadvantageous and Advantagous decks (see 
Appendix for the data). The text was searched for explicit statements which said that 
either decks A and B were bad or Disadvantagous or C and D were good, 
Advantagous or any other similar meaning word, and vice versa after the 
reward/punishment schedules were reversed across decks. 
As expected, the evaluation of participants' answers to the two questions 
revealed that the participants did not reach the conceptual stage in either phase of the 
modified IGT task. In the initial stages most participants indicated that the selections 
were random in terms of wins or loses. As the task progressed, around trial 60, 
participants expressed either boredom, frustration but also some remained positive 
about the task, one describing it as compelling. Towards the end of the task many 
participants indicated randomness, frustration and boredom. Some of the participants 
did remain engaged all the way although their answers did not indicate they had a 
better understanding of the underlying rules of the task. 
-4.2.2.2 EEG Data Processing
The EEG data was acquired with Net Station 4.4.2 and processed with Net Station 
4.5.4. The processing of the data was done in two stages called pre-processing and 
post-processing. After pre-processing stage, the data were manually inspected for 
artefacts and marked accordingly. Below, the data processing stages are outlined in 
detail. 
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Step I: Pre-processing - Filtering, Segmenting and Artefact Detection (Figure 
4.5). 
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Figure 4.5: EEG Tools, Pre Processing. The data was first filtered from 7 to l2z 
(Alpha) - see I above. After which, the data were segmented (see 2) from 450 to 
250ms before each response for Advantageous and Disadvantageous choices and for 
before and after Category Change. This way the segmentation encapsulates fully the 
400 to 300 milliseconds either site of the onset of the Bereitschaftspotential. 
Automated Artifact Detection was run next (see 3) with the shown settings. 
Since the behavioural data suggests that Somatic Markers were likely 
generated right after the first Selection blocks for both phases and the conceptual 
stage was not reached, the first block of trial from each phase was dropped and the 
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segmentation included all of the remaining 80 trials. This produced two IV with two
levels each, Response Selection Disadvantageous and Advantageous (named in the
segmentation tool as Negative and Positive respectively - G 1 stands for Phase 1 and
G2 for Phase 2) and Category Change, Phase 1 (before category change) and Phase 2 
(after category change). A minimum threshold of 20 trials in each Response Selection 
level for each level of Category Change was applied. All participants satisfied this 
condition. The data were then subjected to the Artefact Detection (see Figure 4.5) tool 
to analyse for Bad Channels, Eye Blinks and Eye movements. According to the EGI 
engineers, the above settings are successful in detecting the artefacts for about 96% of 
the adult population and the artefact detection algorithms are based on the work of 
Gratton, Coles & Donchin (1983) and Miller, Gratton & Yee (1988). In addition, the 
data were also manually inspected for artefacts. If the data was perceived to have eye 
blinks, eye movement or other artifacts, the segments were marked as bad and 
excluded from further analysis. 
Step 2: Post Processing - Bad Channel Replacement, Averaging and Re­
Referencing (4.6). 
143 
----- -------- Chapter 4 --------------
Bad Channel Replacement Specification 
@ 4 - BadChannelReplace 
Bad Channel Replacement Settings: 
Output Options: 
Name: I Replace uctension w,th ".bcr" ... 
Destlnoulon I Same As Source 
Upd;ue hie to MFF 
There Jrc no u.Jt!r .Jtdect,;1blt! setttngs for ch,s tool. 
Averaging Settings: 
Handle Source Files: 
1 
:::D 
2 
Separately ��� 
Handle Subjects: 
Together �"'::.-� 
Create a single output file 
containing separate ERPs for 
each subJect. 
Separately l{Q�� 
Montage Oper•tlons Seu,ngs: 
Sowr<• Net HydroC•I CSN 128 1.0 
Clone 
A�,.,� ll<f<tc>IKC" 
fa 10 JO 
JO JO All �Mars 
C!il! JO .M 
15?1 A�r1.oe Reo'it,ence 
�A-,,1� M,oto-dlCrrr,rrKr 
� C,rcun,lrrrntwl 
� Ovvblr 6.#rwn.1 
�,�., 
c;a r:, 
�r)1,ndl'4 �·· 
r!!a ,2 
� rz � Oce1rodc 11 
� Ltrft MJ�t06d Rrfr,rncr 
� L""fllt..d""l '-'p,o,/,Jr. LLIVI 
� u,,,,t,,g,ti.,d,....,/ l,po/Jr. LIUA 
e ll>flltt M,oto.d�lr,c-,w,r 
�,,.,,u_,.,,, 
�rform PAA[ CorTcctlon 
Together l{Q"'::.-(Ig] 
:] Input Sens.ors: 3 
Show L.&bel 5 
Figure 4.6: EEG Tools, Post Processing. The bad channel replacement (see 1) 
algorithm replaces every sample of every channel that is bad for that segment with 
data interpolated from the remaining channels using spherical splines interpolation 
algorithms. The resulting waveform is an approximation of the signal that was present 
at that location on the scalp during recording. The average tool (see 2) averages all the 
segments in each group to a single, average segment from all the segments that were 
not rejected, for each of the categories created during segmentation. The tool outputs 
a single file containing separate ERPs for each subject. To eliminate the influence of 
the arbitrary recording reference channel the data are re-referenced (see 3) to the 
average reference. 
Data exploration and extraction 
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During the exploratory stage of EEG data, the Grand Averaged data were inspected to
determine the area where the SM marker could be visually detected, if present, on F3,
FZ and F4 which are traditionally the frontal electrodes within the 10/20 international
system. The time period between the 450 to 250ms prior to stimulus presentation was
examined. On all three channels, the area between 400ms to 300ms seemed to show 
the largest increase of Alpha power (increase in power mean low activity on the 
corresponding area, decrease, more activity - see section 4.1.1 above) for 
advantageous response selection as compared to disadvantageous response selections. 
That region was marked for the three locations and the mean voltage value was 
extracted for further analysis (also see figure 4.7). 
] ·­-
Time (ms) 
Disadvantageous 
Advantaicou 
Figure 4. 7: Selecting the EEG Temporal Region of Interest - Grand Averaged Data 
are shown Above. The mean amplitude was marked from 400 to 300ms prior to 
response as a possible time frame for SM generation for electrodes F3, FZ and F4 (the 
blue shaded area). 
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Figure 4.8: EEG Data Extraction. The mean voltage value (in microvolts) for each 
participant was calculated from the time window of 400 to 300 ms before the 
response for each of the three locations, F3 (electrode 24), FZ (electrode 11) and F4 
(electrode 124). Then the mean amplitude data was extracted using Statistics 
Extraction Tool for the four groups representing: NegG 1 = ERP data for 400 to 300 
ms before each Disadvantageous choice was made for pre-Category Change 
condition; Neg2 = the same for after-Category Change condition; PosG 1 = The same 
for the Advantageous choices for pre-Category Change condition and PosG2 for after­
Category Change condition. 
The mean Amplitude was extracted for 400 to 300 ms prior to the choice 
being made for three locations of electrodes, F3, FZ and F4 according to the 
international 20/20 system (Figure 4.8). 
4.2.2.2.1 EEG Analysis for the First 100 Trials - Exploring Somatic Markers' EEG 
Correlates 
A 3X2 repeated measures ANOV A (3 electrode positions and 2 choice selections 
respectively) was conducted to determine whether there were statistically significant 
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differences in EEG alpha mean voltage amplitude for 400 to 300ms prior to response
for F3, FZ and F4 electrodes for advantageous and disadvantageous response choices.
Inspection of the data revealed no outliers and the data was normally distributed for
each group, as assessed by boxplot and Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05), respectively. The
assumption of sphericity was not violated, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of
Sphericity (p > 0.05). There was a significant interaction between Electrode positions 
and Advantagous and Disadvant�gous response selection F(2, 20) = 5.26, p < 0.02, 
partial 11
2 = .34. The alpha amplitude across three electrode positions (measured in
microvolts - µ V) was statistically significantly different for advantageous and 
disadvantageous response selections, with alpha amplitude decreasing for 
disadvantageous choices for electrodes FZ and F3 (M = 1.00, SD = 4.92 and M = 
8.60, SD= 5.59 respectively) when compared with advantageous choices(M= 1.12, 
SD = 4.89 and M = 8.78, SD = 5.67 respectively). For electrode F4, the alpha 
amplitude for disadvantageous response selections increased (M = 6.26, SD = 6.00) 
when compared to advantageous responses (M= 6.19 SD= 6.10), (see Graph 4.9). 
We can therefore conclude that alpha power and consequently the underlying brain 
activity was significantly differently represented in left, middle and right frontal areas 
for advantageous and disadvantageous selection choices. 
147 
10 
R�si:,onse S.Plen,ons D,ssad .. .3nus�o1..s. 
• Resoons,e, S.t-lec. ons Advanuseo .11 
I 
ll 
a.bo2� 
1./84.J 
ll 
tlecuoc:it rosinoru 110120 systtm} 
OD'J�l 
1.1201 
I 
•• 
b 2b18 
b.18)5 
Figure 4.9: Alpha Power For Disadvantagous and Advantagous Responses (mean 
alpha power in µV (CI 95 %)): The lowest alpha power is found on the FZ electrode. 
Both, FZ and F3 show an overall decrease of alpha power for disadvantageous 
choices when compared to advantageous ones. F4 shows a reverse trend. 
Post-Hoc Analysis: To further investigate the interaction, simple main effects 
were explored by running two separate, one way repeated measures ANOV As for two 
levels of Response Selections. Since the conditions for running parametric tests, 
paired samples t-tests, were not met three Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests for each 
electrode position comparing disadvantageous and advantageous response selections 
were undertaken. 
One-way ANOV A - Alpha Power for Disadvantagous Responses 
A repeated measures ANOV A determined that mean alpha amplitude differed 
statistically significantly between different electrode positions for Disadvantagous 
response selection (F(2, 20) = 6.56, p < 0.01) 112 = .40. Post hoc tests using the 
Bonferroni correction revealed that alpha power for FZ electrode was smaller than for 
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F3 (1.00 
± 4.92 vs. 8.60 ± 5.59, respectively), which was statistically significant (p <
0.02).
One-way ANOV A - Alpha Power for Advantageous Responses 
A repeated measures ANOV A determined that mean alpha amplitude differed
statistically significantly between different electrode positions for advantageous
response selections F(2, 20) = 6.48, p < 0.01, 11
2 = .39. Post hoc tests using the
Bonferroni correction revealed that alpha power for FZ electrode was smaller than for 
F3 (1.12 ± 4.89 vs. 8.78 ± 5.67, respectively), which was statistically significant (p < 
0.02). 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank - Alpha Power for Responses for each 
Electrode Position 
Three Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests were run to determine if there were differences in 
the mean alpha power for each electrode position separately, F3, FZ and F4, for 
advantageous and disadvantageous response selections. There was a decrease in alpha 
power for FZ electrode for disadvantageous response selection (Mdn = 1.17) which 
was just on statistical significance z = 1.96, p = 05. 9 of the 11 participants showed a 
decrease whereas two show an increase in alpha power for disadvantageous selection 
response as compared to advantageous selection responses. 
No significant differences were found in the other electrodes examined for 
advantageous and disadvantageous response selections. 
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4.2.2.2.2 EEG Analysis for the Second 100 Trials - Exploring Somatic Markers' EEG 
Correlates 
As for the first 100 trials, a 3X2 repeated measures ANOV A (3 electrode positions 
and 2 choice selections respectively) was conducted for the second 100 trials to 
determine whether there were statistically significant differences in EEG alpha mean 
voltage amplitude for 400 to 300ms prior to response for F3, FZ and F4 electrodes for 
advantageous and disadvantageous response choices. Inspection the data revealed no 
outliers and the data was normally distributed for each group, as assessed by boxplot 
and Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .05), respectively. The assumption of sphericity was 
violated, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p < 0.05) so Greenhouse­
Geisser corrected results were considered. There was no statistically significant 
interaction F(l.12, 11.22) = 1.89, p > 0.05. The alpha amplitude across three electrode 
positions was not statistically significantly different for advantageous and 
disadvantageous response selections, 
The main effect of Electrode Position showed a statistically significant 
difference in mean alpha power for three electrodes, F(2, 20) = 9.62,p < 0.01, partial 
112 = .49. Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed that recorded mean 
alpha power was significantly reduced for the FZ as compared to the electrode F3 
(0.24 ± 1.45 vs. 9.31 ± 1.95 respectively) that was statistically significant (p < 0.01). 
4.3 DISCUSSION 
The operations of SM were investigated in two conditions in a modified version of the 
IGT. The first condition, similar to the original IGT task (Bechara et al., 1996), 
consisted of 100 trials in which participants were required to choose between four 
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decks. The reward/punishment schedule was arranged so that the decks A and B were
the disadvantageous or risky decks yielding an overall loss of £250 for every ten
selections, whereas the advantageous or safe decks C and D yielded an overall win of
£250. The second condition reversed the reward/punishment schedule so that the 
decks A and B yielded an overall win of £250 and decks C and D yielded an overall 
loss of £250. 
The behavioral results of the modified IGT task revealed that in the first 
twenty trials participants' selection choices were biased toward the 'risky 'decks A 
and B for both phases, pre and after change. As the game progressed however, 
participants' responses were progressively biased toward the 'safe' decks, C and D, 
reaching the peak at the last block - Block 5 for the pre category change condition 
alone. The task shows a general improvement between block one and block two 
which indicates that learning did takes place. 
After the category change, the mean scores for each block show a general 
trend of a higher ratio of selection for disadvantageous decks. There was no clear 
observable trend of increasing selection ratio of advantageous decks. There is a clear 
increase of the ratio of selection from advantageous decks from Block 1 to Block 2 
but after that, apart from Block 4, the data suggests a higher proportion of selections 
from disadvantageous decks. However, since there was no significant interaction 
between the Selection Blocks and Category change, we have to conclude that the 
category change did not have a statistically significant effect as assessed in this 
experiment. However, there is clear trend that is showing that before shifting 
reward/punishment schedules, the first 100 trials, the mean response generally reflects 
more Advantagous choices whereas after the shift, the means reflect an increase in the 
selection of Disadvantagous choices. 
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The most important observation is that after the change, participants do not 
appear to recover or readjust, a finding that would be expected if SMs had been 
established in Phase 1 and then were operating counterproductively in Phase 2. 
Instead, their responses show a trend of selections from the 'risky' decks. This, 
combined with the subjective response data, suggests that participant never fully 
attain the underlying rules of the task consciously, a result that is consistent with the 
proposal that the implicit influence of the SM attached or associated with the initial 
phase of the task interfere with learning. Any SMs which were learned on the 
previous 100 trials would have guided the selection choices away from the decks A 
and B and towards the decks C and D. In the new situation after the change in the 
reward/punishment schedule, the SM system would thus continue to guide the choices 
towards the decks C and D. 
The most important finding is that redundant feedback it would appear, did 
have an effect on participants' conscious knowledge of the task in that no one 
appeared to have reached conceptual stage - unlike other findings (Bechara, Damasio, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 1997a). There are two important conclusions from the 
behavioural results. First, the participants do not appear to learn the rules of the task 
explicitly; if they did, then the change on the reward/punishment schedule would have 
been expected to trigger a rapid bias towards the advantageous decks. Second, if a SM 
system was in operation, then when faced with different conditions that share the 
same solution structure, this does not generalize its learning but, instead, hinders new 
learning by biasing the decision making towards the disadvantageous choices. The 
behavioural data are thus consistent with the operation of SMs. The EEG data 
strengthens this proposal. 
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The EEG data analysed on three electrode sites, F3, FZ and F4, or left, mid 
and right frontal respectively, indicated, in line with hypothesis, a significant 
interaction between electrode position and response selection combined with a paired 
comparison at significance (p = 0.05). This shows, for the first time, an important 
psychophysiological marker that distinguishes between advantageous and 
disadvantageous decisions before they are enacted and this could be an EEG measure 
of the activity of the SM. This is an important supporting finding for the SM 
hypothesis as well as an important additional measure of QASA. If reliably found in 
larger groups, measures of SM in EEG that can indicate 400ms prior to a decision 
being enacted whether the decision is likely to be advantageous or not have some 
obvious applications. To mention an example, a delay may be introduced in some of 
the important weapon controls in a military aircraft where, for example, the pilot is 
about to fire at the wrong people. However, this is still not possible as fast, on-line, 
data analysis are required for this to be possible. 
Interestingly, post-hoc analysis revealed a similar difference and direction of 
differences between the FZ and F3 for both advantageous and disadvantageous 
response selections. However, as expected the means indicated a lower alpha power 
preceding the disadvantageous response selection as compared to advantageous 
response selections. A difference was found for the FZ electrode, which did 
significantly distinguish between advantageous and disadvantageous choices with the 
alpha suppression more pronounced for disadvantageous response selections. As was 
discussed in the introduction above (section 4.1.1), it was expected that a relatively 
higher activity should reflect an SM signal that is attempting to inhibit and ultimately 
biasing behaviour away from what is intended. We argued that attempting to bias or 
stop a behaviour already initiated might require stronger inhibiting neural activation 
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than just allow the behaviour to continue unabated. The finding of Lower Alpha wave 
levels preceding risky choices compared with safe choices, which as discussed in the 
introduction indicate higher levels of activity of the underlying neural circuits, seems 
to support this view. 
There could well be the same neural circuits activations underlying the SM 
system conveying the information on choices in terms of relative intensity associated 
with each choice in the mid frontal and left lateral areas of the brain (it is worth noting 
that 9 out of 11 participant were right handed hence a greater involvement of the left 
frontal hemisphere would be expected); the latter mainly involved in organizing the 
choices in terms of relative neural circuit activation intensity to other choices; in 
essence biasing decisions towards the ones least inhibited. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter (section 3.1.4, paragraph 5) the mid frontal areas, especially the 
ACC, is involved in the integration of multiple decision parameters (Kennerley, 
Behrens & Wallis, 2011). The findings are in agreement with this and suggests that 
there may be an inhibiting neural activation associated with both response selections, 
advantageous and disadvantageous, however, in a sense, the advantageous responses 
are inhibited less and the relative valuation of these parameters is processed in the 
mid frontal area. This makes sense since participants may have an inhibiting reaction, 
or anxiety, associated with both choices as long as the knowledge remain implicit and 
is not fully realized. We can tentatively suggest at this point that the operations of the 
SM reflected in the relative difference between alpha power intensities associated 
with each choice with relatively greater alpha suppression representing the inhibiting 
biasing SM and lower relative Alpha suppression representing the motivating biasing 
SM. 
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As expected, this difference was not found on the second hundred trials with 
the reverse-learning condition. There was a difference found on the recording
between FZ and F3 which was similar to the one found on the pre-change condition.
This may represent the involvement of medial frontal cortex in ambiguous situations 
as found in other studies (Stern, Gonzalez, Welsh & Taylor 2010;) However and most 
importantly, the EEG data failed to distinguish between the response selections 
indicating the absence of systematic linkages between SMs and responses. 
The results from this experiment are largely congruent with previous studies 
(i.e. Damasio 1994, p. 31-32; Bechara & Damasio, 2005) as well as other 
neuropsychological studies that delineate the functions of frontal and pre-frontal lobes 
(i.e. Kennerley et al., 2011). To the authors knowledge, this is the first time SM400 
has been related to decision making anywhere in literature. If this is validated by other, 
independent studies, then it may turn out to be an extremely useful measure of 
decision-making in a wide variety of paradigms. 
A particularly interesting implication from our findings is that now it suggests 
the possibility of investigating the EEG correlates of SM (henceforth referred to as 
SM400 for Somatic Marker 400-300 milliseconds prior to response) under different 
task conditions. For example, how would SM400 behave under conditions, such as 
manipulating feedback or under conditions of high or low emotional arousal? In the 
next experiment, we will investigate whether and how the SM400 modulates when the 
task environment includes deliberately false information. 
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Chapter 5 - Dissociating Stimulus Response Association 
Learning with Somatic Markers 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As briefly outlined in Chapter 3 ( see section 3 .1. 7.4 ), there is an ongoing debate about 
the validity of the explanation of the Somatic Maker Hypothesis as opposed to 
Stimulus Response Association Leaming (Kringelbach & Rolls 2004). The core of the 
debate involves two related but somewhat different ideas. 
On the one hand, Damasio, Bechara, and colleagues support the idea that the 
impairment of ventro-medial Pre-Frontal Cortex patients (vmPFC) on the 
performance of the Iowa Gambling Task suggests the impairment of a crude 
emotional signal that is sensitive to the long-term consequences of decisions. Based 
on previous experience, the affective components associated with each possible 
outcome, which underlie the Somatic Markers, bias the decision making processes 
towards those marked with positive affective markers and away from those with 
negative ones (Damasio, 1994, 1999; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Anderson 1994, 
1996 - same paper). On the other hand, there is compelling evidence from the 
research work of Rolls and colleagues which suggests that results from IGT may well 
be explained by a stimulus response association type learning, underlined by the 
modular activity of various populations of neurons within the Orbito-Frontal neural 
circuits, which renders input from the body proper as superfluous (Kringelbach &
Rolls 2004; Rolls & Grabenhorst 2008). Primary (unlearned) and secondary (learned) 
emotional stimuli are represented by different Orbito-Frontal structures in accordance 
with the modality of the reinforcer. According to Kringelbach & Rolls (2004), the 
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multistage evaluations and processing that follow, determine the behaviours selected, 
the feelings associated with them and the autonomic responses. 
The main source of conflict between these two positions is the extent of the 
contributions to the OFC and PFC processes from the peripheral and visceral neural 
pathways; central in the Somatic Marker hypothesis but superfluous according to 
Kringelbach and Rolls (2004). Although the inclusion of the as-if body loop (see 
section 3.1.7.3 in Chapter 3) in the Somatic Marker hypothesis does suggest that input 
from the body is not always necessary hence somewhat resolving the discrepancy, 
there remains some criticism with regard to the specificity of these neural circuits and, 
furthermore, that it makes the SM hypothesis rather difficult to falsify. For example, 
if it was found that absence of the SCR prior to making risky choices does not lead to 
impaired performance in IGT - as the Somatic Marker hypothesis would predict -
than the as-if body loop could always be invoked as a likely explanation. On the 
other hand, even if input from the body might be a logically superfluous requirement, 
it does not exclude the possibility that it is nevertheless involved, as has been 
evidenced by the SCR measurements which indicate a correlated somatic state 
activation linked to and predicting the performance on the IGT (Damasio 1994). 
Furthermore, Kringelbach and Rolls present their view of the functioning of 
the OFC as an alternative to the Somatic Marker hypothesis asserting that the latter 
merely sees the OFC as a contributor to the somatic markers whereas instead, 
Kringelbach and Rolls argue, OFC is mainly involved in "representing the reward 
and punishment value of primary (unlearned) reinforcing stimuli and in rapid 
reversal of stimulus-reinforcement associations" (Kringelbach and Rolls 2004). 
However, if we consider both views within the context of Panksepp (2004) theory of 
brain organization and Kahneman's Two Systems theory, both discussed in Chapter 3, 
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it can be argued that instead of being alternatives of each other the Somatic Marker 
and the Stimulus-Reinforcer hypothesis are rather complementary. 
As it will be argued, both explanations can be brought together and indeed 
provide supporting evidence for Panksepp's (2004) theory of brain organization along 
the State versus Channel functioning (see section 3.1.4.2 in Chapter 3) as well as the 
two systems theory, System I and II (Kahneman 2001). The evidence supporting both 
positions on the functioning of the OFC has been discussed at some length before (see 
sections 3.1.7.1 to 3.1.7.4 in Chapter 3). To briefly recap, the SM theory posits that 
the neural systems underlying SM signals, especially vmPFC, are mainly concerned 
with long-term outcomes. When the SM system malfunctions, such as due to an injury 
to the relating neural circuits, the resulting effect in cognitive functioning is, what has 
been termed, myopia for the future (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Anderson 1994, 
1996). Alternatively, the finding that people with damaged vmPFC are impaired in 
the performance of IGT task has been linked to the effects of the immediate feedback 
from each card selection, which provides the conditions for stimulus-reinforcement 
association learning (reinforcement learning for short) (Fellows & Farah 2003; Berlin, 
Rolls& Kischka 2004; Deco & Rolls 2005; Simmons & Richmond 2008; Rolls 2004; 
Rolls 2005). 
The description of the OFC functioning by Kringelbach & Rolls (2004) shows 
the capability of the OFC to engage in quite detailed multileveled processing, which 
is consistent with Panksepp's description of the Channel functioning and Kahneman's 
description of System II functioning (as outlined in Chapter 3). Whereas the 
description of the Somatic Markers as crude and biasing emotional signals by 
Damasio (1994) is, in tum, consistent with Panksepp's description of the State 
functioning and Kahneman's description of System I functioning. This suggests that 
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both modes of processing in the OFC, the crude biasing emotional signal and the 
ability to represent and rapidly reverse (when required) stimulus-response 
associations, may be present and can, consistent with Panksepp's and Kahneman's 
theories, operate either independently of each other or in parallel. 
In the following experiment we seek direct evidence that these different 
explanations of the OFC involvement on the performance in IGT are not competing, 
but are complementary, both describing different aspects of related but distinct 
cognitive processes as generally depicted by both Panksepp and Kahneman. 
If the idea of two separate systems that converge in OFC is correct, then it is 
possible to modify the IGT task in a way so that only one of the systems is affected, 
specifically the Somatic Marker system. The 'SM400' that was identified in the 
previous experiment, it was hypothesized, was a reflection of the Somatic Markers, in 
which case, if the conditions for the Somatic Markers to form were removed, then we 
would predict that this would also be reflected in the absence of the SM400. This 
question can be tested within the current IGT paradigm by modifying the task so that 
the immediate and long-term feedbacks are separately manipulated. The goal of the 
IGT modification would be to retain the conditions for stimulus-response association 
learning unchanged, while at the same time changing specific aspects of the task that 
are most likely to affect the Somatic Markers processes. As will be described below, 
the most likely way to achieve this is in modifying the Long-Term feedback group 
( see section 4 .2 .1. 4 in Chapter 4 for a detailed definition of Long-Term and 
Immediate feedback groups). 
In the previous experiment of the IGT (Chapter 4), two levels of feedback 
mechanisms were distinguished (Figure 5.1). There is one level with immediate 
feedback that reflects instantly the choices made, the feedback presented after each 
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card selection, and another feedback group which is related to the long-term outcomes, 
the running sums in bars and numbers which track the performance over time. It is 
most likely that the Somatic Marker processes would be affected if we modify the 
long-term feedback so that it is correctly related to immediate feedback. If the choices 
made do not reflect the long-term outcome, then there would be no reason for the 
somatic markers to form and guide those choices since the long-term outcome would 
be roughly similar whatever the choice. 
For example, what would be expected if the long-term feedback mechanisms 
were modified not to show the correct running sum but instead an ever increasing sum 
which ever choice is made? In other words, if the task was modified so that the losses 
associated with each card selection do not go into the calculation of long-term 
feedbacks, just the winnings? This would create a dissociation between long term 
outcomes, which would not be fully related to the choices, and the immediate 
feedback related learning, whose conditions are still identical as in the previous 
experiment. A crucial element of this paradigm is that an emotionally negative aspect 
of the long-term feedback is removed, thus mimicking a situation whereby the long­
term consequences do not accurately reflect immediate choices. There are several 
possible outcomes. 
One outcome is, we would expect that SM400, which, if related to Somatic 
Markers is also related to long-term outcomes, to be unable to distinguish between the 
selection responses since the main conditions for it to appear are not present. It would 
be expected that immediate feedback learning mechanisms, as described by Roll 
(2004; 2005) would nevertheless facilitate learning and we should be able to see a 
normal behavioural performance in the absence of the SM400. If, on the other hand, 
the SM400 is present regardless of the manipulation of the long-term outcome 
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feedback, then we might be forced to suggest that SM400 is not related to the Somatic
Markers and that the most likely explanation is that it is related to immediate 
feedback learning mechanisms. 
There are two further possibilities, first, the SM400 can distinguish between 
advantageous and disadvantageous selection responses but the behavioural 
performance does not show a significant increase in learning or, second, the SM400 is 
not present and there is also no behavioural learning. In the first case we can conclude 
that the SM400 is not related to Somatic Markers nor Reinforcement Leaming and a 
different explanation must be investigated. In the second case, if the SM400 fails to 
distinguish between the selection responses and this also is reflected in behaviour, 
then this should be strong support for the SM hypothesis and the role of neural 
systems underlying SM400 event would be largely congruent with Damasio's 
hypothesis. Evidence discussed in the previous two chapters including this one 
strongly supports the latter possibility. 
5.2 EXPERIMENT 3: IS SM400 RELATED TO SOMATIC MARKERS OR 
REINFORCEMENT LEARNING? 
5.2.1 Method 
5.2.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-six participants were randomly selected ( opportunity sampling) mainly from 
students of the first, second and third year of the psychology course at the University 
of Gloucestershire (mean age = 24.85, SD = 8.40, 13 female, 24 right handed). 
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A subsample of this group, a total of 16, were subjected to a 128-channel EEG 
recording while completing the task (mean age = 27.13, SD = 10.13, 10 male, 1 left 
handed). All participants signed a consent form accepted by the Ministry of Defence 
Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix A for the form) prior to taking part in the 
study. Participants were not offered a monetary reward for participating in the study 
and were made aware of their right to withdraw at any time without an explanation 
required. 
5.2.1.2 Materials 
The same materials were used as in experiment 2. 
Apparatus 
The same basic equipment were used as in experiment 2. There was one change in 
feedback in the feedback in the main experiment and one additional question was 
added (See section 5.2.4 below). 
EEG Recording 
The same recording equipment was used as in experiment 2. 
5.2.1.3 Design 
The same design was used as in experiment 2 with one exception. Unbeknown to the 
participants, the Long-Term Feedback, which were the Graphs and the Total tally (see 
figure 5 .1) was manipulated so that the losses were not counted but only the winnings. 
In this way, it was ensured that the decisions made were not linked to the long-term 
performance in the IGT. In these conditions it is expected that Somatic Markers 
would not be able to mark the choices as risky or safe and that should be reflected by 
162 
-------------- Chapter 5 --------------
an absence of the SM400, though implicit learning based on immediate feedback, in 
theory, can. 
- 5.2.4 Procedure 
The same procedure was used as in experiment 2. 
Iowa Gambling Task (computerized version) 
The IGT was the same as in experiment 2 with one change in feedback. The Long-
Term feedback was manipulated so that the losses were not added resulting in an 
ever-increasing amount of money reflected in the Total tally and the Graph bars 
(Figure 5 .1 ). Also, at the end of the experiment, participants were asked the question: 
Did you notice any inconsistency on the feedback? This question intended to gauge 
the participants' conscious awareness of the false feedback. 
Figure 5.1: !GT Decks Arrangement. Nothing was changed with the exception of the 
"Total Money" and the Graphs (the two bars on the upper left), which did not subtract 
the losses therefore resulting in an incorrect (positive) feedback. 
5.2.2 Results 
This section will be divided into two further subsections: Analysis of Behavioural 
Data and Analysis of EEG data. 
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5.2.2.1 Behavioural Analysis 
Performance score on the IGT was split into five equal blocks of twenty card 
selections for the first hundred trials and the same for the second hundred trials. For 
each block, a net score was calculated based on the number of card selections from 
the advantageous decks (C + D in the first part of the experiment) minus the number 
of card selections from the disadvantageous decks (A + B), so that the Calculated 
Score = (C + D) - (A + B). Thus, a positive score reflects a higher ratio of selection 
from the advantageous decks and a negative score a higher ratio of selection from the 
disadvantageous decks. A zero score means that selections were equal on both, 
advantageous and disadvantageous decks. This is reversed on the second part of the 
experiment, after Category Change since the advantageous decks become 
disadvantageous and vice versa. 
Table 5.1 shows the mean and standard deviation for each for each of Block 
Selection for before and after category change. Unlike the table 4.1 in the previous 
experiment, the table below suggest an increasing trend for selection of 
disadvantageous choices for both Phases. Especially, pre-change shows tendency of 
selection on disadvantageous decks and not 'learn'. 
Means and Standard Deviations of the First and Second 100 Trials 
(N = 26) 
Before Category Change After Category Change 
Trials Mean SD Mean SD 
1-20 -1.00 6.20 1.08 11.26 
21- 40 -1.69 5.70 2.31 9.69 
41-60 -1.69 3.78 -0.15 8.27 
61- 80 -3.77 6.21 0.69 9.00 
81-100 -1.54 8.16 -2.31 9.10 
Table 5.1: Means. and Standard Deviations for the First and Second 100 Trials. 
Means and Standard Deviations for the first and second 100 trials, grouped in sets of 
20 trials. The distribution of means show an increasing trend toward disadvantageous 
choices in the first 100 trials, but not so in the second 100 trials. 
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Graph 5.1: Means of Pre and After Category Change with SE Bars (outliers 
corrected). Responses below zero mean that the proportion of choices from 
disadvantageous decks (risky) is higher than those from advantageous decks (safe). 
There is a downward trend toward selecting disadvantageous responses in both phases. 
The most noticeable aspect of the graph is that in Phase 1, participants' appear not to 
have learned. 
Before and after the category change, participants' responses show a trend of 
responses moving towards disadvantageous with the Phase 2 starting at a higher 
proportion of advantageous choices (Graph 5.1). The graph suggest that participants 
selected generally more from risky decks in Phase 1 and as the reward/punishment 
contingencies shifted, participants selected initially more from safe decks (previously 
risky) but with a clear trend towards selecting risky decks again. This suggests that 
overall, participants were influenced by positive long-term feedback (since the losses 
were not added, then selecting from risky decks leads to a higher reward). 
Responses were subjected to a repeated measures two-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with five levels of trials Selection Blocks (each block was the 
mean of the 20 trials in a successive fashion starting from the first Selection Block 1 
to 20) and two levels of before and after the category change, Phase 1 and 2. 
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Using Boxplots, outliers were detected in Selection Blocks 1, 2, 3 and 5 for 
before category change and 3 and 4 for after category change. The outliers were 
replaced with the value closest to the outlier. Also, the assumption of the normal 
distribution of Selection Blocks 2 and 5 Phase 1 were violated as assessed by Shapiro­
Wilk test (p < 0.05) all the other levels were normally distributed. The assumption of 
sphericity was also violated for the interaction but not for the main effects, as assessed 
by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p > 0.05); hence Greenhouse-Geisser correction was 
applied to the analysis accordingly. 
There was no statistically significant interaction There was a main effect of 
Phases which showed that there was a statistically significant difference between 
Phase 1 and Phase 2, F(l ,  25) = 5.54, p < .03, 112 = 0.18. Post-hoc analysis with a 
Bonferroni adjustment revealed that response scores from Phase 2 did statistically 
significantly increase compared with Phase 1 (2.75 (95% CI, 0.34 to 5.16). This 
suggests that participants were selecting more from safe decks on the second half after 
category change. 
Subjective data 
The answers were inspected to see whether at any point the participants said anything 
meaning that decks A and B were risky or bad or any other similar word, or that C 
and D were Safe or Good or any other similar word (see Appendix CD for the data). 
The evaluation of participants' answers to the two questions revealed that the 
participants did not reach the conceptual stage in either phase of the modified IGT 
task. 
On the first trial blocks, most participants would express positive feelings 
about the game and some degree of interest or curiosity. One of the participants for 
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example wrote in response to the question on how they felt about the game "It will be
more interesting when I can figure out the system and then beat it; more money I".
As the task progressed, the same participant wrote in response to the same question 
after the trial blocks 50 to 60 and 60 to 70 "Frustrated'' and "Still frustrated ... " 
respectively and around the trial 90 "Annoyed". Other participants went through a 
similar trend, showing an interest at the beginning of the task and getting increasingly 
frustrated, annoyed or bored towards the end of the task. Many of the participants 
were looking for some kind of trend involving selections from all the desk. A typical 
method they looked for was some ordering of the selection like "a,b,c,d" then "b,d,c,a" 
or similar. Other went from selecting a particular number of times one deck then 
switch to another. Overall, it was clear from the responses that no participant reached 
a clear understanding of the rules. 
All participants reported that they did not notice anything unusual with the 
game's feedback sources. They expressed and were visibly surprised when informed 
about the feedback inaccuracy built into the task. 
5.2.2.2 EEG Data Processing 
The same data processing of the EEG data was conducted as in experiment 2. 
5.2.2.2.1 EEG Analysis for the First JOO Trials -Exploring Somatic Markers' EEG 
Correlates 
A 3X2 repeated measures ANOVA (3 electrode positions and 2 choice selections 
respectively) was conducted to determine whether there were statistically significant 
differences in EEG alpha mean voltage amplitude for 400 to 300ms prior to response 
for F3, FZ and F4 electrodes for advantageous and disadvantageous response choices. 
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Inspection of boxplots revealed outliers. Outliers were normalized to the nearest value 
(groups FZ negative responses - 1 outlier, FZ positive responses - 3 outliers, FZ 
negative responses - 3 outliers, F3 negative responses - one outlier, group F3 positive 
response - 1 outlier) and the data were normally distributed for each level, as assessed 
by boxplot and Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05), respectively. The assumption of 
sphericity was not violated for the main effects but was violated for the interaction, as 
assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p < 0.05). Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
was applied to the data accordingly. No significant interaction was found. 
A significant main effect of electrode position was found F(2, 30) = 4.09, p < 
0.04, partial yt2 = .21, with alpha amplitude decreasing for electrodes FZ (M = 2.50) 
when compared to F3 and F4 electrodes (M= 5.90 and M= 5.60 respectively) (Graph 
5.2). Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction did not reach significance with the 
difference between FZ and F3 approaching significance (p = .06). 
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Graph 5.2: EEG Mean Alpha Power for F3, FZ and F4 Electrodes (CI 95 %). The 
biggest decrease of alpha power is found on the FZ 
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5.2.2.2.2 EEG Analysis for the Second 100 Trials - Exploring Somatic Markers' EEG 
Correlates 
A 3X2 repeated measures ANOVA (3 electrode positions and 2 choice selections 
respectively) was conducted to determine whether there were statistically significant 
differences in EEG alpha mean voltage amplitude for 400 to 300ms prior to response 
for F3, FZ and F4 electrodes for advantageous and disadvantageous response choices. 
Inspection of studentized residuals revealed outliers which were normalized to the 
nearest value (groups FZ negative responses - 1 outlier, FZ Positive responses - one 
outlier, F3 positive responses - 1 outlier) and the data was normally distributed for 
each group, as assessed by boxplot and Shapiro-Wilk test (p > 0.05), respectively. The 
assumption of sphericity was not violated for the main effects but was violated for the 
interaction, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p < 0.05) hence Greenhouse­
Geisser correction was applied. No significant interaction was found. Also, no 
significant main effects were found. 
5.3 DISCUSSION 
Introducing an element of long-term incorrect feedback, which appears to have not 
been consciously apprehended, impedes and somewhat reverses the learning curve 
that was observed in the previous experiment. Unlike what was observed in chapter 4, 
in this modification of IGT the participants' behavioural data shows a trend of 
selection towards risky choices. The long-term incorrect feedback did appear to have 
an effect as participants initially (Phase 1) selected more from the risky decks on all 
trial blocks. An important aspect of manipulating the long-term feedback was to 
remove the negative emotional element from it while retaining it in the immediate 
169 
��������������� Chapters 
feedback sources. Participants appear to have not made the distinction between the 
advantageous and disadvantageous decks either consciously or unconsciously and the 
trend in both, pre and after category change was to move towards more selections 
from the risky decks as the task continued. These results support the SM hypothesis, 
especially its main tenet which states that long-term learning, associated with the 
somatic marker, is necessary for the learning to take place in the IGT. 
As was mentioned in the introduction, there were four possible outcomes. The 
first was that SM400 did not distinguish between choices made but the behavioural 
data shows that learning took place, second that SM400 is present regardless of the 
manipulation of the long-term outcome feedback, third that SM400 can distinguish 
between advantageous and disadvantageous selection responses but the behavioural 
performance does not show a significant increase in learning and last that SM400 is 
not present and there is also no behavioural learning. The data supports the last 
proposition, that modifying the Long-Term feedback led to the failure of SM400 to 
reflect the risk or safety of the choices and this was also reflected in the behavioural 
data. This data are generally in support for the Somatic Marker hypothesis' assertion 
that an emotional signal that reflects the long-term consequences of the decisions and 
located around the frontal central areas of the brain, may be an important component 
of learning and subsequent decision making and behaviours. 
The data do not support Roll's theory which suggest that learning in the IGT 
task is a consequence of immediate feedback, reinforcement learning. There are two 
crucial distinctions between the immediate feedback and long-term feedback in this 
modification of the IGT task, the time the feedback stays on screen and the amount of 
cognitive processing needed to determine whether the feedback was a negative one or 
a positive one. In the immediate feedback, participants are presented with the 
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consequences of their decisions instantly but they stay on screen only for a short time, 
1 second. Also, the cognitive processing requirements to determine whether the 
selection they made was a negative or a positive one is minimal, and easy to make, 
they only have to see which number is bigger, the losses or the winnings, which is 
clear in all cases. Whereas in the Long-Term feedback groups, the total amount stays 
on screen throughout the task, however, the amount of the calculations needed to 
determine whether the selection was good or bad is greater. First they need to 
remember what the amount previous to a choice being made was before each time 
they make a selection in order to determine whether it is increasing or decreasing. 
Second, in order to determine by what amount, they have to make the calculation 
from the immediate feedback, Winnings - Losses, then add this to the current Total. 
Arguably, this is the reason why participants were not able to notice that the feedback 
had been manipulated to show an incorrect sum. Three of the participants that were 
asked, how they thought they did in the game, however, expressed a satisfaction with 
their performance saying that overall they had more money then what they started 
with, which suggests that the long-term feedback was indeed noticed and processed. 
It is difficult to explain the results from this experiment within Roll's 
framework, although in reality, an interplay between the two, immediate and long­
term feedback, may be not just possible but highly likely. However, considering that 
the immediate feedback mechanisms in the task remained exactly the same as in the 
previous version and as in the original task, and yet we observe no learning. Then the 
logical conclusion is that, at least, other elements are also involved, in this case the 
data suggest Somatic Markers. 
Literature discussed so far has identified opposmg arguments as to how 
learning in IGT, as observed from behavioural responses, takes place and the 
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mechanisms involved, but on the whole there are no arguments against that in general, 
learning does takes place in IGT (Damasio, 1994, 1999; Bechara, et al.,1994; 
Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004; Rolls & Grabenhorst, 2008). Since dissociating long-term 
feedback from immediate choices, in the sense that the long term outcomes did not 
accurately reflect the reward/punishment schedules of the choices, led to participants 
not learning the task and also to an absence of the SM400, then the most likely 
explanation is that SM400 is related to the long term outcomes and that it is an 
necessary component for learning to take place. This situation may reflect real life 
cases whereby some mechanism that is meant to provide feedback on a state of a 
system, malfunctions, which may lead to errors. An example of just such a problem 
was described in Chapter 3 ( section 3 .1. 7). 
The EEG recording also supports the behavioural results. Unlike in the 
previous experiment, in this one, frontal electrodes did not distinguish between the 
advantageous and disadvantageous choices. Taken together with the behavioural 
results, EEG analysis of the frontal electrodes support the idea that SM did not create 
or function given the manipulation of the long-term feedback. 
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Chapter 6 - Dissociating Anticipatory Anxiety from Somatic 
Markers and their Relation to SM400 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter we were able to provide further support that the SM400 is 
more likely to reflect the emotional foresight sensitive to the long-term effects 
associated with decisions made. However, there is one further aspect related to this 
claim which if ruled out will strengthen the support for the hypothesis that SM400 is 
indeed related to the long-term decision making and therefore Somatic Markers. 
There is a possibility that in the original Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), the Skin 
Conductance Responses found by Damasio and colleagues (eg. Damasio et.al., 1991) 
as well as the SM400 detected in the first experiment of this series may be related to 
anticipatory anxiety linked with the responses to the risky decks since they have 
larger punishment schedules than the safe decks. In this chapter we will attempt to 
provide evidence that SM400 reflects Somatic Markers and not Anticipatory Anxiety. 
As the research discussed below suggests, anticipatory anxiety is linked to 
general avoidance, risk-averse behaviour, the extent of engaging in which differs in 
different people (Maner, Richey, Cromer, Mallott, Lejuez, Joiner & Schmidt, 2007) 
and there is no evidence to suggest that this is due to different functioning of the 
Somatic Markers system. This type of behaviour can potentially provide an 
alternative explanation to Somatic Marker hypothesis with regard to the performance 
of participants in the IGT; participants may simply guide their decisions on a general 
tendency to avoiding punishments rather than having a feeling of which decision is 
more advantageous and which is not. This explanation is markedly different from the 
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Somatic Marker hypothesis smce the latter supports the view that the Somatic 
Markers provide emotional insights into which decisions are advantageous and which 
are not whereas the former suggests that decisions can also be explained by general 
tendencies and personality traits (Barret & Armony, 2006). As we will see, these 
explanations are not incompatible since they can both affect decisions in different 
ways, however, it is necessary to investigate which of the two the SM400 represents. 
The distinction is crucial since both Somatic Markers and Anticipatory Anxiety 
appear to share many of their underlying neural circuits. 
Literature on the subject of anticipatory anxiety reveals that it involves several 
cognitive and neural aspects which overlap with the Somatic Marker Hypothesis, for 
example, a future oriented cognitive state, negative affect as well as increased 
emotional and autonomic system arousal (Chua, Krams, Toni, Passingham & Dolan 
1999). Furthermore, Chua and colleagues have correlated (using a shock vs no shock 
condition and low vs. high distraction test) several frontal and limbic areas of the 
brain, also related to the Somatic Marker Hypothesis, with the Anticipatory Anxiety, 
such as right superior temporal sulcus, left fusiform, and left anterior cingulate 
whereas Tillfors, Furmark, Marteinsdottir & Fredrikson (2002) have also implicated 
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, left inferior temporal cortex, as well as the 
amygdaloid-hippocampal region. Additionally, Grillon, Lissek, Rabin, McDowell, 
Dvir, & Pine (2008) have found that inability to predict aversive events can lead to a 
greater physical startle reflex, especially in people with Panic Disorder who may be 
overly sensitive to unpredictable aversive events, such as a recurring future panic 
attack for example. 
Other studies show that anticipatory anxiety can play a, often crucial, biasing 
role in decision-making tasks, not unlike the Somatic Markers. Maner, Richey, 
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Cromer, Mallott, Lejuez, Joiner & Schmidt (2007) ran three studies to investigate the 
link between trait anxiety and the tendency to engage in risk- avoidant decision­
making. Comparing people with clinical disorders as well as healthy controls against 
people with anxiety disorders, Maner et al., (2007) found that the latter were 
significantly mpre likely to engage in risk-averse behaviours. People that are heavily 
biased towards risk averse behaviours could also conceivably perform well in Iowa 
Gambling Task, but, unlike what Somatic Markers hypothesis postulates, it does not 
necessarily mean they have an emotional understanding of the task in the same way. 
Furthermore, Barret & Armony (2006) investigated the modulating effects of 
trait anxiety on cognitive performance and autonomic activity during an anticipatory 
anxiety task. Participants were asked and completed a letter-size decision-making task 
while experimenters conditioned the participants to create an association between a 
particular color (background color within which the letters were presented) and 
aversive noise stimuli. After sensitization, participants completed two further 
experiments where in one, the aversive stimulus was presented at a rate unpredictable 
to the participants and another one in which the aversive stimuli was not presented at 
all. They reported that during the first experiment participants elicited a significantly 
greater Skin Conductance Response (SCR) in response to the color paired with the 
aversive stimuli as compared to the second experiment. This suggests that SCRs 
responses, which are a central measure in Somatic Marker studies implicating the 
involvement of the body in the decision making processes, may also be involved in 
anticipation of aversive stimulus. Additionally, Barret and Armony also reported that 
high trait anxiety could predict the speed of response in the decision making task, 
with those with a higher trait anxiety being faster whereas those with low trait anxiety 
being slower. 
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More specifically, Grupe, Oathes & Nitschke (2012) suggested a delineation
of the anticipatory anxiety into Immediate and Sustained anticipatory anxiety and
showed that each mapped to related but different neural circuits. Especially the
Immediate anticipatory anxiety, which is more likely to relate to the dynamic nature
of the Somatic Marker system, appeared to recruit neural circuits, which are also
important in the Somatic Marker hypothesis such as, the orbitofrontal cortex and
pregenual anterior cingulate cortex, as well as the amygdala. Carlson, Greenberg,
Rubin & Mujica-Parodi (2011) also find support for related neural circuits, such as 
anterior insula, as being important to anticipatory anxiety. Furthermore, Briihl, Rufer, 
Delsignore, Kaffenberger, Jancke, & Herwig (2011) found that during the 
anticipation of negative emotional stimuli brain activity in patients with Social 
Anxiety Disorder was increased in the upper midbrain/dorsal thalamus, the amygdala, 
and in temporo-occipital and parietal regions as compared to control subjects. 
These studies raise the possibility that the behaviour and EEG correlates 
observed during participation in the IGT task (Chapter 4) may be explained 
differently. If participants create an anxiety reaction to the bad decks, specifically to 
the larger punishments, they may start to display general risk-averse behaviours, 
which would explain why they tend to veer off those choices and prefer the 
alternatives. In this case, the SM400 signal may be reflecting an Anticipatory Anxiety 
response, which is not necessarily associated with a feeling that reflects long-term 
outcomes. Results from experiment 3 do provide some evidence to the contrary. The 
SM400 appears to be related to the long-term feedback and disappears when long­
term feedback is manipulated to not reflect immediate feedbacks accurately. 
In the IGT task, as the participants work their way through the
reward/punishment schedules across the decks, it is not inconceivable that the larger
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punishments associated with the bad decks may invoke an anticipatory anxiety 
response leading to generally risk-averse behaviours. In such a scenario, we might 
expect to see the same behavioural and, quite likely, the activation of the neural 
patterns as suggested by Chua et al (1999) and Tillfors et al (2002) but, in this case, it 
would not be related to the decision making in the same way as conceived by 
Damasio. In other words, the SM400 neural discrimination of safe versus risky 
choices that was found in the first experiment of this series (Chapter 4), instead of 
being related to the long-term decision-making, or an emotionally guided foresight of 
the future consequences associated with present decisions, may instead reflect the 
more temporally local, risk-averse behaviours that do not necessary involve emotional 
foresight in the way Damasio describes Somatic Markers. Therefore, the SM400 
found in the original administration of IGT could instead be a reflection of an 
anticipatory anxiety response to the larger punishment schedules in the risky decks. 
To exclude, or indeed include, this alternative explanation it is therefore 
necessary to run a modified version of the original IGT to control more explicitly for 
the anticipatory anxiety. If IGT could be modified so that the conditions for inducing 
anticipatory anxiety would be satisfied without compromising the main structure of 
the task, then we would be able to compare its effects on learning and the SM400 
signal. In other words, if two of the decks are associated with a clear, consciously 
perceived anxiety provoking stimuli and if SM400 appears to reflect this, then this 
would support the idea that SM400 is linked to Anticipatory Anxiety and not Somatic 
Markers. The solution found to test for this hypothesis was to introduce into the task a 
subset of negative and positive image stimuli from the International Affective Picture 
System with. IAPS images have been used before in similar paradigms to test for 
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Anticipatory Anxiety (Brtihl et al., 2011; Staples, Oathes, Jenson, Schmidt, & 
Nitschke 2008). 
In this experiment, IGT is modified so that it introduces a clear Negative and 
Positive affective stimuli which would be associated with each choice. As participants 
make a choice, along with the usual feedbacks, an emotionally potent stimulus would 
also be presented in the form of an emotionally intense image, Positive or Negative, 
which will appear at the back of the card instantaneously (see below). Images in the 
Phase 1 are aligned incongruently, positive images with decks A and B (risky decks) 
and negative images with decks C and D (safe decks). The incongruent arrangement 
in the initial decks is chosen so that it was more likely to interfere with learning. In 
this case, if SM400 emerges as a response to the negative images, then that would 
bring into question the previous finding that SM400 reflects somatic markers. It 
should be noted that in the phase two of the task, when the reward/punishment 
schedules swapped across the decks, then the arrangement between IAPS images and 
the risky/safe decks become congruent. It is decided to keep the arrangement of the 
images unchanged since to change the images at that point would give a clear visual 
clue to the participants of the underlying shift of the reward schedules which would 
compromise the task. 
The negative and positive affective stimulus chosen from the IAPS sets is 
selected from the extreme ends of the standardized scores in negative and positive 
arousal/valence dimensions so that an anticipatory anxiety response would be more 
likely to emerge on the negative images relative to the positive images. As was 
mentioned above, when the negative images are paired with safe decks in the first 
phase of the experiment, it is expected that participants will find it harder to learn the 
rules of the task, hence it is expected that learning will not take place. Additionally, 
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even m the second phase, when the images are paired congruently (as the 
reward/punishment schedules shift) it is still expected that the addition of the 
emotional images in the task will play a disruptive role to the learning process as they 
divert attentional resources away from the main goal of the task, which is to gain as 
much money as possible. This is preferable since we are investigating whether SM400 
appears in absence of learning and as a response to the anxiety provoking IAPS 
images. 
The reason to use one image alone versus many images is because it is judged 
that many images containing varying and different content could create too much 
interference in the task. To compensate, the two images selected will have to be the 
most representatives of each category. The draw back is that participants might be 
saturated with one image and the desired emotional effect might therefore be reduced. 
This is a clear limitation of this paradigm as it stands. 
It is expected that a highly negative emotional image, staying on-screen for 
1 OOOms, is likely to induce an anticipatory anxiety response relative to the pleasurable 
image. In which case, if the SM400 is related to the anticipatory anxiety response and 
not long-term decision making, than we would be able to find the signal 
distinguishing between the Negative and Positive sets with the Negative set 
essentially invoking roughly the same neural response that was detected in SM400 - a 
significant decrease of Alpha power 400ms prior to making the choices associated 
with the anxiety provoking, negative images. If, however, the SM400 fails to reflect 
this difference, than we strengthen the argument that SM400 does reflect the 
emotionally guided long-term outcomes, or the gut feeling, and is not related to local, 
immediate feedback anxiety response. 
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6.2 EXPERIMENT 4 - DIS SOCIA TING ANXIETY RESPONSE FROM SOMA TIC 
MARKER HYPOTHESIS 
6.2.1 Method 
6.2.1.1 Participants 
Thirteen participants were randomly selected ( opportunity sampling) mainly from 
students of the first, second and third year of the psychology course at the University 
of Gloucestershire (mean age = 22.77, SD = 8.14, 10 female, 12 right handed). 
A subsample of this group, a total of 12, were subjected to a 128-channel EEG 
recording while completing the task (mean age = 22.75, SD = 8.50, 9 female, 1 left 
handed). All participants signed a consent form accepted by the Ministry of Defence 
Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix 4 for the form) prior to taking part in the 
study. Participants were not offered a monetary reward for participating in the study 
and were made aware of their right to withdraw at any time without an explanation 
6.2.1.2 Materials 
Apparatus 
The same materials were used as experiment 3 with one addition, two Images selected 
from IAPS set. Image numbers 3000 and 4664 were chosen with valence and arousal 
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values of 1.45, 7.26 and 6.61 and 6.72 respectively. The images were chosen so that 
they were approximately matched in the normative arousal scoring while differing in 
negative and positive valence scores. 
6.2.1.3 Design 
The same design was used as in experiment 2 with one addition. Upon selecting a 
deck, participant were shown one of the two images selected from the IAPS set. In the 
first 100 trials, the immediate IAPS image feedback associated with the photos was 
incongruent with the long-term, monetary feedback, and congruent on the second 100 
trials - that is on Phase 1 the safe decks had the negative IAPS feedback, while in 
Phase 2 this was reversed so that the safe decks now had the positive IAPS feedback. 
In these conditions it is expected that Somatic Markers would not be able to 
mark the choices as risky or safe and that should be reflected by an absence of the 
SM400. If, on the other hand, SM400 is present and discriminates between the 
negative and positive images, then SM400 is more likely to reflect anticipatory 
anxiety instead. 
EEG Recording 
The same recording equipment was used as in experiment 2. 
6.2.1.4 Procedure 
The same procedure was used as in experiment 2. 
Iowa Gambling Task (computerized version) 
As in the previous paradigm (see Chapter 4, section 4.2.1.4), each time participants 
selected a card, one of the selected IAPS images was presented on the back of the 
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selected card as shown below. The photos were kept in the same positions as shown 
throughout the 200 trials (Figure 6.1, top image). 
This means that in the first 100 trials, the immediate IAPS image feedback 
associated with the photos was incongruent with the long-term, monetary feedback, 
and congruent on the second 100 trials - that is on Phase 1 the safe decks had the 
negative IAPS feedback, while in Phase 2 this was reversed so that the safe decks 
now had the positive IAPS feedback and the risky the negative IAPS feedback. 
Figure 6.1: The Arrangement of Affective Stimuli and Decks in !GT The screen 
capture on the top shows how the participants are exposed to the images after making 
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a choice, in this case participants has chosen D. On the screen capture on the bottom, 
the photos are shown on the actual original arrangement for this experiment. The 
feedback associated with each card selection was kept as shown on the bottom 
screenshot for all 200 trials. 
6.2.2 Results 
This section will be divided into two further subsections: Analysis of Behavioural 
Data and Analysis of EEG data. 
6.2.2.1 Behavioural Analysis 
Performance score on the IGT was split into five equal blocks of twenty card 
selections for the first hundred trials and the same for the second hundred trials. For 
each block, a net score was calculated based on the number of card selections from 
the safe decks (C + D in the first part of the experiment) minus the number of card 
selections from the risky decks (A+ B), so that the Calculated Score = (C + D) - (A+ 
B). Thus, a positive score reflects a higher ratio of selection from the advantageous 
decks and a negative score a higher ratio of selection from the disadvantageous decks. 
A zero score means that selections were equal on both advantageous and 
disadvantageous decks. This is reversed on the second part of the experiment, after 
Category Change since the advantageous decks become disadvantageous and vice 
versa. 
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Means and Standard Deviations of the First and Second 100 Trials 
(N = 13) 
Before Category Change After Category Change 
Trials Mean SD Mean SD 
1- 20 -5.38 5.74 0.15 8.58 
21- 40 -4.62 6.02 -0.92 4.87 
41- 60 -4.77 5.57 -3.54 6.79 
61- 80 -6.46 5.24 -8.00 6.73 
81- 100 -4.62 10.37 -4.15 7.72 
Table 6.1: Means and Standard Deviations for the First and Second 100 Trials. 
Means and Standard Deviations for the first and second 100 trials, grouped in sets of 
20 trials. The distribution of means shows that overall participants responded 
disadvantageously on both categories. Introducing the emotional stimuli has 
deteriorated the performance. 
Table 6.1 shows the mean and standard deviation for each for each of Block 
Selection for before and after Category Change. The table shows a random behaviour. 
More specifically, participants appear to respond consistently disadvantageously 
before and after category change. 
Before and after the category change, participants' responses show a trend of 
responses moving towards disadvantageous with the After Category change starting at 
a higher proportion of advantageous choices (Graph 6.1 ). Participants appear to have 
selected the risky decks (with positive images) in Phase 1 and again, the risky decks 
(with negative images) in Phase 2. In Phase 2, participants start with selections from 
safe decks (with positive images now) but select progressively the risky decks (with 
negative images). 
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Graph 6.1: Means of Pre and After Category Change with SE Bars. Responses below 
zero mean that the proportion of choices from disadvantageous decks (risky) are 
higher than those from advantageous decks (safe). There is a trend toward selecting 
disadvantageous responses on both categories. 
Responses were subjected to a two-way repeated measures ANOV A with five 
levels of trials Selection Blocks (each block was the mean of the 20 trials in a 
successive fashion starting from the first Selection Block 1 to 20) and two levels of 
before and after the category change, Phase 1 and 2. 
Using Boxplots, outliers were detected in Selection Blocks 1, 2 and 4 for 
before category change and 4 for after category change. The outliers were replaced 
with the value closest to the outlier. The assumption of the normal distribution was 
not violated as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk test (p > 0.05). Also, the assumption of 
sphericity was not violated, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p > .05). 
There was no statistically significant interaction and there were no significant 
main effects. 
Subjective data 
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The answers were inspected to see whether at any point the participants said anything 
meaning that decks A and B were risky or bad or any other similar word, or that C 
and D were Safe or Good or any other similar word (see Appendix for the data). The 
evaluation of participants' answers to the two questions revealed that the participants 
did not reach the conceptual stage in either phase of the modified IGT task. 
Many participants indicated displeasure about the negatively valenced images using 
words such us "gruesome, disturbing, not very pleasant and bloody face". As the 
participants progressed through the task some similar indications, boredom, 
frustration, annoyance, as in previous tasks started to emerge. One participant also 
expressed anger. 
6.2.2.2 EEG Data Processing 
The same data processing of the EEG data was conducted as in experiment 2. 
6.2.2.2.1 EEG Analysis for the First JOO Trials - Exploring Somatic Markers' EEG 
Correlates 
A 3X2 repeated measures ANOVA (3 electrode positions and 2 choice selections -
risky (disadvantageous) and safe (advantageous) - respectively), was run to determine 
whether there were statistically significant differences in EEG alpha mean voltage 
amplitude for 400 to 300ms prior to response for F3, FZ and F4 electrodes for 
advantageous and disadvantageous response choices. Inspection of boxplots revealed 
no outliers and the data was normally distributed for each group, as assessed by 
boxplot and Shapiro-Wilk test (p > 0.05), respectively. The assumption of sphericity 
was not violated for the main effects but was violated for the interaction, as assessed 
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Inspection of boxplots revealed no outliers and the data was normally distributed for 
each group, as assessed by boxplot and Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .05), respectively. The 
assumption of sphericity was not violated as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity 
(p > .05). No significant interaction was found. Also, no significant main effects were 
found. 
6.3 DISCUSSION 
The first thing to notice from the results in this experiment, is that the introduction of 
the emotional images disrupted the learning. This is not unexpected; an added 
emotional dimension is likely to be distracting and impair learning as has happened 
here. Most importantly, in accordance with our hypothesis, the data suggests that 
SM400 is not related to the Anticipatory Anxiety. If the response were only driven by 
anxiety then participants should have chosen poorly in Phase 1 (since the positive 
images were paired with the risky decks) and well in Phase 2 since the positive 
images were paired with the safe decks) and this was not the pattern in Phase 2. 
Accordingly, the absence of SM400 when the task had not been learned, regardless 
of the presence of the anxiety provoking stimuli, provides strong support that SM400 
does not reflect Anticipatory Anxiety. 
In other words, the results of the behavioural data showed that the task was not 
learned and this was reflected in the EEG recording. The introduction of the 
emotionally potent images did not lead to a neural discrimination between the 
Positive and Negative decks at 400 to 300ms prior to making the choice. If it had, 
then the idea that the SM400 reflect the emotionally guided decision-making would 
have been refuted and the association would have pointed towards a correlation 
between the SM400 and an Anticipatory Anxiety response. 
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However, in this experiment, the images presented in the first 100 trials were 
arranged incongruently to the riskiness of the decks. In other words, risky decks were 
paired with the Positive images and safe decks with the Negative images. Therefore 
an argument can be made that the incongruent nature of arrangement of the images in 
the first 100 trials impaired the learning in the first 100 trials. The question then arises, 
what if the emotional stimuli were arranged congruent to the decks on the first 100 
trials, would that assist the participants learning? This question will be addressed in 
the next experiment. We would expect that the introduction of the emotional stimuli, 
regardless of whether they were congruently or incongruently arranged, would impair 
learning as they would attract attentional resources away from the task hence 
impairing performance. 
6.4 EXPERIMENT 5 - TESTING THE CONGRUENT ARRANGEMENT OF 
EMOTIONAL STIMULI AND RISKY /SAFE DECKS IN IGT 
6.4.1 Method 
6.4.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-four participants were randomly selected (opportunity sampling) mainly from 
students of the first, second and third year of the psychology course at the University 
of Gloucestershire as well as local population (mean age = 30.36, SD = 14.54, 17 
female, 22 right handed). 
A subsample of this group, a total of 12, were subjected to a 128-channel EEG 
recording while completing the task (mean age = 37.33, SD= 15.39, 7 female, 1 left 
handed). All participants signed a consent form accepted by the Ministry of Defence 
Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix 4 for the form) prior to taking part in the 
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study. Participants were not offered a monetary reward for participating in the study 
and were made aware of their right to withdraw at any time without an explanation 
6.4.1.2 Materials 
The same materials were used as in experiment 4. 
Apparatus 
The same materials were used as in experiment 4 but the images were switched so 
that in the initial 100 trials, disadvantageous decks were paired with negatively 
valenced image and positive Decks were paired with the positively valenced image 
and vice-versa for the next 100 trials (Figure 6.2 below). 
EEG Recording 
The same EEG recording equipment was used as in experiment 4. 
6.4.1.3 Design 
The same design was used as in experiment 4 with one modification. In the first 100 
trials, the immediate IAPS image feedback associated with the photos was now 
congruent with the long-term, monetary feedback, and incongruent on the second 100 
trials - that is on Phase 1 the safe decks had the positive IAPS feedback, while in 
Phase 2 this was reversed so that the safe decks now had the negative IAPS feedback. 
As in the previous experiment, it is expected that Somatic Markers would not 
be able to mark the choices as risky or safe and that should be reflected by an absence 
of the SM400. Ho�ever, it is important to see whether placing the images in a 
congruent arrangement with regard to the monetary awards in the first 100 trials leads 
to a different behaviour. Again, as in the previous experiment if SM400 is present and 
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discriminates between the negative and positive images, then SM400 is more likely to 
reflect anticipatory anxiety instead. 
6.4.1.4 Procedure 
The same procedure was used as in experiment 4. 
Iowa Gamblin,;: Task (computerized version) 
As in the previous paradigm, each time participants select a card, one of the selected 
IAPS images was presented on the back of the selected card as shown below. The 
photos were kept in the same positions as shown throughout the 200 trials (Figure 6.2). 
This means that in the first 100 trials, the immediate feedback associated with the 
photos were congruent with the long-term monetary feedback - the positive IAPS 
images were paired with the safe decks and negative images with the risky decks in 
the first l 00 trials - and incongruent in the second 100 trials - positive IAPS images 
were paired with the risky decks and negative images with the safe decks (Figure 6.2). 
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Figure 6.2: The Arrangement of Affective Stimuli Across the Decks in !GT Task. The 
IAPS images were arranged so that in the first 100 trials the negatively valenced 
images appeared on the back of the disadvantageous decks and positively valenced 
ones on the back of advantageous decks. 
6.4.2 Results 
This section will be divided into two further subsections: Analysis of Behavioural 
Data and Analysis of EEG data. 
6.4.2.1 Behavioural Analysis 
Performance score on the IGT was split into five equal blocks of twenty card 
selections for the first hundred trials and the same for the second hundred trials. For 
each block, a net score was calculated based on the number of card selections from 
the advantageous decks (C + D in the first part of the experiment) minus the number 
of card selections. from the disadvantageous decks (A + B), so that the Calculated 
Score = (C + D) - (A + B). Thus, a positive score reflects a higher ratio of selection 
from the advantageous decks and a negative score a higher ratio of selection from the 
192 
------------- Chapter 6 ------------ -
disadvantageous decks. A zero score means that selections were equal on both, 
advantageous and disadvantageous decks. This is reversed on the second part of the 
experiment, after Category Change since the advantageous decks become 
disadvantageous and vice versa. It is expected that if anxiety is driving the responses 
then it is expected participants will select from the safe decks in the Phase 1 of the 
experiment and the risky decks on Phase 2. 
Means and Standard Deviations of the First and Second 100 Trials 
(N = 24) 
Before Category Change .After Category Change 
Trials Mean SD Mean SD 
1- 20 0.50 5.32 0.58 7.72
21- 40 -1.42 5.70 0.75 4.52
41- 60 -0.58 6.45 0.67 7.12
61- 80 0.92 8.85 1.00 9.83
81- 100 -0.58 7.19 1.67 9.70
Table 6.2: The Means and Standard Deviations for Before and After Category 
Change. The table shows the means and standard deviations for each of the blocks of 
trials for before and after category change. There is no detectable trend on the data. 
Table 6.2 shows the mean and standard deviation for each for each of Block 
Selection for before and after Category Change. The table appears to show a random 
behaviour. After category change, participants' responses show a trend of responses 
moving towards advantageous. Before category change the behaviour appears more 
random but on the whole are biased towards the Advantagous choices (Graph 6.3). 
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Graph 6.3: Means of Pre and After Category Change with SE Bars (Outlier 
Corrected Data). Responses below zero mean that the proportion of choices from 
disadvantageous decks (risky) are higher than those from advantageous decks (safe). 
There is a trend toward selecting advantageous responses after the category change. 
Responses were subjected to a repeated measures two-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with five levels of trials Selection Blocks (each block was the 
mean of the 20 trials in a successive fashion starting from the first Selection Block 1 
to 20) and two levels of before and after the category change, Phase 1 and 2. 
Using Boxplots, outliers were detected in Selection Blocks 2 - 2 outliers, and 
5 - 4 outliers, for before category change and Selection Blocks 1 - 1 outlier, 2 - 2 
outliers and 5 - 1 outlier for after category change. The outliers were replaced with 
the value closest to the outlier. Also, the assumption of the normal distribution of 
Selection Block 5 pre Category Change was violated as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk test 
(p < 0.05), all other blocks of trials were normally distributed (p > 0.05). The 
assumption of sphericity was violated for interaction as assessed by Mauchly's Test 
of Sphericity x
2c9) 34.47, p = .000, hence Greenhouse-Geisser correction was 
applied. 
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There was no statistically significant interaction and there were no significant 
main effects. 
Subjective data 
The answers were inspected to see whether at any point the participants said anything 
meaning that decks A and B were risky or bad or any other similar word, or that C 
and D were Safe or Good or any other similar word (see Appendix for the data). The 
evaluation of participants' answers to the two questions revealed that the participants 
did not reach the conceptual stage in either phase of the modified IGT task. 
The patter of the responses was largely similar as in the previous version of this task. 
6.4.2.2 EEG Data Processing 
The same EEG analysis procedure was used as in experiment 2. 
6.4.2.2.1 EEG Analysis for the First 100 Trials - Exploring Somatic Markers' EEG 
Correlates 
A 3X2 repeated measures ANOV A (3 electrode positions and 2 choice selections 
respectively) was conducted to determine whether there were statistically significant 
differences in EEG alpha mean voltage amplitude for 400 to 300ms prior to response 
for F3, FZ and F4 electrodes for advantageous and disadvantageous response choices. 
Inspection of boxplot revealed outliers in F3 recording for disadvantageous selections 
- I outlier, F3 recording for advantageous selections - I outlier, in F4 recording 
disadvantageous selections - I outlier and F4 recording advantageous selections - 1 
outlier. Outliers were replaced with the nearest value. The data was normally 
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distributed for each group as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .05). The assumption 
of sphericity was not violated as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p > 0.05). 
No significant interaction was found. Also, no significant main effects were found. 
6.4.2.2.2 EEG Analysis for the Second 100 Trials - Exploring Somatic Markers' EEG 
Correlates 
A 3X2 repeated measures ANOV A (3 electrode positions and 2 choice selections 
respectively) was conducted to determine whether there were statistically significant 
differences in EEG alpha mean voltage amplitude for 400 to 300ms prior to response 
for F3, FZ and F4 electrodes for advantageous and disadvantageous response choices. 
Inspection of boxplots revealed outliers in FZ recording for disadvantageous 
selections - 1 outlier, F3 recording for disadvantageous selections - 2 outliers, in F3 
recording advantageous selections - 1 outlier and F4 recording disadvantageous 
selections - 1 outlier. Outliers were replaced with the nearest value. The data was 
normally distributed for each group, and Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .05), respectively. 
The assumption of sphericity was not violated for the main effects but was violated 
for the interaction, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p < 0.02) hence 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied. No significant interaction was found. 
Also no main effects were found. 
6.5 DISCUSSION 
The data from this experiment shows that it makes no difference if the emotional 
images are arranged congruently or incongruently to the risky or safe decks in 
participants' performance in IGT task. The behavioural data in both experiments 
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show that participants do not really learn the underlying rules of the task, regardless 
whether the IAPS images are arranged congruently or incongruently to the monetary 
awards. The deterioration in performance following the introduction of emotionally 
potent stimuli can be explained by the interrupting influence that the emotional 
stimuli might have had in the learning of the task. Both the subjective answers and the 
analysis of the behavioural data suggest that participants did not learn the task either 
consciously (as shown by the subjective data) or unconsciously (as shown by the 
analysis of the responses across the blocks). Prior research shows that emotionally 
salient stimuli consistently attract attentional resources ( see Yi end 2010 for a review), 
which then interferes with the learning of the task. 
The evidence that SM400 reflects Anticipatory Anxiety would have been 
particularly strong if it reflected Positive and Negative images in the conditions when 
the IGT task has not been learned. In other words, if the introduction of the positive 
and negative IPAS images was reflected by the SM400, especially in the absence of 
evidence that learning had taken place, then there would have been strong support for 
the idea that SM400 reflected Anticipatory Anxiety. 
The most important finding, however, on both experiments in this chapter, is 
that both show no evidence that the SM400 reflects an Anticipatory Anxiety response. 
If that were the case, then we would have expected to find SM400 distinguishing 
between the emotionally Positive and the Negative images. As it was outlined in the 
introduction, the failure of the SM400 to arise in response to the Negative images 
relative to the Positive ones support the hypothesis that SM400 is then not related to 
Anticipatory Anxiety and is more likely to reflect an emotional signal which reflects 
long-term consequences of the decisions, the Somatic Markers. This hypothesis is 
further supported by the behavioural data, which shows that in both experiments the 
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participants do not appear to learn the task and that is followed by the absence of the 
SM400. 
6.6 SUMMARY AND FURTHER DIRECTION 
Combining the findings from Experiment 2, 3 and 4 (this one), the evidence suggests 
that the Alpha Power in SM400 is not related to stimulus-reinforcement association 
learning or anticipatory anxiety response but is instead related to the long-term 
decision making and the Somatic Markers as hypothesised by Damasio and 
colleagues. 
There has been a long and on-going discussion about the validity of the claims 
made by the Somatic Marker Hypothesis. (Dunn et al., 2006; Maia & McClelland, 
2004; Colombetti, 2008 - also see sections 3.1.7.2, 3.1.7.3 and 4.1). However, in this 
and the previous two chapters, we have identified an EEG alpha frequency in the 
central areas of the brain that was able to implicitly reflect the differences between 
risky and safe choices even in conditions where the participants themselves did not 
appear to have a conscious appreciation of the rules underlying the situation presented 
by the IGT paradigm. 
Furthermore, possible future alternative were ruled out such as whether the 
SM400 may actually be related to the stimulus-response association learning, as 
envisaged by Kringelbach & Rolls (2004), or the possibility that the SM400 is related 
to the Anticipatory Anxiety. Of course, more research is needed and more 
independent verifications of the results are necessary before it will be certain that the 
SM400 Alpha frequency in the frontal areas of the brain reflects that region's capacity 
to make decisions utilizing biasing emotional signals based on prior learning. 
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There is one observation, which is particularly important and will underlie the 
next chapters of the thesis. In experiment I and in the two experiments in this chapter 
it was observed that the introduction of emotional stimuli has the effect of modulating 
learning. In the first experiment, it was found that the introduction of the Negative or 
Positive images did have a predictable effect on participants performance and affected 
the SA and Information Bias differently whereas in this chapter it was also found that 
emotional images disrupted learning, even when they were arranged congruently to 
the risky/safe decks. This suggests that it may be beneficial to be able to gauge 
participants' emotional state. 
An emotional state involves a feeling, which may not be accessible to direct 
questioning (Nigel, 1974). However, as it will be argued in the next chapter, different 
emotional states may be related to distinct behavioural and physiological states, which 
can be used to infer an individual's emotional state. More specifically, there is 
evidence that different emotional states are associated with distinct variations in the 
perception of time with the Positive emotions speeding up and Negative emotions 
slowing down the perception of time passing. Next, the evidence on the relation 
between the Perception of Time and different emotional states will be assessed and 
tested. If there is evidence that the correlation holds, then variation on time perception 
can be used to infer the emotional state of an individual. Furthermore, if this 
association 1s supported by experimental data, then an attempt will be made to 
investigate the EEG correlates of such states. 
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Chapter 7 - The Relationship Between Emotions and Time 
Perception 
7 .1 INTRODUCTION 
What we see is what we calculate. Aristotle (350 BCE), stated the following on his 
"On Memory and Reminiscence': "There is no such thing as memory of the present 
while present, for the present is object only of perception, and the future, of 
expectation, but the object of memory is the past. All memory, therefore, implies a 
time elapsed; consequently only those animals which perceive time remember, and 
the organ whereby they perceive time is also that whereby they remember". 
This chapter will explore the hypothesis whether different degrees of changes 
m the subjective perception of time, which is an awareness of duration or a 
hypothesized capacity to use duration information in a task (Matsumoto, 2009), can 
be fundamentally connected to the operations of specific emotional states. The 
concept of time as a form of perception will be discussed first, and then several 
methods and models that have been developed in psychological research to 
investigate and account for the phenomenon of time perception will be assessed. The 
focus, however, will be on the possible causal relationship between time perception 
and emotional states and the plausibility of a causal connection between the effects 
that emotions have in attention, memory and body processes will be investigated with 
respect to variations on the perception of time. 
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7.1.1 Perception 
Prior to perception, the sensory nervous system samples and codes information from 
its environment in several sensory modalities, like heat, pressure, light or chemical 
composition. However, we do not have knowledge of an analogous sensory system 
modality that is specialized to register information about time (Ivry & Schlerf 2008), 
which is why time perception does not have the same logical sensory-to-perception 
continuity like other modalities of perception do, such as visual or auditory perception. 
Nonetheless, we all have a feeling or a sense, a sixth sense if it can be called that, of 
the passing of time, or of the duration of an event. Research has shown however that 
the sense of time passing or experienced durations are unlike the invariability we 
expect from the physical time that is measured by a clock. Experienced durations 
appear to vary from person to person and from situation to situation (Angrilli, 
Cherubini, Pavese & Manfredini 1997) and the passing of time is sometimes 
experienced as 'painfully slow', such us when we are depressed (Gil & Droit-Volet 
2008); 'fast' when we feel aroused and happy (Baum, Boxley & Sokolowski 1984; 
Wittmann & Wassenhove 2009); absent in dreamless sleep or unconscious state and 
distorted in dreams and highly charged emotional states (Stetson, Fiesta & Eagleman, 
2007). It is therefore interesting to investigate under what conditions do these 
variations in the perception of time occur and whether and how are they related to 
emotional states. There is no doubt, however that the changes on the perception of 
time are an interesting phenomenon, which remains vastly understudied, and that 
developing understanding and tools to measure it may prove beneficial in our 
attempts to understand the mechanisms by which emotional processes effect cognitive 
processes of memory and learning. 
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According to Richard Gregory (1997), perception, more specifically visual 
perception as an instance of perception, involves much more than just simply 
processing sensory information. Memory, past experiences, emotions, expectations 
and so on, all influence perception so that the end result is a much richer product than 
the sensory data alone allows; the Hollow Face Illusion (Figure 7 .1) is a clear 
illustration of this (Gregory 1970). A contrary position to this view, first advanced by 
Gibson (1979), argues that the majority of us and for most of the time perception 
arises as a direct, immediate and reliable representation of the world; indeed, the 
argument goes, if it was not we could not function. To give a familiar example, if one 
of our senses is impaired, such as vision, the quality of the perceptual experience is 
severely limited. 
Figure 7.1: The Einstein Hollow Face Illusion. Gregory (1970) argued that the hollow 
face illusion, which consists of seeing a concave mask (left) as a normal convex face 
(right) provides strong evidence of top down, knowledge driven visual perception. 
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Most psychologists would agree that both theoretical approaches commonly 
referred to as top down or concept driven (Gregory 1997) and bottom-up or data 
driven perspectives (Gibson 1970), are useful for explaining different aspects of the 
perceptual system (Uttal, 1981 ). Different perspectives on the same subjects are not 
uncommon and can be found in most scientific pursuits. Take the brain for example, a 
cell biologist will have something valid to say about its molecular structure; a 
neuropsychologist may be concerned with the brain's neuronal activity and their 
correlation to behavioural and cognitive events, whereas an anthropologist may 
theorize about the development of the brain as a response to the evolving social 
structures; each level of analysis seeks to answers sets of different, though related, 
questions. In this respect, time perception is no different; it can be viewed both as a 
top down and as a bottom up percept, each view in itself reflecting a different 
perspective. As it will be argued, this understanding extends to time perception too. 
7.1.2 Perception of Time Intervals and the Passage of Time 
Arguably, the information about the time interval of an event is processed in a top­
down manner whereas the sense of the time passing is, a priori, more of a bottom-up 
percept. The perceived duration of an event, defined here as the interval of time 
spanning from perceived event onset (beginning) to event offset ( ending), logically 
can only be calculated at event offset. At event offset, when it is possible to calculate 
the timing interval between onset and offset, all parts of the event, in the Gibson's 
sense of direct perception, cease to be perceived, meaning that the information about 
the whole time interval of that event is not perceived directly from the incoming 
sensory data but rather calculated from the memory trace of the related event (Fortin 
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& Breton, 1995; Rammsayer, 1994a). On the contrary, the rate of time passing is not 
connected to event onset-offset like interval timing is; instead, it is there, a priori, on a 
state of permanent change, with the present time conceived as a fluid boundary 
between the past and the future (Toda, 1978). Therefore, the perception of time 
intervals are dependent on memory and consequently, benefit from a top down 
cognitive processing (Fortin & Breton, 1995) whereas the rate of time passing is 
sensed, a priori, as the flow or rate of change (Michon, 1985). While the investigation 
of the rate of time passing is much more resistant to experimental manipulation since 
it is very difficult to define in precise terms, there have been a large number of studies 
that have investigated the properties of the perception of various time intervals and 
their neural correlates. 
In a review of time perception studies, Buhusi & Meck (2005) suggest that 
three separate neural systems for cognitive processing of intervals of time have 
emerged, each in different time scales: 1) Circadian rhythms, 24 hours light dark 
cycles, involved in control of sleep and wakefulness, metabolic and reproductive 
fitness, 2) Interval timing, ranging from second to minutes to hours, involved in 
decision making and the regulation of the neural systems that control outward, 
adaptive behaviour such as foraging, and 3) Millisecond timing - involved in motor 
control, speech generation and recognition; each system depends on distinctive 
neuronal structures (Figure 7.2). 
Circadian Rhythms rely on the neuronal activity in suprachiasmatic nucleus of 
hypothalamus (Ruby, Bum & Heller, 1999); Interval Timing depends on intact 
striatum (Matell & Meck, 2004), while it is not affected by damaged suprachiasmatic 
nucleus of the hypothalamus (SCN) or cerebellum (Buhusi & Meck, 2005) whereas 
Millisecond Timing depends on cerebellar activity and the Basal Ganglia (Ivry and 
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Spencer, 2004). The striatum, the globus pallidus (GP), the substantia nigra (SN), and 
the subthalamic nucleus (STN) together comprise the Basal Ganglia; the latter appears 
to be important in both Interval and Millisecond timing. The GP consists of two parts: 
an internal (GPi) and an external (GPe), which also includes the entopeduncular 
nucleus (EPN). SN is composed of a pars compacta (SNc) and a pars reticulata (SNr). 
Most commonly information, such as the interval and millisecond timing information 
from the cerebral cortex, enters the striatum and is forwarded to other parts of the 
basal ganglia with EPN and SNr forwarding the output to the thalamus and Superior 
Colliculus (SC) (Bosman, Houweling, Owens, Tanke, Shevchouk, Rahmati, 
Teunissen, Ju, Gong, Koekkoek & De Zeeuw, 2011). Interval and millisecond timing 
are on focus here. 
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Figure 7.2: Suprachiasmatic Nucleus of Hypothalamus, Striatum and Basal Ganglia. 
SCN is responsible for the Circadian Rhythms; Interval Timing is related to the 
functioning of striatum whereas Millisecond Timing is dependent on cerebellar 
activity and, perhaps, basal ganglia, which is situated at the base of the fore brain. 
205 
spln•I eon:I 
7. 1. 3 Current Methods and Models of Measuring Perception of Time.
Verbal Estimation, Production and Reproduction methods are the three most common 
methods researchers use to measure the perception of a time interval (Rammsayer, 
2002). In Verbal Estimation method, participants are typically required to estimate the 
time, verbally, in time units like seconds, minutes and so on; in the Production 
method, an interval is verbally indicated to the participant who thereafter attempts to 
produce the indicated interval by some operational means, whereas in the 
Reproduction method, participants attempt to reproduce a previously presented target 
interval. In addition to reducing some confounding factors associated with the other 
methods, the Reproduction method is usually the preferred choice as it can be easily 
adapted for measuring timing in primates as well as other animals. 
A relatively new method used to measure time perception is the Temporal 
Bisection Task. Initially developed by Church & Deluty (1977) to study temporal 
discrimination in rats (Kopec & Brody 2010), the Temporal Bisection Task requires 
the comparison of a time interval, Target stimuli, to two other time intervals, 
Reference stimuli, one longer than the Target and one shorter. Participants are usually 
familiarized with the Referent durations during training or throughout the experiment 
(Allan & Gerhardt 2001). 
An advantage of Temporal Bisection Task is that several cognitive processes 
required to perform the task rely in time-dependent processing of information (Kopec 
& Brody, 2010). At first participants are required to memorize time intervals, the 
"long" and the "short" one, the Referents. Second the Target interval must be 
memorized. Third, the Referents and Target durations must be retrieved from memory. 
Forth a comparison must be made between the two Referents and the Target. Fifth a 
decision is made as to which Referent the Target is closer to. 
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A crucially important aspect of this paradigm is that, at a point m time 
between the Referents, the perception of the Target interval approaches the 0.5, which 
is when the Target is perceived as being equidistant from both Referents. At the 0.5 
point the conditions for making a decision during the comparison of the Referents 
with the Target are equal for both Referents. It is at this sensitive point, as it will be 
further argued below (section 7.1.5), that we ask the question, does the manipulation 
of the emotional Valence of the Target interval has discemable effects on the 
perception of its duration? 
An additional advantage of Temporal Bisection Task is that the cognitive 
processes required to perform it closely correspond to the components of the 
Pacemaker-Accumulator model (see next section), which is the most validated model 
of time perception, although not universally accepted (Staddon & Higa, 1999). 
7.1.3.1 The Pacemaker-Accumulator Model 
While a number of competing theoretical models that account for Interval Timing 
have been suggested: neural oscillators (Miall, 1989; Church & Broadbent, 1990), 
sustained neural activation (Machens, Romo, & Brody, 2005; Grossberg & Schmajuk, 
1989), network dynamics (Dragoi, Staddon, Palmer & Buhusi, 2003 ), switching 
among behavioral states (Killeen & Fetterman, 1988), the pacemaker-accumulator 
model (Treisman 1963) is possibly the most validated information processing model 
of time perception (Buhusi & Meck, 2005). It is based on the conception of an 
internal clock, which has an oscillator-like pacemaker that generates regular pulses 
(Figure 7.3) and appears to be underlined by the Dopamine systems (Matell & Meck, 
2004), and an accumulator that registers those pulses. Pulses that are registered in the 
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accumulator are stored in reference memory, which can be described as a subtype of 
semantic memory that stores learned durations. It is hypothesized that participants 
responses during timing tests depend on the comparison between immediate 
subjective experiences of a duration, which is represented as pulses stored in the 
accumulator (working memory) against a range of previously registered durations in 
reference memory (Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984). 
An important advantage of this model is that it supports a clear theoretical 
distinction between the clock and processes of memory, which enables researchers to 
test for dissociations between the two in terms of brain and behavioral data. Another 
advantage is that, though relatively simple, it has been powerful in accounting for the 
evidence from a large number of behavioral and neuroscience studies (Buhusi & 
Meck, 2005). 
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Figure 7.3: The Pacemaker-Accumulator Model. The Pacemaker-Accumulator model 
showing an accumulator receiving pulses from a dopamine pacemaker, interval times 
are then transmitted to working memory and coded into the reference memory. 
During testing, stored time intervals reference memory are compared against those in 
working memory; the latter are passed on directly from the Accumulator during a 
timing task. 
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For example, it has been found that drugs that attenuated activity of the 
dopamine system, modulate the clock so that the subjective clock speed will 
decelerate in proportion to increased drug affinity to D2 receptor antagonist (Matell & 
Meck 2004; Buhusi & Meck, 2005) whilst, on the other hand, dopamine (DA) 
agonists shift the responses leftward in a scalar scale, suggesting an accelerated 
internal clock speed. Whereas drugs that affect the cholinergic systems appear to have 
an effect on the next stage of the Pacemaker-Accumulator model, the memory part 
(Meck 1996); The effects of pharmacologically increasing or decreasing levels of 
Acetylcholine (Ach) in the brain (i.e. using anticholinesterases physostigmine and 
neostigmine to increase Ach levels or cholinergic receptor blockers atropine and 
methylatropine to decrease Ach effects) suggest that Ach levels are proportional to 
the absolute error of a Temporal Memory Translation Constant (Meck & Church 
1987; Buhusi & Meck 2005). Temporal Memory Translation Constant is a 
multiplicative translation variable within the scalar expectancy theory, which reflects 
the scalar transformations of temporal information from the internal clock to the 
temporal memory (see next section). 
Another common finding has been that responses tend to become less accurate 
and more varied in proportion to the magnitude of the length of the judged durations 
(Buhusi & Meck, 2005) and this property of time estimation is expressed by the scalar 
property, which is a variation of Weber's law. Scalar property denotes the covariance 
between the mean and the standard deviation (Figure 7.4). 
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Figure 7.4: The Scalar Property of Time Perception. Taken from Buhusi & Meck 
(2005). a) Shows two typical reproduction studies, one using 8 seconds duration, the 
other 21 seconds. The width of the normal distribution increases proportionally with 
the length of the duration. b) The Scalar property is evident when the responses are 
scaled and superimposed. 
7.1.4.2 The Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET) 
The scalar property was proposed by John Gibbon (1977) within the Scalar 
Expectancy Theory (SET). SET is supported by a range of behavioural studies with 
animals which investigate the timing of the occurrence of a conditioned response 
(CR) in reference to the appearance of a conditioned stimulus (CS) and is based on 
the assumptions made by the pacemaker -accumulator model (see figure 7.3 above), 
namely, a timing mechanism, a memory mechanism, sources of variability in decision 
variables, i.e. length of interval, and a comparison mechanism (Gallistel & Gibbon 
2000). The signal generated by the timing mechanism from onset to offset, according 
to Gallistel & Gibbon, is continuously proportional to the elapsed duration and 
represents the measure of the interval which is written to the memory through a 
multiplicative translation variable, denoted with k*, whose value is close to but not 1. 
Thus, the duration. stored in memory is determined by the multiplication of the
magnitude of the interval with the k*, expressed by the equation: 
1) t* = k*tT
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where t* is the remembered duration and tT is the magnitude of timed interval 
at offset. When a current time interval, denoted by Gallistel and Gibbon as te, is 
compared with one previously recorded in memory, t*, the comparison takes the form 
of the ratio telt*, which is called the decision variable. In reference to CS, CR occurs 
when a threshold, B, is exceeded. In other words when: 
2) telt* > B.
A further feature of this model is the Expectancy to Reinforcement defined as 
the total amount of expectancy that a single reinforcer will support, spread back 
uniformly over the estimated time to reinforcement and denoted by the letter H; at 
interval time zero, t = 0, the value of H is Hix, where x is the estimated time to 
reinforcement and is denoted by the symbol h(o) which equals Hix. Therefore, from 
onset onwards, t > 0, as the time to reinforcement decreases, the expectancy function, 
h(t), mathematically expressed as: 
3) h(t) = Hix- t,
In which case, the expectancy ratio, r(t), which is expressed as : 
4) r(t) = h(t)lh(o) = 111-(tlx) > b. - where bis the threshold response level.
increases hyperbolically (Figure 7.5). 
Within this model, Gibbon (1977) reports that when a positive reinforcement 
schedule is used, the estimated time to reinforcement is inversely related with the 
expectancy of reinforcement. Passing the threshold level, b, determines when a 
response occurs. The threshold is passed when the ratio of local, h(t), with overall, 
h(o), exceeds threshold value. 
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Figure 7.5: Gibbon's Model of the Relationship Between Time and Learning. Taken 
from Gibbon (1977) as is. Estimates of fixed-interval time, T, (top panel) with a 
sample, x, indicated. Expectancies of reinforcement based upon that value are shown 
in the lower panel. The expectancy function h(t), and the expectancy ratio r(t), are 
hyperbolic in t and the point at which the expectancy ratio crosses the threshold, b, is 
indicated as y. 
Looking carefully at this model there is an interesting implication. If the value 
of H decreases due to either environmental or internal factors, then the threshold, b, is 
passed slower and vice versa if the H value increases. We will come back to this 
model later, but it is worth noting at this point a plausible hypothesis that the value of 
H, which represents the value of the stimuli ( or in simpler words the emotional 
intensity that a reinforcement stimuli can elicit), may increase or decrease as a 
function of overall affective intensity. If so, we can speculate that the findings from 
some of the studies referenced above, (Matell & Meck 2004; Buhusi & Meck, 2005), 
may be translated as effects that dopamine has on the computed initial value of H. It 
may be that when stimuli used in the time perception task is judged in a context of a 
positive emotional valence then the initial value of H is smaller (for example, a well 
212 
-
--~ 
-
5 
I 
: __ h (o)= 
��������������Chapter?�������������� 
fed rodent - positive emotional context - will be less motivated to respond to food
stimulus - the value of H would be lower - than a starved one) which suggest that, in
these conditions, participants will tend to respond slower, whereas when the stimuli is
judged within a negative emotional context, than the initial value of H is larger 
leading towards the opposite, people respond faster; in other words time perception is 
speeding up or slowing down respectively, according to the affective intensity. 
Evidence to support this hypothesis will be discussed below. 
7.1.5 Why Time Perception? 
Knowing about variations in individual time perception may be useful for two reasons, 
namely, the implications when the normal functioning of the timing system is 
disrupted may be important, and secondly, it has been recently suggested that the 
normal variations in the brain's timing system may provide a reliable and valid way to 
gauge the involvement of emotions as well as the mechanisms by which they affect 
behaviour (Droit-Volet & Gil, 2009). To give an example, the ability to correctly 
estimate timing of events has a an effect in our ability to mobilise resourcive, 
cognitive and others, so that we are prepared for the anticipated events (Janssen & 
Shadlen, 2005). 
While some degree of variance in time perception, as shown by the scalar 
property, must be normal and, presumably, accommodated for by other systems of the 
brain that depend on timing information, if time perception is at relatively major 
variance with the absolute time ( clock time), it might lead to adverse effects on a wide 
range of important cognitive functions. Major shifts in the perceptual time may result 
in the impairment of the ability to make correct associations between bits of 
information, which, consequently, would reduce the odds of creating a correctly 
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integrated image of an event or situation; the latter is usually referred to as Situation 
Awareness (SA). Having a coherently integrated picture or model of a situation (or 
having SA) requires an immensely complex temporal organization of sensory, 
perceptual and memory information; therefore, temporal binding of sensory (bottom 
up) and memory (top down) data is crucial for a rationally unified conscious 
experience that closely approximates behavioural goals. Neuroscientist Antonio 
Damasio expresses this most clearly in the following statement (Damasio, 1994, pg. 
95-96) "if the brains integrate processes into meaningful combinations by means of
time, this is a sensible and economical solution but not one without risks and 
problems. The main risk is mistiming. Any malfunction of the timing mechanism 
would be likely to create spurious integration or disintegration". Moreover, "The 
fundamental problem created by time binding has to do with the requirement for 
maintaining focused activity at different sites for as long as necessary for meaningful 
combinations to take place. In other words, time binding requires powerful and 
effective mechanisms of attention and working memory". 
The problem of timing, or mistiming, can be elucidated from the perspective 
of the classical and operant conditioning. A note aside, from the perspective of time 
perception, classical and operant conditionings are the same because, after all, two 
basic aspects that determine conditioned response (CR), rate and timing of the 
presentation of conditioned stimulus (CS) relative to unconditioned stimulus (US), are 
basically synonymous (Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000). 
Two widely used behaviorist research paradigms, forward conditioning, 
within which are encompassed delayed and trace conditioning, and temporal 
conditioning are particularly well suited to highlight the problem of mistiming. In 
delayed conditioning, the CS remains present until the US is presented whereas in 
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trace conditioning, the CS is first presented, then some time elapses, then the US is
presented; in temporal conditioning, the US is presented at regularly timed intervals
and the acquisition of CR depends upon correct perception of the timing of the
interval between US presentations, which in this case serve as the CS. The obvious 
aspect that permeates all of these and other similar conditioning procedures is the 
processing of elapsed duration between CS and US; in other words, the timing of the 
interval between the two. 
There is evidence that the time interval between CS and US affects the timing 
between CS and Conditioned Response (CR) so that the larger the time interval 
between CS and US the larger the time interval between CS and CR (Gallistel & 
Gibbon, 2000). Gallistel and Gibbon argue that knowledge about the inter-stimulus 
interval, instead of being adjunctive to associative learning, represents, instead, the 
core of classical and instrumental learning. If that is true, then we can conclude that if 
learned time intervals are distorted under conditions of high emotional arousal, 
negative or positive, the formation of new associations or the retrieval of already 
learned ones is affected, resulting in an overall spurious integration. This conclusion 
is backed by a wealth of research that has found many detrimental effects that high 
levels of emotional arousal can have in a wide range of higher cognitive functions, 
such memory, attention and, as will be further explored below, time perception. 
7.1. 6 Emotions and Time Perception 
There is both anecdotal and experimental evidence which supports the proposition 
that cognitive effects of emotions on attentional and memory processes may also be 
reflected in the perception of time. This is how one of the witnesses of the terrorist 
incident in Mumbai, India, described his experience while under attack, "It was the 
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longest 10-15 minutes of my life," (BBC, 2008). Carson (1982) reports other similar 
situations where, for example, the pilots who were forced to eject from their aircraft 
in an emergency experienced a slowing down of their environment within their 
conscious perceptual field, much like a slow motion movie clip. Similarly, many other 
researchers have reported that the perception of danger consistently leads to a dilation 
of the perceived time intervals (Carson 1982, 1983; Hancock & Weaver 2005). The 
conscious experience of time slowing down appears to be caused by real or perceived 
extreme degrees of danger - we can safely assume that if a situation is perceived as 
dangerous to the self by an individual, his or her emotional reflection of such situation 
will tend to be characterized by high arousal and negative valence. There is no reason 
why the conscious perception of the time slowing down does not have an unconscious 
equivalent that occurs in situations that involve high but not extreme degrees of 
negative emotions. 
According to Eagleman (2008), an increased temporal resolution of recorded 
events is responsible for the phenomenon of perceived time interval dilation. 
Eagleman suggests that high arousal, such as that caused by a highly threatening 
event, causes the brain to increase the temporal frequency of events recorded within 
the same duration of physical time - in other words, the neural circuits of the brain 
which are in a state of high arousal are able to process information in greater detail 
which, according to Eagleman, is the reason for the dilation of the perceived time 
interval. Other researchers too have favored the hypothesis that the brain estimates 
time based on the frequency of recorded sensory information (Khoshnoodi, Motiei­
Langroudi, Omrani, Diamond & Abbassian (2008); Treisman & Brogan, 1992; 
Treisman, Faulkner, Naish & Brogan, 1990). For example, Khoshnoodi and his 
colleagues exposed participants to different durations of vibro-tactile stimuli. They 
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reported a correlation between increased stimulus frequency and overestimated time 
intervals; the overestimated time intervals were independent of gap durations between 
successive stimulus presentations and context. Furthermore, Khoshnoodi et al., (2008) 
reported that the effect was correlated with the frequency rather than the rate of 
presentation. Similarly, Treisman & Brogan (1992) reported that increasing the 
frequency (from 2.5 to 17.5 Hz) of a visual flicker induced, reliably, increased (or 
decreased if the frequency was reversed from 17.5 to 2.5 hz) time estimates. In real 
life, it makes sense that the brain increases its sensory powers to negotiate with what 
it perceives as dangers. However, it appears, that this increase when pushed to 
extremes, such as by extreme fear, exposes the cognitive systems to levels of sensory 
information that it is not capable to process, a kind of emotionally induced cognitive 
overload, and it suggests that during those moment, an individual would then have to 
rely on the activity of its older phylogenetic parts, subcortical areas, to deal with 
danger, which can be inadequate and perhaps maladaptive for some of the different 
kinds of problems that we face in the modem age (LeDoux, 2002). 
For instance, many studies have found that an emotional stimulus, aside from 
time perception, affects memory in a way that it is improved for central details at the 
cost of overall and peripheral information; not much of a hindrance if the problem 
after you is in the shape of a hungry saber-toothed cat; in fact, increased acuity for 
central details would help the detection and the subsequent fleeing from such dangers 
which explains why this behavioural response was evolutionary adaptive in the first 
place. 
For example, astudy carried out by Mather et al., (2006) looked at emotional 
arousal effects in feature binding in memory. On a series of successive trials, 
participants were presented with four pictures of high, medium and low emotional 
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arousal and were asked to monitor and remember the locations of the pictures on the 
screen. They found that memory for picture location, which can be considered as 
peripheral information, worsened as emotional arousal increased and that participants 
with higher depression scores had the worst memory for the location of the negative 
pictures. These differences were also associated with differential brain activity too. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) recording showed that relative to low 
arousals, high arousals showed increased activity in the fusiform gyrus, middle 
temporal gyms/middle occipital gyrus, lingual gyrus and less activity in superior 
precentral gyrus and the precentral superior temporal intersect. Mather at al., (2006) 
concluded that high arousal and negative valence stimuli, attracts attention in such a 
way that the normal functioning of working memory is disrupted, leading to the 
impaired binding of memory elements. Similarly, Hulse & Memon (2006, 2007) 
found that, in emotional situations, people form enriched memories but these 
memories, however, are usually centered around the perceived source of danger, 
possibly because of the involvement of amygdala (Phelps & LeDoux 2005), which 
causes the attentional tunneling effect (attention narrows down to the elements that 
are perceived as most threatening; a survival feature). 
Kohn (1954) also recognised this when he wrote: "Under conditions of 
stress ... the perceptual field is constricted or narrowed, and the scope or span of 
behaviour tends to be restricted to those elements which contribute most to the 
direction of behaviour, or to those elements which appear to be the most threatening." 
(p. 290). Kohn demonstrated this in an experiment where participants were required 
to comprehend and recall a story under conditions of high, low and no threat (threat 
was represented by the possibility of receiving an electric shock). He found that, 
under the threat condition, memory performance was impaired over all, but it was 
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selective for main features. However, Friedland, Keinan & Regev (1992) showed that,
in soldier training, the detrimental effects of emotions on memory could be attenuated
if stressors that are likely to be encountered are incorporated into their training.
Similar findings were also reported by, Callaway (1959) and Callaway & 
Dembo, (1958) for anxiety and its relation to the perception of size. Callaway &
Dembo, using a between subjects paradigm, asked one group to inhale amyl nitrite 
which causes decreased blood pressure, followed by an increased heart rate, flushed 
face and neck, dizziness, and headache. Another group were asked to put their feet in 
cold water causing distress. They found that under these conditions, participants 
tended to overestimate the size of the objects relative to controls, in a visual 
perception task. Estimating the size of an object requires processing of contextual 
cues, therefore, distorted perceptions were attributed to the tendency to focus on the 
main elements of a visual scene while ignoring peripheral information. 
The cost of this attentional tunneling is poor overall memory formation for 
other possibly relevant situational elements (Wessel & Merckelbach, 1998) whereas 
the benefit is that if peripheral information is not needed, then filtering it out helps 
improve performance. However, emotionally induced bias in the cognitive processing, 
as in the attentional narrowing effect described above, has detrimental effects on the 
overall mental representation of a situation. The accuracy of the latter is often cited as 
an important aspect of SA (Endsley, 1995) and therefore, it can be concluded, that the 
attentional narrowing has detrimental effects on the formation of SA. Whereas to 
describe the effects of emotionally induced attentional narrowing in terms of QASA, 
within which SA is described as different in different situations, then SA in such 
conditions is characterized by Focused Situation Awareness (FSA) which is typical, 
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and may indeed be advantageous, in highly dangerous situations (see Chapter I for
further discussion on this theme). 
Wittmann & Wassenhove (2009) write about emotions that: "Insofar as the 
experience of time is tied to the mental status of the beholder, it reflects one's 
cognitive state and emotional well-being. Regarding the sense of time in relation to 
seconds, minutes and hours, our subjective well-being strongly influences how time is 
being experienced: time flies during pleasant activities but drags during periods of 
mental distress". Extending from the above quote, it is logical to suggest that 
measures of the variations of an individual's time perception may be utilised as 
indicators of specific emotional states. Thus, it will be argued that, affective intensity 
and the length of a time interval have a similar effect on estimations of time 
perception; an increased intensity of an emotional experience, as measured by arousal 
and valence, produces proportionally increased variability in the responses, with the 
addition that, the emotional valence conditions the direction of the variability. In other 
words, as the affective intensity increases, the disparity between clock and 
experienced time also increases, and the direction of that disparity as reflected by an 
under or over-estimation of time that is concurrent with the valence in a way that a 
positive valence will tend to lead to relative under-estimations and negative valence 
with relative over-estimations. Research in this topic is relatively scarce; however, 
Angrilli et al ( 1997) have reported just such results using a selection of photos from 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS), which is, arguably, the most 
standardised set of emotional stimuli available (Lang et al., 2005). Angrilli and 
colleagues reported that at 2, 4 and 6 seconds presentations, negatively valenced 
stimuli produced a significant contraction of time perception under conditions of low 
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arousal and a significant expansion under conditions of high arousal; the opposite was
found to be true for emotionally positive stimuli. 
At this point, we can speculate that if the measures of time perception for a 
given individual indicate that his or her perceptual time is relatively slowing, then that 
would indicate a move towards a negative emotional state and towards a positive state 
if the experienced time is speeded up. Therefore, we can hypothesize that the 
knowledge of the degrees of changes in an individual's time perception could enable 
us to estimate the intensity and valence of a person's emotional state. Having such 
knowledge may enable us to estimate the kind of SA a person is likely to have. 
For example, if we can infer that participants relative to a neutral state, are in 
a negative emotional state, we may be able to infer from that that they are likely to 
have a type of SA that is focused, (FSA), conversely, if they are in a relatively 
positive emotional state, then we may infer that the type of SA they are likely to have 
is distributed, (DSA). 
7.2 EXPERIMENT 6: IS NEGATIVE EMOTIONAL AROUSAL RELATED TO A 
DILATION OF TIME PERCEPTION AND A POSITIVE EMOTIONAL AROUSAL 
TO A CONTRACTION OF TIME PERCEPTION? 
The mam aim of this experiment is to study the influence of stimulus-induced 
emotional arousal and affective valence on the experience of time while viewing 
standardized (images selected from the International Affective Picture System) 
photographic slides rated for valence and arousal. The prediction is that negative 
emotional stimuli will be over-estimated and positive one under-estimated relative to 
neutral stimuli. Also, an associated measure, which gauges the participants' ability to 
recall specific details in the images, is expected to show that negative emotional 
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images reduce memory recall performance and the positive images improve it r 1 . e at1v
to neutral images. 
The emotional responses induced by the standardized slides develops Within
about 6 sec and then is extinguished (Greenwald, Cook & Lang, 1989· La ' ng,
Greenwald, Bradley & Hamm, 1993), thus it was decided to choose a 6-sec Target
interval presentation. 
7.2.1 Method 
7.2.1.1 Participants 
Fifty-one participants were randomly selected (opportunity sampling) mainly from 
students of the first, second and third year of the psychology course at the University 
of Gloucestershire (mean age = 28.45, SD = 7.22, 16 female, 47 right handed). 
Participants were further split into three groups according the stimuli to which they 
were exposed, Positive, Negative or Neutral valence (see below for further details). 
Below is the table with Age, Handedness and Gender information organised by 
groups (Table 7.1). 
Positive 
Groups Negative 
Neutral 
Age (SD) 
27.00 (6.52) 
31.06 (8.04) 
27.29 (6.71) 
Demographics 
Handedness (Right) Gender (Female) 
14 4 
17 
16 
6 
8 
Table 7.1: Demographics Organised by Groups. 
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7.2.1.2 Materials
Spielberg State Anxiety Inventory 
The same questi
onnaire as used in experiment 1.
International Affective Picture System (IAPS) 
Sixty colored pictures were selected from the IAPS (Center for the Study of Emotion
and Attention, 1999) consisting of 20 Positive, 20 Neutral, and 20 Negative pictures,
based on IAPS Valence and Arousal ratings. Positive pictures included erotic couples 
and happy families; Neutral pictures included neutral faces and household objects; 
Negative pictures included mutilated bodies and scenes of attack and threat. Positive 
and Negative pictures were selected to be the most arousing exemplars in each 
respective subcategory. Normative ratings of valence (which varies across the 
Negative and Positive axis with Neutral being in the middle) and arousal (which 
varies across High and Low axes) for pictures in these categories differed (Table 7.2 
below): 
• Emotional calibration set (n = 6): 5760, 5780, 5750, 7492, 5825, 5725.
• Positive Set (n = 20): 2050, 2070, 2080, 2160, 2165, 2170, 2311, 2340,
2341, 2360, 4650, 4651, 4652, 4658, 4659, 4660, 4664, 4670, 4680,
4690.
• Neutral Set (n = 20): 2190, 2200, 2210, 2230, 2381, 2440, 2480, 2570,
2850, 7002, 7009, 7010, 7020, 7030, 7040, 7080, 7175, 7233, 7235,
9070.
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• Negative Set (n = 20): 1050, 1120, 1201, 1300, 1930, 3000, 301
3051, 3060, 3071, 3080, 3102, 3110, 3130, 3530, 6260, 6350, 6510.
6540, 9405. 
Normative rating of Arousal and valence for the four sets of chosen photos 
Arousal (mean) 
Valence (mean) 
Calibration {n = 6) Positive (n = 20) Neutral (n = 20) 
4.01 5.7 2.6 
7.45 7.4 4.9 
6.4 
2.6 
Table 7.2: Normative Ratings for the IAPS Images. Normative ratings are given for all 
the IAPS images sets selected, Calibration set plus Positive, Neutral and Negative sets. 
Stimulus Presentation Computer 
Stimulus presentation was controlled bye-prime version 2.0 (PST, Inc.), running on a 
Dell PC, using Microsoft Windows XP with Service Pack 2. 
Each image was presented on a 0.48m diagonal, 4:3 aspect ratios and a 
computer screen with a frame refresh rate of 60 Hz. The screen was placed 1.5 m in 
front of the viewer, resulting in a picture presentation with a visual angle of 14.7 
degrees of visual angle horizontally and 11 degrees vertically. 
7.2.1.3 Design 
Initially all participants completed the SAi questionnaire which was used to evaluate 
the participants' baseline anxiety levels and also to divide them into three groups of 
High, Medium and Low Anxiety. SAi questionnaire was also administered at the end 
of the experiment to evaluate the effect that the emotional images had in the 
participants' anxiety levels. It is expected that participants in the Negative group will 
show increased and those in the Positive group decreased anxiety levels relative to 
participants in the Neutral group. 
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After administration of the first SAI, all participants were exposed to the 
Emotional Calibration set (see above) which were relatively pleasant images selected 
from the IAPS. This set was used to bring the emotional arousal of all participants in 
all groups to a similar baseline level prior to starting the main task. After which, 
participants were trained to distinguish between the Long and Short Referent 
durations. 
Next, the main part of this study utilized a between subjects design with one 
independent variable (Valence) with three levels, Positive, Negative and Neutral. 
There were two main DVs, the Bisection scores that measure the participants duration 
experience of the Target stimuli relative to the durations of the Referent stimuli, and a 
time Estimation score which measures the perceived duration of the Target on a 
Likert scale of 1 to 6, 1 being "very short" and 6 being "very long". It is predicted that 
more emotionally Positive images will be perceived as Short and more emotionally 
Negative images will be perceived as Long relative to the Neutral images. 
There were four further DVs, two of which measured participants' Arousal 
and Valence associated with each image. This score was expected to approximate the 
original scores given in the IAPS set and, along with the anxiety scores (SAI), were 
used to assess the effects that the images in the Positive, Negative and Neutral groups 
had on participants. 
The third DV measured participants SA scores. They were asked to respond 
true or false on questions, which stated whether there was ( or was not) some 
particular element in the emotional image presented in each trial. Since this was a 
peripheral to the main task, it was expected that participants in the Negative group 
would perform significantly worse, and participants in the Positive group significantly 
better than participants in the Neutral group. 
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And the fourth DV measured participants' Confidence scores on the answers.
This was an exploratory DV, which was meant to assess whether different emotional
states are reflected in different levels of confidence. 
7.2.1.3.1 Procedure 
Time Judgment Method 
Participants were verbally informed at the beginning of the experimental session that 
their main task would involve time estimation. Two different time estimation methods 
were used, Bisection and time Estimation. In the first method participants were 
required to decide whether the Target duration, was closer to either of two Referent 
durations; one 3 seconds shorter than the target stimuli the other 3 seconds longer. 
The other measure of perceived duration asked participants to decide on a 6 point 
scale the duration of the target stimuli: 1 representing the shorter, 3 second duration 
up to 6 which represented the longer, 9 second duration. 
The mam task had 20 trials. To assess the Perception of Time Intervals, 
Arousal, Valence, Confidence and SA levels associated with each image presented in 
each trial, six questions were asked at the end of each series of image presentations 
assessing the perceived durations of the Target images relative to Referents, a direct 
Estimate of the durations, Confidence in their judgments, and Valence and Arousal 
Ratings for each IAPS image. Also, at the end of each trial a question was asked 
about a particular detail of the emotionally Valenced image; the last question was 
used to assess participants' SA. 
Outline of the experimental steps 
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Step 1 - Assigning participants according to their initial emotional arousal 
scores 
After giving informed consent, the participant was led into a dimly lit room and asked 
to sit in a reclining chair. The experiment was entirely presented on the computer
screen and the experimenter was absent throughout the duration of the experiment. 
Participants were asked to follow instruction from the computer screen. 
Participants were asked to complete a State Anxiety Inventory (SAI) 
(Spielberger, 1989). The latter score was used to separate participants into three 
groups: 
1) High Arousal - had a summed score over 43
2) Neutral - had a summed score between and including 33 to 43
3) Low Arousal - had a summed score under 33
The cut-off points were determined by the means reported in ST AI manual for 
university students. The mean of State anxiety scores for university/college students 
are reported to be 36.47, SD = 10.02 for males and 38.76, SD = 11.95 for females. 
The overall mean is therefore 37.62 which was rounded up to 38. The low and high 
cut off points for the Neutral group were set at the range of 1 SD around the mean. 
A computer program designed for this experiment using E-Prime, searched for 
the above values and randomly assigned high and low arousal groups in equal 
probability to one of two conditions: Positive, Group 1 (G 1) or Negative, Group 3 
(G3) whereas the Neutrals were the control group, Group 2 (G2) and were 
automatically assigned to the Neutral condition as follows: 
32 > G 1 > 43 and Group 3 (G3): 32 > G3 > 43 whereas G2: 33 =>G2<= 42. 
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This was done in order to have an overall equal anxiety scores in the Negative and
Positive groups. 
After this, all participants passively watched 6 images from the Emotional
Calibration set which were presented for 10 seconds each, on the same order as given
in the set. A fixation cross in the middle of the screen was presented for 500 ms
between each image (figure 7.6). 
6 images times 10 s 
Figure 7. 6: Temporal Arrangement of the Emotional Calibration Set. Participants are 
presented with 6 images, which stayed on screen for 1 Os each, presented at 500ms 
intervals. This presentation was the same across all groups and it was used as way of 
calibrating the participant's emotional arousal to the same level across all groups. 
Step 2 - Training participants to distinguish between the Referents 
Next instructions were given to participants to observe an image 6 times (Image 
number 7006 from IAPS set. Normative Valence and Arousal ratings were 4.61 and 
2.08 for male and 5.09 and 2.58 for female respectively. Over all Valence and 
Arousal ratings were 4.88 and 2.33 respectively) and distinguish between two 
randomly presented durations, one longer, termed as LongD (9000ms) one shorter, 
termed as ShQrtD (3000ms). After each image presentation, feedback was presented 
on screen for 1 OOOms informing the participant whether it was a LongD or ShortD. 
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Next participants were asked to actively distinguish whether the same, 
randomly presented durations of 400 and 1600ms were LongD or ShortD. Feedback 
was given after each attempt. At the end of this step, participants were asked to 
continue only if they felt confident they could distinguish between these two 
durations comfortably. 
Step 3 - Main task, assessing the effects of emotions in the perception of time 
The next step of the study assessed the effects of induced emotional arousal on time 
perception. This phase involved the random-order presentation of 60 photos, of which 
40 were the same photo of a globe (IAPS picture nr. 706, figure 7.7, left) that has a 
neutral emotional valence and was used to present the Referent durations, and 20 
other photos that are the Target duration and which contained the Positive, Negative 
and Neutral emotional valences. According to the scores from the ST AI (as explained 
above) participants were exposed to either 1) Neutral, 2) Positive or 3) Negative 
images (see sample images below, figure 7.7). 
In the main session (figure 7.7), each participant was asked to complete 20 
trials. In each of the 20 trials, participants were presented with three successive 
images (Pl, P2 and P3 respectively). Pl and P3 (the Referent durations) were the 
same throughout the trials, (IAPS image nr. 706, figure 7.6 left) and groups, and had a 
neutral Emotional Valence. In each trial, P 1 and P3 durations were counterbalanced 
and randomized to have one of two durations: 3 seconds or 9 seconds. 
P2 (which was the Target stimuli) was, according to the group, Neutral, 
Positive or Negative and was exactly 6 seconds in duration. 
In each trial participants were asked to judge whether P2D (D = duration), the 
duration of the target stimulus, was closer to the longer or shorter duration 
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(represented by PID or P3D). The PID and P3D were counterbalanced across trials 
and the photo used for these trials remained the same across trials and groups. 
Sample of IAPS Images Photos 
J) Neutral 2) Pleasant 3) Unpleasant------------------
Tria/1 of 20 
+ 
P1 
Duration (Pl D): either 3s or 
9s 
Arousal: Low 
Valence: N eutral + 
P2 
Duration (P2D): 6s 
Arousal: Low if Neutral 
otherwise High. 
Valence: Positive, Negative 
or Neutral 
P3 
Fixation Point 
+ 500ms 
Duration (P3D): either 3s or 
9s 
Arousal: Low 
Val ence: Neutral + 
Questions 
Counterbalanced 
Compare durations of P2 with Pl 
and P3. 
Estimate duration of P2 
Confidence in answer 
Arousal rating for P2 
Valence rating for P3 
Question about details of P2 
Figure 7. 7: The Main Experiment Structure. The main experimental structure (below). 
Above is a sample of the images used in each category, Neutral, Positive and 
Negative from left to right. 
After each trial of image presentations, participants were asked a total of 6 
questions: 
1) Bisection _question: Asks participants to make a judgment as to whether P2D
(the target) was closer to the longer or shorter durations, represented by P JD 
andP3D. 
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2) Estimation question: Asks participants to indicate on a 6 point Likert scale
how close P2D was to the Short or to the Long Duration, where 1 = Extremely 
close to the Short Duration and 6 = Extremely close to the Long Duration. 
3) Confidence question: Asks participants to indicate their confidence in their
answers on a 4 point scale (1 - not at all confident, 4 - very sure). 
4) Arousal Estimation question: Asks participants to indicate on a 9-point Likert
scale how strong or weakly mentally arousing was the photo (1 - Weakly 
Arousing, 9 Strongly Arousing). 
5) Valence Estimation question: Asks participants to indicate, on a 9-point Likert
scale, how strong was the emotion evoked by the photo (1 - Very Weak, to 9 -
Very Strong). 
6) Situational Awareness question: States the presence or absence of some detail
on P2. Participants answered by selecting either True or False on computer 
screen. 
Step 4 - Control Questions and Debriefing 
Participants were questioned by the experimenter whether they had understood 
all the on-screen instructions correctly. All participants were fully debriefed. 
7.2.2 Results 
The data will analysis will be arranged into four categories. The first Category 
encompasses analyses of the Anxiety, Arousal and Valence scores, which together 
indicate the extent of the effects that the emotional stimuli has had on participants. 
Next, the Confidence scores will be analysed to see whether there are differences in 
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confidence between different groups. The third category will be the SA scores. 
Bisection and Estimation scores are in the forth category which directly tests the 
relationship between different emotions and the perception of time. In the fourth 
category a correlation will also be run between the Estimation scores and Valence 
scores to test for the extent and direction of correlation between emotions and time 
perception. 
7.2.2.1 Anxiety Levels Control Results 
Category 1 - Effects of Emotional Stimuli on Participants 
The responses of participants on the SAI questionnaire were calculated by first adding 
the scores for each of the participants separately at the beginning of the experiment 
and at the end of the experiment then subtracting the Anxiety score at the beginning 
from the score at the end of the experiment. Hence a positive number indicates an 
increase in the Anxiety levels and a negative number, a decrease in the Anxiety levels. 
Anxiety is used here also in the context of arousal with high anxiety indicating also a 
possible high arousal level. 
Below are the means table along with the bar chart of the responses (Graph 
7 .1 ). We can observe from the graph that both the Negative and Positive images did 
invoke an increase in anxiety levels. We can see that the increase is bigger for the 
Negative images than Positive and Neutral ones. The Neutral images, on the other 
hand appear to have invoked a decrease in anxiety levels. 
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Graph 7.1: Mean Anxiety Scores for all Affective Conditions (CI 95 %). Anxiety 
scores for both Negative and Positive groups increased after image presentation, 
though more for the Negative group. They decreased for the Neutral group. 
To assess whether the differences were significant, a one-way ANOVA was 
run taking one between levels IV, Valence, with three levels Positive, Negative and 
Neutral. 
Using boxplots, three outliers were discovered in the Negative group, one in 
the Positive group and one in the Neutral group. All outliers were replaced with the 
value closest to it. The data were normally distributed for each group as assessed by 
Shapiro-Wilk test (p > 0.05). Homogeneity of variances was not violated as assessed 
by Leven's test of Homogeneity of Variances (p > 0.05). 
Anxiety scores were significantly different between different emotional 
Valence groups, F(2, 48) = 28.24, p < 0.01. Anxiety score increased from Neutral 
group (M = -2.12, SD = 3.94) to the Positive group (M = 4.94, SD = 3.34) and 
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Negative group (M = 6.41, SD = 3.30) in that order. Tukey's post-hoc analysis
revealed that the mean increase from Neutral to Negative (8.53, 95% CI(5.59, 11.46)) 
was statistically significant (p < 0.01) as well as the increase from Neutral to Positive 
(7.06, 95%, CI(4.12, 9.99)), p < 0.01. There were no significant differences between 
the Negative and Positive Arousal scores. The results show that the emotional stimuli 
had the expected effect on the participants Anxiety scores with both Positive and 
Negative images invoking a perceived increase in Anxiety and the Neutral a 
perceived decrease. 
7.2.2.2 Result of Arousal Ratings 
Next, the results of the Arousal scores given by participants for the IAPS images were 
analysed. The data were added then averaged for each participant. A score closer to or 
one would indicate low Arousal; a score close to or 9 would indicate high Arousal. 
Using boxplots, one outlier was discovered in the Positive group. The outlier was 
replaced with the value closest to it. The data were normally distributed for all levels, 
except the Positive as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk test (p > 0.05) and (p < 0.05), 
respectively. Homogeneity of variances was violated as assessed by Levene's test of 
Homogeneity of Variances (p < 0.05). Arousal score was significantly different 
between different emotional Valence groups, Welch's F(2, 30.81) = 68.96, p < 0.01. 
Arousal increased from Neutral group (M = 1.87, SD= .67) to the Positive group (M 
= 4.24, SD= .60) and Negative group (M = 4.51, SD= 1.05) in that order (Graph 7.2). 
Games-Howell post-hoc analysis revealed that the mean increase from Neutral to 
Negative (2.64, 95% CI(l.89, 3.38)) was statistically significant (p < 0.01) as well the 
increase from Neutral to Positive (2.37, 95% CI(l .83, 2.91)), p < 0.01. There were no 
significant difference between Negative and Positive groups. The results show that 
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the emotional stimuli had the expected effect on the participants Arousal scores with 
both Positive and Negative images invoking a perceived increase in Arousal levels 
relative to the Neutral images. 
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Graph 7.2: Mean Arousal Scores for all Affective Conditions (Cl 95 %) . The results 
from the Ratings of the Arousal scores show that participants perceived the Negative 
and Positive images as significantly more arousing than the Neutral images. 
7.2.2.3 Result of Valence Measures 
Next, the results of the Valence scores given by participants for the IAPS images were 
analysed. The data were added then averaged for each participant. A score closer to or 
one would indicate low emotional Valence; a score close to or 9 would indicate a high 
emotional Valence according to each group. Using boxplots, four outliers were 
discovered in the Positive group. The outliers were replaced with the value closest to 
them. The data were normally distributed for all levels as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk 
test (p >0.05). Homogeneity of variances was violated as assessed by Levene's test of 
Homogeneity of Variances (p < 0.05). 
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Valence score was significantly different between different emotional Valence 
groups, Welch's F(2, 29.59) = 87.69, p < 0.01. The emotional valence increased from 
Neutral group (M = 1.92, SD= 0.57) to the Positive group (M = 4.19, SD= 0.47) and 
Negative group (M = 4.62, SD= 1.18) in that order (Graph 7.3). Games-Howell post-
hoc analysis revealed that the mean increase from Neutral to Negative (2.70, 95% 
CI(2.03, 3.37)) was statistically significant (p < 0.01) as well that from Neutral to 
Positive (2.26, 95% CI(l.90, 3.50)), p < 0.01). There was no significant difference 
between Negative and Positive groups. The results show that the emotional stimuli 
had the expected effect on the participants Valence scores with both Positive and 
Negative images invoking a perceived increase in Valence levels relative to the 
Neutral images. 
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Graph 7. 3: Mean Valence Scores for all Affective Conditions (Cl 95 %). The results 
from the Ratings of the Valence scores show that participants perceived the Negative 
and Positive images as significantly more Unpleasant/Pleasant than the Neutral 
images. 
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Category 2 - Do emotions differently affect Confidence? 
7.2.2.4 Result of Confidence Measures 
Next, the results of the Confidence scores reflecting the Bisection and Estimation 
responses were analysed. The data were added then averaged for each participant. A 
score closer to or one would indicate low confidence; a score close to or 4 would 
indicate high confidence. Using boxplots, one outlier was discovered in the Neutral 
group, one in the Positive group and two in the Neutral group. The outliers were 
replaced with the value closest to them. The data were normally distributed for all 
levels as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk test (p > 0.05). Homogeneity of variances was 
violated as assessed by Levene's test of Homogeneity of Variances (p < 0.05). 
Confidence score was significantly different amongst different emotional Valence 
groups, Welch's F(2, 29.08) = 6.30, p < 0.01. Confidence increased from Neutral 
group (M = 2.94, SD = .52) to the Positive group (M = 3.17, SD = .32) and Negative 
group (M = 3.38, SD = .22) in that order (Graph 7.4). Games-Howell post-hoc 
analysis revealed that the mean increase from Neutral to Negative (0.44, 95% CI(0.10, 
0.79)) was statistically significant (p < 0.01). There were no significant differences 
between Negative and Positive groups or Neutral and Positive groups. The confidence 
on answers is relatively high for all groups, all scoring over 2.5 whereas negative and 
positive groups scoring over 3. 
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Graph 7.4: Mean Confidence Scores for all Affective Conditions (CJ 95 %). The 
Confidence ratings indicate that participants were, on the whole, confident on their 
answers. Participants were significantly more confident on the answers given for 
negative images as compared to Neutral images. 
Category 3 - Do emotions differently affect Situation Awareness? 
7.2.2.5 Results of SA Measure 
Next, the results of the SA scores given by participants were analysed. The correct 
and incorrect responses were added separately for each participant. A score of 20 
correct would mean O incorrect. The incorrect responses were subtracted from the 
correct responses so that a positive number indicates more correct answers were given 
whereas a negative number less; zero shows an equal proportion of right and wrong 
responses. Using boxplots, one outlier was discovered in the positive group, one in 
the neutral group. The outliers were replaced with the value closest to them. The data 
were not normally distributed on all levels as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05). 
Homogeneity of variances was violated as assessed by Levene's test of Homogeneity 
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of Variances (p > 0.05). SA score was significantly different between different 
emotional Valence groups, Welch's ANOVA F(2, 27.87) = 7.56, p < 0.01. SA score 
increased from Negative group (M = 15.29, SD = 4.06) to the Positive group (M = 
17.65, SD= 2.03) and Neutral group (M = 18.94, SD= 1.25) in that order (Graph 7.5). 
Games-Howell's post-hoc analysis revealed that the mean decrease from Neutral to 
Negative (-3.65, 95% CI(-6.26, -1.03)) was statistically significant (p < 0.01). There 
were no differences between Negative and Positive Groups or between Positive and 
Neutral groups. These results indicate that Negative images had a detrimental effect 
on the processing of the information when compared to the Neutral images. 
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Graph 7.5: Mean SA Scores for all Affective Conditions (CI 95 %). The SA ratings 
indicate that participants were, on the whole worse in the negative affective condition. 
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Category 4 - Do emotions differently affect time perception? 
7.2.2. 6 Bisection Measure 
A one way, between subjects ANOVA was run with the IV the Valence with three 
levels, Positive, Negative and Neutral and DV the Bisection scores. The responses 
"Long" and the responses "Short" were added separately. The Bisection score was 
calculated by subtracting the sum of the responses "Short" from the sum of the 
responses "Long" so that a positive number show a dilation of the perception of time 
whereas the negative numbers show a contraction. Using boxplots, one outlier was 
discovered in the Neutral group. The outlier was replaced with the value closest to it. 
The data were normally distributed for two groups, Negative and Neutral but not 
Positive as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk test (p > 0.05) and (p < 0.05), respectively. 
Homogeneity of variances was not violated as assessed by Levene's test of 
Homogeneity of Variances (p > 0.05). The Bisection score was significantly different 
between different emotional Valence groups, F(2, 48) = 20.27, p < 0.01. Bisection 
perception score increased from Positive group (M = -3.41, SD= 2.98) to the neutral 
group (M = 0.47, SD= 3.20) and negative group (M = 4.47, SD= 4.56) in that order 
(Graph 7.6). Tukey's post-hoc analysis revealed that the mean increase from neutral 
to negative (4.94, 95% CI(l .92, 7.97)) was statistically significant (p < 0.01) as well 
as the increase from positive to negative (7.88, 95%, CI(4.86, 10.91)), p < 0.01. There 
were no significant differences between the neutral and positive Bisection scores 
though they approached significance (2.94, 95%, CI(-.08, 5.97)), p = .06. The results 
confirm the main hypothesis that Negative emotional stimuli are related to a 
perceived dilation of time perception and positive to a perceived contraction ( as the 
difference between the positive and neutral images approached but not reached 
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significance, this is obviously a less supported statement) relative to the Neutral 
stimuli. 
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Graph 7. 6: Mean Bisection Scores for all Affective Conditions (CI 9 5 %) . A positive 
number indicates a dilation of time perception, a negative score, a contraction. The 
data shows that Negative images did induce a dilation of Time Perception and 
Positive images a contraction relative to the Neutral images (the difference between 
the Positive and Neutral images approached significance). 
7.2.2. 7 Estimation Measure 
The data for the Estimation score were added then averaged for each participant. A 
score closer to or one would indicate a short duration Estimation; a score close to or 
six would indicate a long duration Estimation. No outliers were discovered using 
boxplot. The data were normally distributed for two groups, Positive and Neutral but 
not Negative as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk test (p > .05) and (p < .05), respectively. 
Homogeneity of variances was not violated as assessed by Leven's test of 
Homogeneity of Variances (p > .05). Since the data were not normally distributed at 
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all levels, both Kruskal-Wallis and ANOVA tests were run. Since the results were 
comparable, ANOV A results are reported. 
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Graph 7. 7: Mean Estimation Scores for all Affective Conditions (CI 95 %). The data 
shows that Negative images did induce a dilation of Time Perception and Positive 
images a contraction relative to the Neutral images (the difference between the 
Positive and Neutral images approached significance). 
Estimation of Duration score was significantly different between different 
emotional Valence groups, F(2, 48) = 21.36, p = .00. Estimation of Duration score 
increased from Positive group (M = 2.65, SD = .47) to the Neutral group (M = 2.98, 
SD = .40) and Negative group (M = 3.61 , SD = .44) in that order (Graph 7.7). 
Tukey's post-hoc analysis revealed that the mean increase from Neutral to Negative 
(.63 , 95% CI(.27, .99)) was statistically significant (p = .00) as well as the increase 
from Positive to Negative (.96, 95%, CI(.60, 1.32)), p = .00. There were no significant 
differences between the Neutral and Positive Duration perception scores though they 
approached significance (.33, 95%, CI-.03, .69)), p = .08. 
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7.2.2.8 Correlation Between Valence and Time Estimation 
Since the data are not normally distributed for the Positive group in the Bisection 
measure (see above), a Spearman's Rank Order correlation was run to assess the 
relationship between Bisection scores and Valence scores. Preliminary analysis 
showed the relationship to be monotonic, as assessed by visual inspection of a 
scatterplot. 
There was a strong positive correlation for the Negative group between the 
perception of the duration of time, as shown by the Bisection score, and perceived 
strength of Valence of the images, rs(15) = .80,p = .00. 
There was a strong negative correlation for the Positive group between the 
perception of the Duration of time and perceived strength of Valence of images, rs(15) 
= -.72, p = .00. There was no significant correlation between Estimation of time and 
perceived strength of Valence of images for the Neutral group, rs(15) = -0.33, p = .20. 
The correlation suggest that there is relationship between the time perception and the 
emotional Valence with the increasing degrees of Negative emotional Valence 
leading to increased dilation of the perception of time, and increasing degrees of 
Positive emotional Valence leading to increased contraction of the perception of time 
relative to the Neutral (Graph 7.8). 
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Graph 7.8: Correlation Between Valence and Time Estimation. The graph shows a 
Positive correlation between the Perceived duration and rated Valence of the Negative 
Images. The correlation is reversed for the Positive images. 
7.3 DISCUSSION 
The results of this experiment support our experimental hypotheses. We found a 
statistically significant effect of emotional Valence on time perception. Positive 
emotions appeared to speed up the experience of time while, in contrast, negative 
emotions produced the opposite effect; time was experienced as slowing down. Also, 
we found that negative emotional Valence was correlated to poorer image processing, 
whereas, in contrast, positive emotional Valence was correlated to a better image 
processing. The latter results are congruent with the results from the first experiment 
where increased negative emotions seemed to lead to poorer SA. 
The results on the ST AI scores showed that the emotional stimuli had the 
expected effect on the participants. Arousal scores with both positive and negative 
images did invoke a-perceived increase in Arousal scores and a perceived decrease of 
Arousal for the neutral images. These results were further supported by the 
participants' self-rating scores, which also showed that the emotional stimuli had the 
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expected effect on the participants. Arousal scores with both positive and negative
images did appear to invoke a perceived increase in Arousal levels relative to the
neutral images. Participants appeared to be overall confident in their answers, all
scoring in average above the 2.5 in a scale of 1 (low confidence) to 4 (high 
confidence) with the positive and negative. The confidence ratings indicate that 
participants were, on the whole, confident on their answers. Participants were 
significantly more confident on the answers given for negative images as compared to 
neutral images suggesting that the negative images, in particular, had the largest effect 
on participants' confidence in their answers. 
The data did show that negative images did induce a dilation of time 
perception and positive images a contraction relative to the neutral images (the 
difference between the positive and neutral images approached significance) in both 
measures with regard to the referents and the direct estimations. The negative images 
seemed to have had the largest effect in distorting time perception, especially since 
they were also perceived to be the most accurate answers, as indicated by the 
confidence scores. 
Also, and importantly, the correlation suggests that there is a strong 
relationship between the time perception and the emotional valence with the 
increasing degrees of negative emotional valence leading to increased perception of 
time dilation, and increasing degrees of positive emotional valence leading to 
increased perception of time contraction relative to the neutral. 
Taken together, there is strong evidence to support the conclusion that the 
Valence of emotional arousal affects, or is affected by, the variations in the time 
perception. Concurrent with James & Lange's theory of emotions (i.e. James 1890), 
as well as Damasio 's (1994, 1999), it could well be that the variations in time 
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perception may reflect different degrees of involvement of the body's afferent neural
pathways which then result in the feeling of an emotion. This is conjecture at this
point however, there is some evidence which support this hypothesis. 
Khoshnoodi et al., (2008) as well as Treisman & Brogan (1992) have both 
reported that simply increasing the frequency of stimulus presentation leads reliably 
to an over-estimation of time. At the same time, exposing participants to the 
emotionally negative stimuli also leads to an over-estimation. If the perceptual and 
autonomic systems are activated to a relatively higher degree, this could be what 
underlies both the dilation in time perception as well as an associated negative feeling. 
It would be interesting to test whether differing frequencies of stimulus presentation 
affect the way emotional stimuli are perceived in terms of their Valence, since this has 
not been directly tested so far. 
There has been an increased interest in the relationship between emotion and 
time perception but, as Lake & LaBar (2011) conclude, there has been little attempt to 
link this research directly to affective sciences. An important question is how 
perception of time is distorted in anxiety-provoking situations and the effects that that 
has in the in other processes of cognition, such as perception, learning and decision­
making. The results of this experiment do through some light on the relationship 
between the two but much more research is needed. 
Having found support for the relationship between the variations m time 
perception and the emotional Valence, next we tum our attention to shorter, 
millisecond time scales. If the same effect is found on shorter time scales then we can 
further narrow down our attention to the possible EEG correlates of the variations in 
tipe Perception and their associated emotional Valences. 
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Chapter 8 - Investigating the Sub and Supra-Second Timing 
Mechanisms and Their Underlying Neural Circuits 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The evidence presented in the previous chapter suggests that the experience of time 
varies in a predicted direction as a function of the valence of emotional stimuli with 
the Negative emotional stimuli being highly positively correlated with the perceived 
durations and the Positive stimuli highly negatively correlated for referent durations 3 
and 9 seconds with comparison duration of 6 seconds. Furthermore, it was found that 
the SA, as assessed by memory recall score on emotional images, was significantly 
impaired for negatively valenced images compared to positively valenced ones. These 
findings suggest that variations in the valence of emotional stimuli, variations in SA 
and variations in the perception of time may be cognitively and neurologically linked. 
This possibility is further explored here and the next chapter. 
In this chapter we will discuss some of the evidence commg from 
neuroscience research, which implicates distinct brain areas and neurotransmitter 
systems as important for the perception of time, such as the cortical (i.e. motor and 
pre-motor areas) and subcortical (i.e. Basal Ganglia) and the Dopaminergic (DA) 
systems (Meck 1966). Furthermore, evidence will be assessed that there are partly 
distinct neural circuits that are responsible for milliseconds, seconds-to-minutes as 
well as the circadian range timings and that this distinction is somewhat blurred 
around the 1 second interval range (Buhusi & Cordes, 2011). Finally, evidence will be 
discussed that suggest that timing mechanisms in the brain may underlie other 
important functions such as learning, memory encoding and emotional processing. 
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8.1.1 Exploring Different Neural Circuits Underlying Different Aspects of Interval
Timing 
A vast array of brain areas have been implicated in the neural contributions to Time 
Perception on millisecond to second intervals, both cortical (parietal, premotor '
prefrontal, and insular cortices) and sub-cortical (basal ganglia and cerebellum) (Bueti 
2011). Buhusi & Meck (2005) suggest that there are two main functionally separate 
Neural Circuits involved in processing interval timing information: an automatic 
timing system and a cognitively controlled timing system; the automatic system is 
mainly underlined by the activity around the motor and premotor circuits (Treisman, 
Faulkner & Naish, 1992) and the cognitively controlled system relies mainly in 
prefrontal and parietal regions (Lewis & Miall, 2003). Dividing many studies of time 
representation according to three general task characteristics: the duration measured, 
the use of movement to define a temporal estimate, and the continuity and 
predictability of the task, Lewis & Miall (2003) found that different durations were 
related to different psychophysical correlates. One of these differences related 
specifically different patterns of brain activation to the measurement of sub-second 
(timing intervals shorter than 1000 milliseconds) and supra-second timing intervals 
(timing intervals longer than 1000 milliseconds). It appears that the length of time 
being judged involves different stages of neural and cognitive activations. 
Current pharmacological research suggests that different stages of temporal 
processing may also be modified by different neurotransmitter systems. For example, 
the internal clock used to time durations in the seconds-to-minutes range appears 
linked to dopamine (DA) function in the basal ganglia, while temporal memory and 
attentional mechanisms appear linked to acetylcholine (ACh) function in the frontal 
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cortex. These two systems are connected by frontal-striatal loops, thus allowing for
the completion of the timing sequences involved in duration discrimination (Meck 
1996). 
Taking a relatively novel approach Gooch, Wiener, Hamilton & Coslett 
(2011) studied the differences in brain activation of sub and supra-second timing by 
using a voxel- based lesion-symptom mapping. The important aspect of this method is 
that it is essentially blind to which areas may prove to be important hence completely 
avoiding any potential experimenter bias (Buhusi & Cordes, 2011). Gooch et al., 
(2011) reported that lesions in frontal or parietal cortices led to less accuracy in Time 
Perception as compared to controls and that the right hemisphere, but not the left, was 
involved in both sub and supra-second timing. Interestingly, for the sub-second timing 
the additional activity of the left hemisphere was required suggesting that sub-second 
timing requires left-hemisphere structures, implying that sub-second timing might 
require a specialized neural circuitry (Buhusi & Cordes, 2011). In addition, reviewing 
single unit activity recordings in monkey's Pre-Frontal Cortex, Oshio (2011) 
suggested that PFC neurons may be involved in the monitoring of cue duration and 
memory encoding of the temporal aspects of the information. 
Furthermore, Portugal, Wilson & Matell (2011) recorded from the striatal 
neurons of rats that were trained to perform a temporal reproduction task and found 
that their activity (91 % of neurons involved in timing) was further modulated by the 
motor behaviour. Portugal et al., (2011) concluded that temporal information within 
the striatum is embedded within its contextual and motor functions. Besides its 
involvement in the preparation and execution of motor functions, the pre motor cortex 
also, more specifically the ventral pre motor cortex, is involved in supporting 
perceptual decisions, monitoring performance and uses "recent and long-term sensory 
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memory to decide, execute, and evaluate the outcomes of the subjects' choices"
(Pardo-Vazquez, Padron, Fernandez-Rey. & Acuna 2011). 
Although the neural correlates that underpin the inter-individual variability on
time estimation are not really understood, there is evidence that it also depends on the 
scale of the temporal durations (Gilaie-Dotan, Kanai & Rees 2011). Gilaie-Dotan and 
colleagues investigated the differences on brain activity between estimations of 2 
second and 12 second intervals and found that the gray matter volume in both the 
right posterior lateral sulcus encompassing primary auditory and secondary 
somatosensory cortex, plus parahippocampal gyrus strongly predicted an individual's 
ability to discriminate longer durations of 12 seconds but not 2 seconds regardless of 
the stimulus modality. The results suggest that the aforementioned brain structures are 
involved in modality-independent time discrimination. 
Although the neural circuits involved in the sub and supra-second timing 
overlap, a broad categorisation would link the sub-second timing with the circuits that 
underlie movement preparation and execution such as motor and pre-motor areas, 
basal ganglia as well as the right and left prefrontal cortex whereas the supra-second 
timing seems to be controlled largely by frontal lobe areas (including the prefrontal 
cortex), parahippocampal gyrus as well as the basal ganglia. Within the context of this 
chapter, it is interesting to investigate the effects of judging different durations of 
differently valenced stimuli around the 1000 millisecond time interval as, it is 
suggested, it is around this time interval that both system contribute thus suggesting 
an increased contribution from frontal, prefrontal and subcortical areas around this 
time. 
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8.1.2 Exploring Different Cognitive Processes Underlying Different Aspects of 
Interval Timing
It has been suggested that processes of Time Perception may be an important medium 
for the translation of signals across the multimodal sensory processes, specifically 
from the visual to auditory modality, as the latter is deemed to be dominant in 
temporal processing (Bueti 2011). There is not much experimental support for this 
idea, but, nonetheless, if experimental support were to confirm this, then the 
implications for the cognitive mechanisms of time perception are profound. It 
suggests that temporal processing mechanisms, besides handling temporal 
information, also provide, in a sense, the medium of the synchronization of 
information between sensory modalities. The idea of cognition relying in the 
synchronization of multiple sites supporting multiple functions is not new. Damasio 
(1994), for example, suggests that a crucial quality of cognition is its reliance on the 
synchronized activity of multiple brain regions. In any synchronization, temporal 
information is crucial hence malfunctions of cognitive processes or brain region 
concerned with time perception may have widespread, damaging effects. Damasio 
(1994) states: Any malfunction of the timing mechanism would be likely to create 
spurious integration and disintegration. This may indeed be what happens in states of 
confusion caused by head injury, or in some symptoms of schizophrenia and other 
diseases." (p.95). Nonetheless, though the idea is seductive, it requires much more 
empirical evidence before it can be explored in that context. 
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8.1.2.1 Recent Evidence on the Link of Emotions and Time Perception 
Droit-Volet, Fayolle & Gil, (2011) recently tested a paradigm, (the structure of which
is similar to the one on the first experiment of this thesis), on measuring the link 
between emotions and time perception. Instead of asking participants to judge the 
duration of emotional stimuli of various arousals or valences, they instead induced a 
particular emotional mood by asking participants to watch a fear-inducing, sadness­
inducing or neutral movie; Droit-Volet and colleagues assessed the mood induced by 
administering, before and after, the Brief Mood Introspective Scale. They 
administered a temporal bisection task before and after watching the movie and 
reported that fear-inducing movie alone, which was judged to provoke an increase in 
fear and arousal levels, did lead to an over-estimation of durations. 
Reviewing studies that link emotions with the variation in time perception, 
Schirmer (2011) has proposed that stimulus-specific sentient representations may 
mediate emotional influences on the Perception of Time. Also, there is evidence that 
temporal ambiguity or unpredictability increases anxiety levels and is accompanied 
by an increase in activity of Amygdala, which, again, may account for the distortions 
in interval timing (Lake, & LaBar, 2011). Amygdala, which is heavily connected with 
both cortical and subcortical areas (Sah, Faber, Lopez de Armentia, & Power, 2003), 
including the striatum (Davis & Whalen 2001) may be a prime area by which the 
perception of time is affected by emotional stimuli. 
In a reproduction study reported by Lambrechts, Mella, Pouthas. & Noulhiane 
(2011), content bearing stimuli (Pleasant, Unpleasant and Neutral images selected 
from IAPS) versus content deprived stimuli (gray squares) was also reported, to have 
a differential effect on time perception for different time scales. Lambrechts et al., 
(2011) reported that at 2 s, the reproduced duration was longer for content-bearing 
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than content-deprived stimuli. For 4 s and 6 s, an inverse relationship was reported
between stimulus duration and differences on the time perception of content-bearing 
versus content-deprived stimulus with the 6 s not showing a significant difference. 
However, at all durations, Lambrechts et al., (2011) report, the precision of the 
reproduction was greater for non-emotional than emotional stimuli (pleasant and 
unpleasant). Again, this supports the idea that emotional stimuli affect our perception 
of time, however, since the direction of the distorted precision is not given, we may 
assume that it was somewhat random; unlike what was found in the previous 
experiment (Chapter 7) of this thesis. 
The following experiment will further expand on the previous experiment 
(Chapter 7) by testing for sub (under 1000 ms) and supra-second (over lOOO ms) 
interval timing in conditions of negative, positive and neutral affective conditions. 
Participants will be asked to judge a duration of a target stimuli of a positive, negative 
or neutral valence with reference to two referent stimuli. The referent stimuli will be 
set at 400ms and 1600ms. The target stimuli will be spread over 6 durations: 600, 800, 
1000, 1200 and 1400ms. Due to the additional involvement of the brain areas 
processing emotion, it is predicted that, in particular, supra-second timing will show 
that negative images will slow down the perception of time and positive images speed 
it up relative to the neutral images, as was found in the previous experiment. The sub­
second timing, on the other hand, is not clear whether it would be affected in the same 
way since the time for evaluating the emotional content of the images is rather short. 
The biggest effect is expected to be found around the 800 to 1200ms interval since 
that is the area where the stimuli are close to being equidistant from each referent 
interval hence the decision space is more ambiguous. 
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8.2 EXPERIMENT 7 - INVESTIGATING THE ROLE OF DIFFERENT 
AFFECTIVE CONDITIONS IN THE PERCEPTION OF TIME IN SUB AND 
SUPRA-SECONDS TIME INTERVALS 
8.2.1 Method 
8.2.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-one participants were randomly selected ( opportunity sampling) mainly from 
students of the first, second and third year of the psychology course at the University 
of Gloucestershire (mean age = 27.24, SD = 10.45, 12 female, 19 right handed). 
8.2.1.2 Materials 
Stimulus Presentation Computer 
The same equipment was used as the equipment used in experiment 2. 
Apparatus 
Each session involved the administration of a computerised Time Estimation task, 
provided by the experimenter. Sessions took approximately 30-40 minutes. 
Spielberg State Anxiety Inventory 
The same questionnaire as used in experiment 1. 
International Affective Picture System images (IAPS) 
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One hundred and eighty (180) colored images were pooled from the IAPS consisting 
of 60 pleasant, 60 neutral, and 60 unpleasant images, based on normative pleasure and 
arousal ratings. Pleasant images included erotic couples and happy families; neutral 
images included neutral faces and household objects; unpleasant images included 
mutilated bodies and scenes of attack and threat. Pleasant and unpleasant images were 
selected to be the most arousing exemplars in each gender Category, Male and 
Female; normative ratings of valence and arousal for the same pictures in the male 
and female categories differed - in other words and to take an obvious example, an 
image of an attractive female or male may not elicit the same emotional reaction in 
both genders. Ninety, of the 180 images, were chosen on Female Arousal and Valence 
ratings, the other on Male Arousal and Valence ratings. 
Both Male and Female image Categories were further organised into five 
Image Groups containing 18 images each. Each of the five Image Groups were later 
on presented at one of five pre-set Durations of 600, 800, 1000, 1200 and 1400ms, 
therefore representing 2 sub-second Duration groups, 2 supra-second and one in the 
actual 1000 millisecond interval. Within each of the Image Groups there were three 
Image Sets, each containing 6 Positive images, 6 Negative images and 6 Neutral 
images. Based on the normative ratings of Arousal, the images were distributed so 
that the arousal values did not significantly differ between the same Sets compared 
across Image Groups, different Durations and Categories (Table 8.1 ). 
IAPS images Female Sets 
5. Positive Set (n 30): 1710, 2347, 2150, 2165, 5833, 2058, 2045, 5910, 8190, 7330,
1811, 2209, 8470, 8420, 8200, 8370, 4626, 8185, 8080, 4614, 8499, 8501, 4525, 
4640,4575,2208,4542,4660, 8034,5629. 
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6. Neutral Set (n = 30): 7490, 7026, 5740, 7187, 7052, 7100, 7950, 7035, 7004, 7080' 
7185, 7000, 7041, 5471, 7217, 7175, 7020, 2397, 7010, 2190, 2840, 7059, 7031' 
7491, 7705, 7150, 7110,5130, 7060, 9360. 
7. Negative Set (n = 30): 9421, 2800, 9140, 9420, 9301, 9326, 9435, 3350, 3103, 9185 '
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3191, 3180, 3230, 3225, 2205, 9325, 9253, 3016, 9405, 2703, 9921, 6563, 2095, 
3059,3131, 9433,3015,3168,9075,3068. 
IAPS images Male Sets 
1. Positive Set (n = 30): 4250,4210, 4180, 5833, 8501, 8190, 5825, 1710, 1440,
1750, 4220, 4150, 1460, 4008, 4680, 5700, 8170, 8370, 4660, 8510, 4225, 
4310,4142,8499,4668, 8185,4001,4697,8179,4770. 
2. Neutral Set (n = 30): 7165, 7140, 7052, 5471, 7080, 7026, 7100, 5740, 7020,
7233, 7041, 7009, 7090, 7010, 7000, 2840, 7004, 7187, 7185, 7035, 7175, 
7705, 7040, 7217, 7950, 7110, 7025, 7224,5130, 7031. 
3. Negative Set (n 30): 9252, 3500, 3068, 3059, 6313, 6350, 3030, 6570,
9413, 3140, 3010, 6563, 3069, 3110, 3001, 3530, 3071, 9183, 9410, 3060, 
9940,3130,3100,3120,3170,3000,3131,3080,3102,3053. 
Female Male 
Durations Valence 1mean1sa; Arousal rmean1saJ Vatence (mean/sd} Arousal (mean/sd} 
600ms 7.98/ .38 5.78 / .fil 7.82/ .39 6.67 / .44 
800ms 7.91 / .31 6.01 / .11 7.76 / .37 6.63/ .82 
Positive 1000ms 1.84/ 39 6.25/ .74 1.14/ 31 6.29/1.22 
1200ms 7.81/ .38 5.87 / .52 7.66 / .41 6.42/ .84 
1400ms 7.76/ .38 5.85/ .57 7.57 / .51 6.11/1.20 
600ms 1.67 / .21 6.32/ .59 2.13/ .30 6.85/ .36 
800ms 1.56/ .17 5.95/ .56 2.11/ 30 6.66/ .21 
Negative lOOOms 1.62/ .20 5.88 / .21 2.06/ .30 6.33/ .39 
1200ms 1.60/ .20 6.48/ .24 2.03/ 30 6.23/ .23 
1400ms 1.57 / .24 6.04/ .86 2.00/ .33 6.33/ .50 
600ms 5.08/ .33 2.44/ .33 5.04/ .44 l.49/.72 
800ms 5.00/ .28 2.36 / .18 4.99/ .40 2.56 / .33 
Neutral lOOOms 4.96/ .28 2.61/ .16 4.91/ .36 2.55/ .47 
1200ms 4.90 / .34 2.30/ .32 4.88/ .36 2.45/ .74 
1400ms 4.85/ .40 2.64/ .12 4.83/ .41 2.29/ .40 
Table 8.1: Normative Means and Standard Deviations for All Affective Conditions in 
Each Group. The pictures from each Category, male and female, were further 
subdivided into five Image Groups each later on presented at one of the following 
durations, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400 milliseconds. All Image Groups between males 
and females were matched for arousal and valence ratings so that there were no 
significant differences. Within each Image Group, the ratings for arousal were also 
matched for the Negative and Positive image Sets (see statics below). Means and 
standard deviations for each Image Sets within Each Image Group for both Categories, 
male and female, are shown above. 
A 5 (Durations: 600, 800, 1000, 1200 and 1400ms) by 3 (Valence: positive, 
negative and neutral images), between factors ANOV A revealed neither statistically 
significant interaction nor main effects between gender and image groups for the 
Arousal levels. Therefore, only the valence differed. 
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8.2.1.2 Design 
The main part of this study utilises a within subjects experimental design with two
independent variables (IV): (1) Durations with 5 levels (Table 1) and (2) Emotional
Valence, which has 3 levels, Positive, Negative and Neutral. 
The task has 90 trials overall. To assess the Perception of durations and 
Arousal and Valence levels associated with each image presented in each trial, four 
questions were asked at the end of each image presentation assessing the perceived 
Durations, Confidence in their judgments, and Valence and Arousal ratings for each 
IAPS image. The Confidence question was included to assess the participants' 
confidence in their responses to their perceived time intervals. The other two DVs 
were used to measure the actual, as opposed to normative, measures of valence and 
arousal ratings for each of the participants. This would be used as a control measure 
to ensure the IAPS images were perceived negative, positive or neutral according to 
the image. 
8.2.1.2 Procedure 
After giving informed consent, participants were led into a softly lit room and asked 
to sit in a reclining chair. Prior to starting the test, a verbal description of the 
experiment was given. The test itself was presented entirely on the computer screen 
and the experimenter was absent throughout the duration of the task. Participants were 
asked to follow instruction from the computer screen. While the experiment was 
running, the experimenter was located in an adjacent room. Upon finishing the task, 
participants were instructed to ring a bell to notify the experimenter. 
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Adopting a prospective paradigm, participants were told at the beginning of 
the experimental session that their task would involve time estimation. Participants 
were required to judge whether the duration of an image on screen, following two 
referent durations, one 400ms, one l 600ms, was closer to the longer duration image 
or the shorter one. As indicated, the images presented varied in duration (600, 800, 
1000, 1200 and 1400 milliseconds) and in valence (positive, negative and neutral). 
Step 1 - Participants anxiety was measured 
Participants were asked to complete an on-line version of State Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI) (Spielberger, 1989). The inventory consisted of 20 statements (e.g. 'I am 
worried'). Participants responded by clicking one of four options on the computer 
screen (1 = not at all, 4 = very much so). The questionnaires produced a summed 
score, which was used to indicate state anxiety (anxiety at that present time). 
Step 2 - Participants were trained to distinguish between a short and long 
duration (Referents) 
Next instructions were given to participants to observe an image 6 times (Image 
number 7006 from IAPS set: Normative Valence and Arousal ratings were 4.61 and 
2.08 for male and 5.09 and 2.58 for female respectively. Over all Valence and 
Arousal ratings were 4.88 and 2.33 respectively) and distinguish between two 
randomly presented durations, one longer, termed as LongD (1600ms) one shorter, 
termed as ShortD ( 400ms ). After each image presentation, feedback was presented on 
screen for l s  informing the participant whether it was a LongD or ShortD. 
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Step 3 - Participants were asked to distinguish between a short and long
duration Referents 
Next participants were presented asked to actively distinguish whether the same ,
randomly presented durations of 400 and 1600ms were LongD or ShortD. Feedback
was given after each attempt. At the end of this step, participants were asked to
continue only if they felt confident they could distinguish between these two 
durations comfortably. 
Step 4 - Instructions for the rating procedures were given 
Next participants were presented with the standard IAPS adult instructions for rating 
procedures for Valence and Arousal respectively (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert 1999). 
Step 5 - Main task instructions 
Next participants were given detailed instruction on the main task the instructions for 
the main task as follows: 
"This is the main task and it involves 90 trials. You will be presented with 
three stimuli: "LongD", "ShortD" and "Photo". "LongD" and "ShortD" are the same 
stimuli as before. The "Photo" duration is set at random in each trial. You will be 
asked to decide whether the photo duration is more similar to "ShortD" or "LongD". 
You can use the keyboard to answer some questions at the end of each trial." 
It is important that each trial is completed correctly. Please take a quick break 
if you feel you are getting tired. 
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Step 6 - Participants were required to judge whether a time interval of a 
positive, negative or neutral image presented on screen, was closer to the longer or 
shorter Referent. 
The main experiment started. Participants saw a fixation cross which stayed on screen 
for 500ms, followed by the same image encountered during training (Steps 2 and 3) 
with randomly but counterbalanced alternating durations of 400 or l 600ms, followed 
by a fixation cross followed by the other duration than the one just previously 
presented followed by a fixation cross, followed by one of the IAPS images randomly 
selected from the one of the Sets The participants answered the Confidence, Arousal 
and Valence questions after each trial (Figure 8.1). 
Trial 1 + 
P1 Counterbalanced 
Duration 
400ms or ... v,;vu,.:, 
Arousal: Low 
Valence: Neutral + 
P2 
Duration (P2D}: either 
400ms or 1600ms 
Arousal: Low fixation Point + 500ms Valence: Neutral 
Figure 8.1: Main experiment structure. 
+ 
Questions 
Compare durations of P3 with Pl 
andP2. 
Confidence in answer 
Arousal rating for P3 
Valence rating for P3 
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8.2.2 Results 
8.2.2.1 STAI Control Results for Genders 
An independent-samples t-test was run to determine if there was a statistically 
significant mean difference between the state anxiety level between genders at the 
beginning of the experiment. There were no outliers in the data, as assessed by 
inspection of a boxplot. Anxiety scores for each level of gender were normally 
distributed, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilks test (p > 0.05), and there was homogeneity 
of variances, as assessed by Levene's Test for Equality of Variances (p > 0.05). No 
significant differences were found. 
A further, independent-samples t-test was run to determine if there was a 
statistically significant mean difference between the state anxiety level between 
genders at the end of the experiment. There were no outliers in the data, as assessed 
by inspection of a boxplot. Anxiety scores for each level of gender were normally 
distributed, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilks test (p > .05), and there was homogeneity of 
variances, as assessed by Levene's Test for Equality of Variances (p = .67). No 
significant differences were found. 
ST AI control scores show that there were no differences between gender 
anxiety scores before and after the test. The first measure shows that both genders 
who were exposed to gender-appropriate emotional stimuli, started at similar levels of 
emotional arousal. Furthermore, the ST AI measure after the test showed that the 
different images used for each gender did not have a significantly different effect on 
anxiety on each gender, which was the original intention. 
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8.2.2.2 Results of Time Perception 
The DV was the Bisection Measure and was calculated by subtracting the sum of 
responses "short" from responses "long". Hence a negative number indicates a 
higher proportion of Short responses - contraction of time perception - and a positive 
number a higher proportion of Long responses - dilation of time perception. Zero 
means an equal number of long and short responses. 
Below are the means table along with the bar chart of the responses. (Graph 
8.1) The most striking difference is observed at 1200ms. Looking at the graph, we can 
see that even though the images are closer to the longer duration referent (the 1600 
millisecond one), there is a higher proportion of "short" responses for the positive 
images and "long" response for the negative images. 
Also, at 600ms, there is a marked difference between the perceived duration of 
positive and negative images. While the proportion of short responses is greater for 
both negative and positive images, there is a tendency to perceive negative images as 
comparatively longer. This appears to be reversed in the 800ms time but the 
differences between the three emotional Valences are smaller. At 1400ms, the 
differences between the three conditions are again small. 
At 1 OOOms, the perceived durations are all the same, perceived as being 
slightly shorter in all of the emotional Valences. 
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• Emotions ,euttal -5.14 -3.43 ·0.29 1..52 3.90 
Graph 8.1: Mean Bisection Score for All Affective Conditions Across Different 
Durations (CI 95 %). The biggest difference in Duration perception for different 
Valences is in the 600 and 1200ms Durations. 
A 5X3 repeated measures ANOV A was conducted to determine whether there were 
statistically significant differences in perception of interval duration over the five 
different time points for different emotional Valences. Outliers were discovered using 
boxplot for: Neutral 600ms - 5 outliers and Negative 1200ms - 3 outliers. All outliers 
were replaced with the nearest value. The data was not normally distributed in all the 
groups except negative lOOOms, as assessed Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05). Inspection 
of the histograms revealed that it was not possible to transform the data to meet the 
normal distribution condition since different groups were skewed in different ways, 
some positive some negative. To control for this, the data were run both on ANOV A 
procedures and the non-parametric equivalent, Friedman test. The results were 
comparable hence the ANOVA results are reported below. The assumption of 
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sphericity was violated, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p < 0.05).
Therefore, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied (E = 0.54). There was a
statistically significant interaction which showed that there were significant changes
in duration perception over different time points for different emotionally Valenced 
images F(4.32, 86.35) = 5.03,p < 0.01, 11
2 = .20.
8.2.2.2.1 Post Hoc Tests 
To further explore the interaction, five one way repeated measures ANOV As taking 
Valence as an IV with three levels, Positive, Negative and Neutral, were run to see 
whether there were significant differences for each of the five durations. 
For the 600ms duration, the repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to 
determine whether there were statistically significant differences in the perception of 
time for different emotional Valences. Since the data were not normally distributed at 
all levels, the data were run both on ANOV A procedures and the non-parametric 
equivalent, Friedman test. The results were comparable hence the ANOVA results are 
reported below. The assumption of sphericity was violated, as assessed by Mauchly's 
Test of Sphericity (p < 0.5). Therefore, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied 
(E = 0.61). To adjust for multiple comparisons, the significance value was set to p =
0.05/5 = 0 .01. There was a statistically significant difference in perception of 
duration of different Valences at 600ms: F(l.22, 24.44) = 6.84, p = 0.01, 112 = 0.26 
with perception of the Duration being longer for Negative images (M = -4.19, SD =
2.89) and shorter for Positive and Neutral images (M = -5.24, SD= 1.18 and M = -
6.00, SD = 0 respectively). Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni correction revealed that 
perception of duration differed significantly between positive and neutral (p < 0.03) 
and between negative and neutral (p < 0.03). Judging by the means, the positive 
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images were perceived as shorter whereas negative images were perceived as longer
relative to the neutral images ( Graph 8 .1). 
For the 1200ms duration, the repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to
determine whether there were statistically significant differences in the perception of
time for different emotional Valences. Since the data were not normally distributed at 
all levels, the data were again run both on ANOV A procedures and the non­
parametric equivalent, Friedman test. The results were comparable hence the 
ANOVA results are reported below. The assumption of sphericity was violated, as 
assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p < 0.05). Therefore, a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction was applied(£ = 0.74). To adjust for multiple comparisons, the significance 
value was set to p = 0.05/5 = 0.01. There was a statistically significant difference in 
perception of duration of different Valences at 1200ms: F(l.47, 29.44) = 14.62, p < 
0.01, 112 = 0.42, with perception of the durations being longer for Negative images (M 
= 2.86, SD = 2.06), shorter for Positive images (M = -0.48, SD = 2.09) and in between 
the two for Neutral images (M = 1.52, SD= 3.34). Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni 
correction revealed that perception of Duration differed significantly between Positive 
and Negative (p < 0.01) and between Positive and Neutral (p = 0.01) (Graph 8.1). 
No other significant differences were found on other Durations. The data 
confirm the experimental hypothesis; negative images are perceived as longer and 
positive images are perceived as shorter in both sub and supra-second intervals. The 
two durations, which yielded the most significant differences, were the 600 and 1200 
milliseconds, which were in the expected direction; the negative emotional stimuli 
slowed down the perception of time whereas positive stimuli speeded up perception 
of time. The results were more striking at 1200 milliseconds. 
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8.2.2.3 Results of Confidence Measures 
The responses of participants were calculated by adding them up. Hence a larger 
number indicates a higher confidence in the answer. 
Below are the means table along with the bar chart of the responses. (Graph 
8.2). The most striking difference is observed at 1200ms. Looking at the graph, we 
can see that the confidence is lowest for the positive images. It indicates, with regard 
to the Bisection measure, that there was a feeling of low confidence in the answers for 
the positive images relative to neutral and negative images. 
In all the durations, the confidence on the neutral answers is in between the 
confidence scores of positive and negative images and is relatively stable throughout. 
A 5X3 repeated measures ANOV A was conducted to determine whether there were 
statistically significant differences in confidence on answers over the five different 
time points for the three different emotional Valences. Outliers were discovered using 
boxplot for: Negative 800ms - 3 outliers, Neutral 800ms - 1 outlier and Neutral 
1400ms - 1 outlier. All outliers were replaced with the nearest value. The data were 
not normally distributed in the following levels, positive 600ms, negative 600ms, 
neutral 600ms, negative 800ms, negative 1 OOOms, positive 1400ms and neutral 
1400ms, as assessed Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05). Inspection of the histograms and 
attempts to transform the data showed that it was not possible to meet the normal 
distribution condition since different groups were skewed in different ways, some 
positive some negative. In order to control for this violation, the data were run both on 
ANOV A procedures and the non-parametric equivalent, Friedman test. 
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Graph 8.2: Mean Confidence Score for All Affective Conditions Across Different 
Durations (Cl 95 %). The biggest difference in Confidence scores is in 1200 Duration. 
Confidence on the perception of the neutral images falls between those of Positive 
and Negative images. 
The results were comparable hence the ANOV A results are reported below. 
The assumption of sphericity was violated, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of 
Sphericity (p < 0.05). Therefore, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied (£ = 
0.54). There was a statistically significant interaction which showed that there were 
significant changes in Confidence in answers over different time points for different 
emotionally Valenced images: F(4.31, 86.17) = 31.22,p < 0.01, 112 = 0.61. 
8.2.2.3.1 Post Hoc Tests 
To further explore the interaction, three one way repeated measures ANOVAs taking 
Duration as an IV with five levels, 600, 800, 1000, 1200 and 1400 milliseconds, were 
run to see whether there were significant differences of confidence between five 
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durations for each valence. Furthermore, five one way repeated measures ANOVAs
were run taking Valence as an IV with three levels, positive, negative and neutral, to
see whether there were significant differences in confidence for each of the five
durations. 
A one way repeated measures ANOV A was conducted to determine whether 
there were statistically significant differences in confidence for the positive images 
across different durations. Since the data were not normally distributed the data were 
run both on ANOV A procedures and the non-parametric equivalent, Friedman test. 
The results were comparable hence the ANOVA results are reported below. The 
assumption of sphericity was not violated, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of 
Sphericity (p > 0.05). To adjust for multiple comparisons, the significance value was 
set to p = .05/3 = 0.02. There was a statistically significant difference in the 
Confidence in answers for different durations F(4, 80) = 94.61, p < 0.01, 112 = 0.83 
with a decreasing confidence from 600ms to 1200ms (M = 21.38, SD = 2.84; M = 
20.10, SD= 2.83;, M = 19.05, SD= 2.73 and M = 12.86, SD= 1.80, respectively) but 
returning close to original value for 1400ms duration (M = 21.14, SD= 2.63). Post­
hoc analysis with Bonferroni correction revealed that Confidence in answers differed 
significantly between lOOOms and 1200ms (p < 0.01) and between 1200ms with 
1400ms (p < 0.01). Judging by the means, the positive images invoked significantly 
less confidence after the lOOOms but significantly more confidence after the 1200ms 
(Graph 8.3). 
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Graph 8.3: Mean Confidence Score for Positive Affective Conditions Across Different 
Durations (CI 95 %). Confidence decreases from shorter durations up to 1200ms but 
increases again for 1400ms. 
A one way repeated measures ANOV A was conducted to determine whether 
there were statistically significant differences in Confidence for the neutral images. 
Since the data were not normally distributed the data were run both on ANOV A 
procedures and the non-parametric equivalent, Friedman test. The results were 
comparable hence the ANOV A results are reported below. The assumption of 
sphericity was not violated, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p > 0.05). 
To adjust for multiple comparisons, the significance value was set to p = .05/3 = 0.02. 
There was a statistically significant difference in the Confidence in answers for 
different durations F(4, 80) = 3.90, p < 0.01, 112 = .16 with a the Confidence levels 
being greater for 600, 800 and 1400ms (M = 20.86, SD= 2.94; M = 20.19, SD= 2.34 
and M = 20.90, SD = 2.41, respectively) as compared to 1000 and 1200ms (M = 
19.48, SD = 3.06 and M = 19.48, SD = 3.25 respectively). Post-hoc analysis with 
Bonferroni corre<;tion did not reveal significant differences. The means show a slight 
decreasing trend in confidence until 1200 milliseconds (Graph 8.4). There is an 
increase, although slight, at 1400 milliseconds. 
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Graph 8.4: Mean Confidence Score for Negative Affective Conditions Across Different 
Durations (CI 95 %). There is a similar trend for the neutral images to the positive 
images (see graph 9.3) but it is less pronounced. 
A similar ANOV A was run for the negative images but no significant 
differences were found on the confidence levels. 
A one way repeated measures ANOV A was conducted to determine whether 
there were statistically significant differences in confidence between different 
affective condition for the 1200ms duration. The data was normally distributed as 
assessed by Shapiro-Wilk: test (p > 0.05). The assumption of sphericity was not 
violated, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p > 0.05). To adjust for 
multiple comparisons, the significance value was set to p = .05/5 = 0.01. There was a 
statistically significant difference in the confidence in answers for 1200ms duration 
F(2, 40) = 98.51, p < 0.01, 112 = 0.83 with confidence being lowest for the positive
images as compared to neutral and negative images (M = 12.86, SD = 1.80; M = 
19.48, SD = 3.25 and M = 19.57, SD = 2.80 respectively). Post-hoc analysis with 
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Bonferroni correction revealed that confidence m answers differed significantly
between positive and negative images (p < 0.01) and between positive and neutral
images (p < 0.01). Judging by the means, the positive images invoked significantly
less confidence than both negative and neutral images (Graph 8.5). 
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Graph 8.5: Mean Confidence Score for All Affective Conditions for 1200ms Duration 
(CI 95 %). There is a similar trend for the Neutral images to the positive images (see 
graph 9.3) but it is less pronounced. The confidence for the Positive image durations 
was significantly lower at 1200 milliseconds. 
A one way repeated measures ANOVA was also conducted to determine 
whether there were statistically significant differences in confidence between different 
affective conditions at the 1400ms duration. Since the data were not normally 
distributed the data were run both on ANOV A procedures and the non-parametric 
equivalent, Friedman test. The results were not comparable, ANOV A showed a 
significant difference but Friedman's test showed a non significant difference hence, 
taking into acco1:nt the non-parametric test, there were no differences in confidence 
for the 1400ms. 
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There were no other significant differences in the Confidence scores for other 
_ANOVAs. To summarise, there was a significant interaction between different 
durations and affective conditions. Overall, Confidence for the negative images was
stable whereas neutral and positive images invoked a U shaped dipping at 1200
milliseconds. The positive images appeared to invoke significantly less confidence 
then both neutral and negative images at 1200 milliseconds. 
8.2.2.4 Results of Valence Measures 
The responses of participants were calculated by adding them up, averaged then 
rescaled so that a score of 9 would mean highly pleasurable whereas a score of one 
would mean extremely disagreeable. 
Below are the means table along with the bar chart of the responses. (Graph 
8.6) Again, the most striking differences are observed at 600 and 1200ms. As 
expected, the graph shows that the least pleasurable images, as ratings indicate, 
appear to be, mostly, the negative images and the most pleasurable the positive 
images, especially at 600 and 1200 milliseconds. 
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8.00 
7.00 
6.00 
5.00 
4.00 
3.00 
2.00 
1.00 
0.00 
• Arousal Positive 5.64 5.65 5.83 6.86 5.48 
• Arousal Negative 2.72 5.63 5.71 5.74 5.75 
• Arou�I Neutral 5.52 5.62 5.75 5.75 5.52 
Graph 8.6: Mean Valence Score for All Affective Conditions for All Duration (CI 
95 %) - Outlier Corrected. The graph shows that overall, positive images were 
perceived as more pleasurable than negative images with the biggest differences at 
600 and 1200 milliseconds. 
A 5X3 repeated measures ANOV A was conducted to determine whether there 
were statistically significant differences in Valence ratings over the five different time 
points for different emotional Valences. Outliers were discovered using boxplot for: 
negative 800ms - 3 outliers, neutral 800ms - 1 outlier and neutral 1400ms - 1 outlier. 
All outliers were replaced with the nearest value. The data was not normally 
distributed in the following groups neutral 600ms, negative 800ms, negative 1 OOOms, 
positive I 400ms and neutral 1400ms, the other 10 levels were normally distributed s 
assessed Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05) and (p > 0.05 respectively). Inspection of the 
histograms and attempts to transform the data showed that it was not possible to meet 
the normal distribution condition on all levels since different groups were skewed in 
different ways, some positive some negative. In order to control for this violation, the 
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data were run both on ANOVA procedures and the non-parametric equivalent, 
Friedman test. The results were comparable hence the ANOV A results are reported 
below. The assumption of sphericity was violated, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of 
Sphericity (p < 0.05). Therefore, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied (£ = 
0.26). There was a statistically significant interaction which showed that there were 
significant changes in the Valence ratings of images over different time points for 
different emotionally Valenced images F(2.05, 41.00) = 39.78.91,p < 0.01, 112 = 0.67. 
8.2.2.4.1 Post Hoc tests 
To further explore the interaction, three one way repeated measures ANOV As taking 
Duration as an IV with five levels, 600, 800, 1000, 1200 and 1400 milliseconds, were 
run to see whether there were significant differences of Valence scores between five 
Durations for each Valence. Furthermore five one way repeated measures ANOV As 
were run to see whether the Valence scores differed within each Duration. 
A one way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine whether 
there were statistically significant differences in Valence ratings of the positive 
images across different durations. The data were normally distributed on all levels 
except the 1400ms one as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05). The assumption 
of sphericity was violated, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p < 0.05). 
Therefore, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied (£ = 0.33). To adjust for 
multiple comparisons, the significance value was set to p= 0.05/3 = 0.02. There was a 
statistically significant difference which showed that there were significant changes in 
the Valence ratings of positive images over different time points F(l.32, 26.36) = 
16.04, p < 0.01, 112 = .45. Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni correction revealed that 
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Valence ratings in images differed significantly between l OOOms to 1200ms (p <:: 
0.01) and between 1200 and 1400ms (p < 0.01). Looking at the table of means and the 
chart above (Graph 8.6) we can see that the images are rated as more pleasurable at 
1200ms than both l OOOms and 1400ms. 
Another one way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine 
whether there were statistically significant differences in Valence ratings of the 
negative images across different durations. The data were normally distributed on all 
levels except the 800 and 1 OOOms as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05). The 
assumption of sphericity was violated, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p 
< 0.05). Therefore, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied(£ = 0.34). To adjust 
for multiple comparisons, the significance value was set to p = 0.05/3 = 0.02.There 
was a statistically significant difference which showed that there were significant 
changes in the Valence ratings of negative images over different time points F(l.36, 
27.15) = 90.93, p < 0.01, 112 = .82. Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni correction 
revealed that Valence ratings in images differed significantly between 600 to 800ms 
(p < 0.01). Looking at the table of means and the chart above (Graph 8.6) we can see 
that the images are seen as more disagreeable at 600ms than 800ms. 
A further one way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine 
whether there were statistically significant differences in Valence ratings of the 
neutral images across different durations. The data were normally distributed on 
l OOOms and 1200ms levels but not normally distributed in other levels as assessed by 
Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05). In order to control for this violation, the data were run 
both on ANOV A procedures and the non-parametric equivalent, Friedman test. Since 
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the results were comparable, ANOV A tests are reported below. The assumption of 
sphericity was not violated, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p > 0.05). 
To adjust for multiple comparisons, the significance value was set to p = 0.05/3 = 
0.02.There was a statistically significant difference which showed that there were 
significant changes in the Valence ratings of neutral images over different time points 
F(4, 80) = 3.89, p < 0.01, 112 = .16. Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni correction did 
not reveal significant differences. 
For the 600ms duration, the repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to 
determine whether there were statistically significant differences in Valence ratings 
for different emotional Valences. The data were not normally distributed for the 
neutral group as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05). The assumption of 
sphericity was violated, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p < 0.05). 
Therefore, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied (E = .74). To adjust for 
multiple comparisons, the significance value was set to p= 0.05/5 = 0.01. There was a 
statistically significant difference in Valence ratings at 600ms F(l .48, 29 .49) = 46.17, 
p < 0.01, 112 = 0.70 with the Valence decreasing from the positive images (M = 5.64, 
SD= 1.18) to the neutral images (M = 5.52, SD= 0.49) and negative images (M = 
2.72, SD = 1.32) in that order. Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni correction revealed 
that Valence ratings of positive images differed significantly from the negative (p < 
0.01 and negative differing significantly from the neutral (p < 0.01). Judging by the 
means (Graph 8.6), the positive images were perceived as significantly more 
agreeable than negative images and negative images as significantly more 
disagreeable than neutral images. 
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For the 1200ms duration, the repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to
determine whether there were statistically significant differences in Valence ratings
for different emotional Valences. The data was normally distributed for all levels as
assessed by Shapiro-Wilk test (p > 0.05). The assumption of sphericity was not
violated as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p > 0.05). To adjust for multiple 
comparisons, the significance value was set to p = 0.05/5 = 0.01. There was a 
statistically significant difference in Valence ratings at 1200ms F(2, 40) = 98.51, p < 
0.01, 112 = 0.83, with the Valence decreasing from positive images to neutral images to
negative images in that order (M = 6.86, SD= 0.30; M = 5.75, SD= 0.54 and M = 
5.74, SD= 0.47, respectively). Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni correction revealed 
that Valence ratings of positive images differed significantly from neutral and 
negative images (p < 0.01). Judging by the means (Graph 8.6), the positive images 
were perceived as more pleasurable than both neutral and negative and Negative 
images. 
For the 1400ms duration, the repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to 
determine whether there were statistically significant differences in Valence ratings 
for different emotional Valences. The data was normally distributed for all levels 
except the neutral group as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk test (p > 0.05). The assumption 
of sphericity was not violated as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p > 0.05). 
To adjust for multiple comparisons, the significance value was set to p = 0.05/5 = 
0.01. There was a statistically significant difference in Valence ratings at 1400ms F(2, 
40) = 5.93, p < 0.01, 112 = 0.23, with the Valence decreasing from negative images to
neutral images to positive images in that order (M = 5.75, SD= 0.46; M = 5.52, SD= 
0.40 and M = 5.48, SD = 0.42, respectively). Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni 
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correction revealed that Valence ratings of negative images differed significantly
from neutral and positive images (p < 0.05). Judging by the means (Graph 8.6), the
negative images were perceived as more pleasurable than both neutral and positive 
images. 
As expected, the valence ratings, apart from the 1400ms, showed the positive 
images as more pleasurable than neutral and negative images ass les pleasurable than 
the neutral images wherever there were significant differences. The most salient 
differences seem to be at the 600 and 1200 milliseconds. 
8.2.2.5 Arousal Measures 
The responses of participants were calculated by adding them up, averaged so that a 
score of 9 would mean high Arousal whereas a score of one would mean low Arousal. 
Below are the means table along with the bar chart of the responses (Graph 
8.7). Apart from the 1200ms time, all the other Arousal scores show an expected 
pattern. The negative and positive images show a generally higher Arousal rating 
when compared to neutral with the noticeable exception at 1200ms. Also, the bar 
chart shows that, again, apart from the 1200m duration, the Arousal ratings of positive 
and negative images are very close together. At 1200ms, the Arousal for the positive 
images is the lowest. The negative images appear to invoke a relatively consistent 
higher Arousal rating whereas the positive images appear to oscillate reaching the 
lowest point at 1200ms. Notice neutral images are consistently low after the 600ms 
and stay relatively at the same level. 
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7.00 
6.00 
5.00 
4.00 
3.00 
2.00 
1.00 
0.00 
• Arousal Pos1tiv<! 5.48 3.98 3.53 2.23 3.83 
• Arousal Negative 5.75 3.79 3.74 3.83 4.01 
• Arousal Neutral 5.52 2.68 2.65 2.76 2.68 
Graph 8.7: Mean Arousal Score for All Affective Conditions for All Duration (CI 
95 %) - (Outliers Normalised). The graph shows that overall, negative and positive 
images were perceived as more arousing than neutral images in all durations. 
A 5X3 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine whether there 
were statistically significant differences in Arousal ratings over the five different time 
points for different emotional Valences. Inspection of boxplots revealed one outlier at 
the neutral group 600ms; the outlier was replaced with the value closest to it. The data 
was not normally distributed in the following five out of 6 levels, neutral 600ms, 
neutral 800ms, neutral lOOOms, neutral 1200ms, and also neutral at 1400ms as 
assessed Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05), all the other levels were normally distributed. 
Inspection of the histograms and attempts to transform the data showed that it was not 
possible to meet the normal distribution condition. In order to control for this 
violation, the data were run both on ANOV A procedures and the non-parametric 
equivalent, Friedman test. The results were comparable hence the ANOVA results are 
reported below. The assumption of sphericity was violated, as assessed by Mauchly's 
Test of Sphericity (p < 0.05). Therefore, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied 
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(i:: ,::; 0.50). There was a statistically significant interaction which showed that there
were significant changes in the Arousal ratings of images over different time points
for different emotionally Valenced images F(3.64, 72.74) = 10.62, p = 0.01, 11
2 = 0.35.
8.2.2.5.1 Post Hoc tests 
To further explore the interaction, three one way repeated measures ANOVAs taking 
Valence as an IV with three levels, Positive, Negative and Neutral, were run to see 
whether there were significant differences of Arousal ratings in each of the five 
Durations. Five further one way repeated measure ANOV As were run to see whether 
the Arousal ratings differed within each of the durations. 
A one way repeated measures ANOV A was conducted to determine whether 
there were statistically significant differences in Valence ratings of the positive 
images across different durations. There were no outliers and the data was normally 
distributed on all levels as assessed by boxplot and Shapiro-Wilk test (p > 0.05), 
respectively. The assumption of sphericity was violated, as assessed by Mauchly's 
Test of Sphericity (p < 0.05). Therefore, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied 
(E = 0.41). To adjust for multiple comparisons, the significance value was set to p 
= .05/3 = 0.02. There was a statistically significant difference which showed that there 
were significant changes in the Arousal ratings of Positive images over different time 
points F(l.66, 33.11) = 41.06, p < 0.01, 112 = 0.67. Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni 
correction revealed that Arousal ratings in images differed significantly between 
600ms to 800ms (p < 0.01), between lOOOms and 1200ms (p < 0.01) and between 
1200ms and 1400ms (p < 0.01). Looking at the table of means and the chart above 
(Graph 8.7) we can see that the positive images invoke less arousal at 800ms 
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compared to 600ms, 1200ms compared with lOOOms and more arousal at 1400ms
compared with 1200ms. 
A one way repeated measures ANOV A was conducted to determine whether 
there were statistically significant differences in Valence ratings of the neutral images 
across different durations. There were no outliers and the data was not normally 
distributed on all levels as assessed by boxplot and Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05), 
respectively. In order to control for this violation, the data were run both on ANOV A 
procedures and the non-parametric equivalent, Friedman test. The results were 
comparable hence the ANOVA results are reported below. The assumption of 
sphericity was violated, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p < 0.05). 
Therefore, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied (£ = 0.29). To adjust for 
multiple comparisons, the significance value was set to p = .05/3 = 0.02. There was a 
statistically significant difference which showed that there were significant changes in 
the Arousal ratings of negative images over different time points F(l .17, 23.33) = 
65.42, p < 0.01, 112 = 0.77. Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni correction revealed that 
Arousal ratings in images differed significantly between 600ms to 800ms (p < 0.01). 
Looking at the table of means and the chart above (Graph 8.7) we can see that the 
neutral images invoke significantly less arousal at 800ms compared to 600ms. 
For the 600ms duration, a one way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted 
to determine whether there were statistically significant differences in Arousal ratings 
of the differently Valenced images. There were no outliers and the data was normally 
distributed on all levels, except for the neutral as assessed by boxplot and Shapiro­
Wilk test (p > 0.05). The assumption of sphericity was not violated, as assessed by 
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Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p > 0.05). To adjust for multiple comparisons, the 
significance value was set to p = .05/5 = 0.01. There was a statistically significant 
difference in Arousal ratings at 600ms F(2, 40) = 5.93, p < 0.01, 'fl
2 = 0.23. Post-hoc 
analysis with Bonferroni correction revealed that Arousal ratings in images differed 
significantly between positive and negative images (p < 0.05) and between negative 
and neutral images. Looking at the table of means and the chart above (Graph 8.7) we 
can see that the negative images are rated as more arousing than both positive and 
neutral images. 
For the 800ms, a one way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to 
determine whether there were statistically significant differences in Arousal ratings of 
the differently Valenced images. There were no outliers and the data was normally 
distributed on all levels, except for the neutral as assessed by boxplot and Shapiro­
Wilk test (p > 0.05). The assumption of sphericity was not violated, as assessed by 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p > 0.05). To adjust for multiple comparisons, the 
significance value was set to p = 0.05/5 = 0.01. There was a statistically significant 
difference in Arousal ratings at 800ms F(2, 40) = 8.67, p < 0.01, 'fl2 = 0.30. Post-hoc 
analysis with Bonferroni correction revealed that Arousal ratings in images differed 
significantly between neutral and, both, positive and negative images (p = < 0.01) and 
(p < 0.02) respectively. Looking at the table of means and the chart above (Graph 8.7) 
we can see that the neutral images are rated as less arousing than both positive and 
negative images. 
For the lOOOms, a one way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to 
determine whether there were statistically significant differences in Arousal ratings of 
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the differently Valenced images. There were no outliers and the data was normally 
distributed on all levels, except for the neutral as assessed by boxplot and Shapiro­
Wilk test (p > 0.05). The assumption of sphericity was not violated, as assessed by 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p > 0.05). To adjust for multiple comparisons, the 
significance value was set to p = 0.05/5 = 0.01. There was a statistically significant 
difference in Arousal ratings at 800ms F(2, 40) = 4.92, p < 0.02, 112 = 0.20. Post-hoc
analysis with Bonferroni correction revealed that Arousal ratings in images differed 
significantly between neutral and, both, positive and negative images (p = < 0.01) and 
(p < 0.02) respectively. Looking at the table of means and the chart above (Graph 8.7) 
we can see that the neutral images are rated as less arousing than both positive and 
negative images. 
For the 1200ms, a one way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to 
determine whether there were statistically significant differences in Arousal ratings of 
the differently Valenced images. There were no outliers and the data was normally 
distributed on all levels, except for the neutral as assessed by boxplot and Shapiro­
Wilk test (p > 0.05). The assumption of sphericity was not violated, as assessed by 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p > 0.05). To adjust for multiple comparisons, the 
significance value was set to p = 0.05/5 = 0.01. There was a statistically significant 
difference in Arousal ratings at 800ms F(2, 40) = 10.58,p < 0.01, 112 = 0.35. Post-hoc 
analysis with Bonferroni correction revealed that Arousal ratings in images differed 
significantly between positive and negative (p < 0.01) and approach significance 
between negative and neutral (p = 0.06). Looking at the table of means and the chart 
above (Graph 8.7) we can see that the positive images are rated as significantly less 
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arousing than negative images and negative images are close to significantly higher 
arousal ratings than neutral images. 
For the 1400ms, a one way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to 
determine whether there were statistically significant differences in Arousal ratings of 
the differently Valenced images. There were no outliers and the data was normally 
distributed on all levels, except for the neutral as assessed by boxplot and Shapiro­
Wilk test (p > 0.05). The assumption of sphericity was not violated, as assessed by 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p > 0.05). To adjust for multiple comparisons, the 
significance value was set to p = 0.05/5 = 0.01. There was a statistically significant 
difference in Arousal ratings at 800ms F(2, 40) = 8.31, p < 0.01, 112 = 0.29. Post-hoc 
analysis with Bonferroni correction revealed that Arousal ratings in images differed 
significantly between neutral and both positive and negative images (p < 0.01) and (p 
< 0.02) respectively. Looking at the table of means and the chart above (Graph 8.7) 
we can see that the neutral images are rated as significantly less arousing than both 
negative and positive images. 
Measures of the Arousal showed that negative and positive stimuli invoked at 
most levels higher scores than neutral stimuli (except the 600ms duration). There is, 
however, a notable difference at 1200 milliseconds where the negative and positive 
stimuli seem to differ more than in other durations, with the positive stimuli invoking 
a lower arousal at that point. 
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8.3 DISCUSSION 
The bisection scores show a highly significant interaction indicating that the 
perception of time across different durations differed significantly according to the 
different emotional stimuli. Further analysis showed that two durations yielded the 
most significant differences in this regard, 600 and 1200 milliseconds. The 
differences showed, as expected, that the negative emotional stimuli were associated 
with a slowing down of the perception of time whereas the positive stimuli were 
associated with a speeded up perception of time. The most significant results were 
found at the 1200 milliseconds duration for the positive images. 
Even though all images at that the duration 1200 milliseconds were actually 
closer to the longer duration Referent (the 1600ms one), positive images were 
perceived as being more similar to the shorter duration Referent (400ms one). Also, at 
this time-point, 1200 milliseconds, there is a clear separation between the perception 
of the duration of the neutral images when compared to both negative and positive 
images, and in the predicted direction. The mean perceived duration of the neutral 
images is 0.86 lower than the negative and 1.04 higher than the positive. The 
difference at this duration between the perception of time of differently Valenced 
stimuli is significantly larger than in all other durations (graph 8.1 ). Therefore we 
conclude that the results of the experiment support our main experimental hypotheses, 
that negative and positive emotions are respectively related to a dilation and 
contraction of the perception of time. Although the effect seems to be larger for the 
supra-second interval .(that is, at 1200ms), it should be noted that the relationship 
appears to hold for both sub and supra-second time intervals. positive emotions 
appeared to speed up the experience of time in the 600 milliseconds and 1200 
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milliseconds time intervals while, in contrast, negative emotions produced the 
opposite effect; time was experienced as slowing down at those durations relative to 
neutral images. 
There was also a statically significant interaction of confidence scores 
between different durations and emotional Valences. While the confidence remind 
relatively unchanged for the neutral images through all the durations, the confidence 
for the negative and positive images tended to show a relatively U shaped curve 
dipping at the lowest point at 1200 milliseconds. This is most pronounced for the 
positive images that show a significant dip in confidence at 1200 milliseconds 
compared to before ( 1000 milliseconds) and after (1400 milliseconds). The 
perception of duration of positively Valenced images at 1200 milliseconds also 
invoked significantly less confidence than in neutral and negative images too. 
The valence ratings, as expected, generally showed that IAPS images were 
perceived as expected. The most significant differences were seen at the 600 and 1200 
milliseconds with the positive and negative valences showing a marked difference 
from the neutral images in the expected direction. Since the negative images were 
perceived as significantly more negative than neutrals at 600ms whereas positive 
images where see as significantly more positive than neutral at 1200 milliseconds, and, 
furthermore, negative images alone seem to significantly decreased at 600ms when 
compared to 800ms whereas positive images alone seem to increase in valence at 
l 200ms as compared to 1000 and 1400ms, it can be tentatively suggested that the 
effect on the sub-second time scales are more liable to be affected by the negative 
emotional stimuli whereas the supra-second time scales by the positive emotional 
stimuli. 
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The Arousal scores showed, as expected the negative and positive images 
invoked a consistently higher Arousal rating when compared to neutral. Also, the bar 
chart (Graph 8.6) shows that in all durations except the 1200ms and 600ms durations, 
the Arousal ratings of the positive and negative images are very close together. At 
1200ms, the Arousal for the positive images is the lowest. The data analysis showed 
that Arousal levels differed significantly for different Valences across durations. 
Positive images at 1200 milliseconds especially invoked less Arousal levels compared 
with IOOOms, and 1400ms. It appears that a dip in Arousal levels at 1200 milliseconds 
was associated with an increased distortion of the perception of time. At 1200 
milliseconds, the correct response for all questions would have been the "long" 
response since that duration is closer to the 1600 milliseconds than 400 milliseconds 
by 400 milliseconds, however, in the case of positive images, the overall responses 
tended to see them as closer to the shorter duration, indicating therefore a strong 
effect of the affective conditions, especially the positive affective condition at this 
point. Overall the data seems to suggest that high negative arousal at sub-second 
intervals has a strong effect and dilates perception of time whereas high positive 
arousal at supra second intervals has also a strong effect and contract the perception 
of time. It could be argued that negative affective stimuli are initially preferentially 
processed at short intervals since they may represent danger and hence avoiding such 
stimuli would be advantageous in evolutionary terms. 
The findings here are in general agreement with Droit-Volet et al., 2011) and 
Lambrechts et al., (2011). With regard to the latter work, there is an interesting 
parallel with Eagleman (2008), which was mentioned in the previous chapter. In 
Chapter 7, Egleman (2008) and a few other studies were cited (Khoshnoodi et al., 
2008; Treisman & Brogan, 1992; Treisman et al., 1990) which suggest that increasing 
288 
���������������Chapters��������������
the temporal resolution of the brain's processing of information also leads to a 
dilation of Time Perception - in other words, perceptual time slows down. The results 
here appear to confirm this, as the participants are exposed to highly negative 
emotional stimuli, the brain's resolution increases leading to dilation of the time 
perception. The interesting aspects of the results in this study are that the effect seems 
to happen at specific time intervals, 600 and 1200 milliseconds ones to be more 
precise and at this times, and negative images appear more dominant in the 600ms 
interval whereas positive images at 1200ms interval. Also, it is not sure why do these 
effects happen at symmetrical time points. At this time it is not possible to give a clear 
answer since the enquiry to find a plausible answer on this did not yield any particular 
study that could bring some light. It is, however, curious that it happens, as far as this 
particular set of data suggests, in time intervals that are multiples of each other 
therefore mathematically related. 
The next chapter will focus on the supra-second time interval, since this where 
the biggest difference was found, to see whether changing the distance of the referents 
to the comparison interval makes any difference. Reducing the distance of the 
Referent intervals means that there is more cognitive capacity required to make the 
distinction. What would happen in these conditions? This question will be 
investigated next. 
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Chapter 9 - Investigating the Decision Making Processes in 
Time Perception 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous two chapters it was shown that the emotional bisection task clearly 
differentiates the effects that different affective stimuli has in the perception of time. 
Importantly, the previous experiment showed that within the same task, different, 
conflicting affective stimuli could differentially affect the perception of fixed time 
intervals thus allowing for a possible on-line evaluation of a person's perception of 
diverse affective stimuli by measuring its perceived length of time. The most relevant 
aspect of that finding, with regard to this thesis, is the possibility of using the 
variations on the perception of time as an indicator of a person's perception of a 
situation in terms of emotional valences of negative, positive or neutral. As shown on 
the first experiment (Chapter 2), negative and positive stimuli can have a marked 
effect in how a situation is perceived, as shown by QASA measures. Furthermore, in 
Chapter 6 it was shown that emotional stimuli, of both negative and positive valence, 
did have a detrimental effect in the processes of decision making, interrupting normal 
decision making performance, as was found in the same task without the emotional 
stimuli (Chapter 4). To extend the investigation further, a modified version of the 
bisection task to will be used in this chapter to investigate the cognitive mechanisms 
of the effects of emotional stimuli in decision-making. 
There is an ongoing debate whether the decision made when target duration is 
perceived as more similar to the short referent or long referent in the bisection task is 
made with regard to the memory of the referents themselves or, conversely to a 
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decision criteria akin to that used in signal detection tasks (Allan 2002; see also 
Chapter 1 section 1.6.1 ). Earlier versions of the bisection tasks did not include the 
referents duration in every comparison trial. In other words, the referent durations 
were used to train the participants' memory, often termed as referent memory. 
Participants then, it was assumed, used the referent memory during the target 
presentation to make the comparison with the target duration so that a decision would 
be made whether the target interval was perceived to be closer to the longer or shorter 
referent. There is accumulating evidence, however, which suggest that the referent 
durations, rather than used as direct comparisons to the target stimuli, are used to 
establish a decision criterion against which target durations are measured and a 
decision is reached. The evidence, however, is conflicting and there is no broad 
agreement among researchers in this area. 
For example, Rodriguez-Girones & Kacelnik (2001) run a modified version of 
the bisection task in which the referents were presented sequentially but varying in 
duration. Similar to the previous experiment (Chapter 8), the two referents durations 
were counterbalanced and presented on each trial before the target duration; the 
durations of the referents varied in each trial, known as the roving-referents bisection 
task. As opposed to the fixed referents version, in the roving-referent version, it was 
argued, the memory of the referents could not be established reliably since they were 
not constant. The results showed that the performance of the participants significantly 
deteriorated with the introduction of the roving-referents as opposed to the fixed 
referents. Rodriguez-Girones & Kacelnik argued the comparison of the target was 
made against the referents presented in each trial. In other words, the roving-referents 
prevented a reliable reference memory to be established in the long-term memory 
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hence suggesting that the participants compared the duration of the target to the 
referents in each trial. 
However, in another modified version of the bisection task, Wearden & 
Ferrara (1995, 1996) found that the absence of the referents yielded the same 
performance. Wearden and Ferrara presented participants with a set of target intervals 
of varying durations. Participants were asked to simply partition the target durations 
into short and long ones; note the absence of the referents. They found that even in the 
absence of the referent durations, participants yielded similar data when the referents 
were present thus suggesting the comparison of the duration of the target intervals 
must be made against some criterion and not directly compared to the actual stored 
memories of the referent durations. 
In a series of experiment, Allan (2002) supported the conclusion reached by 
Wearden and Ferrara and suggested that the referent durations used in training served 
to establish a decision criterion, that is to say, the target intervals were not compared 
to either referent but to a general decision criterion they help establish. Allan (2002) 
found that in fixed referent, roving referents and even when feedback for each trial 
was given, the data was similar hence, suggesting that the referents simply established 
a criterion after which the presentation of the referents did not have much effect. 
However, developmental differences have been found. For example, Droit-Volet & 
Rattat (2006) found that 5 and 8 year olds showed a lowered temporal sensitivity 
when the bisection task did not use referents (as in Wearden & Ferrara 1995, see 
above) compared to when referents were used; adults did not show a difference. 
It is not known, however, whether timing of emotional stimuli are also 
processed in the same way with regard to the bisection task. The experiments above 
that support the idea that referent durations serve to form a decision criterion use 
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neutral stimuli in their experiments. However, both experiments, Chapters 7 and 8, 
and other experiments too (Droit-Volet, Fayolle & Gil, 2011; Schirmer 2011; 
Lambrechts, Mella, Pouthas. & Noulhiane 2011) show that affective stimuli are not 
processed in the same way as affectively neutral stimuli. Therefore, it is not known 
whether affective stimuli would be more likely to be processed with regard to the 
referent durations directly or to a decision criterion. The distinction is important 
because it implies the involvement of different memory processes. If the comparison 
takes the form of target against a decision criterion then that is more likely to involve 
the long term memory in the decision processes. Otherwise, if the comparison takes 
the form of target against the referents presented in each trial, then working memory 
is more likely used (Rodriguez-Girones & Kacelnik 2001 ). Furthermore, if a decision 
criterion is used, as opposed to trial referents, that indicates a lack of SA as, 
presumably, the given referent durations in each trial are not utilized. 
In terms of affective involvement, the negative emotional stimuli are more 
likely to lead to the use of a decision criterion whereas for the positive one the trial 
referents. This would be in line with the findings of Chapter 2 where negative 
emotional valence was found to lead to a more focused SA than positive emotional 
valence. In other words, a negative affective valence that leads to a more focused 
processing of information is then more likely to ignore relevant information in the 
environment and use a rule of thumb or a decision criterion as a guide whereas a 
positive emotional valence that leads to a more distributed SA is then likely to result 
in the use of a wider range of information; hence it is more likely that the trial 
referents are utilized in decision making when they are available under the positive 
and neutral affective conditions and the decision criterion under the negative affective 
condition. 
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In the following experiment the bisection task was manipulated so that the 
decision on the perception of time intervals could be made either against a decision 
criterion or trial referents. Participants were trained with a set of referents using a 
different duration from the referents that were presented in each trial. The training 
referents had a duration of: short referent = 800ms, long referent = 1600ms. The trial 
referents were the same as the ones used in the previous experiment: short referent = 
400ms, long referent = 1600ms; the target stimuli had a fixed duration of 1131 ms. 
This means that, if the decisions are made against the decision criterion 
established by the training referents, then it is more likely that more responses will be 
'short' rather than 'long' since the target would be closer to the shorter referent than 
the longer referent by 138ms [(long referent - target) - (short referent - target) =
(1600 - 1131) - (800 - 1131) = 138ms] - in other words the target is closer to the 
shorter referent by 13 8ms compared with the longer referent. Whereas, if the decision 
is made with regard to the trial referents, then the answers to the comparison of the 
duration of the target interval are more likely to be 'long' since the target is closer to 
the longer referent by 262ms ([(long referent - target) - (short referent - target) = 
( 1600 - 1131) - ( 400 - 1131) = 262ms] - in other words the longer referent is 262ms 
closer to the target compared with the shorter referent). The hypothesis is that 
negative emotional stimuli will be judged against the decision criterion ( established 
during training referents - hence more responses would be 'short' for the negative 
stimuli) whereas positive emotional stimuli will be judged against the trial referents. 
To summarize the above in simple words, the durations of the pair of the 
training referents and trial referents are different. The only difference is the training 
referents have the short referent 400ms longer. This is also the only major deference 
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compared with the preceding experiment. The rest of the structure of the experiment 
remains largely the same. 
It should be noted that the positive stimuli is likely to yield more responses 
short regardless since the conditions have not changed to a significant degree from the 
previous experiment (Chapter 8). In the Chapter 8 experiment, it was found that target 
stimuli of positive valence with a duration of 1200ms and with trial referents of 400 
and 1600ms durations did yield significantly more responses short than long. It is not 
expected that dropping the target from 1200 to 1131 would result in any significant 
differences, if anything, there would be more responses short. The most interesting 
possibility is whether the negative stimuli, which was found to be perceived as mostly 
long in the previous experiment, were perceived to be as mostly short - which is to 
say, perceived to be closer to the shorter referent. If this were the case, there would be 
strong support for the idea that the processing of the emotionally negative stimuli 
mainly involves information from long term memory stores to the cost of ignoring 
some of the possibly relevant perceptual information held in working memory. 
9.2 EXPERIMENT 7 - INVESTIGATION THE PROCESSES OF DECISION 
MAKING IN TIME PERCEPTION 
9.2.1 Method 
9.2.1.1 Participants 
Ten participants were randomly selected ( opportunity sampling) mainly from students 
of the first, second and third year of the psychology course at the University of 
Gloucestershire (mean age = 31. 70, SD = 11.81, 3 female, 8 right handed). 
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9.2.1.2 Materials 
Stimulus Presentation Computer 
The same stimulus computer was used as in other experiments. 
Apparatus 
Each session involved the administration of a computerised Time Estimation task, 
provided by the experimenter (see section 9.2.1.3 below for more details). Sessions 
took approximately 40 to 45 minutes. 
Spielberg State Anxiety Inventory 
The same questionnaire as used in experiment 1. 
International Affective Picture System images (IAPS) 
Based on the normative ratings of arousal for males and females separately, 
the images were distributed so that the arousal values did not differ significantly 
between the affective conditions of positive and negative and within and between 
male and female sets (table 9.1). 
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IAPS images Female Sets 
1. Positive Set (n = 30): 1710, 2347, 2150, 2165, 5833, 2058, 2045, 5910,
8190, 7330, 1811, 2209, 8470, 8420, 8200, 8370, 4626, 8185, 8080, 
4614, 8499,8501,4525,4640,4575,2208,4542,4660,8034,5629. 
----------- - Chapter 9 -----------
2. Neutral Set (n = 30): 7490, 7026, 5740, 7187, 7052, 7100, 7950, 7035,
7004, 7080, 7185, 7000, 7041, 5471, 7217, 7175, 7020, 2397, 7010, 
2190,2840, 7059, 7031, 7491, 7705, 7150, 7110,5130, 7060,9360. 
3. Negative Set (n = 30): 9421, 2800, 9140, 9420, 9301, 9326, 9435,
3350, 3103, 9185, 3191, 3180, 3230, 3225, 2205, 9325, 9253, 3016, 
9405, 2703, 9921, 6563, 2095, 3059, 3131, 9433, 3015, 3168, 9075, 
3068. 
IAPS images Male Sets 
1. Positive Set (n = 30): 4250,4210, 4180, 5833, 8501, 8190, 5825, 1710,
1440, 1750, 4220, 4150, 1460, 4008, 4680, 5700, 8170, 8370, 4660, 
8510,4225,4310,4142,8499,4668,8185,4001,4697,8179,4770. 
2. Neutral Set (n = 30): 7165, 7140, 7052, 5471, 7080, 7026, 7100, 5740,
7020, 7233, 7041, 7009, 7090, 7010, 7000, 2840, 7004, 7187, 7185, 
7035, 7175, 7705, 7040, 7217, 7950, 7110, 7025, 7224,5130, 7031. 
3. Negative Set (n = 30): 9252, 3500, 3068, 3059, 6313, 6350, 3030,
6570, 9413, 3140, 3010, 6563, 3069, 3110, 3001, 3530, 3071, 9183, 
9410, 3060, 9940, 3130, 3100, 3120, 3170, 3000, 3131, 3080, 3102, 
3053 
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Female Male 
Valence (mean/sd) Arousal (mean/sd) Valence (mean/sd) Arousal (mean/sd) 
Positive 7.86 I .35 5.95 I .56 7.71 I .40 6.42 I .91 
Negative 1.6 I .20 6.13 I .60 2.06 I .29 6.48 I .41 
Neutral 4.96 I .32 2.47 I .26 4.93 I .38 2.47 I .53 
Table 9.1: The Valence and Arousal Means and Standard Deviations for All Affective 
Conditions - scale 1 to 9, 1 low arousal/ negative valence, 9 high arousal/positive 
valence. The normative valence and arousal means and standard deviations for the 
images of each affective condition, positive, negative and neutral, are shown 
separately for males and females. Note, the arousal values for the positive and 
negative group are roughly similar, whereas the valence values are markedly different. 
9.2.1.2 Design 
The main part of this study utilises a repeated measures design with one independent 
variable, the affective condition with 3 levels, positive, negative and neutral and 
taking as DV the difference between the responses "long" with the responses "short" 
so that a negative number indicates a contraction of time perception and a positive 
number a dilation of time perception. 
The task has 90 trials overall. To assess the perception of time intervals and 
arousal and valence levels associated with each image presented in each trial, four 
questions were asked at the end of each image presentation assessing the perceived 
duration of the image, confidence in that judgment, and valence and arousal ratings 
for each IAPS image. 
Furthermore, the task was manipulated so that, unbeknown to the participants, 
the duration of the referents presented in training was different from the duration of 
the referents presented in each trial (see procedure for more detail). It is expected that 
the duration of the affectively negative stimuli will be judged relative to the referents 
during training whereas the duration of the neutral and positive stimuli will be judged 
relative to the referents presented in each trial thus showing that the processes 
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involved in decisions that have a negative emotive aspect differ from those of 
decisions that are affectively neutral and positive. 
9.2.1.3 Procedure 
After giving informed consent, participants were led into a softly lit room and asked 
to sit in a reclining chair. The test itself was presented entirely on the computer screen 
and the experimenter was absent throughout the duration of the task. Participants were 
asked to follow instruction from the computer screen. While the experiment was 
running, the experimenter was located in an adjacent room. Upon finishing the task, 
participants were instructed to ring a bell to notify the experimenter. 
Participants were required to judge whether the duration of an image on screen, 
following two referent durations, one 400ms, one 1600ms, was closer to the longer 
duration image or the shorter one. Prior to these, participants were trained to 
distinguish between two referents, one 800ms long, the other 1600ms long. 
Step I - Participants anxiety was measured 
The same procedure was followed as in the previous experiment. 
Step 2 - Participants were trained to distinguish between a short and long 
duration (Referents) 
The procedure was the same as in the previous experiment with only one difference, 
the short referent had a duration of 800ms as opposed to 400ms in the previous 
experiment. Please note that during the trials when participants were required to make 
a duration judgment, the duration of the short referent, without the participants 
knowing, it was changed to 400 milliseconds (see step 6). 
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Step 3 - Participants were asked to distinguish between short and long 
duration Referents 
Next participants were asked to actively distinguish whether the same, randomly 
presented durations of 800 and 1600ms were LongD or ShortD. Feedback was given 
after each attempt. At the end of this step, participants were asked to continue only if 
they felt confident they could distinguish between these two durations comfortably -
all participants were able to comfortably distinguish between the durations. 
Step 4 - Instructions for the rating procedures were given 
Next participants were presented with the standard instructions for IAPS rating 
procedures for Valence and Arousal respectively (see IAPS technical manual, Lang, 
Bradley & Cuthbert, 2008, for a full). 
Step 5 - Main task instructions 
Next participants were given the instructions for the main task. 
Step 6 - Participants were required to judge whether a time interval of a 
positive, negative or neutral image presented on screen, was closer to the longer or 
shorter Referent. 
The main experiment started. Participants saw a fixation cross which stayed on screen 
for 500ms, followed by the same image encountered during training (Steps 2 and 3) 
with randomly but counterbalanced alternating durations of 400 (note, this was 
different from the training session - see steps 2 and 3) or 1600ms, followed by a 
fixation cross followed by the other duration than the one just previously presented 
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followed by a fixation cross, followed by one of the IAPS images randomly selected 
from one of the Sets. The IAPS image stayed on screen for 1131 milliseconds. The 
participants answered some questions at the end of each trial (Figure 9 .1 ). 
Triol 1 of 90 
+ 
P1 
Duration (P1D): either 
400ms or 1600ms 
Arousal: Low 
Valence: Neutral 
Counterbalanced 
+ 
P2 
Duration (P2 D): either 
400ms or 1.600ms 
Arousal: Low Fixation Point: 
Valence: Neutral + 
P3 
Duration (P3D): 1131ms 
Arousal: High 
Valence: Positive, Negative 
or Neutral 
SO Oms 
+ 
Questions 
Compare durations of P3 with P1 
and P2. 
Figure 9.1: Main experiment structure. 
Confidence in answer 
Arousal rating for P3 
Valence rating for P3 
Step 7 - Participants anxiety was measured again 
Participants were asked to complete again the on-line version of State Anxiety 
Inventory (SAI) (Spielberger, 1989). 
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9.2.2 Results 
9.2.2.1 STAI Control Results for Genders 
To assess whether any of the affective conditions had a stronger effect in participants, 
state anxiety scores were collected before and after presentation of emotional stimuli. 
If the anxiety scores increased, that would indicate that negative images had the 
stronger effect, if anxiety scores decreased, the positive images had the stronger effect, 
else the data would suggest that the negative and positive images had an equal effect 
in participants' anxiety, effectively, cancelling each other out. 
A paired-samples t-test was used to elucidate whether there was a statistically 
significant mean difference between the anxiety scores before the exposure to 
affective stimuli compared to after. No outliers were detected and the assumption of 
normality was not violated, as assessed by Shapiro-Wille test (p > 0.05). No 
significant difference was detected thus confirming that neither the positive nor the 
negative images had stronger effect on participants. 
9.2.2.2 Results of Time Perception 
The Bisection scores were calculated by subtracting the number of responses "short" 
from responses "long". Hence a negative number indicates a higher proportion of 
"short" responses - contraction of time perception - a positive number a higher 
proportion of "long" responses - dilation of time perception; zero means equal 
number of "long" and "short" responses. 
Below are the means table along with the bar chart of the responses (Graph 
9.1). It can be seen from the graph that both the positive and the negative affective 
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conditions show a tendency to lead to a contraction of the time perception, and in a 
similar level, contrary to the neutral condition. 
3 ' 
2 
I 
1 l 
·l 
·2 • 
Mean Response (long - short) 
Positive 
·2.
2 
Mean Response (long - short) 
Neutral 
Afective Condition 
Negative 
·2.4 
Graph 9.1: Mean of Bisection Scores for All Affective Conditions (CI 95 %). Both the 
positive and negative emotional stimuli are perceived as shorter than the neutral 
stimuli. 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine whether there were 
statistically significant differences in the perception of time over the different 
affective conditions. There were no outliers and the data was normally distributed for 
each group, as assessed by boxplot and Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .05), respectively. The 
assumption of sphericity was not violated, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of 
Sphericity (p > 0.05). The affective condition elicited statistically significant changes 
in the perception of time, F(2, 18) = 4.75, p < 0.03, 112 = .35, with the perception of 
time decreasing from neutral (mean = 5.00, SD = 10.21) to positive (mean = -2.20, 
SD = 9.02) and to negative (mean = -2.4, SD = 12.21). Post-hoc analysis with a 
Bonferroni adjustment did not reveal significance differences among the groups. 
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The results from time perception scores show that the affective condition 
significantly affected the perception of time, as assessed by ANOV A. The mean 
scores indicate that both the negative and positive affective conditions were 
associated with a contraction of the perception of time whereas the neutral affective 
condition with a relative dilation. Considering that in the previous experiment the 
responses for the negative images was mainly long (see Graph 8.1 at 1200 
millisecond), the results here suggests that the negative affective stimuli was 
considered with regard to the training referents (long term memory) to make the 
decision whereas that neutral and positive affective conditions utilized the immediate 
referents (working memory) thus confirming the experimental hypothesis. 
9.2.2.2 Results of Confidence Measures 
The responses of participants were calculated by adding them up so a higher score 
would indicate higher confidence in answers and lower score, lower confidence. 
A repeated measures ANOV A was conducted to determine whether there were 
statistically significant differences in confidence ratings over the different affective 
conditions. There were no outliers and the data was normally distributed for each 
group, as assessed by boxplot and Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05), respectively. The 
assumption of sphericity was not violated, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of 
Sphericity (p > 0.05). The affective condition did not elicit statistically significant 
changes in confidence ratings. 
9.3.5 Results of Valence Measures 
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The responses of participants were calculated by adding them up, averaged then 
rescaled so that a score of 9 would mean highly pleasurable whereas a score of one 
would mean extremely disagreeable. 
Below are the means table along with the bar chart of the responses (Graph 
9.2). The means show, as expected, that the negative images have a lower value on 
the valence scores, the neutral is in the middle and the positive images are perceived 
as the most pleasurable. 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine whether there were 
statistically significant differences in the valence ratings over the different affective 
conditions. There was one outlier in the positive condition as assessed by boxplot. 
The outlier was replaced with a value closest to it. The data was normally distributed 
for the negative and positive group but not for the neutral group as assessed by 
Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05) and (p > 0.05), respectively. The assumption of 
sphericity was approaching violation, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p 
= 0.05). Therefore, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied (E = 0.66). The 
affective conditions did elicit statistically significant changes in the valence ratings 
F(l.31, 11.80) = 61.84, p < 0.01, 112 = .87, with the valence ratings increasing from 
negative 2.48 ± 1.28 to neutral 4.48 ± 0.67 and to positive 5.73 ± 0.50 (Graph 9.2). 
Post-hoc analysis with a Bonferroni adjustment revealed that the valence ratings were 
statistically significantly increased from negative to neutral (2.00 (95% Cl, 1.15 to 
2.85), increased significantly from neutral to positive (1.24 (95% CI, 0.71 to 1.78) and 
also increased significantly from negative to positive affective condition (3.24 (95% 
CI, 2.14 to 4.35) thus confirming that the images had the expected effect on the 
participants with the negative images having the strongest effect. 
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Mean Valence Ratings 
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Graph 9.2: Mean of Valence Scores for All Affective Conditions (CJ 95 %). The 
valence ratings increase from to negative to neutral and to positive as expected. 
9.2.2.3 Arousal Measures 
The responses of participants were calculated by adding them up and averaged so that 
a score of 9 would mean high arousal whereas a score of one would mean low arousal. 
Below are the means table along with the bar chart of the responses. (Graph 
9.6). As expected, the graph shows that the positive and negative images are 
perceived as equally high arousing compared to the neutral images. 
A repeated measures ANOV A was conducted to determine whether there were 
statistically significant differences in the arousal ratings over the different affective 
conditions. There were no outliers as assessed by boxplot. The data was normally 
distributed for the negative and positive group but not for the neutral group as 
assessed by Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05) and (p < 0.05), respectively. The assumption 
of sphericity was no.t violated, as assessed by Mauchly's Test of Sphericity (p > 0.05). 
The affective conditions did elicit statistically significant changes in the arousal 
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ratings F(2, 18) = 5.18, p < 0.02, 112 = 0.37, with the arousal ratings increasing from 
neutral 2.22 ± 1.63 to positive 3.57 ± 1.31 and to negative 3.87 ± 2.19 in that order. 
Post-hoc analysis with a Bonferroni adjustment revealed that the arousal ratings were 
statistically significantly increased from neutral to positive (1.36 (95% Cl, 0.10 to 
2.61), p < 0.04. No other differences were found thus confirming that the positive 
images had the strongest effect in the participants ' arousal levels. 
Mean Arousal Rati ngs 
4.50 
4.00 
Arecrive Condition 
Mean Arousal Ratings 3.57 2.22 3 .87 
Graph 9.3: Mean of Arousal Scores for All Affective Conditions (CJ 95 %). The 
arousal scores increase from neutral to positive and to negative. The negative and 
positive arousal scores are similar whereas the neutral score is noticeably lower. 
9.3 DISCUSSION 
Before discussing the main finding, the results from the control measures will be 
discussed. The state anxiety score taken for before and after the presentation of 
affective stimuli showed that there were no differences in the participants anxiety 
levels by the exposure to the emotionally mixed stimuli. The explanation could be 
that emotionally positive and negative stimuli cancelled out their respective effects on 
the participants ' anxiety levels. Even though no differences are detected on the 
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anxiety levels, other, individual measures of the participants' perception of the 
affective stimuli show that, indeed, participants were affected by the emotional 
stimuli as expected. 
The measure of the valence associated with each image presented showed that 
negatively valenced images were perceived as significantly more negative than 
neutral images. Also, and as expected, the positively valenced stimuli were perceived 
as significantly more pleasurable than the neutral stimuli thus confirming that the 
IAPS images had the desired effect in the participants' perception of the images. The 
arousal scores also showed a significant difference, especially the positive images 
were perceived as significantly more arousing than the neutral stimuli. The important 
finding here is that no significant differences in arousal between the negative and 
positive emotional stimuli were found, suggesting, therefore, that only the valence 
changed significantly between the two. 
The main finding of this experiment, however, is that negative emotional 
stimuli appears to be judged against the decision criteria formed by the referents 
during training whereas the positive and neutral stimuli appear to be judged against 
the trial referents thus confirming the experimental hypothesis. This conclusion is 
better understood in conjunction with the findings from the previous experiment. The 
training referents and the trial referents in the previous experiment were the same and, 
furthermore, they were also the same with the trial referents in this experiment. The 
only variable that changed was the training referents on this experiment; the short 
referent was set from 400 in the previous experiment to 800ms in this experiment. 
The only change observed on the participants' behaviour was that negative images 
were perceived as being shorter, whereas neutral and positive images were perceived 
roughly the same as in the previous experiment. In other words, lengthening the 
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duration of the "short" training referent to 800ms, but keeping everything else the 
same led to participants experiencing the duration of the negative images as shorter. 
This is despite the fact that a comparison against the referents displayed in every trial, 
arguably, would have led to the negative images being perceived as longer. Therefore, 
the likely explanation is that the negative stimuli were being compared against the 
training referents and not the trial referents. Almost Freudian in scope, it suggests that 
negative stimuli specifically may be more reliant for their processing on long-term 
memory whereas positive and neutral stimuli appear to be more reliant on working 
memory structures. The remarkable finding to note here is that, both, the positive and 
the neutral stimuli hardly changed at all from the findings in the previous experiment, 
it is the negative stimuli alone which shows a substantial change in the experience of 
time thus supporting the conclusion that only the negative stimuli are affected by the 
manipulation of the training referents. 
The finding here suggest, in line with the QASA analysis (see Chapter 2) and 
other studies (Mather et al., 2006; Hulse & Memon, 2006, 2007; Kohn, 1954) that 
negative stimuli may lead to a focused type SA and that furthermore, in these 
circumstances, the data here suggests, the decisions made tend to rely more on 
previous information residing in the long-term memory store with the trade off that 
some of the available information, which could be helpful in improving performance 
accuracy, is ignored. 
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Chapter 10 - Summary and Conclusions 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this part of the thesis each chapter will be summarised and the main themes and 
findings will be outlined. The order of the chapters, as presented thus far, will be 
generally maintained. The summary of each chapter will identify and outline the 
general themes of the arguments as well as the main conclusions. Where original 
contributions to the disciplines studied are claimed, they will be highlighted and the 
original aspects will be described. This section, however, does not aim to expound 
upon different points with exhaustive detail but merely point out general themes and 
when reasonable, focus briefly on specific details. This section will also be used to 
highlight some of the limitations of the experiments, the reasons for those limitations 
and attempts made to overcome them. One persistent limitation of most of the studies 
presented in this thesis is the number of participants, especially for experiments in 
chapters 4 and 9. Despite many attempts in many different forms (leaflets around the 
university and the town, request for assistance from staff at the University of 
Gloucestershire as well as friends and family, recruitment attempts in various social 
media outlets, such as Facebook), the recruitment of participants remained one of the 
more difficult challenges. However, once this difficulty became clearer, the design of 
the experiments was tailored so that fewer participants were required to achieve 
reasonable statistical power. As can be seen from most experiments, a within subjects 
design was used when possible, which requires fewer participants to achieve 
reasonable power. Furthermore, since the main problem when using small samples in 
statistical analysis is the increased probability of a, so called, type 2 error (failure to 
reject a false null hypothesis), then the experiments presented here, especially those in 
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chapters 4 and 9, were of sufficient power since an effect was detected and the 
experimental hypothesis confirmed. The other problem with the small samples is that 
they are less representative of the population. As highlighted above, various attempts 
to increase the number of participants were made and most experiments have a 
reasonable sample size. It is important, however, to acknowledge that more 
participants would have generally been an improvement. 
10.2 CHAPTERS GENERAL SUMMARY 
10.2.1 Chapter 1 
Chapter one focused on investigating the main models of SA as well as the 
current state of research in this area. A critical evaluation of the available literature 
identified several shortcomings of the current dominant models. Furthermore, an 
argument was made that the understanding of SA could be taken further by 
integrating emerging knowledge from related fields of research, especially the 
cognitive neuroscience of decision-making and emotions. A particular model of SA, 
QASA, was identified as the most promising to investigate SA within the context of 
emotional processes. The theme emerging from Chapter one was brought into a more 
detailed focus and subsequently led to the first experiment, which tested the QASA 
measures of SA under different affective conditions. 
10.2.2 Chapter 2 
The effects of negative and positive affect on memory and attentional 
processes, which are fundamental processes of cognition therefore also fundamentally 
connected to the processes supporting SA, were explored. Based on the review, it was 
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hypothesized that negative and positive affect would lead to a more stringent or 
relaxed criteria, respectively, for filtering information. A novel paradigm for testing 
this hypothesis was designed to control for the effects of different affective conditions. 
It was found that positive and negative affective conditions had highly predictable and 
somewhat opposing effects on SA, Information Bias and, importantly, to their 
relationship, as shown by the QASA measures. In other words, analysis of the data 
suggested that negative affective conditions were related to a narrower information 
bias (participants appear to have a more stringent criteria on accepting information as 
true) and, conversely, that positive affective conditions were related to a more relaxed 
information bias (the criteria for accepting information as true was less stringent). The 
investigation and the finding that different affective conditions have different effects 
on the processes of SA is, as far as the author is aware, a new contribution to the field. 
Having found that emotions have an effect on the processes of SA, the next 
chapter was focused more on the emotional effects in another important aspect of SA, 
that of decision-making. 
10.2.3 Chapter 3 
Following from the evidence that emotions are involved in the processes of 
SA, as suggested by the experiment in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 was therefore focused on 
the current state of research on emotions. Since an important aspect of SA is its 
relationship to decision-making processes, the emotional research on cognitive 
psychology and neuroscience was explored within the context of decision-making. 
Both, neuroscience and cognitive theories suggested the existence of two 
separate systems (system I and system II, or channel and global functioning), 
underpinned by different but overlapping neural systems and serving different 
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cognitive functions. The Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) was identified as a 
model, which attempted to integrate evidence from both fields, neuroscience and 
cognition, and presented a plausible and easily tested model of decision making. 
Importantly, SMH accounted for the influence of emotions on the processes of 
learning and decision-making and was based on a widely validated tool, Iowa 
Gambling Task. The SMH suggests that embodied and largely implicit emotional 
factors associated with previous experiences are important for the processes of 
decision making. The argument was made that information bias (IB) and SM may be 
two sides of the same coin, first from the cognitive perspective and largely in line 
with operations of System I, and second from the neuroscience perspective, both 
essentially aiding decision making by determining the characteristics of the decision 
space. 
Previous research on SM identified the pre-frontal cortex and the 
somatosensory cortex as important mediators of emotional influences on decision­
making processes. This suggested that, a modified version of the Iowa Gambling Task 
could be used to investigate the neural correlates of IGT as reflected by EEG 
recording. The next chapter tested this proposition. 
10.2.4 Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 focused even further in investigating the influences of Somatic 
Markers in decision making under conditions where the situational factors that 
contribute to the creation of the Somatic Markers suddenly shift so that previously 
created Somatic Markers may hinder learning. This would allow for the detection of 
EEG correlates of emotional influences when learning takes place and when it does 
not. 
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The alpha EEG correlates on the frontal electrodes were recorded and 
analysed for before and after category change. It was found that at 400 to 300 
milliseconds prior to a decision being enacted, the frontal electrodes, especially the 
mid-frontal electrodes (electrode FZ according to the international 10/20 system), was 
able to distinguish between the advantageous and disadvantageous responses for pre­
category change but was absent after the category change. It was suggested that the 
SM400 found at the frontal electrodes in the alpha frequency may be reflecting the 
Somatic Markers since they were detected only under conditions when learning had 
taken place. More research and independent verification is, of course, needed, 
however, as far as the author is aware this is also a new finding in this area of research. 
10.2.5 Chapter 5
Chapter 5 investigated the possibility that SM400 may simply reflect stimulus­
response association learning. It was argued that there is a crucial distinction between 
the stimulus-response association learning and the Somatic Marker theory of learning. 
Stimulus-response association learning, it was argued, was based on the immediate 
feedback/consequences of actions, which then conditioned the behaviour in one way 
or another, driven towards behaviours that are rewarding and away from the ones that 
are punishing. The Somatic Markers were, instead, sensitive to long-term outcome of 
actions. To test this, the IGT task was modified to dissociate the long-term feedback 
from the immediate choices, in the sense that the long-term outcomes did not 
accurately reflect the punishment schedules of the choices. The data showed that 
under these conditions, participants did not learn the task and this was also reflected 
by the absence of the SM400 EEG signal. It was suggested that since the 
manipulation of the long-term feedback led to the task not being learned and the 
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absence of the SM400, then the learning in the IGT task may be more in line with the 
SMH explanation as opposed to stimulus response association learning. In other 
words, a malfunctioning of the systems evaluating the long-term consequences 
hinders learning. 
10.2.6 Chapter 6 
In Chapter 6, a further possibility was ruled out; that the observed behaviour 
of the participants performing in the IGT might be driven by anticipatory anxiety and 
that that is reflected by the SM400 EEG marker. Prior research indicated that 
anticipatory anxiety shares many cognitive and neural circuits with the operation of 
Somatic Markers. Aside from the overlaps, the distinction between the systems, it was 
argued, was that while the anticipatory anxiety might also drive behaviour in the same 
way as Somatic Markers, away from the risky choices and towards the safe ones, it 
does not lead to the same type learning and it is more susceptible to individual 
differences than Somatic Markers. In other words, anticipatory anxiety may be a more 
general tendency of generally anxious people to avoid any risky behaviour as opposed 
to having a feeling about which decision is more advantageous in the long run, which 
is what Somatic Markers represent. The Iowa Gambling Task was modified to control 
more explicitly for conditions of anticipatory anxiety and the behavioural and EEG 
data were examined to see whether the learning reflected this and whether SM400 
also reflected anticipatory anxiety. The IGT was tested in incongruent-congruent 
(negative stimuli was initially, in phase 1, paired with the safe decks and then with the 
risky decks) and congruent-incongruent (negative stimuli was initially, in phase 1, 
paired with the risky decks and then with the safe decks) conditions. It was found that, 
in both conditions, the introduction of anxiety provoking stimuli did not lead to the 
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participants learning the task and that this was also reflected by the absence of the 
SM400. This suggested that SM400 does not reflect anticipatory anxiety and that 
learning in the IGT is unlikely to be driven by anticipatory anxiety. 
10.2.7 Chapter 7
Following on the findings from Chapters 2 to 6 which suggested, generally, 
that different emotions had different effects in SA and decision making, chapters 7 
and onwards focused further still on investigating the mechanisms by which 
emotional stimuli affected learning, SA and decision-making. A vastly understudied 
subject, the relationship between the perception of time and different emotional states 
was identified as a possible way to explore the cognitive mechanisms through which 
emotional processing affects learning, SA and decision making. It was found that the 
valence of emotional arousal affects, or is affected by, the variations in the time 
perception. The data did suggested that negative images did induce a dilation of time 
perception and positive images a contraction relative to the neutral images with the 
negative images showing the largest effect in distorting time perception. Furthermore, 
the results also supported the finding in the first experiment (Chapter 2), that negative 
affective condition is associated with reduced SA. 
10.2.8 Chapter 8 
Following from Chapter 7, which investigated the timing mechanisms under 
different affective conditions for 2 to 9 seconds range, Chapter 8 was focused in the 
time intervals around the I-second. Research around this particular interval suggested 
that neural systems supporting the sub and supra-second time intervals, different in 
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each case, converged around the I -second interval. The experiment in this chapter 
tested testing f sub (under 1000 ms) and supra-second (over lOOOms) interval timing 
in conditions of negative, positive and neutral affective conditions. Due to the 
additional involvement of the brain areas processing emotion, it was predicted that, in 
particular, supra-second timing will show that negative images will slow down the 
perception of time and positive images speed it up relative to the neutral images, the 
same as was found in the previous experiment. It was found that high negative arousal 
at sub-second intervals ( 600ms) had a strong effect and dilated the perception of time 
whereas high positive arousal at supra second intervals (1200ms) had also a strong 
effect and contracted the perception of time. It was argued that negative affective 
stimuli are preferentially processed at short intervals since, for example, if they 
indicated real danger, it would be evolutionary adaptive to notice and avoid any 
potential harm first. Positive stimuli, on the other hand, is also important to process 
because getting to the rewards (i.e. food, a mating partner) is also evolutionary 
important but it does not have the same urgency as avoiding a potential harm. 
10.2.9 Chapter 9 
Chapter 9 investigated the possibility that the operations of the timing 
processes under different affective conditions might be used to show the mechanisms 
by which different affects, especially negative affect, influence the processes of 
memory and decision making. Given the results from the previous experiment 
(Chapter 8) the bisection paradigm was designed to manipulated one aspect of the 
"long-term" memory, the short referent on the bisection task, so that it was longer 
during referent training, but shorter during the main task. It was found that the 
negative affect alone was influenced. While the neutral and positive affective 
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condition yielded roughly the same behavioural patter as observed in Chapter 8, 
negative affect on the other hand showed a complete reversal of the observed 
behaviour. It was argued that the evidence from this experiment supports a separation 
so that the timing processes involved in the negative affect are mainly based on the 
long-term memory whereas the those involved in the neutral and positive affect use 
working memory, hence suggesting a possible mechanism by which the effects that 
negative and positive affective condition on memory and decision making may be 
explained. 
10.3 - ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO RESEARCH AND FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
Lastly, I would like to finish this thesis by presenting a short list of the findings, 
which I hope have at a modest degree provided original contributions to research: 
1. Chapter 2: It showed that different affective conditions may affect the
processes of SA differently. 
2. Chapter 4: It was shown that an Alpha EEG signal (SM400) on the frontal
electrodes was capable of distinguishing between the decisions which were 
advantageous and those which were disadvantageous even when such 
information was not available in the conscious awareness. 
3. Chapter 5: It was shown that SM400 was not likely to reflect an emotional
signal reflecting immediate, stimulus-response consequences. 
4. Chapter 6: It was shown that SM400 was not likely to reflect anticipatory
anxiety. 
5. Chapter 9: It was shown that negative affective stimuli are likely to rely more
on the long-term memory than positive and neutral affective stimuli. 
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As regard the Situation Awareness, the experiments m this thesis have 
highlighted and shown that the removal of emotional influences from any model 
that attempts to measure SA greatly hinders them. Negative and Positive 
emotional influences appear to have distinctive effects on the processes of 
attention, decision- making and the perception of time, all of which are important 
aspects of any current or would be SA model. 
Finally, one of the most intriguing results to the author is the one found in 
Chapter 9, which suggests separate cognitive processes supporting the processing 
of different affective stimuli. Given more time and space in this thesis, a modified 
version of the task in Chapter 9 manipulating the "long" referent (as opposed to 
the short referent) would have been conducted. If that had led to the positive 
affective condition reflecting the manipulation, than this would have been strong 
support for the separation of the processes supporting different affective stimuli. 
It is hoped that the work presented here would enable me to continue and 
hopefully further advance this line of research. 
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APPENDIX A 
DATA Screening and Raw Analysis 
INTRODUCTION 
Below are outlined a representative sample of the raw data screening and analysis for each main 
section. Where appropriate, the data are analysed in the following general order, Data Screening, 
Main Analysis, Post-Hoc Tests: 
1) Data Screening and Assumptions
1 Checking/or Outliers 
Boxplots are a popular method for detecting outliers, which is readily available in SPSS explore 
procedure. Outliers are identified as data points that are 1.5 box-lengths from the edge (Tukey, 
1977). Outliers are denoted with circular dots or asterisk ( extreme outliers) with their case number 
labeled. 
2 Tests for Normality 
Checks were made whether the data were normally distributed using the Shapiro-Wilk test, which 
is recommended for small sample sizes (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965; Razali & Wah, 2011). 
3 Normalizing Outliers 
If outliers were detected, the first consideration was to inspect the data for entry errors (e.g. typed 
in the wrong key) or measurement errors (malfunction of equipment or out of range values). If, 
however, the data inspection suggested that the data points were genuine, it was decided to either 
1) keep but normalize the outliers or 2) run an equivalent non-parametric test that is less sensitive
to outliers. 
If it was decided to keep the outliers (the outliers were present only on some levels and were not 
too numerous) then outliers were normalised to their nearest neighbor not an outlier, which, 
essentially, reduces the standard error and stabilizes the averages (Barnet & Lewis, 1978). 
If it was decided that outliers were too numerous, present in most levels of IV and the data were 
not normally distributed in most levels of the IV, then a non-parametric test was run instead. There 
are no strict and widely agreed guidelines for this so each data set was judged separately. 
A third option was to remove the outliers completely however this was ruled out due to the small 
number of participants the reduction of which would have led to a further reduction in power. 
4 Checking/or Outliers again 
5 Checking Homogeneity of Variances (or sphericity) 
If there was homogeneity of variances ( or sphericity for within participants designs), no further 
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modifications were applied. If there was no homogeneity of variances or sphericity, Welch
ANOVA (Moder, 2010) or Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied to the data (Greenhouse & 
Geisser, 1959), respectively. In addition the results from the Games-Howell post-hoc test were
used for multiple comparisons (Games & Howell, (976) when assumptions were not met otherwise
Tukey's Honestly Significant Difference (Abdi & Williams, 2010). 
2) Data Main Analysis
This consisted mainly of ANOVAs, ANOVAs with Greenhouse-Geisser correction, Welch's
ANOV A or a non-parametric equivalent depending on the type of analysis. If an interaction was
found then the interaction was explored further in post-hoc tests, the main effects were ignored. 
Otherwise, if the interaction was not significant, then the main effects were explored further. 
3) Post-Hoc Analysis
6 Post Hoc Analysis 
Post Hoc tests were run whenever a significant interaction was found. Appropriate corrections 
were used for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni, Games-Howell, Tukey's HSD etc) as required for 
each test. 
6. Summary
378 
The data from every chapter went through the above general steps. An example of the data analysis 
is given below. The tables and graphs in each chapter below will be given the same heading as the 
analysis under which they appear in the main text. The intention is that the tables and graphs 
presented here aid the understanding of the analysis reported in the main text. Aspects of the data 
screening and analysis from Chapter 2, 4 and 7, which apply to the analysis of the data from the 
other experiments, will be presented in detail. 
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Original Raw Data Links 
All the original data files are found in the attached CD-ROM in SPSS (.sav) and tab delimited 
(.csv) formats. Below are the links to the SPSS files; the data in other formats can also be found in 
the same folder. The data files are in the original and normalised form ( outliers normalised). Below 
are the links to the raw data files: 
1) CD-ROM/Appendix/Data/Chapter 2/QASA Original Data.
2) CD-ROM/Appendix/Data/Chapter 4/ Chapter IV Behavioural Data
3) CD-ROM/Appendix/Data/Chapter4/ Chapter IV EEG Data
4) CD-ROM/ Appendix/Data/Chapter4/ Chapter IV Subjective Data
5) CD-ROM/ Appendix/Data/Chapter 5/Chapter V Behavioural Data
6) CD-ROM/Appendix/Data/Chapter 5 Chapter V Subjective Data
7) CD-ROM/ Appendix/Data/Chapter 5/Chapter V EEG Data
8) CD-ROM/ Appendix/Data/Chapter 6/Chapter VI Subjective Data
9) CD-ROM/ Appendix/Data/Chapter 6/Incongruent/ Chapter VI Incongruent
10) CD-ROM/ Appendix/Data/Chapter 6/Incongruent Chapter VI Incongruent EEG
11) CD-ROM/ Appendix/Data/Chapter 6/Congruent/Chapter VI Congruent
12) CD-ROM/ Appendix/Data/Chapter 6/Congruent/Chapter VI Congruent EEG
13) CD-ROM/ Appendix/Data/Chapter 7 / Chapter 7 Data
14) CD-ROM/Appendix/Data/Chapter 8/ Chapter VIII Data
15) CD-ROM/ Appendix/Data/Chapter 8/Chapter VIII IAPS Data
16) CD-ROM/Appendix/Data/Chapter 9/ Chapter IX Data
17) CD-ROM/ Appendix/Data/Chapter 9 / Chapter IX IAPS Data
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CHAPTER2 
2.2.2.1 Changes in Induced Affect 
Test of Normality 
Tests of Normality 
Kol rn og orov-Sm i rn ova 
Grouo Statistic d
'" 
Diff_Anxiety Positive .10& 15 
Neutral .144 15 
Negative .141 15 
". This is a lower bound o the true significance. 
a. Lillie/ors Signi icance Correction
Sig. 
.200 
. 200 
.200 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. 
.954 15 .594 
.943 15 .424 
.969 15 .844 
Shapiro, S.S. & Wille, M. B. (1965). An analysis of variance test for normality (complete samples). 
Biometrika, 52 (3-4), 591-611. 
Razali N.M., & Wah Y.B. (2011) Power comparisons of Shapiro-Wilk, Kolmogorov-Smirnov, 
Lilliefors and Anderson-Darling tests. J. Stat. Model. Anal. 2(1), 21-33. 
Checking for Outliers 
20.00 
10.00 
. 2! 
.00 
:c' 
0 
10.00 22 
34 
20.00 
Positive Neutral Negative 
Group 
Tukey, J. W. (1977). Exploratory Data Analysis. Addison-Wesley. 
>< 
c 
<t 
0 
0 
Testing Normality Again 
Tests of No rmal i ty 
Kolmogorov- Smirnov" 
Grouo Statistic d f Sig. 
Di ff_Anx ietv Positive .108 15 .200 
Neutra l . 164 15 .200 
Negative . 12 3 15 .2 00 
~- This is a lower bound of the true signi fi cance. 
a. Lill iefors Significance Correction 
Checking Outliers Again 
>-
-
QI 
>< 
c 
<! 
::e· 
i5 
20 .00 
1 0.00 
.00 
1 0.00 
20.00 
Positive 
Checking Homogeneity of Variances 
N eutra l 
Group 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic d f Sig. 
.9 54 15 .594 
. 
.93 2 15 .289 
. 
.952 15 .54 9 
N ega t ive 
T es t o-f Homog e n e ity of Variance s 
D i ---~ _ Anxiety 
L evene 
Statistic d ·· 1 d 2 Sig_ 
3_630 .,. ..... 4 2 _03 5 
Levene, H. (1960). Robust tests for equality of variances. In Ingram, 0. & Harold, H. , et al., 278-
292. 
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Main Analysis 
Robust Te sts of Equali ty of Means 
D( '_Anxiety 
Statistic a d 1 d ·2 Sig . 
W'elch 2 1.81 2 2 2 6 .114 .000 
a. Asymptotical ly F d1istributed . 
Moder, K. (2010). Psychological Test and Assessment Modeling, 52(4), 343-353 
Post Hoc Tests 
Mult iple Co mpari sons 
Dependent Variable. Diff_Anx iety 
Mean 95% Confi dence Interval Di fference Cl-
(I) Grouo Cl ) Grouo J) Std . Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
T ukey HSD Positive Neutral 2 .60000 2 .30233 .502 -2 .993 5 8.1935 
Negative 12.26667 2 .30233 .000 6 .6732 17.8602 
Neutral Positive - 2.60000 2 .30233 .502 -8.1935 2.993 5 
. 
Negative 9.66667 2 .30233 .000 4.0732 1 5.2602 
Negative Positive -12 .2666 7 2 .302 33 .000 - 17 .8602 -6 .6732 
. 
Neutral -9.66667 2 .30233 .000 -15 .2602 - 4. 0 732 
Games-Howell Positive Neutral 2 .60000 2.6204 3 .589 -3 .9535 9 .1535 
Negative 12 .26667 2.4 5467 .000 6.0530 18. 4803 
Neutral Positive - 2.60000 2.6204 3 .589 -9. 1535 3.9535 
Negative 9.66667 1. 73498 .000 5.3551 13.9782 
Negative Positive -1 2.2666 7 2 .4 54 6 7 .000 - 18.4 80 3 - 6.0530 
. 
Neutral -9.66667 1.73498 .000 -13 .9 782 -5 .3 551 
• . The mean difference is significant at the 0 .05 level. 
Abdi, H. & Williams ,L. J. (2010). Tukey's Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) Test. In Neil 
Salkind (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Research Design. Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Games, P. A . & Howell J. F. (1976). Pairwise Multiple Comparison Procedures with Unequal N's 
and/or Variances: A Monte Carlo Study, Journal of Educational Statistics, 1(2), 1976, 113-125. 
2.2.2.2 Testing Differences in Computer Games Familiarity Between the Three Affective Groups 
Tests of Normality 
Tests of Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
Grouo Statisti c d ' Sig. Statistic 
Computer Positive .271 
Neutral .373 
Negative "300 
a. Lillie ors Signi icance Correction 
Checking for Outliers 
.. 
Q) 
... 
::, 
c. 
E 
0 
u 
1.00 
.90 
.80 
.70 
.60 
.SO 
Main Analysis 
7 12 
0 
5 
Posi tive 
15 
15 
15 
.004 
.000 
.00 1 
25 
0 
Neutral 
Group 
.615 
.73 4 
.799 
Hypo th es:is T est Sum mary 
Null Hypothe si s 
The d ist ri bution o f Co mputer 1s 
1 the same ac ross categ o ri es o f 
Group. 
T es t 
In d epend ent -
Samples 
Krus k a l- Walh s 
Test 
Sig. 
.695 
Shapiro-Wilk 
d 
44 35 
* 
3 6 4 3 
* 33 
15 
15 
15 
Nega tive 
D ec is io n 
Retam the 
nu ll 
hypo thes is . 
Asymptot ic s ign ificances a re d isplayed . The s ign ificance level is .05 . 
Sig . 
.006 
.001 
.004 
K.ruskal, W. & Wallis, W. A. (1952). Use of ranks in one-criterion variance analysis. Journal of the 
383 
384 
American Statistical Association, 47 (260), 583-621. 
2.2.2.3 Testing Experimental Hypothesis 1 
Testing Normality 
Tests of Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
Grouo Statistic df Sig. 
Bias Positive .226 15 .037 
Neutral .141 15 .200 
Negative . 144 15 .200 
'"- This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lillie ors Signi icance Correction
Testing for Outliers 
� "' 
25.00-
.oo-
ii:i 2s.oo-
so.oo-
75.00-
Tests of Normality Again 
Positive 
23 
0 
Neu tr-al 
Gr-oup 
Tesls of Normalily 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
Grouo Statistic d; Sig_ 
Bias Positive .158 15 .200 
Neutral .15 4 15 .200 
Negative .144 15 .200 
.. _ Tt1is is a lower bound o the true signi icance. 
a. Lillie ors Signi iq.nce Correction
Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. 
.842 15 .013 
.952 15 .SSS 
.939 15 .373 
Neg:u:1ve 
Shapiro-\Vilk 
Statistic d Sig. 
.914 15 .154 
.695 15 .061 
.939 15 .373 
Checking Outliers Again 
20.00 
.00 
- 20.00 
40.00 
Posit ive Neutral Negative 
Group 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Bias 
Levene df1 df2 Sig. 
Statistic 
2.308 2 42 .112 
Main Analysis 
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A NOVA 
Bias 
Sum ot 
Squares d Mean Sq uare F 
Bet'\lveen Groups 75 15 .36 7 2 3757.684 5 1.63 7 
Within Groups 3056.364 4 2 72.771 
Total 105 7 1.732 44 
Lehmann, E.L. (1959) Testing Statistical Hypotheses. John Wiley & Sons. 
Post-Hoc Analysis 
Dependent Variable . Bias 
Tukey HSD 
Multiple Comparisons 
Sig_ 
.000 
Mean 9 5';l:~ Confidence Interval Difference (I-
(I) Grouo CIJ Grouo J) Std . Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Positive Neutral -22 .31533 3.11 4 92 .000 -29.8830 -14. 14 76 
. 
Negative - 30.60133 3.11 492 .000 -36.1690 - 23 .0336 
Neutral Positive 22 .31533 3.1 14 92 .000 14 .74 76 29.863 0 
. 
Negative -6 .28600 3.11 492 .029 -15 .8537 - .71 83 
-Negative Positive 30 .60133 3.11 492 .000 23 .0336 38.1690 
. 
Neutral 8 .28600 3.11 492 .0 29 .7183 15 .8537 
.. _ Ttle mean di 'erence is signifi cant at ttle 0.0 5 level. 
2.2.2.4 Testing Experimental Hypothesis 1 
Testing Normality 
Tests of Normali ty 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Grouo Statistic d ' Sig . Statistic d Sig . 
SA Positive .22 8 15 .035 
Neutral . 163 15 .200 
Negative .14 8 15 .200 
'' . This is a lovver bound o tt1e true signi icance. 
a. Lilliefors Sign i'icance Correction 
Testing Outliers 
.872 15 .036 
. 
.92 4 15 .220 
. 
.9 4 5 15 .444 
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7S.OO 
S0.00 
2S.OO 
<( 
VI 
.00 
1S 
0 
2S .OO 
S0.00 
Positive N euual 
G r o up 
Testing Normality Again 
Tests of Normality 
SA 
Kolmogorov-Sm irnova 
Grouo Statistic d f Sig. 
Positive . 169 15 . 157 
Neutral . 163 15 _200 
Negative .14 6 15 . 200 
.. . This is a lower bound o f the true signi fi cance . 
a. Lilliefors Signi f icance Correction 
. 
. 
N ega ti ve 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic d f Sig_ 
.916 15 . 167 
.92 4 15 .220 
.9 4 5 15 .444 
Testing Outliers Again 
75.00 
50.00 
25.00 
.00 
25.00 
50.00 
Positrve Neutral Negative 
Group 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
SA 
Levene df1 df2 Sig. 
Statistic 
2.051 2 42 .141 
Main Analysis 
A NOVA 
SA 
Surn o ' 
·squares d Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 22581.443 2 11290.722 16.312 .000 
W'ithin Groups 29072.065 42 692.192 
Total 51653.508 44 
388 
<( 
VI 
I - I - I 
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Post-Hoc Analysis 
Multiple Co mparisons 
Dependent Variable. SA 
Mean 95% Confidence Interval Difference (I-
m Grouo (IJ Grouo J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Tukey HSD Positive Neutral 53 .544 00 9.60689 .000 30.2041 76.8839 
. 
Negative 37.16067 9.60689 .001 13.8208 60.5005 
-Neutral Positive -53 .544 00 9.60689 .000 -76.8839 -30.2041 
Negative -16.38333 9.60689 .215 -39.7232 6.9565 
Negative Positive -37.1606/ 9.60689 .001 -60.5005 -13 .8208 
Neutral 16.38333 9.60689 .215 -6.9565 39.7232 
Games-Howel l Positive Neutral 53 .544 00 9.20080 .000 30.6716 76.4 164 
. 
Negative 37.16067 9.15536 .001 14.4 064 59.9150 
Neutral Positive -53 .544 00 9.20080 .000 -/6.4 164 -30.6716 
Negative -16.38333 10.4 1160 .273 - 42.14 54 9.3787 
Negative Positive - 37.16067 9.1 5536 .001 -59.9150 -14.4064 
Neutral 16.38333 10.4 1160 .273 -9.3787 42.14 54 
~- The mean difference is signi 'icant at the 0.05 level. 
2.2.2.6 Testing Differences in Confidence in Answers Between the Three Groups 
Testing Normality 
Tests of Normali ty 
Kolmogorov-SmirnO\,a 
Grouo Statistic d f Sig. 
Con 'Average Positive .210 15 .0 7 4 
Neutral .127 15 .200 
Negative . 132 15 .200 
'"- Th is is a lower bound of the true signi f icance. 
a. Lillie ors Signi icance Correction 
Checking For Outliers 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Statisti c d f Sig . 
.929 15 .262 
. 
.974 15 .917 
. 
.931 15 .2 86 
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2.00 
.., l.80 
en 
~ 
.... 
> ~ 
c: 
0 
u 1.60 
1.40 
Pos itive 
Testing For Normality Again 
23 
0 
N eu t ra l 
Group 
Tests of Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova. 
Grouo Statistic df Sig. 
Con 'Average Positive .182 15 
Neutral .122 15 
Negative .132 15 
., . This is a lower bound o the true signi'i cance. 
a. Li llie ors Signi icance Correction 
Checking For Outliers Again 
.... 
c:n 
2 .00 
~ l.SO 
.... 
> 
;:'!: 
c 
0 
u 
l.60 
l 40 
P o sltlvc 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Ncutr.:i, I 
Group 
.192 
.200 
.200 
N egative 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic d t Sig. 
.919 15 .189 
. 
.972 15 .887 
. 
.931 15 .286 
N egative 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Con Average 
Levene 
Statistic d 1 d ·2 Sig. 
2 .988 2 4 2 .06 1 
Main Analysis 
A NOVA 
Con Average 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .33 4 2 .1 67 11.817 .000 
Within Groups .594 42 .0 14 
Total .929 44 
Post-Hoc Analysis 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable. ConfAverage 
Mean 95% Confidence Interval Difference (I-
fl) Groun rl) Groun J) Std . Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Tukey HSD Positive Neutral - .09422 .04343 .088 - .1997 .0113 
. 
Negative - .21075 .04343 .000 - .3163 - .1052 
Neutral Positive .09422 .04343 .088 -.0113 .1997 
. 
Negative - .11653 .04343 .027 - .2220 - .0110 
Negative Positive .210{5 .04343 .000 . 1052 .3163 
. 
Neutral . 1165 3 .04343 .027 .0110 .2220 
Games-Howell Positive Neutral - .09422 .03 489 .030 - .1806 - .0079 
. 
Negative - .21075 .04752 .001 - .3295 - .0920 
Neutral Positive .09422 .03 489 .030 .0079 .1806 
Negative - .11653 .04673 .051 -.2336 .0006 
Negative Positive .21075 .04752 .001 .0920 .3295 
Neutral .11653 .04673 .051 - .0006 .2336 
.,. _ The mean di ference is signi ficant at the 0.05 level. 
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CHAPTER4 
4.2.2.1 Behavioural Analysis 
Data Screening - checking normality 
Tests of Normalily 
Kolmogorov-5mirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic d f Sig. Statistic d f Sig_ 
First20F .157 15 .200 .92 4 15 .221 
. 
5econd20F .153 15 . 200 .935 15 .329 
Third20F .237 15 .023 .85 4 15 .020 
. 
Fourth20F . 146 15 .200 .968 15 .832 
Fi h20F .186 15 .172 .950 15 .532 
. 
First205 .1 60 15 . 200 .964 15 .760 
Second20S .191 15 .146 .94 7 15 .486 
. 
Third205 .14 9 15 .200 .943 15 .4 22 
Fourth20S .115 15 .200 .95 4 15 .590 
Fi 11205 .22 4 15 .04 1 .898 15 .087 
.. . This is a lower bound o the true signi fi cance . 
a. Lillie ors Signi icance Correction 
Checking for Outliers 
12 12 12 
2 0 0 
* 
12 
0 
5 
0 
1 0 6 
0 0 
1 0 1 5 
10 0 0 
$ ~ 
7 
1 0 0 
1 
0 
1 0 
0 
20 
~ :::;! g ~ _, g ~ [ ~ ! ~ = 8 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ = s::: Se: ~ ~ ~ s::: = ~ = ~
Checking Normalization Again 
392 
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Te st s o f N ormality 
Kolmogorov -Smirnova 
Stati st ic d f Sig . Statistic 
First2 OF . 152 15 .200 
Se cond20F . 153 15 
. 
.200 
Third20F .22 0 15 .048 
Fo u rth2 OF . 164 15 
. 
.200 
Fii'th20 F .166 15 .1 72 
. 
First20S . 1 7 2 15 . 200 
Second20S .233 1 5 .027 
T hird20S .207 15 .08 5 
. 
Fo u rth20S . 111 15 .200 
Fi h20S .2 4 5 15 .016 
... . This is a lower boLmd o f the true signi f icance . 
a . Lilliefors Sign ificance Corr ection 
Checking for Outliers Again 
20 
10 
0 
10 
20 
-, ..,, 
-I .,., .,., -, 
... 
,; ::; 0 ;:r ... 
"' 
t"\ c: 
"' ~ 0 ... ;::. ::; :::; a. 
'" '" 0 c. f\.J ::; 0 ,::; 
-, N ,::; N -, ..,, 
0 -, c, 
-, 
-, 
Checking Sphericity 
. 9 44 
.93 5 
.644 
.929 
.950 
.91 7 
.906 
.928 
.96 4 
. 689 
..,, 
,; 
t"\ 
0 
c. 
N 
0 
..,, 
Shapiro-Wilk 
d f Sig . 
15 .4 3 5 
15 .3 29 
15 .014 
15 .267 
15 .532 
15 .1 7 4 
1 5 . 116 
15 .258 
15 . 765 
15 .064 
-I .,., -, 
::; 0 ;::.' c: a. ;::. ::; N N 1:) 0 
'" 
..,, 
..,, 0 
..,, 
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Mauchly' s Tes t of Spheri ci1y• 
Measure . MEASURE_! 
Eps ilon" 
Approx. Chi- Greenhouse-
Within Subiem Effect Mauchly's W Sq uare df Sig. Geisser Huynh-Feldt Lower-bound 
Phase 1.000 .000 0 1.000 1.000 
Se lectionBlocks .397 11.458 9 .250 .723 .932 
Phase ., SelectionBlocks .712 4.223 9 .897 .871 1.000 
.. 
' 
Tests the null hypothe,1, that the error co~anance matrix of the orthonormal1zed transformed dependent variables 1s 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept 
Within Subj ects Design: Phase + SelectionBlocks + Phase ' SelectionBlocks 
1.000 
.25 0 
.250 
b. May be used to adj ust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in 
the Tests of Within-Subj ects Effects table. 
Mauchly, J.W. (1940). Significance Test for Sphericity of a Normal n-Variate Distribution. The 
Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 11(2), 204-209. 
Main Analysis 
Te sts o f Within - Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE_! 
Type Ill Sum Partial Eta 
Source of Squares d f Mean Square F Sig. Squared 
Phase Sphericity Assumed 146.02 / 1 146 .027 2.176 .162 . 135 
Greenhouse-Geisser 146.027 1.000 146 .027 2.176 .162 .13 5 
Huynh-Feldt 146 .027 1.000 146.027 2 .176 .162 . 135 
Lower-bound 146.027 1.000 146.027 2.176 .162 .13 5 
Error(Phasel Sphericity Assumed 939 .573 14 67.112 
Greenhouse-Geisser 939.573 14. 000 67 .112 
Huynh-Feldt 939.573 14.000 67.112 
Lower-bound 939.573 14.000 67 .112 
Blocks Sphericity Assumed 29 3.173 4 73 .293 3 .010 .026 .177 
Greenhouse-Ge isser 293 .173 2 .893 101.356 3.010 .04 3 . 177 
Huynh-Feldt 293 .173 3.726 78 .681 3.010 .029 .177 
Lower-bound 293 .173 1.000 293 .173 3.010 .105 .177 
Error(Blocks) Sphericity Assumed 1363 .627 56 24.350 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1363 .627 40 .4 95 33 .674 
Huynh-Feldt 1363 .627 52 .165 26.140 
Lower-bound 1363 .62 7 14.000 97 .4 02 
Phase • Blocks Sphericity Assumed 94 .24 0 4 23 .560 .852 .498 .057 
Greenhouse-Ge isser 94.240 3 .48 4 27 .049 .852 .486 .057 
Huynh-Feldt 94. 240 4. 000 23 .560 .852 .498 .057 
Lower-bound 94. 240 1.000 94. 240 .852 .372 .057 
Error(PhaseBlocks l Sphericity Assumed 15 48 .160 56 27 .64 6 
Greenhouse-Geisser 15 48.160 48.777 31.740 
Huynh- Feldt 15 4 8.160 56 .000 27 .646 
Lower-bound 15 4 8.160 14 .000 110.583 
Greenhouse, S.W., & Geisser, S. (1959). On methods in the analysis of profile data. Psychometrika, 
24, 95-112. 
395 
Post-Hoc Analysis 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure. MEASURE_l 
Type Ill Sum Partial Eta 
Source Phase Blocks of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Squared 
Phase Linear 29.205 1 29.205 2.176 .162 .135 
Error(Phase) Linear 187.915 14 13.422 
Blocks Level 1 vs. Level 2 388.800 1 388.800 8.964 .010 .390 
Level 2 vs. Level 3 38.533 1 38.533 1.628 .223 .104 
Level 3 vs. Level 4 43.200 1 43.200 .888 .362 .060 
Level 4 vs. Level 5 .533 1 .533 .013 .910 .001 
Error(Blocks) Level 1 vs. Level 2 607.200 14 43.371 
Level 2 vs. Level 3 331.467 14 23.676 
Level 3 vs. Level 4 680.800 14 48.629 
Level 4 vs. Level 5 563.467 14 40.248 
Phase • Blocks Linear Level 1 vs. Level 2 76.800 1 76.800 1.794 .202 .114 
Level 2 vs. Level 3 3.333 1 3.333 .064 .804 .005 
Level 3 vs. Level 4 76.800 1 76.800 1.896 .190 .119 
Level 4 vs. Level 5 90.133 1 90.133 1.942 .185 .122 
Error(Phase ·s1ocks) Linear Level 1 vs. Level 2 599.200 14 42.800 
Level 2 vs. Level 3 726.667 14 51.905 
Level 3 vs. Level 4 567.200 14 40.514 
Level 4 vs. Level 5 649.867 14 46.419 
4.2.2.2.1 EEG Analysis for the First JOO Trials -Exploring Somatic Markers' EEG Correlates 
Testing Normality 
Tests of Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic 
FZNegGl .137 11 .200 .952 
FZPosG 1 .142 11 .200 .947 
F3NegGl .154 11 .200 .950 
F3PosGl .153 11 . 200 .945 
F4NegGl .174 11 .200 .943 
F4 PosG 1 .171 11 .200 .946 
·,_ This is a lower bound of tile true significance. 
a. Lillie ors 5igni'icance Correction
Shapiro-\'v'ilk 
df Sig. 
11 .674 
11 .602 
11 .638 
11 .581 
11 .5 5 7 
11 .589 
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Checking For Outliers 
20 
15 
10 
s 
0 
- lu 
FZNc9G l FZPosG l F3Nc9 G l F3PosGl r 4 NcgG l r4PosGl 
Testing Sphericity 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity• 
Measure : EEG_microvolt 
Epsilonb 
Approx. Chi- Greenhouse-
Within Sub iects Effect Mauchly's W Square df Sig. Geisser Huynh-Fe ldt Lower-bound 
ElectrodePositive .633 4 .120 2 .12 7 .731 .825 .500 
Responses 1.000 .000 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 
EI e ct rode Positive T .864 1.312 2 .519 .881 1.000 
Responses 
Tests the null hypothesis chat the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables 1s 
proportional co an identity matrix. 
a. Design. Intercept 
With in Subj ects Design. ElectrodePositive + Responses + ElectrodePositive T Responses 
b. May be used to ad just the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in 
the Tests o Within-Subj ects Effem cable. 
Main Analysis 
.500 
397 
Tests of Within - Subjects Effects 
Measure . EEG 
Type Ill Sum Partia l Eta 
Source of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Squared 
Electrode Position Sphericity Assumed 667 .677 2 333 .839 6.523 .001 .395 
G re enhouse-Gei sser 667 .677 1.463 456.453 6.523 .01 4 .395 
Huynh-Feldt 667.677 1.650 404. 544 6.523 .011 .395 
Lower-bound 667 .677 1.000 667.677 6.523 .029 .395 
E rror(E lee trod e Position) 5phericity Assumed 1023 .621 20 51.181 
Greenhouse-Geis ser 1023 .621 14.628 69.979 
Huynh- Feldt 1023 .621 16.504 62 .021 
Lower-bound 1023 .621 10.000 102 .362 
Response Sphericity Assumed .096 l .096 1.44 9 .256 .127 
Greenhouse-Geisser .096 1.000 .096 1.449 .256 .127 
Huynh-Feldt .096 1.000 .096 1.44 9 .256 .127 
Lower-bound .096 1.000 .096 1.44 9 .256 .127 
Error(Responsel Sphericity Assumed .661 10 .066 
Greenhouse-Geisser .661 10.000 .066 
Huynh-Feld t .661 10.000 .066 
Lower-bound .661 10.000 .066 
ElectrodePosition • Sphericity Assumed .197 2 .098 5 .2 5 5 .015 .344 
Response Greenhouse-Geisser .197 1.761 .112 5.2 55 .019 .344 
Huynh-Feldt .197 2.000 .098 5.25 5 .015 .34 4 
Lower-bound . 197 1.000 .197 5.2 55 .045 .344 
Error Sphericity Assumed .375 20 .019 (ElectrodePosition•Resp Greenhouse-Geisser .375 17.611 .021 onsel 
Huynh-Feldt .3 75 20.000 .019 
Lower-bound .375 10.000 .037 
Post-Hoc Analysis 
One-way AN OVA - Alpha Power for Disadvantagous Responses 
Mauchly's Test of Spher ici ty• 
Measure. EEG_microvolt 
Epsilon" 
Approx. Chi- Greenhouse- I Huynh-Feldt I Lower-bound Within Subiects Effect Mauchly's W Square df Sig. Geisser 
ElectrodePositions .625 4.231 2 . 121 .121 I .819 I .500 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matnx of the orthonormallzed transformed dependent variables 1s 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design. Intercept 
Within Subj ects Design. ElectrodePositions 
b. May be used to ad just the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance . Corrected tests are displayed 
in the Tests of Within-Sub jects E eccs table . 
Tests o f Wi thin - Subjects Effects 
Measure . EEG_microvolt 
Type Ill Sum 
Source of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Electrod ePositions Sphericicy Assumed 333.61 4 2 166.807 6 .563 .006 
Greenhouse-Geisser 333 .61 4 1.4 54 229.369 6 .56 3 .01 4 
Huynh- Feldt 333 .61 4 1.638 203 .6 46 6 .563 .011 
Lower- bound 333 .61 4 1.000 333 .61 4 6 .563 .028 
E rror(E le ctrod ePos itions) Spherici cy Assumed 508.36 4 20 2 5.4 18 
Greenhouse-Geisser 506 .364 14 . 54 5 3 4. 952 
Huynh-Feldt 508.364 16.362 31.03 2 
Lower-bound 506.364 10.000 50.636 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
.396 
.396 
.396 
.396 
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Pairwi se Comparisons 
Measure . EEG_microvolt 
Mean 
95% Confidence lntirval for 
Difference {I- Difference 
(I) ElectrodePositions Cl) ElectrodePositions J) Std. Error Sig.b Lower Bound Upper Bound 
l 2 - 7 .603 2 .043 .012 -13 .4 68 - 1.739 
3 - 5 .263 2 .695 .238 -12 .999 2 .4 73 
2 l 7 .603 2 .0 4 3 .012 1.739 13 .4 6 8 
3 2.3 4 1 1.5 5 7 .4 91 -2.1 28 6 .809 
3 1 5.263 2.695 .238 -2 .4 73 12 .999 
2 - 2 .3 4 1 1.5 57 .4 91 -6 .809 2.128 
Based on estimated marginal means 
•. The mean difference is significant at the 
b. Adj ustment for multiple comparisons. Bonferroni. 
Dunn, O.J. (1961). Multiple Comparisons Among Means. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 56, 52-64. 
One-way AN OVA - Alpha Power for Advantagous Responses 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericit y• 
Measure. EEG_microvolt 
Epsilon" 
Approx. Chi- Greenhouse- I Huynh- Feldt I Lower-bound Within Subiects Effect Mauchly's w Square df Sig. Geisser 
Electrod ePositions .6 4 1 4 .005 2 .135 .736 / .832 / 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matnx of the orthonormahzed transformed depend enc variables 1s 
proportional to an id entity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept 
Within Subj ects Design. ElectrodePos itions 
.500 
b. May be used co adj ust the degrees o freedom or the averaged tests o signi icance. Corrected tests are d isplayed 
in the Tests of Within-Subj ects Effects table. 
Tests of Within - Subjects Effects 
Measure . EEG_microvolt 
Type Ill Sum Partial Eta 
Source of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Squared 
Electrode Positions Sphericity Assumed 3 34.260 2 167.130 6 .4 83 .007 .393 
Greenhouse-Geisser 33 4.260 1.4 72 227. 153 6.483 .015 .393 
Huynh-Feldt 33 4.260 1.663 200.9 44 6 .483 .011 .393 
Lower-bound 33 4 .260 1.000 334 .260 6 .483 .029 .393 
Error(E le mod ePositions) Sphericicy Assumed 515 .632 20 2 5.782 
Greenhouse-Geisser 515 .632 14 .715 35 .0 41 
Huynh-Feldt 515 .632 16.63 4 30.998 
Lower-bound 5 15.632 10.000 51.563 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure . EEG_microvolt 
Mean 
95% Confidence lnt1irval for 
Difference (I - Difference 
m Electrode Positions (I) Ele ctrodePositions J) Std . Error Sig.b Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -7.664 2.035 .011 -13.506 -1.82 3 
3 -5 .067 2.710 .273 -12 .84 7 2.712 
2 l 7.66 4 2.03 5 .011 1.823 13 .506 
3 2.597 1.604 .4 10 - 2.007 7.201 
3 1 5.067 2.710 .273 -2. I l 2 12 .84 7 
2 -2.597 1.604 .4 10 -7.201 2.007 
Based on estimated marginal means 
,._ The mean difference is significant at the 
b. Adj ustment or multiple comparisons. Bonferroni. 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank - Alpha Power for Responses for each Electrode Position 
Hypothesis Test Summary 
Null Hypothesis Tes.t Sig. Decision 
Re lated-
he median of d ifferences Samples Retam the 
1 between FZNegG 1 and FZPosG 1 Wilcoxon .050 null 
equals 0. Signed Rank hypothes is . 
Test 
Asympto ti c s ign ificances are d isp layed. The s ignifi cance leve l is .05. 
Wilcoxon, F. (1945). Individual comparisons by ranking methods. Biometrics Bulletin, 1(6), 80-83. 
4.2.2. 2.2 EEG Analysis for the Second I 00 Trials - Exploring Somatic Markers ' EEG Correlates 
Test of Normality 
399 
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Tests of Normality 
Kol rn ogorov -Sm i rn ova 
Statistic d r Sig . Statistic 
FZNegG2 .2 4 1 11 .01 4 . 93 4 
FZPosG2 .2 4 0 11 .075 .932 
. 
F3NegG2 .169 11 .200 . 933 
. 
F3 PosG2 . 171 11 .200 .928 
. 
F4 NegG2 . 203 11 .200 .928 
. 
F4 PosG2 . 205 11 .200 .926 
. r . 
"' . This 1s a lower bound o the true s1gn1 1cance. 
a. Lillie ' ors Signi icance Correction 
Checking For Outlier s 
20 
10 
Sh a pi ro-Wi I k 
d f 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
fZN cgG2 r ZPosG2 f 3NcgG2 f3J>osG2 F4NcgG2 F4J>osG2 
Tests of Sphericity 
Sig . -
.449-
.4 27 
.4 4 5 
.38 8 
.391 
.36 8 
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Mauchly's Tes! of Spherici ty" 
Meas ure . EEG_microvolt 
Epsi lon° 
Approx. Chi - Greenhouse-
Within Subiects Effect Mauchly's W Square d f Sig. Geisser Huynh-Fe ldt Lower-bound 
Electrod ePosi tions .908 .864 2 .6 4 9 .9 16 l.000 . 500 
Responses l.000 .000 0 l.000 l.000 l.000 
Electrod ePos itions • .217 13 .738 2 .001 . 561 . 582 .500 
Responses 
Tes ts the null hypothesis that the error covariance matnx of the orthonorma llzed transformed dependent variables 1s 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept 
Within Subj ects Design. ElectrodePositions + Re sponses + ElectrodePositions • Responses 
b. May be used to adj ust the degree s of reedom for the averaged tests o significance. Corre cted tests are displayed in 
the Tests of With in-Subj ects Effects cab le. 
Main Analysis 
Tests o f Wi thin - Subjects Effects 
Measure . EEG microvolt 
-
Typ e Ill Sum Partia l Eta 
source of Squa res d f Mean Square F Sig . Squared 
Electrod ePositions Sphericity Assum ed 932 .636 2 4 66 .319 9 .6 1 7 .001 .4 90 
Greenhouse-Geisser 932 .638 1.832 509.02 4 9 .617 .002 .4 90 
Huynh - Feldt 932 .638 2 .000 466. 319 9 .61 7 .001 .4 90 
Low er-bou nd 932 .638 1.000 932 .638 9 .617 .011 .4 90 
Error( E le ctrod ePoslt ion s) Sphe ricity Ass um ed 969.764 20 48 .488 
Greenhouse-Geisser 969.764 18.322 52 .929 
Huynh-Fe ld t 969. 76 4 20.000 4 8 .4 88 
Lower- bound 969. 764 10.000 96.976 
Responses Sphericity Ass umed .077 l .077 3 .692 .08 4 .270 
Greenhouse-Geisser .0 77 1.000 .077 3 .692 .084 .270 
Huynh-Feldt . 0 77 1.000 .077 3 .692 .084 .270 
Lower-bound .077 1.000 .077 3 .692 .084 .270 
ErrorCResponses) Sphe ricity Assumed .2 08 10 .021 
Greenhouse-Geisser .206 10.000 .021 
Huynh-Feldt .208 10.000 .021 
Lower-bound .208 10.000 .021 
ElecrrodePositions "" Sphe ricity Ass umed .0 5 7 2 .02 9 1.889 . 177 . 159 
Responses Greenhouse-Geisser .0 5 7 1.122 .0 51 1.889 . 197 . 159 
Huynh-Feldt .05 7 1. 165 .0 4 9 1.889 . 19 7 . 159 
Lower-bound .057 1.000 .057 1.889 .199 . 159 
Error Spherici ty Assumed . 3 0 2 2 0 .01 5 
(Electrod ePositions ... Res Greenhouse- Geisser .302 11.219 .027 pons es ) 
Huynh-Fe ldt . 302 11.648 .026 
Lower-bou nd . 302 10.000 .03 0 
Post-Hoc Analysis 
Pairwi se Compariso ns 
M easure . EE G m icrovolt 
-
i\•1ea n 
D ifference Cl-
95% Con~~~~! nl~~trva l for 
(I) El eccrodePositions (I) Electrode Positions J) Std . Error Sig. b Lower Bound Upper Bou nd 
l 2 - 9 .067 2 .093 .004 -1 5 . 075 - 3 .059 
3 -5 .922 2 . 361 .093 -1 2 .699 .656 
2 I 9 .06 7 2 .093 .004 3 .059 15 .075 
3 3.1 4 6 1.807 .337 -2 .0 4 1 6 . 333 
3 l 5 .922 2 . 361 .093 - . 856 12 .699 
2 - 3 . 1 4 6 1.807 . 33 7 - 6 . 333 2 . 0 4 1 
Based on e snm ated m arginal m eans 
,.. _ T he m ean d ifference is significant ac the 
b . Adj ustm e nt for m ultip le com parisons. Bonfe rroni. 
CHAPTER 5 AND 6 
The analysis for the Chapters 5 and 6 were conducted exactly the same as for Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 7 
7.2.2.1 Anxiety Levels Control Results 
Test of Normality 
Tests of Normality 
Kol mogorov-Smirnov"' 
Grouo Statistic di Sig. 
AnxietyCalculated Negative .237 17 .012 
Pos itive .208 17 .048 
Neutral .160 17 .200 
.,. . This is a lower bound of the true signifi cance. 
a. Lilliefors Signi kance Correction 
Checking for Outliers 
34 
* 
20.00 
4 0 
"C 
+ 
.., 
LO.DO ~ 
:::, 
v 
-;;; 
u 
>-
GI 
·;:. 
c: .00 
<( 14 
Ol S 
0 
LO.DO 
N cg .l ti ve Posit i ve 
Group 
Testing Normality Again 
Tests of Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
. 
Grouo Statistic d i' Sig . 
An x ietyCalculated Negati've . 159 17 .200 
Positiv e . 1 4 3 17 . 200 
Neu tral . 1 4 0 17 .200 
·.·. This is a lovver bou n d o f the true si g ni fi ca n c e . 
a . Lillie fors Signi fi can ce Correction 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. 
.90 4 17 .080 
.833 17 .006 
.971 17 .84 2 
44 
0 
Neutra l 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic d f Sig . 
. 918 1/ . 13 / 
. 
. 957 17 . 5 8 1 
. 
. 966 17 .7 4 6 
Checking Outliers Again 
1 5 .00 
10.0 0 
.;, 
a.I 
-ns 5 .0 0 
::::, 
u 
"iii 
u 
::,... 
Q) 
>< .00 
c 
<( 
S .00 
1 0 .00 
Ne gati v e: Positive Neutral 
Gro up 
Checking Homogeneity of Variances 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Anxiet\•'Ca. lcu laited 
Levene 
Statistic d '" l d 2 Sig. 
.3 46 2 48 .709 
Main Analysis 
AN OVA 
AnxietyCalculated 
Sumo 
Squares dt Mean Square F Sig. 
Bet'INeen Groups 
. 
706.663 2 353 .4 31 26.236 .000 
Within Groups 600.62 4 48 12.517 
Total 1307.6&6 50 
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Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable . Anx iecyCa lculated 
Mean 
Di fference (I-
! ll Grouo (l l Grouo Jl Std . Error 
Tukey HSD Negative Positive 1.4 7059 1.21351 
. 
Neutral 8 .5294 1 1.21351 
Pos itive Negative -1.4 7059 1.21351 
. 
Neutral 7 .05882 1.21351 
Neutral Negative - 8 .529 4 1 1.21351 
Positive -7.05882 1.21351 
Games-Howell Negative Positive 1.4 7059 1.13930 
. 
Neutral 8 .5294 1 1.2 4 5 4 1 
Positive Negative -1.4 7059 1.13930 
. 
Neutral 7 .05882 1.25251 
Neutral Negativ e -8 .52 9 4 1 1.2 4 54 1 
. 
Positive - 7 .05882 1.25251 
' . The mean di fference is sign ificant at the 0 .05 level. 
7.2.2. 2 Result of Arousal Ratings 
Tests of Normality 
Tests of Normality 
K olmogorov-Sm irnov" 
Grouo Statistic df Sig . 
ArousalCa lcu lated Negative .174 11 .180 
Positive .232 
Neutral . 172 
a. Li llie 'ors Signi icance Corre ction 
Checking for Outliers 
7.00 
6 .00 
-0 S.00 
"' :;
:s 
~ 
"' 
4.00 ~
"' "' :s
0 
~ 3 .00 
2.0 0 
l.00 
Nega tive 
17 
17 
20 
0 
Positive 
Group 
.016 
.194 
95 % Confidence Interval 
Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
.4 52 -1. 46 4 3 4.4 05 4 
.000 5.5946 1 1.4 6 4 3 
.4 52 - 4.4 05 4 1.46 4 3 
.000 4 .12 40 9 .993 7 
.000 -11.4 6 43 - 5 .594 6 
.000 -9.9937 - 4 . 12 4 0 
.4 11 -1.329 1 4 .2703 
.000 5 .46 4 5 1 1. 594 3 
.4 11 - 4.2 103 1.3291 
.000 3 .9771 10 . 14 06 
.000 -1 1.594 3 -5 .4 6 4 5 
.000 -10 .14 06 -3 .9771 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. 
.922 17 . 163 
.888 17 .042 
.922 17 .160 
Neutra l 
Testing Normality Again 
Tests of Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wi lk 
Grouo Statistic df Sig. Statisti c d f Sig. 
ArousalCalculated Negative .174 17 .180 .922 17 
.163 
Positive .217 17 .033 .882 17 .03 4 
Neutral .1 72 1 7 .194 .922 17 
.160 
a. Li lliefors Signi ficance Correction 
Checking Outliers Again 
7 .00 
6 .00 
-c S.00 
"' ~ 
::, 
..., 
-;;; 
4. 00 u 
-;;; 
"' ::, 
0 
~ 3.00 
2.00 
L OO 
Ne9tHi11c Posit ive Neutra l 
Gr oup 
Checking Homogeneity of Variances 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
ArousalCalc.ulated 
Levene 
Statistic. d 1 d'"2 Sig . 
4.484 2 48 .016 
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Main Analysis 
Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
ArousalCalculated 
5tatistica d,. l d 2 5ig . 
Welch 68.961 2 30.808 .000 
a. Asymptotically F distributed . 
Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable : ArousalCalculated 
Mean 95% Confidence Interval Di fference (I-
(I) Grouo (I) Grouo )) Std . Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Tukey HSD Negative Positive .26765 .27327 .593 - .3932 .9285 
. 
Neutral 2.6382 4 .27327 .000 1.9773 3.2991 
Positive Negative - .26765 .27327 .593 - .9285 .3932 
. 
Neutral 2.37059 .27327 .000 1.7097 3.0315 
Neutral Negative -2 .6382 4 .27327 .000 -3 .2991 - 1.9173 
. 
Positive -2 .37059 .27327 .000 -3 .0315 -1.7097 
Games-Howell Negative Positive .26765 .29263 .636 - .4 602 .9955 
. 
Neutral 2.6382 4 .30109 .000 1.8921 3.384 4 
Positive Negative - .26765 .29263 .636 - .9955 .4 602 
. 
Neutral 2.37059 .21 849 .000 1.8334 2.9078 
Neutral Negative -2 .6382 4 .30109 .000 -3 .3844 - 1.8921 
. 
Positive -2.3 7059 .21 849 .000 -2 .9078 -1.833 4 
··. The mean di 'erence is significant at the 0.05 level. 
7.2.2. 3 Result of Valence Measures 
Tests of Normality 
Tests of Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Grouo Statistic d f Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
ValenceCalculated Negative . 1&3 17 .13 5 .936 l! .277 
Positive .192 17 .098 .922 17 .161 
Neutral . l&S 17 . 12 5 .928 17 .201 
a. Lillie fors Significance Correction 
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Checking for Outliers 
7.00 
6.00 
-0 S .0 0 
"' ~
:::, 
u 
rij 
4.00 u 
"' u 
c 
~ 
"' > 3 .00 
2 .00 
1.00 
Testing Normality Again 
Negati v e 
22 
0 
9 
19 
0 
2 0 
8 
32 
Posit ive 
Gr o up 
Test s of Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov• 
Grouo Statistic df Sig. 
ValenceCalculated Negative .183 17 . 135 
Positive .185 17 . 12 5 
Neutral . 185 17 . 12 5 
a. Lillie ors Signi 'icance Correction 
Checking Outliers Again 
N eutra l 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. 
.936 17 .2 17 
.897 17 .060 
.928 17 .201 
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7 . 00 
6.00 
-0 S.00 
.,.. 
~ 
::::s 
u 
-;;; 
u 
.,.. 
u 
c 
.,.. 
~ 
4.00 
3.00 
2.00 
LOO 
N ega tive Po sitive Neutra l 
G r oup 
Checking Homogeneity of Variances 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
ValenceCalculated 
Levene 
Statistic d. 1 df2 Sig. 
10.211 2 48 .000 
Main Analysis 
Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
ValenceCalculated 
Statistica d ·1 d 2 Sig. 
Wei ct, 87.688 2 29.587 .000 
a. Asymptotical ly F d istribLited . 
Post Hoc Tests 
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Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable . Va len ceCalcul ated 
Mean 
Di ference (I-
(I) Grouo (I) Grouo J) Std . Error 
Tukey HSD Negative Positive .4 3235 .2 7631 
Neutral 2.69706 .27631 
Positive Negative - .4 323 5 .2 7631 
. 
Neutra l 2.26471 .27631 
Neutral Negative -2.69706 .2 7631 
Positive -2 .26471 .27631 
Games-Howell Negative Positive .43235 .30857 
. 
Neutral 2.69706 .31883 
Positive Negative - .4 323 5 .3085 / 
. 
Neutral 2.26471 .1793 5 
Neutral Negative -2 .69706 .31883 
Positive -2 .26471 . 1793 5 
" . The mean difference is signi fi cant at the 0.05 level. 
7.2.2.4 Result of Confidence Measures 
Tests of Normality 
Tests of Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
Grouo Statistic di' 
Con'Calculated Negative .16 5 17 
Positive .223 17 
Neutral .1 66 17 
,, . n1is is a lower bound o ' the true signi'icance. 
a. Lil lie fors Signi'icance Correction 
Checking for Outliers 
Sig. 
.200 
.02 4 
.119 
95% Confidence lnter,al 
Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
.2 r 1 -.2359 1.1006 
.ODO 2.0288 3.3653 
.271 -1.1006 .23 59 
.000 1.5965 2.9329 
.000 -3.3653 -2 .0288 
.ODO -2 .9329 -1.5965 
.3 58 - .3458 1.2105 
.ODO 1.8989 3.4 953 
.358 -1.2105 .34 58 
.000 1.8231 2.7063 
.000 -3 .4 953 -1.8989 
.000 -2.7063 -1.8231 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic d ' Sig. 
.850 17 .011 
.831 17 .006 
.900 17 .067 
4 11 
4 .0 0 
3.50 
3. 0 0 
-a 
Q) 
~ 
~ 
v 2 .SO 
-;;; 8 
u 0 
-
c: 
0 
u 
2.0 0 
2 9 
0 
1.5 0 
1. 0 0 
N egativ e Positive 
G r ou p 
Testing Normality Again 
Tests of Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
Grouo Statistic df Sig. 
ConfCalculated Negative . 163 17 
Pos itive . 164 17 
Neutral .109 17 
" - Th is is a lower bound o the true signi icance. 
a. Lill iefors Signi icance Correction 
Checking Outliers Again 
. 133 
.130 
.200 
s l 
0 
4 0 
0 
N cu t,al 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. 
.9 32 17 .23 9 
.9 35 17 .26 6 
. 
.960 17 .6 32 
4.00 
3.50 
3.00 
� 
2.50 
2.00 
Negative f>ositi.-e Neutral 
Group 
Checking Homogeneity of Variances 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Con Calculated 
Levene 
Statistic d '"} d 2 Sig 
7.046 2 48 . 002 
Main Analysis 
Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
ConTalculated 
Statistica d 1 d ·2 Sig. 
Welch 6.301 2 29.083 .005 
a. Asymptotically F distributed.
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Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable. ConfCalculated 
Mean 95% Confidence Inte rval Di fference (I-
(IJ Grouo (I) Grouo ) ) Std . Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Tukey HSD Negative Positive .20588 .12853 .2 5 5 - . 1050 .5167 
Neutral .444 12 .12853 .003 .1333 .7550 
Positive Negative - .20588 .12853 .255 -. 5167 .1050 
Neutral .2 3 82 4 .12853 .163 - .0726 .5491 
Neutral Negative - .444 12 .12853 .003 -.75 50 -.1333 
Positive -. 2382 4 .12853 .163 - .5491 .0726 
Games-Howell Negative Positive .20588 .09277 .085 - .0236 .4 353 
Neutral .4441 2 .1374 5 .O ll .0979 .7903 
Positive Negative - .20588 .09277 .085 - .4 353 .0236 
Neutral .2382 4 .14 851 .262 -. 1306 .6070 
Neutral Negative -.444 12 .1374 5 .011 -. 7903 -.0979 
Positive -.23 824 .14851 .262 -. 6070 .1306 
' . The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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7.2.2.5 Results of SA Measure 
1. Tests of Normality
Tests of Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
Grouo Statistic d' Sig_ 
SA_Calculated Negative .218 17 .031 
Positive .240 17 .010 
Neutral .303 17 .000 
a. Lillie ors Sign(icance Correction
Checking for Outliers 
20.00 
1.8.00 
LG.OD 
a 14.00 
I..J 
-s,' 
l.2.00 
10.00 
8.00 
Testing Normality Again 
Grouo 
S;\_Calculated Negative 
Positive 
Neutral 
Nc:g,;:u.lvCl: 
34 
0 
Pos1ll..,c,, 
Group 
Tests of Normality 
Kolmogorov-Srnirnova 
Statistic df Sig_ 
.218 17 .031 
.216 17 .034 
.331 17 .000 
a. Lillie ors Signi'icanEe Correction
Sf1apiro-Wilk 
Statistic 
.693 
.778 
.742 
Statistic 
.893 
.874 
.738 
df 
44 
0 
17 
17 
17 
Sh a pi ro-Wi I k 
df 
17 
17 
17 
Sig_ 
.052 
.001 
.000 
Sig. 
.052 
.025 
.000 
,- I I -, 
~ 
I I I -
I I 
-
_J 
, 
N o t~ I 
I I I l 
I I 
I 
I 
Checking Outliers Again 
20.00 
18.00 
16.00 
-0 
CIJ 
i 
::, 
u 14.00 
r,S 
u 
<t. ' 
Vl 
12.00 
10 .00 
8.00 
Negative Positive Neutral 
Group 
Checking Homogeneity of Variances 
Te st of Homogeneity of Variances 
SA_Calculated 
Levene 
Statistic d l d 2 Sig. 
13 .3 46 2 48 .000 
Main Analysis 
Robust Test s of Equality of Means 
51.\_Calculated 
Statistica d 1 d 2 Sig. 
\\i'eld1 7 .559 2 27 .870 .002 
a. Asymptotically F distributed . 
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Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Compari sons 
Dependent Variable . 5A_Calculated 
Mean 
Difference (I-
m Grouo m Grouo JJ Std . Error 
Tukey HSD Negative Positive -2 .35294 .93194 
. 
Neutral -3 .64 706 .93194 
Positive Negative 2.35294 .93194 
Neutra l -1.294 12 .93194 
Neutral Negative 3.64706 .93194 
Positive 1.294 12 .93194 
Games-Howell Negative Positive -2 .35294 1.10049 
. 
Neutral -3 .64706 1.02983 
Positive Negative 2.35294 1.10049 
Neutral -1.294 12 . 57785 
Neutral Negative 3.64706 1.02983 
Positive 1.294 12 .57785 
• . The mean d ifference is signifi cant at the 0.05 level. 
7.2.2.6 Bisection Measure 
1. Tests of Normality 
Te sts of Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
Grouo Statistic df 
BisectionCalculated Negative .117 
Pos itive .22 5 
Neutral .179 
• . This is a lower bound of the true signi fi cance. 
a. Li lliefors Significance Correction 
Sig. 
17 .200 
17 .022 
17 .150 
95% Confidence Interval 
Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
.039 - 4.6068 - .0991 
.001 - 5.9009 -1 .3932 
.039 .0991 4.6068 
.35 5 -3. 5480 .9598 
.001 1.393 2 5.9009 
.3 5 5 -.9598 3.5480 
.104 -5 .1047 .3989 
.006 - 6.2633 -1.0308 
.104 - .3989 5.1047 
.083 -2 .728 1 .1 399 
.006 1.0308 6.2633 
.083 - . 1399 2.7281 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. 
.958 17 .590 
.886 17 .040 
.929 17 .211 
41 7 
Checking for Outliers 
-c 
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LS.00 
1 0.00 
S.00 
.DO 
5.00 
10.00 
Testing Normality Again 
BisectionCa lcu lated 
Ne g a liv e 
Grouo 
Negative 
Pos itive 
Neutral 
Positive 
Group 
Tests of Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
Statistic d f Sig. 
.11 7 17 .200 
.225 17 .022 
.191 1 7 .098 
• . This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lill ie ors Signi fi cance Correction 
Checking Outliers Again 
15.00 
.1 0.00 
S.00 
.DD 
5 .00 
1 0 . 00 
G r oup 
Statistic 
.9 58 
.866 
.923 
41 
0 
N eutra l 
Shapiro-Wilk 
df 
17 
17 
17 
Sig . 
.590 
.04 0 
.166 
Checking Homogeneity of Variances 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances. 
BisectionCa.lculated 
Levene 
Statistic d 1 d ·2 5ig_ 
1.797 2 48 .177 
Main Analysis 
AN OVA 
BisectionCalculated 
Sumo r 
Squares d Mean Square F Sig. 
Bet\lveen Groups 539.4 51 2 269.725 20.274 .000 
\\t'itt1in Groups 638.588 48 13.304 
Total 1178.039 so 
Post Hoc Tests 
Mult iple Compari son s 
Depend enc Variable : BisectionCalculated 
Mean 9 5% Con fidence Interval Difference (I-
(ll Grouo Cl l Grouo J) Std . Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Tukey HSD Negative Positive 1.86235 1.25101 .000 4.8561 10.9080 
. 
Neutral 4 .94 116 1.25107 .001 1.915 5 7.9669 
Positive Negative -7 .8823 5 1.2 5107 .000 -10 .9080 - 4.8567 
Neutral -2 .9 4 118 1.2 5 107 .058 - 5.9669 .084 5 
Neutral Negative - 4.94118 1.25107 .001 -1 .9669 -1.9155 
Positive 2.9 4 116 1.2 5 107 .056 - .0845 5 .9669 
Games-Howell Negative Positive 7 .8823 5 1.32056 .000 4.6120 11.1 528 
Neutral 4.94116 1.3 5 102 .003 1.6026 8 .2795 
Positive Negative - 1 .68235 1.3 2 058 .000 -11.1528 - 4.6120 
. 
Neutral -2.94118 1.06127 .024 - 5 .5 4 98 - .3326 
Ne utral Negative - 4. 9 4 118 1.3 5 102 .003 -8.279 5 -1.602 8 
Positive 2 .9 4 118 1.06127 .02 4 .3 326 5 . 54 98 
~. T he mean d ifference is signi f icant at the 0 .05 level. 
418 
419 
7.2.2. 7 Estimation Measure 
1. Tests of Normality 
Tests o f Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smi rnova Shapiro-\\i'i lk 
Grouo Statistic df 
EstimationCalculated Negative .215 
Positive .126 
Neutral .118 
' . This is a lower bound of the true signi ficance. 
a. Lillie ors Signi 'icance Correction 
Checking for Outliers 
4 .50 
4 .00 
-0 
11) 
~ 
:::, 3.50 
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"' u 
c 
0 
~ 3.QO E 
vi 
L,.J 
2.50 
2.00 
Negat ive 
Checking Homogeneity of Variances 
17 
17 
17 
Positive 
Gr o up 
Sig. Statistic 
.036 .87 4 
.200 .92 4 
. 
.200 .97 4 
Neu tra l 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
EstimationCalrnlated 
Levene 
Statistic d ·1 d ·2 Sig _ 
.7 4 7 2 48 .4 79 
df 
17 
17 
17 
Sig. 
.025 
.170 
.877 
Main Analysis 
A NOVA 
Estimation Ca I cu lated 
Sum o 
Squares d~ Mean Square F Sig . 
Betvveen Groups 8.122 2 4.061 21.3 4 5 .000 
Within Groups 9 .133 48 .190 
Total 17 .2 5 5 50 
Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: EstimationCalculated 
Mean 95% Confidence Interval 
Di erence (I-
Ill Grouo fll Groun )) Std . Error Sig_ Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Tukey HSD Negative Positive .96176 .14962 .000 .5999 1.3236 
. 
Neutral . 63 2 3 5 . 14962 .000 .2705 .9942 
Positive Negative - .96176 .14962 .000 -1.3236 -.5999 
Neutral -.32941 .14962 .081 - .6913 .032 4 
Neutral Negative - .63235 .14962 .000 - .9942 - .2 705 
Positive .32941 . 14962 .081 - .032 4 .6913 
Games-Howell Negative Pos itive .96176 .15 586 .000 .5787 1.3448 
. 
Neutral .63235 .14 372 .000 .2790 .9857 
Positive Negative - .96176 .15 586 .000 -1.3 448 - .5787 
Neutral - .32941 . 14902 .085 - .6961 .0373 
Neutral Negative - .63235 .14372 .000 - .9857 - .2790 
Positive .32941 .14902 .085 - .0373 .6961 
' . The mean difference is signifi cant at the 0.05 level. 
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CHAPTER8 
7.2.2.6 Bisection Measure 
Tests of Normality 
Tests of Normality 
Kol m ogorov-Sm irnova 
Grouo Statistic d f 
BisectionCalculated Negative .117 
Positive .22 5 
Neutral .1 79 
.. . This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
Checking for Outliers 
1 5.00 
10.00 
5.00 
.00 
S.00 
1 0.00 
N ega ti ve 
Testing Normality Again 
Sig. 
17 .200 
17 .022 
17 . 150 
Posiuv e 
G r o u p 
Tests of Normali ty 
Kolmogorov-Srni rnO\,a 
Grouo Statistic d f 
Bisection Ca I cu I ate d Negative .11 7 
Positive .225 
Neutral .191 
~. This is a lower bound of the true sign ificance. 
a. Lilli efors Signi ficance Correction 
Sig. 
17 .200 
17 .022 
17 .098 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic 
.958 
.886 
.929 
41 
0 
N e u1:r.:a l 
df 
17 
17 
17 
St1apiro-Wilk 
Statis tic d f 
.958 17 
.886 17 
.923 17 
Sig. 
.590 
.0 40 
.211 
Sig. 
.590 
.040 
.166 
Checking Outliers Again 
1 5.00 
LO.DO 
-0 
IV 
~ 
::, S.00 
.., 
,;; 
u 
c: 
0 
·z; 
.., 
.00 
IV 
"' iii 
S.00 
LO.DO 
Ne ga tive Positive Neutra l 
G r o up 
Checking Homogeneity of Variances 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
BisectionCalculated 
Levene 
Statistic d '] d 2 Sig_ 
1.797 2 48 .1 77 
Main Analysis 
A NOVA 
Bis ectionCa I cul ate d 
Sumo 
Squares d ' Mean Square F Sig. 
Bet\iveen Groups 539.4 51 2 269.725 20 .27 4 .000 
W'ithin Groups 638.588 48 13.304 
Total 1178.039 50 
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Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Comparis o ns 
Depend enc Variable_ BisectionCalculated 
Mean 
Difference (I-
(I) Grouo (I) Groun } ) Std _ Error 
Tukey HSD Negative Positive 7 _8823 5 1.25107 
Neutral 4 _94118 1.2 5107 
Pos itive Negative -7 .882 35 1.25107 
Neutral -2 . 9 4 118 1.25107 
Neutral Negative -4.94118 1.2 5107 
Positive 2 .9 4 118 1.2 5 107 
Games-Howell Negative Pos itive 7 _88235 1.3205 8 
Neutral 4. 9 4 118 1.3 5 102 
Posi tive Negative -7 _88235 1.32058 
Neutral -2 .94118 1.06127 
Neutral Negative -4.94118 1.35102 
Positive 2 . 9 4 118 1.0612 7 
- . The mean di fference is significant at the 0 .05 leveL 
7. 2.2. 7 Estimation Measure 
Tests of Normality 
Tests of Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
Grouo Statistic df 
EstimationCalculated Negative .215 
Positive . 126 
Neutral .118 
~. This is a lower bound of the true signi ficance. 
a. Lillie ors Signi icance Correction 
Checking for Outliers 
4 .SO 
4 .00 
a 3.SO 
-;;; 
u 
c: 
0 
-~ 
-~ 
3 . 0 0 
..... 
2 .s o 
2.00 
Checking Homogeneity of Variances 
17 
17 
17 
G r o u p 
Sig. 
.036 
.200 
.200 
95% Confidence Interval 
Sig_ Lower Bound Upper Bound 
_ooo 4_856 7 10_9080 
.001 1.9155 7 .9669 
.000 - 10.9080 -4 .856 7 
.0 5 8 -5 .9669 .0845 
.001 -7.9669 -1.91 55 
.058 - .0845 5 .9669 
_ooo 4.6120 11.1528 
.003 1.6028 8 _2795 
_ooo -11.1528 - 4.6120 
.02 4 -5 _5 4 98 - .3326 
.003 -8.2795 -1.6028 
.02 4 .3326 5.5498 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. 
.874 17 .025 
. 
.924 17 .170 
.974 17 .877 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Es ti ma ti on Ca I cu I ate d 
Levene 
Statisti c. d 1 d 2 Sig . 
. 747 2 48 .4 79 
Main Analysis 
AN OVA 
Estim ationCa lcu lated 
Sum of 
Sq uares d Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 8 .122 2 4.061 21.3 4 5 .000 
\'v'ithin Groups 9 .133 4 8 .190 
Total 17.2 55 50 
Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable. EstimationCalculated 
Mean 95% Con 1dence Interval Difference (I-
rn Groun rl l Groun J) Std . Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Tukey HSD Negative Positive .96176 .14962 .000 .5999 1.3236 
Neutral .63235 .14962 .000 .2705 .9942 
Positive Negative - .96176 .14962 .000 -1.3236 - .5999 
Neutral - .3294 1 .14962 .081 - .6913 .032 4 
Neutral Negative - .63235 .14962 .000 -.9942 - .2705 
Positive .32941 .14962 .081 - .032 4 .6913 
Games-Howell Negative Positive .96176 .15 5 86 .000 .5 r87 1.3 448 
Neutral .63 2 3 5 .14372 .000 .2790 .9857 
Positive Negative - .96176 .15 586 .000 -1.3 44 8 - .5787 
Neutral - .3294 1 .14902 .085 - .6961 .0373 
Neutral Negative - .63235 . 143/2 .000 - .9857 - .2790 
Positive .3294 1 .14902 .085 - .03 73 .6961 
' . The mean difference is signi ficant at the 0.05 level. 
Chapters 8 and 9 went through similar analysis 
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APPENDIXB 
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Below are the Consent Forms and Information Sheets Given to Participants for each Chapter. 
Chapter 2 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
426 
Please, continue only if you do not have any history of emotional disturbance or heart D 
condition. 
Effects of Emotional Arousal on Situational Awareness 
We would like to invite you to participate in this research project being undertaken by Mr Dritan 
Nikolla. You should only participate if you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage 
you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what your participation will involve. Please take time 
to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. If you would like to take part, 
please let us know if you have been involved in any other study during the last year. 
The research project is a study about how individuals' awareness of a situation changes according 
to their emotional state and how this affects memory and cognitive performance. You will be asked 
to complete a questionnaire (measuring aspects of your current emotional state), then look at a series 
of pictures, some of which may be explicit in nature or emotionally disturbing. For this reason 
those who have suffered from an anxiety disorder, depression or a heart condition may not take part. 
If you wish to see examples of the photos before deciding whether to participate, please ask the 
investigator. 
Following this you will be asked to participate in an "enemy detection" computer task, which 
involves the presentation of photos sampled from video recording of a war-game (see the photo 1 below). 
Sample Photo of War-game Task 
Photo 1 
You will be asked to take control of a robot that is located remotely at the battlefield. The task 
requires you to learn what the controlling levers do, and in addition you will be asked questions 
from the army's headquarters (HQ). The task is not timed but you are expected to complete the task 
as quickly as you can do so, without compromising performance. 
Your participation is expected to last around 30 minutes. 
Detailed instructions will however, be given at each stage of the experiment via the computer 
screen. You will be given an opportunity to practice the tasks and to ask any question you may have 
before you start. 
Further details of the task and the rationale behind it will be provided in the debrief session, at the 
end of the study. 
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You may at any time withdraw from the study without giving a reason. If you ever require an 
further explanation, please do not hesitate to ask. y 
Any information obtained during this trial will remain confidential as to your identity: if it can be 
specifically identified with you, your permission will be sought in writing before it will be published. 
Other material, which cannot be identified with you, will be published or presented at meetings with 
the aim of benefiting others. You may ask the Project Officer for copies of all papers, reports 
transcripts, summaries and other published or presented material. All information will be subject t� 
the current conditions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
Experimental records, including paper records and computer files, will be held for a minimum of 
10 years in conditions appropriate for the storage of personal information. You have right of access 
to your records at any time. 
Name and contact details of Principal Investigator: 
Mr Dritan Nikolla 
E-mail: dnikolla@glos.ac.uk
Tel:01242714844 
CONSENT FORM FOR ALL EXPERIMENTS 
Title of Study: Effects of Emotional Arousal on Situational Awareness 
The nature, aims and risks of the research have been explained to me. I have read and understood the 
Participant Information Sheet and understand what is expected of me. All my questions have been 
answered fully to my satisfaction. 
I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to participate in this 
project, I can notify the researchers involved and be withdrawn from it immediately without having 
to give a reason. 
I understand that the screening process to decide if I am suitable to be selected as a participant may 
include completing a medical screening questionnaire and/or a physical examination by a medical 
officer and I consent to this. 
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. I 
understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance 
with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
I agree to volunteer as a participant for the study described in the information sheet and give full 
consent. 
This consent is specific to the particular study described in the Participant Information Sheet attached 
and shall not be taken to imply my consent to participate in any subsequent study or deviation from 
that detailed here. 
Participant's Statement: 
I ������������������������������� 
agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I 
agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the Participant 
Information Sheet about the project, and understand what the research study involves. 
S�� D� 
Witness Name Signature 
Investigator's Statement: 
I ������������������������������� 
confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks (where 
applicable) of the proposed research to the Participant. 
Signed Date 
AUTHORISING SIGNATURES 
The information supplied above is to the best of my knowledge and belief accurate. I clearly 
understand my obligations and the rights of research participants, particularly concerning 
recruitment of participants and obtaining valid consent. 
Signature of Principal Investigator 
Date 
Name and contact details of Principal Investigator: 
Name and contact details of Principal Investigator: 
Dritan Nikolia 
E-mail: dritannikolla@connect.glos.ac.uk
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Tel: 01242 714807 
430 
Debriefing Form for Military Task 
This study was designed to examine the way in which people process ambiguous information as 
true or false under different emotional conditions. 
The data collected on this study is used to investigate a new model of Situation Awareness, which 
means, knowing what is going on around you. The purpose of our model is to detect people that are 
likely to make an error, such as friendly fire, and develop strategies to neutralize them. 
I hope that this has helped to clarify for you the purpose of the study you have just undertaken. 
If you have any further questions or feel that you need to talk to someone about your participation 
please contact Dritan Nikolla (Email: dritannikolla@connect.glos.ac.uk; Mobile: 07823322559) or 
Dr. Graham Edgar (gedgar@glos.ac.uk) 
If you feel you need further help, please use University of Gloucestershire Counseling Service: 
Links to the University of Gloucestershire Counseling service and Phone Number: 
Website: http://resources.glos.ac.uk/departments/studentservices/counselling/ Phone: 01242 
714542 
You participation in this study is greatly appreciated 
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Chapter 4 to 6 only the CONSENT form was used. 
432 
Chapter 7, 8 and 9 all used the following information sheet. The same consent form as before 
was used. 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Please, continue only if you do not have any history of emotional disturbance or heart condition. D 
Effects of Emotional Arousal on Situational Awareness as reflected in Time 
Perception and Somatic Markers. 
MoDREC reference number: 
We would like to invite you to participate in this research project being undertaken by Mr Dritan 
Nikolia. You should only participate if you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage 
you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what your participation will involve. Please take time 
to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. If you would like to take part, 
please let us know if you have been involved in any other study during the last year. 
The research project is a study about how individuals' feeling of time changes according to their 
emotional state and how this affects memory and cognitive performance. You will be asked to 
complete three questionnaires (measuring aspects of your current emotional state), then look at 90 
pictures, some of which may be explicit in nature or emotionally disturbing. For this reason those 
who have suffered from an anxiety disorder, depression or a heart condition may not take part. If
you wish to see examples of the photos before deciding whether to participate, please ask the 
investigator. 
Your participation is expected to last around 45 minutes. 
Detailed instructions will however, be given at each stage of the experiment via the computer screen. 
You will be given an opportunity to practice the tasks and to ask any question you may have before 
you start. 
Further details of the task and the rationale behind it will be provided in the debrief session, at the 
end of the study. 
You may at any time withdraw from the study without giving a reason. If you ever require any f 
urther explanation, please do not hesitate to ask. 
Any information obtained during this trial will remain confidential as to your identity: if it can be 
specifically identified with you, your permission will be sought in writing before it will be published. 
Other material, which cannot be identified with you, will be published or presented at meetings with 
the aim of benefiting others. You may ask the Project Officer for copies of all papers, reports, 
transcripts, summaries and other published or presented material. All information will be subject to 
the current conditions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
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In the event of you suffering any adverse effects other than emotional disturbance as a consequenc 
of your participation in this study, you will be eligible to apply for compensation under the MoD'
e
'No-Fault Compensation Scheme' (see details attached). 
s 
Experimental records, including paper records and computer files, will be held for a minimum of 10
years in conditions appropriate for the storage of personal information. You have right of access to
your records at any time. 
Participants' travel expenses will be reimbursed. 
A full scientific protocol for this research has been approved by the Ministry of Defence Research 
Ethics Committee. This study complies and at all times will comply with the Declaration of 
Helsinki5 as adopted at the 52nd WMA General Assembly, Edinburgh, October 2000 and with the 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Biomedical 
Research, (Strasbourg 25.1.2005). Please ask the Project Officer if you would like further details of 
the approval or to see a copy of the full protocol. 
Name and contact details of Principal Investigator: 
Mr Dritan Nikolla 
e-mail: s0712633@connect.glos.ac.uk
Tel:01242714844 
5 World Medical Association (2000) Declaration of Helsinki. Ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects. 
52"d World Medical Association General Assembly, Edinburgh, Scotland October 2000. 
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